federalidea.com

by Qadri Ismail

Human rights is the last resort of the hopeless.

Its liberal advocates don’t see it that way. They find it heroic, the foundation of a new international order that will, when established universally, guarantee secure lives for everyone, everywhere ‘rom Tibet to Timbuktu. But would the subaltern, the oppressed ‘the target of human rights’ ‘necessarily agree ?

Take the following story. (Its details have been fudged to protect the innocent from the brutality of the Rajapakse regime and its paramilitary partners.)

A Tamil man was abducted by the military, at a checkpoint, somewhere in northeastern Sri Lanka recently, witnessed by many civilians. His wife inquired at every nearby military camp, but they denied having or ever detaining him. Someone advised her to contact a paramilitary group. They work closely with the government, she was told, and so could help. Desperate, she did. (This would be the EPDP or TMVP.) They noted her details and promised to investigate.

A few days later, members of this group abducted the woman and raped her.

Her husband is still missing, presumed killed by the military.

Seeing no other option, she told her story to a human rights organization.

The point should be obvious. The western powers and their human rights groups would have nothing to complain about if the Rajapakse regime did not treat its citizens, mostly the Tamils, but also Muslims and, increasingly, Sinhalese who resist, with systematic brutality. For the case of this woman and her husband is not isolated. It is not something ‘collateral’ that occurs, inevitably, regrettably, in the course of fighting a war on terror.

Her rape, if not her husband’s murder, was planned, deliberate. As was the mass expulsion of Tamils from Colombo last year, a move the odious Defense Secretary advocated and defended publicly. As were the killings of Franklin Raviraj and T. Maheswaran, both MPs who spoke eloquently, often in Sinhala, in the Sinhala media, against the horrors of this government.

As is the ongoing expropriation of Muslim land in Amparai district by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources. The legalized violence against Muslims is not the unintended consequence of the war against the LTTE. Neither is the recent spate of attacks against Rupavahini employees.

The counter-argument that the LTTE does similar things, while true, is an incredible response. Is the government’s best defense that it is like a terrorist group?

The Rajapakse regime understands its mandate as promoting the greed and bloodlust of its thugs, whether in the cabinet or defense establishment, not the welfare of its citizens. Indeed, it has demonstrated that Mahinda Chinthanaya could be reduced to just one idea: if the people aren’t quiet while we pillage the south, bombard the north and pacify the east, our thugs will terrorize them.

If our people, then, with nowhere else to turn, take these matters up with, to put it bluntly, white people, are we to blame them?

Space for the intervention of western human rights groups in Sri Lanka only becomes open in a political vacuum. This space should have been occupied by political resistance, the left. But, quite apart from the ineptitude of the current UNP, our left parties have, over the last forty years, largely surrendered to Sinhala nationalism.

For, despite the valiant efforts of the LSSP to remind us recently, through the republication of old speeches, that comrade Colvin warned, in 1956, that one language (’Sinhala only’) would lead to two nations, the same Colvin also said, opposing the DC Pact in 1965: ‘Dudleyge badey masala vadey.’ The same Colvin, in 1972, authored a constitution making Buddhism effectively the state religion. Our left never recovered from such surrender. Indeed, in asserting that one could sell out the minorities and still call oneself left, it only made itself an example for the JVP to emulate.

I do not hold the left responsible for the horrors of the Rajapakse presidency. But what is it doing abetting them? Whose good is served by D. E. W. Gunasekera and Tissa Vitharana sitting with the government?

The complicity of the left, the lethargy of the UNP, helps justify the western human rights argument that, in the absence of the space for resistance in Sri Lanka, they must intervene. Since we cannot save ourselves, the west will save us.

