Archive for April, 2008

Designing a pluralist peace process in Sri Lanka

By Harim Peiris

Sri Lanka’s peace process faces two strategic challenges, firstly transforming the Sri Lankan state to accommodate the full diversity of its society and secondly transforming the LTTE from a military organization to a socio-political one.

Transforming the state

A permanent and durable solution to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and a just and democratic peace with full respect for human rights extending to the LTTE-controlled Wanni and the Tamil dominated North and East would require changes to the nature and functioning of the Sri Lankan state. The state would have to be more inclusive and structurally accommodating with stronger democratic institutions and practices. A more pluralist political order would necessarily entail some form of devolution or distribution of power, likely either expressly or implicitly in federal terms. It would also have to improve its capacity and track record on the protection and promotion of fundamental human rights, particularly in the areas of personal security, rights of the internally displaced, and political and religious opinion.

Transforming the LTTE

The LTTE have fought a bloody war with the Sri Lankan state and an internecine war with other Tamil militant groups since the early 1980s. In the process it has become a highly militarized and authoritarian organization. The Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) of February 2002 succeeded in stopping medium- and large-scale military clashes, but did not stop political violence in the forms of assassinations, other killings, forced conscription of children or similar attacks on individuals. The Tsunami of December 2004 provided the political space for the PTOMS between the GOSL and the LTTE and together with the CFA provided an opportunity and a foundation on which to build towards a durable peace and ethnic reconciliation. The resurgence of fighting since mid 2006 provides a fresh challenge of transforming the conflict from a violent military confrontation between the parties to a non violent political engagement. However, to achieve a positive peace we also need to deal with the challenge of transforming the LTTE from an authoritarian militant group that uses terror, to a political force that engages normally, democratically and politically, with the state and does not resort to violence to make its arguments heard. It must transform itself from a military force to a socio-political force, which renounces terrorism as a means to advance political goals. Whether it has the capacity and will to do so on its own volition is another issue.

Transforming the conflict from violence to non violence

Transforming a deep seated and protracted ethnic based civil conflict such as Sri Lanka’s conflict, towards a sustainable and durable peace is an arduous and long term process. It is a process that would require both the development of a strategic end goal, namely the transformation of the parties to the conflict, the Sri Lankan State and the LTTE as well as and more challengingly the envisioning and maintaining a road map to reach the strategic objective. The road map would require constant and skilful navigation through the multiple political dynamics of both the Sri Lankan Southern polity and the Tamil nationalists. It would also require a sufficient consensus of the members of the international community that carry weight in Sri Lanka, namely the Co-chairs and India.

The current political scenario in Sri Lanka has retarded the peace process considerably from its earlier gains of the CFA and the PTOMS. However, options for peace must be strengthened to move once again from a purely military approach to a more political approach. Civil conflicts typically move cyclically and the current phase of heightened conflict will be replaced with a more political approach that seeks to address the underlying political causes of the conflict.

Opportunities to strengthen peace options should be created when political openings present themselves, the initiatives of parties and policies that are pro peace should be strengthened and efforts to undo the past gains of the peace process should be challenged, minimized and mitigated.

There are four strategic long term areas of the peace process, irrespective of medium term fluctuations in violent military confrontations.

a. Reducing violent hostilities through a cessation of hostilities to aid a return to political talks.

b. Strengthening human rights and addressing the humanitarian issues of the conflict affected civilians, especially the internally displaced persons (IDP)s.

c. Rebuilding the war-torn / tsunami-affected areas of the North and East: implementing the inclusive and shared humanitarian and reconstruction concept of PTOMS and reworking important elements of the concept in a way that will both expedite reconstruction and including the Muslim community in the process.

d. Working out an inclusive political solution by building on existing proposals for devolving power in a state structure with federal characteristics with suitable transitional arrangements.

These four areas of the peace process are individually important and together may be mutually reinforcing and propelling. However, the ways in which the four areas of the peace process complement or possibly contradict each other need to be carefully analyzed and honestly discussed and addressed by the different political actors and the relevant stakeholders. Progress on the same would contribute to deescalating the conflict and contributing towards a pluralistic process for peace in Sri Lanka. [dailymirror.lk]

(The writer was an advisor to President Kumaratunga and served as Presidential Spokesman from 2001 to 2005)

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Several hospitals in northern Sri Lanka face increasing challenges

Statement by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC):

The limited number of staff available to care for routine cases alongside war casualties has become a critical issue for several hospitals in northern Sri Lanka. In addition, the lack of regular deliveries of supplies from the country’s health ministry has resulted in clinics and hospitals in the Vanni (the four northern districts of Sri Lanka) running out of basic medicines such as paracetamol, antibiotics and vaccines.

By agreement with Sri Lanka’s health ministry, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is providing hospitals in Anuradhapura, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya districts with medical equipment and supplies for the treatment of sick and war-wounded people. In addition, it has supplied devices to Murankuran hospital to stabilize broken limbs.

The ICRC is also lending its support to the health ministry’s child immunization programmes and to ante-natal care provided for pregnant women in Vavuniya North. Almost 50 children were vaccinated and nearly 20 women received ante-natal care during the month of March.

‘We accompany Ministry of Health staff–one doctor and two midwives–to Nedunkerni and Kanakarayankulam, where they run clinics for pregnant women and ensure that children follow the prescribed immunization programme,’ says Yvonne Ginifer, an ICRC health delegate based in Vavuniya.

Under international humanitarian law applicable in armed-conflict situations, people not involved in fighting, including the wounded and sick, whether they be civilians or fighters, must be given any medical care they may require as quickly as possible.

Jaffna residents cannot obtain certain health-care services on the peninsula. To ensure that appropriate levels of health care are nevertheless available to them, the ICRC airlifts patients between Jaffna and Colombo twice a week. In March alone, 54 patients requiring specialized surgery, medical tests or treatment, accompanied by 35 caretakers and 10 medical staff from the Jaffna Teaching Hospital, were transported to Colombo on ICRC-chartered flights. In addition, medical equipment, vaccines prescribed for children through the national immunization programme and drugs for pregnant women were routinely transported on Jaffna-bound flights.

‘The ICRC flights are a great help for patients, especially those with complicated illnesses. For them, access to appropriate care is a matter of life and death,’ says a doctor working at the Jaffna Teaching Hospital who accompanies patients on the flights. Jaffna’s health-service personnel also use the ICRC-chartered aircraft to travel to other parts of the country for their medical training.

‘Vaccines must be stored and transported at a certain temperature. The only way to bring them to Jaffna while meeting this requirement is by air. Transporting them by ship is not an option because of the lack of cold-chain facilities and the length of time needed,’ says Toon Vandenhove, the ICRC’s head of delegation in Colombo.

Serving as a neutral intermediary at Omanthai crossing point

ICRC staff are on hand six days a week at Omanthai crossing point to facilitate the smooth passage of vehicles and civilians between areas controlled by the government of Sri Lanka and those controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In March, the ICRC ensured the safe passage through the crossing point of over 3,000 vehicles and 33,000 civilians, including more than 170 ambulances and almost 900 patients crossing in both directions.

By conveying the remains of fallen fighters across the front lines, the ICRC has helped to clarify what became of many who might otherwise have remained unaccounted for. The remains are transferred only with the agreement of both sides. In March, the ICRC transferred the remains of some 50 fallen fighters from Kilinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya and Welioya through the Omanthai crossing point. To help preserve the bodies, the ICRC upgraded the cold storage facilities in the mortuary of Anuradhapura hospital and started carrying out similar work in Padaviya hospital.

Protection of civilians and of persons held in connection with the conflict

The ICRC has continued to monitor violations of international humanitarian law affecting civilians throughout the country and to discuss them with the parties to the conflict. There have been regular reports of missing or arrested relatives, extra-judicial killings and ill-treatment.

With the cooperation of both government officials and the LTTE, the ICRC has been visiting a growing number of people arrested for security reasons. The aim of the visits is to monitor treatment and conditions of detention. On nearly 60 visits to 40 places of detention, ICRC delegates met with almost 730 detainees and provided them with recreational items, clothing and toiletries.

The families of more than 400 detainees recently received financial assistance to visit their loved ones in various places of detention. More than 30 released detainees received funds to return home via public transportation.

Restoring family links

In cooperation with the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society, the ICRC has taken steps to ensure that members of families separated by the conflict can maintain contact with one another. It collected over 400 family messages and distributed 230 during the month of March.

For further information, please contact:

Carla Haddad, ICRC Geneva, tel: +41 22 730 24 05 or +41 79 217 32 26

Aleksandra Matijevic, ICRC Colombo, tel: +94 11 250 33 46 or +94 777 289 682

Sarasi Wijeratne, ICRC Colombo, tel: +94 11 250 33 46 or +94 773 158 44

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History-making in Lanka-I:Problems

by Michael Roberts

Central themes in the understanding of Sri Lanka’s recent as well ancient history have been fashioned by two occupational categories, namely, schoolteachers and politicians. The school teachers of the first 75 years of the 20th century were mostly well-meaning personnel trained in the British empiricist traditions. Their tendency was to regard history as a collection of undisputed facts that could be juxtaposed along a chronological line. There was limited attention to the interpretive dimensions of the trade and the potential or existing debates around these interpretations. This heritage has been implanted in recent decades by what masquerades as an educational system (where I suspect that in practice it is a process of rote-learning that is now twisted by pliant teachers in each language stream to suit ethnic claims).

The political spokesmen were as categorical, but tailored their interpretations to their partisan requirements, among them the de-legitimation of opponents. Thus, for example, by weight of articulation the Lefties of the 1940s-to-60s were able to perpetuate the idea that the Fathers of Sri Lanka’s independence pursued begging bowl politics and only succeeded because India’s independence in 1947 paved the way for Sri Lanka in 1948 (a thesis that is quite fallacious).

So, HISTORY has been turned into a powerful FACT. It is not only part of the process of litigation seeking to establish property rights, whether paraveni (hereditary), willed by testament or prescriptive. It is also a foundation for claims to territory by states or embryonic states.

Where information is turned up by archaeology and its material products, whether visual paintings, artefacts or buildings in various stages of disuse, history is SEDUCTIVE. These remnants proclaim antiquity. Antiquity evokes respect if not awe. There are two scales here, however. The archaeological artefacts of so-called primitive peoples are increasingly valued in modern times, but have usually gathered less awe and political legitimacy than those of technologically advanced peoples and empires. The imposing ruins of ancient Egypt, Sumeria, Angkor Wat et cetera convey claims to greatness which the supposed descendants of the people who built them can parade with pride in ways less feasible for the ‘primitive’ aboriginal folk.

HISTORY is alsoBEGUILIING. Any Tom, Dick or Harry (hereafter shortened to TomDH) thinks s/he can write definitive history. Thus, recently in 2008 one C. Wijeyawickrema circulated a paper entitled “Ravana’s land and Tamil Nadu politicians: a brief history,” which not only brought alleged Tamilnadu versions of the Rama-Ravana story into play, but detailed 20th century events in Sri Lanka and Tamilnadu in order to present a picture of collusion over a long span of time between Tamilnadu separatists on the one hand and Sri Lankan federalists and Eelamists on the other. In short, historical ‘data’ (much of it spurious and questionable) was deployed to sustain his paranoid interpretation of the power wielded by Dravidian separatist forces in southern India as a major foundation for his rejection of federalism in any form for Sri Lanka.

Likewise, the Lanka Guardian (http://lankaguardian.blogspot.com) recently carried an article called “Vijaya came later” written by an intellectual associated with a movement known as Jatika Chinthanaya (Nationalist Thought), namely, Nalin de Silva, a don in the field of mathematics. In a series of ‘definitive’ assertions de Silva states (1) that there were “Hela people living in this country before the Aryan language speaking people came from North India;” (2) that “from about ninth century BC Indo Aryan speaking people migrated to Sri Lanka and Vijaya could be the name given to the Victor who established some kind of dominance over the Hela people who lived in the country” and (3) that “the Indo Aryans who migrated to Sri Lanka or Heladiva fought and mixed with the Hela people who were neither Aryans nor Dravidians, and in the course of time formed the mixed nation Sinhala.”

Though proclaimed without a shred of evidence to demonstrate that the term Hela was in use before the fifth century BC (BCE), the argument is innovative. In effect, it seeks to outflank the inferential, yet reasonable, speculation that Tamil-speakers were found within the island at the time of the alleged arrival of the eponymous ancestor of the Sinhala people, namely Vijaya, by diving (literally) deeper back in time. The word Hela becomes his magic wand.

In other words, this is a blatant effort to ‘out-primordialise’ the pro-Tamil spokespersons who claim a primordial civilisational presence in the island for Tamils at the time the speakers of what is taken to be an Aryan-language arrived under the leadership of one Vijaya. In the process, Nalin de Silva also ‘out-primordialises’ the conventional Sinhala claim to the island embodied in the Vijaya legend. Vijaya remains as historical fact however, but as the second stage in the emergence of the “mixed nation”of Sinhalese (Sinhalas).