This is a version, a revision, as my teacher Gayatri Spivak argues in her new book, Other Asias, of the old colonial notion, ‘the white man’s burden.’ Read any classic work of liberalism, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, for instance, and you will see that civil society, as a concept, is inseparable from civilization. To Locke, the savage, that’s us, was incapable of instituting civil society because she lacked the capacity to civilize herself. That is how civilization, the establishment of civil society for the savage, became the justification for colonialism, an alibi for political domination and economic exploitation. In that precise sense, Sri Lankan ‘civil society’ groups are the consequence, continuation, of colonialism.

Things are not quite the same today. The white man, and woman, is still on a mission to save us. This time, however, a lot of us, whether in Sri Lanka or the west, are actively helping them. Some do so sincerely, enthusiastically, convinced that the west is right, that human rights is an unqualified good thing. (Before we rush to criticize this position, we should remember that Marxism also came from the west. The famous opening line of The Communist Manifesto exclusively addresses Europe.) Some do so for the perks, the money. (But then we shouldn’t forget, as Rajan Phillips reminded Sumanasiri Liyanage on this very question: people who take money to wage peace are infinitely preferable to those who make money, from the President and his bothers to the military commanders and others, from war.)

Some of us do so critically, sometimes stifling ironic smiles. For the self-righteousness, tone-deafness, of human rights folks, whites usually, but not exclusively in the west can be quite amusing. Not to mention the hypocrisy of western diplomats. Do we need mention, once again, that the Sri Lankan Prevention of Terrorism Act was modeled on the British, who were oppressing the Northern Irish at the time? And what gives any U.S. ambassador, anywhere, the balls to lecture anybody on human rights or democracy? when its own president was first elected by the Supreme Court and it continues to hold prisoners, in Guantanamo, without due process? When George W. Bush, in speech after speech, justifies torture (’enhanced interrogation techniques’). And still supports perverse Pervez Musharraf.

The west needs to be educated. That the history of human rights is intertwined with colonialism. That their credibility will decline further every time they continue to use a double standard. For, surely, no U.S. backer of human rights could be taken seriously if they are also, like just about every senator and congressperson, unreconstructed supporters of Israel’s oppression of the Palestinian people. That they need to acknowledge, and legislate, social and economic rights as equally important as political rights.

At the same time, the non-west needs to change, too. China is the first example that comes to mind. But the Indian treatment of Kashmiris is not very different from the Sri Lankan treatment of Tamils. Muslims in Gujarat and elsewhere live in as much fear as Tamils in Colombo.

But it does not follow, while we wait for these things to happen, that we shut up and let the Rajapakse regime wage a war against the Tamils and, more generally, democracy. I mean: what plausible argument can the president fabricate to justify his continued violation of the 17th amendment? In his insistence that he, as president, is above the law, Mahinda Percy Rajapakse sounds exactly like George Walker Bush.

In its undisguised racism, its brazen brutality, its pathetically insecure inability to take even the mildest criticism, the sheer volume of its corruption, its utter ineptitude, its intimidation of the population at large, the Rajapakse regime is approaching the J. R. Jayewardene as the worst in our history. It is a sad feature of our moment that, like the SLFP then, the southern political opposition now is virtually non-existent. It is, if anything, even sadder that the Tamil opposition, today, has taken the monolithic, viciously murderous, exclusivist form of the LTTE. No one has let the Tamil people down more than they.

In this context, the only ethically effective space of resistance to the Rajapakses has, for better and worse, become that of human rights activists; and I don’t just mean folks in Colombo. In Mannar, Jaffna, Vavuniya, Mutur and Batticaloa, ordinary people resist the Rajapakse ruffians and its paramilitary predators daily, in the name of human rights. We know their efforts count because the government screams hysterically in response. Or arrests those who publicize their work, like J. S. Tissainayagam, guilty only of the crime of expressing his opinion.