The TomDHs of contemporary times are not only Sinhalese. Tamils attached to the contemporary claims of the Tamils also work print and cyber-space assiduously to claim not only that the Tamil presence in Sri Lanka pre-dated the purported arrival of the Sinhala forefathers (certainly a distinct probability), but also to proclaim a linear genealogical continuity linking these Tamils of centuries BC with those who existed, say, when the Portuguese imperial forces turned up in the sixteenth century–and thus with the Tamils of the 20th century. The latter is a representation that is as far-fetched as it is preposterous.

By way of illustration let me refer to the cyber-net response to an article on the “federal idea” in www transcurrents.com by one Sebastian Rasalingam, writing in opposition to the general thrust of Tamil claims today. Rasalingam was vigourously challenged on 9 March 2008 by a pseudonymous blogger with the nom-de-plume “ilaya seran senguttuvan.” Among other things Senguttuvan asserted that “the ancient Temple in Trinco [is proof that] the Tamil language-cultural traditions have been there for over 4,000 years.” When such monumental and sweeping claims can be made on the basis of one historical site of uncertain date (and possibly a medieval one at that), we are in the realms of fantasyland. Indeed, there is simply no foundation for meaningful discussion of historical issues with such ardent partisans on either side of the fence.

In this scathing comment on the intervention of TomDH types in Sri Lanka’s historiography I am not suggesting that a postgraduate degree in History is a pre-requisite for historical interpretation. Training in history does not preclude faulty interpretation. Ultimately, the test is in the content of one’s interpretation, its evidential grounding, the reasoning behind the linkages and one’s honesty of purpose. One test of intellectual honesty lies in the readiness to confront opinions and items of data that are counter to one’s argument. Where counterpoints are simply by-passed or glossed over, there it is that readers have room to question a writer’s thesis–the more so if his/her ethnic and other circumstances indicate affiliation with this or that political claim to territory or resource.

Experienced historians will also tell you that in any one subject there is often no agreement among specialist historians on the major issues within that defined subject. “Evidential grounding’ is not always positive empirical fact; it extends to circumstantial data. As illustration let me take a thesis that I presented in 1989 about the story of the arrival of the Portuguese apparently carried to the King of Kotte in 1505, that famous tale about “kudugal sapakana le bona minissu”–”people who devour stones and drink blood” (see journal Ethnos 1989).

My speculative suggestion was that this tale was a parable, one that depicted the Portuguese as destructive and viperish. In other words it was cleverly indicated therein that the Portuguese were demonic; they were yakku. In summary, the hypothesis rested on two suggestions: (1) that the story was concocted in the late 16th century AFTER the Sinhala people had experienced the terrible effects of Portuguese imperial activity; and (2) four or five clues within the text in question which pointed in the same direction, clues that are allegorical and cryptic.

When formulating this interpretation I consulted a literary specialist, Professor Suraweera, whose immediate reaction was to ask: “how can you prove your idea?” or words to that effect–a typical empiricist reaction. However, his widening eyes and subsequent translation of my article meant his acceptance of the idea. When the article saw the light of print howecer, it was dismissed by my former colleagues, Shelton Kodikara and C. R. de Silva, while imperiously disparaged by K. M. de Silva. Fortunately it has received since support in foreign quarters from Akhil Gupta (who uses the article in his teaching) and Richard Young. Indirect support was also provided by Young’s translation and analysis of a 18th century ola-leaf manuscript of older provenance that displayed virulent hostility to the Catholic and Saivite dispensations (The Carpenter-Heretic, Colombo: 1998).

History, then, is a contentious subject among academics. Where the investigation relates to the origins of particular named peoples and goes back deep in time to eras where the data is limited and fragmentary, the scope for contention is greater. The difficulties are exacerbated too at times by the requirement for multi-disciplinary skills that embrace linguistics and archaeological techniques. In fact, multi-disciplinary cooperation is a pre-requisite for rounded analysis of ancient Sri Lankan history.

All this, then, underlines the complexity of historical issues relating to the origins of the Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri Lanka and the identities that prevailed at various periods. From a logical point of view one can conjecture that many of the aboriginal people of the era prior to the emergence of writing in the Brahmi, Prakrit, Tamil and proto-Sinhala scripts, say, prior to the centuries four and five BC (BCE), eventually intermarried with migrants from the Indian sub-continent who brought the Tamil language as well as those who brought, or developed, the proto-Sinhala language from Prakrit, Pali and Sanskrit roots. But there seems to be limited information on the identities (as both subjectively and relationally constituted in each generation of twenty years, and thence continuously re-constituted) prevailing among the peoples of that time. Lacking expertise in this field I cannot say much more.

But it requires little more than common sense to stress that one cannot apply modern concepts to that era. To deploy the terminology of “nation” in this era, as Nalin de Silva does, is simply ludicrous. This concept has a modern connotation and is deeply influenced by the philosophy of the French Revolution, the theory of popular sovereignty and the idea of citizenship that did not rest solely on putative blood line or language of birth. It is also informed by the institutional practices of countless states in the last 200 years.

Let me conclude by attending to the vocabulary of “nation” in the English language. In 16th century England “nation” was synonymous with “a host of persons,” with a “particular class, kind, race and thus with “a family or kindred,” “clan” and “tribe.” These associations continued for several centuries, but within the context of intermittent wars between England (Britain) and France, and then because of the French Revolution the term “nation” came to denote “the political people of a society.” This is to simplify a long and complex story (see Roberts, Sinhala Consciousness in the Kandyan Period, Colombo: 2004, pp. 95-108).

The consequence is that the terms “nation” and “tribe” were gradually differentiated during the course of the period extending from1600 to, say, 1914, with “nation” carrying legitimacy, while “tribe” was associated with a primitive a state of being–so that the 20th century Leftists in British Ceylon in the inter-war years could disparage the Sinhala and Tamil communalists by depicting them as “tribal.” But this process of language change was partial. As Susan Bayly has emphasised, the British in India used “the terms caste, tribe, nation and race interchangeably and imprecisely” (”Caste and Race” in Peter Robb, ed., The Concept of Race in Asia, 1997, p. 175). Again, even in the early twentieth century one found aboriginal people and older generations in Australia equating “tribe” with “nation.”

In the 19th and early 20th centuries this confusion was compounded by the tendency both in everyday speech and bureaucratic practice for the terms “race” and “nation” (in its modern connotation) to be used as synonyms. This occurred in a context featured by the development of race theories associated with burgeoning imperialism and beliefs in White superiority. Within the Indian sub-continent Orientalist scholars also discovered a difference between the Aryan and Dravidian languages, but spoke about this distinction in ways that encouraged a slippage into racial difference. The result was a widespread belief in the distinction between “Aryan races” and “Dravidian races.”