I am not an uncritical supporter of human rights. But if given a choice between just two alternatives, the Rajapakse regime and human rights activists, I will back the latter any day. They are in the business of tending lives. The Rajapakses, of destroying them. They are the human wrongs of Sri Lanka.

by Dayan Jayatilleka

One of the most laughably absurd of all the criticisms directed against the incumbent administration, is that its commitment to the full and immediate implementation of the 13th amendment which makes for provincial autonomy, is somehow a betrayal of the election mandate of President Rajapakse as contained in his manifesto. This criticism, levelled by radical ultranationalists, betrays triple ignorance: ignorance of a Constitution and its role in the polity; ignorance of the election manifesto and mandate of the incumbent President; and ignorance of forms of government and systems of state.

A Constitution is the basic law of the land. No election mandate or manifesto ranks above it, nor can it. A president is elected under the Constitution, and his most fundamental duty is to uphold the Constitution. If a Constitution is to be changed it must be according to the process and procedure laid down by the Constitution itself.

It seems to have been forgotten by the critics that ‘the 13th amendment’ is merely shorthand for the 13th amendment to the Constitution. The 13th amendment is part of the Constitution itself. As such, President Rajapakse is sworn to uphold it, as would be any other President, so long as the amendment is not repealed by a lawful, constitutional process, i.e. a process laid down in the Constitution itself. There is no choice in the matter, and no electoral mandate can conceivably supersede the supremacy of the Constitution and its provisions.

The argument that the 13th amendment was the product of gunboat diplomacy is not only an over-simplification, it is also irrelevant. The 13th Amendment was the result of a whole chain, an entire series of causes and effects, one of which was coercive diplomacy. What makes it irrelevant is that Constitutions are often products of conflicts, even wars, including wars which result in interventions and more dramatically, occupations, the Constitution of Japan being a case in point. Whatever the circumstances and chain of causation, this is the form that History has taken in the case of a particular country. This does not make a constitution eternal. What it does however is to ensure that such amendments or entire Constitutions cannot be repealed other than by duly elected and constituted, Constituent Assembly. Nothing of the sort has taken place in Sri Lanka, with regard to the existing Constitution or the 13th amendment.

The second display of ignorance of the critics pertains to the mandate of President Rajapakse, or ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ as it is called. The aspect of the mandate that concerns this issue is the pledge to remain within, or, to put it more strongly, uphold, the unitary form of state. President Rajapakse himself has, on solemn official occasions, spelled out his stand as ‘maximum devolution within a unitary state’. The recent pledge to fully implement the 13th Amendment is in no way a contradiction of the election mandate, because the 13th amendment was ruled two decades ago, and has been recognised ever since, as within the parameters of the unitary constitution.

What the President has done is to commit himself to the reactivation and full implementation of a part of the Constitution which has remained dormant because of the armed actions and entrenched presence of the separatist LTTE.

The third area in which ignorance is displayed by the critics, concerns forms of state and government. The government is accused of attempting to introduce federalism, when the Supreme Court has clearly ruled that the 13th amendment and resultant provincial autonomy does not amount to federalism. The assumption of the critics is that any form of devolution of power, of power sharing, is federal in character and a transgression of the limits of the unitary state. This betrays a notion of the unitary state as a purely centralised state with no power sharing between centre and periphery. In turn, this betrays ignorance of the many, well known systems of devolution and regional and/or provincial autonomy in non-federal systems, including unitary ones. These range from China to the UK and from Spain to Indonesia and the Philippines.

The radical ultranationalists combine their critique of the promise to reactivate the 13th amendment with retro-chic anti-Indian sloganeering. These slogans cannot have an immediate mass resonance because the old context of cross-border (some alleged state-sponsored) terrorism and overt military incursion is long gone. However, the political movement coining the slogans has a longer-range objective, which is sought to be achieved by a two-pronged tactic. By preventing any attempt at devolution, i.e. internal reform which alone can forestall external interference and by simultaneously decrying attempts at intervention, the movement hopes to generate a self-fulfilling prophecy, much as it did in the 1980s. The salient difference between the strategy of the 1970s and ?80s and that of the early 21st century is the transparent hope of influencing and inheriting much of the military rather than going up against it as in 1971 and the late ’80s.