In British Ceylon this tendency was further compounded by the multiple meanings attached to certain terms in the Sinhala and Tamil languages. In Tamil (guided here by Maya Ranganathan and S. V. Kasynathan) one would have to attend to the use of the terms inam, thesam, jati and kulam; the variations in written and spoken language; the variation between the practices of people in Tamilnadu and those in Lanka; and that between older generations and those of the 1990s & 2000s.

Some of these grounds of variation exist among the Sinhalese as well. In the 19th century in Sinhala the term jatiya could equate in relational practice with kula (caste, type). Once the European references to “race” entered the scene, jatiya was utilised for that concept too. Thus, in a setting involving interplay with the English language jatiya could refer to either caste or nation or race. To this day many Sri Lankans, especially those from older generations, use the term “race” freely in English-speak in referring to the Sinhalese or Tamils-entirely oblivious to the manner in which the concept “race” has been exorcised or downgraded in Europe after the Nazi upsurge; and neglecting the considerable admixture of blood in their own pedigrees.

There can be little doubt that the various ethnic categories residing in Sri Lanka today are all, every single category without exception, of mixed racial genealogy involving Veddas, Sinhala-speakers and Tamil-speakers as well as infusions of Black African (kaberi), European, Kerala, Telugu, Arab and Malay sperm in various measures. Racial purity is simply not a feasible claim.

This excursion on my part, then, asks for greater caution in extending modern terminology into the ancient period of Sri Lankan history. This does not mean that the people of that day did not make distinctions between categories of people; or that there was a state of categorical fluidity and confusion generated by continuous boundary crossing and intermarriage, a utopian scenario so prized by today’s post-modernists. Admittedly, over the last twenty-three centuries many Veddas have become Sinhalese and/or Tamil and a few Sinhalese and Tamils have become Veddas. Likewise, Sinhalese-speakers have become Tamils in subjective sentiment and language of preference and Tamils have moved the other way. It is the specific circumstances that encouraged such shifts of identity among significant segments of each category at particular points of time that require historical investigation. That is, as corollary, I hold in speculative assertion that such processes coexisted with attachment to their respective identities among significant bodies of each community, affiliations produced in part by numerical preponderance in specific regions and through a struggle for resources and control of existing states. In the long history of humankind it is war that has consolidated pre-existing identities, identities that, in turn, contributed in some measure to these very conflicts. Not all dynastic wars were simply dynastic wars.

The basic question at issue for ancient Sri Lanka is linked with the monopoly of violence, namely, the possession of state power and its spatial reach. In these terms, the inter-related issues for non-partisan historians are: (A) during the long span of 12-14 centuries prior to the emergence of the Kingdom of Yalppanam in the 13th century AD (CE), what language did the majority of people speak? (B) And which speech-community held the reigns of state power in those regions where a sprawling irrigation civilisation was being fostered? It is on this question-raising note that I end. [island.lk]

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Rise in Muslim Discontent

by Col R Hariharan (retd.)

The political style of Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his use of military option in handling the Tamil insurgency have split almost all political parties which have been compelled to make hard political choices. Starting with the United National Party (UNP), the latest episode in the “split-story” is the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).The smaller parties did not split but joined the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) bandwagon enjoying the perks of office. Those who have resisted have generally put paid for their demeanour. But the hardest hit in this political maelstrom is the Muslim political leadership, notably the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).

[Rauff Hakeem at "Thaarusalaam" on Dec 13, 2007-pic by Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai]

No Muslim leader has so far been able to truly fill the leadership void created after the assassination of Mohammad Hussein Muhammad Ashraff, who gave a vision to the SLMC in the national sphere. He gave a new thrust to the SLMC’s emergence as a representative body of Muslims in 1986. The rise of Ashraff was in a way path breaking because for the first time the poorer and marginalised Tamil speaking Muslims of the east had a leader who created space for them in Sri Lanka politics. Till then individual Muslim leaders made their mark by toeing the Sinhala line within the two major political parties. It was Ashraff who struck his own path and developed the SLMC and the Muslim constituency as an independent entity and worked out political equations on handling the Tamils and Sinhalas. This was very important at that time as Muslims were caught between the increasingly violent confrontation between Sinhalas and Tamils – the two larger communities.

After the death of Ashraff, the SLMC lost not only its shine but its direction as well. It has been split, at least into three major entities. Rauf Hakeem a lieutenant of Ashraff took over the major chunk of SLMC considering himself political heir to Ashraff, while Ferial Ashraff, wife of the late Ashraff, joined the UPFA coalition with her faction.

With the fourth edition of the Eelam War raging in the north, the sharing of power between ethnic communities is as yet an undecided issue. With President Rajapaksa representing the larger section of Southern Sinhala viewpoint, both the Tamil and Muslim communities need strong and unified leaderships to workout an equitable solution to power sharing.

Among Muslim leaders, particularly of the SLMC, the peace process 2002 created a feeling of disappointment. The peace talks between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) excluded direct and separate representation to the Muslim community, who inhabit large areas in the northeast. They feared the devolution process would bypass Muslim interests by default. Efforts of Rauf Hakeem to muscle into the process through direct deal with Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader, resulted in empty words. The demand for equitable role for Muslms in the peace process on their own right was never taken seriously by other stakeholders including the international community.

Similar was the experience of the Muslim community which bore a major brunt of the devastation of the tsunami strike in December 2005. Their relief measures were slow in coming. And they were unhappy that their woes did not get the adequate attention they deserved. These experiences have glaringly showed the inadequacy of Muslim leadership to articulate their viewpoint.

These came on top of a similar experience in the past when India actively intervened in the period 1983 to 1987 in support of the Tamil cause that culminated in the India- Sri Lanka Agreement 1987. Then also the Muslim community felt their interests had been marginalised in the devolution stakes. At that time the Muslim polity had no independent articulation but had tried to find a place within the leadership of the two major national parties. And the elections taking place now in the east are only a resurgence of the very same form of provincial level devolution. So it will probably revive the old fears of alienation. And the Muslim population is politically more conscious than ever before. So the feeling of alienation could be stronger if the elections are not conducted fairly.

Muslim leadership and the PC elections

With the President talking of democratisation of the east, the time has come for Muslims to demand a share of the pie in the power structure. This would also set precedence for their share in power in the national dispensations in the future as and when the war ends (!). If the Muslim leaders fail to achieve this they are likely to be become non entities in the eyes of the people. This has created a crisis of sorts for the Muslim polity in participating in the forthcoming provincial council elections in the eastern province. The crisis has three major facets.

The first relates to handling President Rajapaksa’s desire to play an assertive role in the east, so that the ruling UPFA coalition (and as a corollary Sri Lanka Freedom Party-SLFP) can gain a firm foothold cashing upon their military success against the LTTE. Rajapaksa has shown remarkable political savvy in understanding the weakness of Muslim leadership which is split and easily satisfied with political pickings. So he struck a deal with the community leaders (Jamaat) directly and that acted as a hidden persuader in working out support for the UPFA. Only Rauf Hakeem of the SLMC appears to be trying to be free of the “Rajapaksa embrace” perhaps to save his own identity as the true successor of MHM Ashraff.