Permitting the blockage of internal reform ‘devolution’ can prove nothing less than suicidal for Sri Lanka. We need the support of Asia, in the face of Tamil Diaspora driven pressure from the West. We need the support of both rising powers in Asia: China and India. China has no Tamil lobby, shares our views on state sovereignty and secessionism, and has enjoyed excellent ties of long standing and bipartisan character. It is a reliable friend and ally. However, we also need the support of our neighbours. No one can harm any country, if its neighbours stand with them. Without the support of one’s neighbours, one is vulnerable. India is our neighbour. She is also a rising power on an upward curve of global popularity she is courted by all others. Given the realities of geopolitics and geo strategy, we shall not be safe if India turns against us, or simply turns away from us, even if we enjoy China’s full support.

Having balanced the threat from the Tigers, the Tamil Nadu factor and doubtless many other constants and variables, India has, at the highest levels, stated its position on Sri Lanka. It welcomes, as a first step, the pledge to fully implement the 13th amendment. The recent critical statements by India’s two Communist parties, the CPI-M and the CPI, indicate that political sentiment in India may be approaching a tipping point in relation to Sri Lanka.

Certainly the imminence of general elections in bound to have an impact, and we must note that any non-Congress administration may have fewer anti-LTTE memories than a Congress government in which Rajiv Gandhi’s widow plays a decisive role. Sri Lanka must get India on board without delay, and the modest price for that support is the full implementation of the 13th amendment, i.e. of our own Constitution.

The recent naval episodes also underscore the need for a more active Indian role in interdiction. Whatever the domestic political cost of antagonising the radical ultranationalists, it is dwarfed by the potential security cost of alienating India. Whatever the pain and damage that the radical ultranationalists can inflict, these are dwarfed by the pain and damage that will result from a laissez-faire policy on the part of our neighbour which enables the LTTE to operate relatively freely from or through Southern India. This window of opportunity will not last for long. The global economic slowdown/downturn is bound to impact negatively upon us, while the results of the US elections could impinge dramatically.

As Mao pointed out, in war and politics, it is not only a matter of enemies and friends ‘there are also the intermediate forces. These have to be won over or at the least neutralised. The war or the political struggle is won by that side which wins over or neutralises the intermediate forces, thereby isolating the main enemy. If on the other hand, one is oneself isolated, one loses. The 13th amendment is the method by which the intermediate forces, domestic and external’ the moderate, non-Tiger or anti-Tiger Tamils, and India-can be won over. Therefore, the full implementation of the 13th amendment as promised, is nothing less than an urgent strategic and security imperative.

________________________________________________
(The writer was Minister of Policy Planning & Youth Affairs in the North-East Provincial Council set up under the Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13th Amendment in 1988. The views in this article are strictly the personal opinions of the author).

By Kishali Pinto Jayawardena

My neighbour confided to me in an aside the other day, that she was not sure what the fuss was all about anyway. “After all’ she said ‘they are only arresting Tamils, are’nt they.’ And after all, as she went on to say, heedless of the varying expressions on my face ranging from immediate anger, strong indignation to utter annoyance ‘most of them have sympathies with the LTTE, don’t they?”

Someone had remarked, I think, Oscar Wilde, though my memory fails me, (and I paraphrase) that life would be perfect if we could choose our relatives as much as we could choose our friends. Undoubtedly, he should have added neighbours to the former category and doubtless, given his consummate wit, may have added something pithy in that regard as well.

The slippery slope of rights abuses

But the problem is simple; how does one contend with a state of mind of this nature? How does one begin to explain that some of the strongest dissenters of the LTTE are indeed, Tamils and that they have been killed for this? That there are many ordinary Tamils less in the public eye by choice but who are equally vehement in their criticisms while not forsaking their ethnic heritage or their right to be part of this country as Tamils? That they do not engage in such criticisms purely for the sake of supporting other political parties in opposition to the LTTE, (now enthusiastic partners with this government), but who are equally murderous?