Rauf Hakeem’s fears are not unjustified. The President’s new thrust lines of politics in the east involve coalition with the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), who are still armed and have a dubious record of acts of violence and intimidation against Muslims. If TMVP establishes itself in the corridors of power, life could become difficult for Muslims. Moreover, in the near term, if the President succeeds it could end the carefully nuanced Muslim leadership’s tactics of “milking” maximum benefit out of the traditional antagonism between the SLFP and its bte noire the UNP. In some distant future it holds the potential to evolve a Tamil-Sinhala political coalition at the cost of Muslim interests in the power play. This unlikely happening could throw the Muslims into political wilderness.

The second facet relates to the importance the eastern provincial council elections hold for Muslim political identity. The fact that three senior Muslim members of parliament resigned their membership to participate in the provincial council poll shows this. This comes out of what they feel as justifiable claims to have an elected body of their choice with a Muslim chief minister. This is not an unrealistic thought. By most counts (though often unreliable) Muslims have emerged as the biggest population group in the east touching around 42 per cent of the total. It is this desire to capture power that has made two prominent Muslim leaders – Hizbullah and Rauf Hakeem – choose opposite political camps. Hizbullah has chosen to partner the UPFA while Hakeem is going along with the UNP agreeing to put up candidates of SLMC to contest with UNP symbol. His choice is probably driven by the fear of Rajapaksa’s domination which he perceives as Southern Sinhala assertion.

Lastly, the success of the Muslim leaders in the election is going to determine the pecking order of Muslim leadership in the national sphere. But with the TMVP domination of the Batticaloa district and the uncertain dimensions of Sinhala support in what had been traditional UNP strongholds, any split in Muslim votes could result in the diminution of an independent Muslim political articulation. So far the Muslim politicians have been able to achieve much using their clout with whosoever is in power. But the moment the relevance of their support diminishes such achievements could become uncertain.

The security threat

Some of the problems faced by Sri Lanka’s Muslim population are similar to those faced by Muslims in many countries where they are a minority. These are mostly related to the inherent contradictions within the Muslim Ummah in reconciling increased assertion of Islamic identity with that of national one. Thanks to the more accommodative Sufi beliefs of most of the Sri Lankan Muslims to a large extent this problem has been managed well despite periodic confrontation with the increasing spread of fundamentalist Wahabi influence.

Despite minor sectarian skirmishes between the two, so far the community has managed to keep them within manageable proportions, thanks to the pragmatic approach of Muslim population and its leaders. If there is a perceived threat to the Muslim identity the Wahabis are likely to take advantage and use it as a lever to spread their influence. And it is good to remember that unfettered spread of Wahabi influence has led to the growth of aggressive fundamentalism of the Taliban type in many countries. Similar potential exists in arming Muslim private militias which could come into being as a response to TMVP depredation if it continues after the elections. And political disillusionment is the first step to these unhealthy developments.

The observation of International Crisis Group on the subject in their report of May 29, 2007 aptly sums up the whole situation: There is no guarantee that this commitment to non-violence will continue, particularly given the frustration noticeable among younger Muslims in the Eastern province. In some areas there are Muslim armed groups but they are small and not a major security threat. Fears of armed Islamist movements emerging seem to be exaggerated, often for political ends. Small gangs have been engaged in semi-criminal activities and intra-religious disputes, but there is a danger they will take on a role in inter-communal disputes if the conflict continues to impinge upon the security of co-religionists.

Such a development should not be dismissed casually. The weakened Muslim leadership could well be swept aside if the community loses its confidence in the present scheme of things. (In this context, it is probably too early to comment on the impact of Pakistan President Musharraf’s generous offer to help Sri Lanka’s fight against terror. But when such an offer comes from a leader, who had unhesitatingly used the same terror weapon in neighbouring countries in the past through proxies guided by the ISI machinery it has dangerous portends.) This should be the last thing all communities in this troubled province need. To avoid such a development, the work is cut out for all stakeholders in and out of power to ensure a fair representation for all communities. Specifically the needs of the hour are as follows –

* The administration should run a free and fair election without stuffing of ballots or intimidation to keep voters away from exercising their franchise. The UPFA leadership in particular should run a tight ship avoiding the temptation to use the TMVP muscle power to ensure victory, as the opposition is already voicing their suspicion. One way of achieving this is to have international election observers present during the election process and providing unfettered media access during the run up to the elections and voting.

* Have a proactive internal security plan in place to ensure communal confrontation does not erupt even accidentally.

* Muslim leadership inside the coalitions should ensure the tradeoffs are not short term. It is high time the leadership united on major issues of community and national interests rather than think on personal considerations. A major weakness is the leadership’s inability to think and act proactively. This can come through if only the work out a larger consultative coalition outside party folds to serve the common interests of the community. [Saag]

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)

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IIGEP observations on Presidential Commission of Inquiry into HR Violations

Public Statement by The International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP):

As you may be aware, the IIGEP is in Sri Lanka at the invitation of the President to observe the work of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into 16 cases of human rights violations and killings. The IIGEP is further mandated to make recommendations to the Commission for corrective action, and to report to the President of Sri Lanka whether the investigations and inquiries conducted by the Commission are in accordance with international norms and standards.

This Public Statement outlines the IIGEP’s observations on the work of the Commission since the end of February 2007 and until the middle of March 2008. It further summarises the reasons why the Members of the IIGEP took a decision to conclude their work at the end of March 2008.

The IIGEP’s public release of information is governed by paragraph 11 of the Presidential Letter of Invitation which requires the IIGEP to publish the objections raised by the Commission of Inquiry and the Attorney General to the IIGEP’s public statements.

In view of this requirement, please find attached the responses of the Chairman of the Commission and the Attorney General to the contents of the IIGEP’s Public Statement:

PDF Files:

- In Full: IIGEP Public Statement

- Response by Chairman of the Commission

- Response by Attorney General
________________________________________________________

Summary of IIGEP Statement:

The 11-member IIGEP said: “Summary executions, massacres, disappearances, wanton destruction of property, and forcible transfers of populations can never be justified. No efforts should be spared to uncover responsibility, including recognition of command responsibility, for such actions.”