And how does one begin to explain that the slope is so dangerously slippery and that today it may be a person of a particular ethnicity but tomorrow, it may be a trade unionist, a journalist or indeed, a citizen who prides himself as belonging to the majority race but was unwise enough to speak sharply to a policeman on duty? This is what happens when the Rule of Law breaks down; suddenly, the boundaries become blurred and reason is lost. But how does one explain all this without seeing that infuriatingly blank look of incomprehension in return. It is certainly an unequal argument; on the one side, there is the massive propaganda and on the other side, there is that hopeless plea to reason and sanity, increasing in hopelessness as the days pass by.

Democratic functionality of a system

Let us re-state the principles. There is no doubt that a legitimate State has every right to defend itself. However, the fact remains that it must do so within boundaries; it cannot engage in humanitarian crimes, it cannot engage, (despite the horrendously retrograde policies of the junior George Bush), in torture and it cannot engage in actions that denigrate an entire race. It has been said many times before but is an assertion that bears repetition for its sheer importance; a State is fundamentally different from a terrorist entity. When that difference disappears and a State descends to the level of its most implacable foe, then the very reason as to why the terrorists are being fought, (ie; to preserve a democratic functionality), is obliterated. This is what we have come perilously close to in Sri Lanka today.

A major reason as to why the democratic functionality of the Sri Lankan system is being whittled down is, of course, to do with the Rajapaksa Presidency’s disregard for the Constitution and its contemptuous spurning of the 17th Amendment. If crucial oversight bodies such as the National Human Rights Commission and the National Police Commission were functioning to the fullest extent of their constitutional and statutory authority, much of this criticism may have been deflected. If the current practice relating to the retraining of life and liberty rights of people was somewhat more in line with the standards laid down by Sri Lanka’s own Supreme Court at one point of time, (let alone international human rights standards), then again there would have been far more sympathy for the government’s perennial cry that it is being unfairly bludgeoned. It is a long line of “Ifs” that may have put to shame Kipling’s own philosophical musings on the same.

Arbitrary arrests

Let us take just one practical example to illustrate the above. My neighbour’s thinly veiled racism becomes pertinent in this context. It is indeed true that arrests of Tamils have now become a recurring decimal, characterized in all instances by common features; indefinite detention under emergency order, solitary confinement, denial of confidential access to legal counsel and in some cases, torture or ill treatment. These are however, the very features of detention outlawed by Sri Lanka’s highest Court in the mid nineties in response to the pleas of Sinhalese as well as Tamils and Muslims who had been treated in a manner violative of constitutional norms.

In one strikingly apt instance where a former government Minister, Sirisena Cooray had been arrested on flimsy evidence during the Kumaranatunge regime, relevant principles were forcefully articulated by Justice ARB Amerasinghe (with whom Justices Wijetunge and Asoka de Z. Goonewardene agreed). The Court stated that “The police had their suspicions and hoped that some evidence might turn up to make their suspicions reasonable. However, vague, general suspicions and the fervent hope or even confident assumption that something might eventually turn up to provide a reasonable ground for an arrest will not do.” It was held (Rodrigo v De Silva, 1997 3 SLR, 271) that there had been a violation of Cooray’s rights and that there had been many mistakes and misunderstandings based on misleading advice given to the Defence Secretary by senior intelligence officials, as a result of which he misdirected himself.

It was somewhat unfortunate that the right of a detained person to confidential legal representation did not form part of the ratio in this case. Earlier, a Bench of judges headed by Justice MDH Fernando had granted interim relief allowing Cooray’s right of access to lawyers on the basis that he should not have been denied that right but this did not form part of the substantive judgment.