The public report gave following reasons for IIGEP’s decision to terminate the mission “with profound regret that more could not have been achieved.”:

1. A conflict of interest in the proceedings before the Commission
2. Lack of effective victim and witness protection
3. Lack of transparency and timeliness in the proceedings
4. Lack of full co-operation by State bodies
5. Lack of financial independence of the Commission

The IIGEP has decided that it will terminate its observation role at the end of March 2008 and close its operations in Sri Lanka by the end of April 2008. It has taken this decision after due consideration and for fundamental reasons. The President of Sri Lanka invited the IIGEP to observe the proceedings of the Commission of Inquiry, to offer recommendations for corrective action, and to assess the conduct of the Commission’s proceedings in the light of international norms and standards. “Despite their best efforts, the Eminent Persons have concluded that they have accomplished all that is possible within the constraints of the prevailing situation. They have thus decided, with deep regret, to end their activities,” the IIGEP statement said.

“The IIGEP has repeatedly drawn attention to the defects above-mentioned and others in the proceedings of the Commission in its three-monthly interim reports to the President, its public statements, and directly to the Commissioners. These critiques and suggestions have been largely disregarded. The IIGEP noted, however, that the Commission has attempted to limit the role of the Attorney General by employing counsel from the Unofficial Bar as lead counsel in two cases (the Trinco 5 and Pottuvil cases).

“This small success, however, has hardly outweighed the atmosphere of confrontation and disagreement towards the IIGEP engendered by organs of Government and – at least in official correspondence – by the Commission. The uncooperative atmosphere has rendered the task of the IIGEP, which approached its work in a spirit of co-operation and, at first, with optimism, disquieting and unpleasant. There seems to the IIGEP to be an absence of political and institutional will on the part of the Government to pursue with vigour the cases under review with the intention of identifying the perpetrators or at least uncovering the systemic failures and obstructions to justice that rendered the original investigations ineffective.

“All Members of the IIGEP are keenly aware of the security situation presently prevailing in Sri Lanka. The Government is faced with an insurgency in which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) conduct their hostilities through ruthless methods, not sparing the civilian population. Sections of popular opinion suggest that human rights and respect for the rule of law should take second place to measures necessary to repel these hostilities. The IIGEP rejects this opinion. There is no conflict or incompatibility between the successful conduct of military and security operations on the one hand, and respect for the rights of citizens on the other. Indeed it should be emphasised that respect for human rights, and the conduct of military operations in strict accordance with international humanitarian law, are powerful weapons in the struggle against dissident forces and terrorism in that they help to earn the trust and support of the civilian population. Moreover, they are essential to morale and promote a culture of professionalism and self-respect within the police and armed forces.

“To the extent that emergency conditions may require special state measures derogating from certain peacetime rights, these must be publicly announced, enacted in law, and justified in terms of necessity and proportionality. Summary executions, massacres, disappearances, wanton destruction of property, and forcible transfers of populations can never be justified. No efforts should be spared to uncover responsibility, including recognition of command responsibility, for such actions. The IIGEP has, however, found an absence of will on the part of the Government of Sri Lanka in the present Inquiry to investigate cases with vigour, where the conduct of its own forces has been called into question.”

The IIGEP made following particular recommendations:

1. That the President should ensure that all State bodies comply with international norms and standards and his directive to provide full disclosure of information and cooperation to the Commission.

2. The Government should respect and implement the internationally agreed doctrine of command responsibility as part of the law of Sri Lanka, whereby superiors of those who have committed criminal acts may also be held responsible.

3. The Government of Sri Lanka should establish, as a priority, a workable, effective and permanent system of victim and witness protection. The Commission should endeavour to train the staff of its victim and witness protection unit in order to provide the optimum level of security and assistance to potential witnesses. The IIGEP also calls for the establishment of a facility whereby essential witnesses, who have left Sri Lanka, and who can continue to give first hand evidence as to some of the events under examination by the Commission, can give their oral evidence to the Commission by video-links under conditions of complete safety. In this respect, international support to the Commission has proven critical.

4. The Commission of Inquiry should include in the course of its inquiries an examination of the reasons for systemic failures and past impunity in relation to the cases under review, and consider the making of recommendations for the eventual appointment of independent special prosecutors in cases in which the security forces have been involved in serious human rights violations.

5. The Government of Sri Lanka should provide the immediate and necessary financial resources to the Commission of Inquiry,and place adequate funds at its disposal, to enable it to fulfil its mandate.

6. The Government of Sri Lanka should not entrench the role of the Attorney General as counsel assisting the Commission of Inquiry through legislation.

The IIGEP was fully formed in February 2007, when the President of Sri Lanka invited 11 persons from a number of countries to observe the work of the Commission of Inquiry to Investigate and Inquire into Alleged Serious Violations of Human Rights (”the Commission”), which was established in November 2006. The Serious Violations referred to in the Warrant establishing the Commission were 15 cases dating from 1 August 2005 until 16 October 2006. A 16th case was later added.

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Knowledge Imperialism

An essay by Dr V Ramakishnan, Emeritus Professor, Eastern University

It is about time education is elevated to centre-stage as the main focus of the national debate. A regular review of what goes on in our schools and universities will have healthy implications for the long term well being of the larger community we live in – the future of our children and of generations yet to come.

Education is a future oriented activity. The schools report card or performance at public examinations could hardly prove to be the measure of a child’s potential to perform in later years. It is we older ones as parents and community leaders who could piece things together in broader canvas to assess the value or otherwise of the education we once received in our schools and universities.

Let’s Recall:

All of us could easily recall the explosion of our pent-up energies into sheer un-orchestrated noise when the bell rings announcing school is over for the day. It is with the feeling of liberation we would dash towards the main gate. And life and learning for us as children would only begin thereafter.

It is mothers’ love for her little ones as core-centre, expanding in a concentric circle that promote a sense of intimacy with all those we relate with which constitutes the civilising role of the home and the community.

All learning is by way of emulation of the way adults around us would perform and not the lecture and giving of notes. The efficacy of the socialisation process is governed by custom accorded the status of law because it carries the guarantee of a binding in conscience. It is custom as the cementing link that makes society an organic whole where every institution would also play a role in the education of the young. Here education is a form of initiation to help everyone play a productive role as citizens. Development of the child’s personality to be creative in its efforts would become integral to the overall aim.

For Public Good?

On the other hand, the present institutionalised system sees children herded into large buildings for good part of the day. As they grow older they are detained much longer and thus denied the civilising influence of the home and the community.

At school, specialist trained teachers walk in and out of classrooms delivering what they know with little or no knowledge of the long term impact on the personality development of each child and the well-being of the community we live in. And yet, we persist in believing that the education is aimed at public good, as an act of faith.

As the child moves up the ladder at school specialisation gets intensified. Passing three subjects would do to enter the university. But the inter-relatedness of knowledge seen in its totality to gain an insight into its relevance and meaningfulness is denied or overlooked. It is like dissecting a fish to study its parts. Later, when stitched up and released into water, the fish would fail to swim. If this analogy were accorded some degree of credibility, it is likely to reveal the fate that awaits the larger community in an increasingly competitive world.