A remarkably problematic order of the Human Rights Commission
Denial of such access has now become common and has indeed, been recently upheld by the National Human Rights Commission in a reasoning that is remarkable for its complete lack of understanding of applicable rights standards. Thus, in an order dated 31/01/2008, the Commission found that no violation of rights had occurred as a result of a gaggle of police officers insisting that they should be within earshot of two lawyers who had attempted to confer privately with their clients at Boosa. The relevant order (minus its grammatical errors) states inter alia that ’still some international laws and standards have not been incorporated into our law…..further it should be noted that the Sri Lankan government is not bound to follow all international laws and standards.”

This is remarkable reasoning for a body which is statutorily enjoined to ensure that national laws and administrative practices are in accordance with international human rights norms and standards (Section 10 (d) of the Human Rights Commission Act).

The question as to the extent to which Sri Lankan laws and practices embody all the guarantees that are contained in international conventions as for example the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been manifested (as an issue linked to the GSP+ trade preferential rights) is now before the Supreme Court. However, it is decisions such as this recent order of the Commission which appear to give the lie to spurious arguments that such compliance is as satisfactory as it could be. What more does one need? [courtesy: sundaytimes.lk]

“Do you want two languages and one nation or one language and two nations? Parity, Mr. Speaker, we believe is the road to the freedom of our nation and the unity of its components. Otherwise two torn little bleeding states may arise from one little state.”

-Dr Colvin R. de Silva speaking after the Sinhala Only Act was passed in 1956, making Sinhala the national language of Sri Lanka

By Remy Herbert

Introduction

The right to use one’s own language within their own country is not only an internationally recognized human right; it is also an important issue that has led to protracted conflict in several countries.

Language is a tool for communication and to acquire knowledge, but even more significantly it is the source of the ethnic identity and self pride of an individual or community.

In Sri Lanka, language rights became an issue of public dialogue in the early 1930s. The dominant factor of the early dialogue on language policy was to make Sinhala and Tamil languages as the official language by recognizing the status of equality of both languages to replace English which was made the official language by the British colonial rulers. But, the denial of equal status to the Tamil language in the language policy of post independent Sri Lanka by making Sinhala the sole official language has created a situation in which the language issue is an important, sensitive and decisive factor in the ethnic politics of Sri Lanka.

Official Languages Policy

In 1956, the Parliament decided to enact the Official Language Act, which stated that “the Sinhala language shall be the one official language of Ceylon.”

In 1958, Parliament passed legislation to permit ‘the use’ of the Tamil language. This was known as the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, No 28 of 1958.

Under the 1972 Constitution, Sinhala was declared to be the official language. The use of Tamil was permitted; however it was not the language of administration, nor was it an official language of the country.

According to the 1972 Constitution, the language of the courts would be Sinhala, throughout all parts of the country. All records, including pleadings, proceedings, judgements orders and records would be in Sinhala.

According to the 1978 Constitution; while Sinhala remained the Official Language, Sinhala and Tamil were National Languages.

According to the 1978 Constitution, officials were entitled to access state services and conduct official business in either of the National Languages. There was also provision for the publication of official documents, notice boards, orders etc in both languages.

By amending Article 18 of the Constitution, Tamil was also made an official language in 1987. The English language was made the ‘link’ language.

The 16th Amendment provided that in an area where Sinhala is used as the language of administration, a person other than an official acting in his/her official capacity, is entitled to receive communication and transact business with any official in either Tamil or English.

Implementation

“Several instances of failure on the part of government institutions to comply with the constitutional provisions relating to the official languages have been brought to my notice. These are serious omissions as they cause immense inconvenience and hardship to members of the public who are not conversant with Sinhala. Besides, it also amounts to a violation of the law. I dread to think of the plight of citizens who receive letters in a language which they do not understand. This is tantamount to denial of that citizen a fundamental right.” Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge Circular on the Implementation of the Official Languages Policy, 30th June 1997

Over the decades, Presidents and Ministries have intervened from time to time by giving instructions to the state officials for the proper implementation of the OLP. But, nineteen years after the adoption of the bi-lingual OLP, the status of its implementation remains far from satisfactory.

This issue was clearly identified and elaborately discussed during the period of the United National Front government under the Triple R process (Commissioner General of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction) as a theme for national building. But, unfortunately, this process was not taken forward after the change of the government.

In 2006, a language audit to assess the current status of the implementation of the OLP outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces was undertaken by the Foundation for Coexistence. The Language Audit was conducted in seven State institutions situated in sveral districts and two schools in Colombo.

The outcome of the Language Audit clearly indicated the serious lack of implementation of the OLP in all the institutions audited, despite the passing of several decades since the policy came into place. Proper implementation of the OLP is not merely an indicator to assess the government’s commitment for multi-ethnic plural and inclusive governance which is inevitable if we are to convince the Tamils for a peaceful coexistence with an undivided polity.”The official language policy will be implemented vigorously. The dictionaries and encyclopedias which are necessary for the development of the Sinhala and Tamil languages will be built up.”

Mahinda Chintana

Despite the various statements of politicians, more than 77% of surveyed Tamil speaking general public in 2006 expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of usage of Tamil language skills among the staff of the public sector Of the 958 departments and institutions referred to in the budget estimates for 2004 only 114 had requested an allocation to implement the OLP. In 2005 it was 200 and in 2006 it went up to 226. This indicates that almost two thirds of state institutions have still not planned to implement the OLP.

The right to transact business with the state in ones own language is a fundamental right

International Examples

In many other countries, the issue of language parity has been of great importance in defining national and ethnic identities. Such countries include India, Belgium and Canada. In India, though there are more than 1000 languages, each language is recognized as an official language of the country.

In countries such as Australia and the United States, though English is the national language, the right to converse and to conduct official business in any language is respected and upheld. In police stations and courts and other government departments, interpreters are made available to cater to any language.

In these cases, upholding a commitment to language pluralism is not simply a practical, pragmatic concern, but a way of displaying respect for diverse identities.

The Sri Lankan Experience

Sri Lanka has been torn apart by conflict for decades, in part due to its inability to tolerate diversity and pluralism.

The lack of will to respect the language parity of Tamil speaking people in the country, despite this right being enshrined in the Constitution has been a critical factor in dividing the nation.

Role of the Government

The Government has an obligation to ensure the rights of all of its citizens, including the right to a fair trial, to protection from the law, the health and education. However, many citizens are still excluded from equal access to these rights because of the inability of successive administrations to ensure the proper implementation of the official languages policy.

Any citizen should have the right to conduct business and move about the country using his or her own language. To be able to do this, the government must take immediate steps to build the capacity of institutions to provide services in Sinhala and Tamil to an acceptable standard.

This will necessarily including providing competent interpreters and translators to institutions, providing documents and noticeboards that can be understood by all of the citizens, and by building on and implementing an education policy that enable Tamil speaking children equal access to education as their Sinhalese speaking counterparts and that will ensure the competency of Sri Lankans in two national languages for future generations.

The Role of the Citizens

Sri Lankan citizens have a right and an obligation to demand the implementation of the Official Languages Policy from their institutions and from their Government.

Experience suggests that it is only through concerted and consistent pressure that the Government will act on its various pledges. [dailymirror.lk]

By Col R Hariharan (retd.)

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s statement about the willingness of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao “to enter into a dialogue with the Dalai Lama” in the light of the Tibetan leader’s assurance that he did not support total independence for Tibet and that he renounced violence, adds a new dimension to the agitation of Tibetans world over against Chinese rule in Tibet.

[Dalai Lama]

The agitation started on March 10, 2008 with a protest march by monks reminiscent of the saffron agitation last year in Myanmar against military dictatorship. This snowballed into a public protest two days later and spread outside among Tibetan community living in adjacent provinces of China and among Tibetan refugees the world over. Violence in Lhasa resulted in deaths estimated around 100, though the official figures are less. Between March 17 and 20, the Chinese came down hard on the protestors. They have made arrests and foreigners including tourists have been asked to leave Tibet.