The most disastrous outcome of the present system is the plight of neglected youth, be it the finished product or the drop-outs. They are neither willing to go back and come to terms with their homes nor are they willingly received for employment for which they were trained for.

While at school our kids have become increasingly demanding of their parents. And worse is their refusal to acknowledge the sacrifices made. With colonial education now given free it becomes pain that afflicts almost every home right across the country transcending the great race-divide. But media differences in education, allowed to mature for more than half a century, has brought into being several generations that cannot communicate their pain across the well entrenched language-divide.

Obstacle to Reviews:

True, we have arrived at a stage to realise the need for a review and the need to ask the more basic question “What are we educating our children for?” We need to rub clean the accumulated muck to conceive a system that is relevant and meaningful for every citizen to play a more productive role. But the problem is “Can we?”, for we ourselves are artefacts of the very system we seek to review. Even if we are to break through what lies encrusted in our own minds, would we be allowed a role to play in determining aims and objectives and monitoring it up to its delivery end?

Invoking indigenous educational psychology in tracing the source of our ignorance (ajnana, avijja) is likely to incur the wrath of those in authority. It might be dismissed as an act of lunacy, by those who define the limits of discourse among department officials, teacher training colleges and university departments of education. This would not go beyond the Anglo-Saxon “stimulus-response theories of conditioning” as defining educational basics -prospects of a comfortable job as “stimulus” demand for education in “response”.

Even if it be within the existing conditioning theories, call for a dialogue by parents and other informed citizens may not be welcome. Education of our children is a highly centralised operation exclusively by department officials and teachers appointed and supervised by them. They merely continue from where their predecessors left with little or no knowledge of basic aims and objectives. We have therefore to trace its origins to discover when and why it was introduced.

Relict of Colonial Times:

Institutionalised education in its present form would link us powerfully to the British period of colonial rule (1796-1948). The British had, by 1830, introduced a unified administration headed by their Governor assisted by civil servants and a law enforcing agency for the effective Colombo-centric exercise of power right across the country.

English being the language of administration English-medium schools were established to train a local elite that would willingly collaborate with them at the lower levels of the administration. Jobs with guarantee of fixed income and bits of power to lord over their fellow men as the stimulus a cosmopolitan grouping was at hand ready to respond. Some among them were even rewarded with land to help farm, taxes. (This later helped them as absentee landlords with families firmly rooted in the power centre found mini-dynasties, to respond and dominate the Westminster style of government). Two hundred years gone, this ideological alliance has helped them emerge as a formidable establishment resisting all attempts at change as education remains loyal to its colonial heritage from Point Pedro up to Kataragama.

Excepting Royal College, management of English schools was sub-contracted to the Anglican clergy. Along with government grants they were also allowed to charge fees to make English education a monopoly of the affluent classes.

The British also proceeded to establish Vernacular (Sinhala and Tamil) schools for the lower strata of the population to be trained for minor employment in the administration. But more importantly it was an attempt to wean them away from the monks and pundits as communicators of what was once a rich and eventful cultural history.

Indigenous Aims Sidelined:

More vulgar and atrocious was the decision to deny recognition and funding assistance to what remained as formal in indigenous education.

But, what was to go unnoticed was the gradual disintegration of the community. Four centuries of European colonial rule and its persistence in the form of unchallenged colonial education did see society wilt into a motley collection of individuals and lose its educative role. With that goes knowledge of agriculture, fishing and all other forms related to our food heritage, our pure and applied sciences – in particular indigenous medicine, our commitment to custom as source of law and social justice and hence an identity to be proud of. (This was the home grown concept of the nation state.) Society
loses its disciplinary rigour and its capacity to resist colonial intrusion aimed at destroying the spiritual strength necessary to stand on its own legs. Independence granted becomes in the circumstances no more than change of the name-board.

Even after a period of two centuries intervening, it is the same old structure and content that remains to characterise our educational system. This education given free (1944) spread countrywide and the schools take over (1960) sees the bureaucrats return in full force to announce that they and they alone are to control the education of our children. Tutory mudalalies and foreign funded NGOs also come into help detain our children a little longer before they go home.

English schools have returned re-christened as International schools never to be questioned by public authority on aims and objectives. They are to be accorded a near monopoly of placement in the university’s professional course programmes conducted exclusively in the English medium. Many would also find it possible to enter foreign universities. Together, their alumni are now ready to grab key positions in the country’s executive cadre and shape its destinies.

Nationalism’s Limits:

State schools were to become the vernacular schools of old and condemned to remain sub-standard forever. Some effort was made at reform, but with little or no effect. Buddhist and Hindu schools were being founded with state grants-in-aid from the latter half of the nineteenth century. But they were more concerned with arresting the proselytising activities of the Christian missionaries than challenging colonial intentions.

CWW Kannangara, as Education Minister and member for Galle in the state council introduced free education (1944) aimed to deny the Missionaries the right to charge fees over and above state grants. This was intended to curb the proselytising activities of Christian missionary schools. But it was never meant to be a direct onslaught colonial intention.

It was Handy Perinpanayakam the Gandhian and founder of the Jaffna Youth Congress who championed the cause of the mother tongue medium to guarantee relevance and greater efficiency in the early phase of the English schools programme. The mother tongue medium was to ensure accommodation of the cultural heritage within the schools’ teaching programme. This was ridiculed and sidelined by influential sections of the Jaffna intelligentsia for fear English schools going vernacular.

In the meanwhile, those opposed to Kannangara’s onslaught to open the gates of opportunity to all hypocritically succeeded in getting defeated in the general election (of 1947) that followed. The central schools he pioneered were soon ordered to switch over to the swabhasa medium, citing the mother tongue advantage. Several other measures also followed to keep the central schools sub-standard for ever. To conceal all this was the great hoax of naming all central schools as temples of great learning (Madhya Maha Vidya Alaya). And the universities too kept the Arts faculty gates wide open to accommodate their alumni in large numbers. But the victims of open discrimination were kept divided among themselves up to the university end with a
mediation-curtain imposed from above.

Efforts were also made at a multi-lingual approach by Swami Vipulananda, Wilmot Perera, AMA Azeez and others. But their efforts were brought to nought with the take over of all schools by the state in 1960.

But the greatest effort at radical change was when SWRD Bandaranayake obtained an overwhelming mandate to initiate what he called was to be a “period of transition”. He attempted to give rural youth a chance, people to conduct business with government agencies in the language they understand, to give swabhasa teachers a status-boost to guarantee quality input and the Buddhist monks a role to play in public affairs. In seeking to revive native medicine and explore prospects for research into the history of science and culture, he was also unwittingly opening a battlefront against the well-entrenched Allophathy medical system and the more powerful pharmaceutical giants of the west. He was got rid of by an assassin’s bullet (1959) and with that all talk of radical reform ceases.

Universities-Colonialism Entrenched:

It is the University system at the apex that have turned out to be the biggest offenders of justice and fair play. Discriminatory policies stealthily introduced have succeeded in preventing students from the provinces entering the more established universities. Nor has the system opened out to accept the claims of the indigenous thought heritage.

Pressure of numbers sees the tightening of admission procedures to the more prestigious professional courses and containing the flow of Arts students from the provinces. Universities are founded in the provinces with admission determined on the proximity principle. With limited resources, qualified teachers and cash, they are destined to remain second-class for good, mediocre at the beginning, stunted for ever. This arrangement enables the privileged class to be skilfully steered to retain the monopoly enjoyed in the power establishment.

But most meaningless and wasteful was the content and teaching methods adopted at the university. Undergraduate studies and research was to be circumscribed by knowing more and more of less and less. Ideally, it was aimed to know everything about anything and nothing of anything else. As end-product, he or she could drift to any part of the world that’s in need of their skills. To the employers abroad it was cost-free for training them, was to be a charge on our tax payers.

It was Sir Ivor Jennings, specially introduced as the first Vice-Chancellor who successfully steered the smooth transfer of the obnoxious colonial system in its entirety, as the much cherished feature of the new independent state. He drafted the first constitution that would accord it the status of a “Nation-State” where colonial style bureaucrats and law enforcing agencies remain to have the final say in matters affecting people’s well-being. Want of respect and commitment by the people to accept, the new arrangement becomes the source of much corruption and many institutions have now become dysfunctional leading to the breakdown of law and order.

It is Jennings who was also responsible for weeding out many brilliant minds in the Arts and Social Sciences who were making a substantial contribution in reviewing the damage done in the colonial era. This was to synchronise with the views of the bureaucrats in the Education Ministry to keep swabhasa education sub-standard and intake confined to the rural district.

Saratchandra by-passed the campus tsars in carrying theatre to the villages which helped creative writers flourish and some Sinhala films attain world class. (So too, with the arrival of rural youth in cricket).

By retaining the English medium in professional studies, the course programmes of the Jennings era continues without any significant change to adjust to national aspiration and needs.

It is the legal system introduced by the British that continues to define the administration of justice in Sri Lanka. Once a military law enforced in England soon after the Norman Conquest, it was soon presented as Common Law later refined and perfected to govern the colonies of the British Empire. In Sri Lanka it helped to bolster the Colombo-centric exercise of administrative power. It is this system that constitutes the hard core of course programmes in our law faculties.

Our customary laws that upholds property as trust available to successive generations and as cohesive factor welding a matriarchal society defining the native conception of a state hardly attracts our researchers’ interest. Thus on the knotty problem of justice, we have to rely on a system that prevailed in colonial times of divide and rule.

The science based faculties in all our universities also continue from where the British left. To date we are yet to see a standard work on the history of indigenous science-as the knowledge base of a civilisation that remained vibrant in pre-Portuguese times. It is difficult a task that would defy an easy solution. Five hundred years intervene to see us spiritually eroded without a living tradition to inform linkage.

The West has now begun to talk of an East Asian miracle. But one significant factor stands out prominently that separate South Asia from the East. The East was never subject to West European rule to the extent we were subjected to. Hence the need to assess the damage done for a near five hundred years, especially in the field of our thinking on basics.

Indigenous medicine is the one area of professional activity that survives to highlight the cultural context essential for an exposition of aims in education. The emphasis is on the preventive as a complex of the ethical, psycho-physical and the spiritual-the discipline essential to stay focussed on the task undertaken. Knowledge is not to be isolated from human action integral to community living. And the physician has a role in the education process to guide his patient perform to his creative best. Diagnosis consists of an honest dialogue between the two and an intimate knowledge of the genetic history and the mystic physiology the human body (sarira) bears within it. Schooled in the guru-santana tradition the physician belongs to, his perceptual powers are cultivated to know what is specific to the patient. The medicine prepared and administered has to be patient specific. Fees charged is no more than what is offered as an act of gratitude. And this on a sheaf of beetle leaf.

In contrast, western Allopathy medicine relies heavily on the Empiricist method of statistical probability with likelihood of error in diagnosis. Yet our medical education remains exclusively committed to Allopathy and the culture associated with it. Pharmaceutical giants concerned with profit would by-pass regulating authority and conduct clinical experiments in poorer countries and even corrupt practising doctors into prescribing their drugs. Lobby power within Sri Lanka prevents a healthy attitude towards integrating indigenous medicine into the teaching programmes of our universities.

It is unfortunate that we have yet to come up with a way out of the crisis that afflicts our society. All that we can do is to point at the damage being done thus far.

We have neglected our agriculture, fisheries etc. and substituted them with apples, oranges, canned fish and fancy items and would not hesitate to teach development theories recommended by their producers. We have embraced the sciences and legal systems the colonising power introduced and have them taught in our schools and universities without examining their aims. We have sidelined indigenous medicine and allowed Allopathy culture to take absolute control of our hospitals and medical faculties. It appears we have given the colonial powers assurances that we will be producing generations of young men and women made in their image. By way of new knowledge, we are totally dependent on their knowledge industry-in short victims reliant on their thinking.

Can this be called “Knowledge Imperialism?”

In essence it’s a conflict of civilisations-an ideal symbolised by a prince renouncing palace power and pleasures to remain focussed on the universal and assure rigour of discipline in society. This gets displaced by a governing ideology the English trader introduced in 1796. Institutionalised as education factories to spread across the country, the purpose remains unchanged till today.

Education as a mental discipline and culture now makes way to training and indoctrination for assigned roles in return for wages. We are to think and act the way the colonial power wanted.

Ivor Jennings’ constitution of 1947 allowed the entire colonial outfit framed for the centralised exercise of power to pass off as the new Sovereign “Nation State”: This sees the departmental bureaucrats, tutories and NGOs gain monopoly of the education of our young as the mother is pressurised to join the workforce to meet costs.

What is taught in our schools and universities remains what it was in colonial times. By way of new knowledge to meet current challenges we are called upon to rely on what is there in their books and research journals that crowd our libraries – to be forever dependent on their knowledge industry.

Even years after independence, colonisation stays put to manipulate and shape contemporary events by defining the parameters of the national debate. This, we would call “knowledge Imperialism” making it a mockery of a sovereign “Nation State”: Imperialism via its knowledge industry could even engineer mini-wars and yet claim to manage the peace process.

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