[Agitation shown on TV around the globe]

Despite the Dalai Lama’s repeated appeal to his followers to desist from violence, it does not seem to be having the desired effect on them. So the focus will now be on how fast the Chinese control the agitation without courting further adverse publicity. This becomes a prestige issue for the Chinese as the Olympic flame is to travel through parts of the troubled region to put the Beijing Olympics on its first paces in two months. Even if the agitation is quelled or subsides, it has brought to the surface the simmering issue of Tibet. The timing of this agitation is critical as international media focus is shifting to Beijing for the Olympics. It also invites attention to a number of other issues impinging upon not only Tibet and China, but their neighbours and China’s global power equation.

Dalai Lama’s status

The violence unleashed on Han population and on public assets by the Tibetan agitators despite the Dalai Lama’s repeated appeals have raised a question mark over the Dalai Lama’s monolithic influence over the Tibetan population living both at home and abroad. In particular, the agitators spearheaded by the Tibetan Youth Congress were clamouring for independence as against the Dalai Lama’s emphasis on autonomy for Tibet. The virulence of the agitation appears to have surprised the Dalai Lama and the Chinese. Is the Dalai Lama losing control over the younger generation of expatriates? The answer to this question would decide the fate of the institution of the Dalai Lama in the future. Any uncertainty in the future of Tibetan leadership is going to be a significant issue not only for China but also for countries like India, Nepal, and even Europe which have provided sanctuaries to large number of Tibetans.

The talks to resolve the Tibetan issue between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Premier could be a long drawn affair. There are basic differences between the two sides on the territorial limits of Tibet as understood by them. Their perceptions on the scope and extent of autonomy are also different. The Chinese strategy in such talks is to stretch them as long as long as possible as seen from our own experience. During this period, if there are institutional changes in Tibetan leadership how far it would be acceptable to the younger generation of Tibetans? What if the Chinese try to identify an incarnation of the Dalai Lama on their own and install him as they did in the case of the Panchen Lama? These issues would affect the durability of any formulation worked out in the talks.

Strategic issues

Next to China, historically India had been having the closest links with Tibet. So turbulence in Tibet or Tibetan leadership could create problems for India both internally and internationally. Both India and China are slowly inching towards building a peaceful relationship between them as dictated by their own economic and diplomatic interests. This burgeoning relationship could be tested if Tibet remains unstable. This is perhaps the reason for the Indian Foreign Minister to carefully nuance his statement on the agitation and India’s stand on the Tibet question.

However, if China increases its force levels in Tibet it would become a matter of strategic concern for India. With a strongly pro-Chinese partner in the Maoists in the ruling Nepalese coalition any such large Chinese troop movements even in India’s neighbourhood could trigger further concerns for India.

Apart from that, India’s continuing dispute with China on the Tibetan boundary question has connotations for India’s coalition politics. Memories India’s war with China in 1962 over the disputed border still rankle the mind of large sections of Indian public, who consider it an act of betrayal by the Chinese leadership. This feeling will continue to condition Indian political perceptions to a certain extent. So if the Tibetan agitation persists it could find support among the Indian public and polity.

Similarly, the U.S. and the European Union had been taking special interest for a long time on the Tibet issue for various reasons ranging from strategic interests to the right of Tibetans to practice their religion, culture and language, to their human rights. They have been financially supporting Tibetans living overseas that had helped preserve their identity. The Chinese had always been keeping a watchful eye on such links, particularly with non-governmental organisations of these countries.

The U.S.-China relations are perhaps the closest than ever before. China’s export economy is largely dependent upon the U.S. markets. The U.S. had been a major investor in the Chinese growth story. However, there is mutual suspicion on both sides due to the unarticulated intentions that drive this relationship. The U.S. moves in recent years to build strategic linkages with India and bring it into a quadrilateral relationship with Japan and Australia as well, has been a source of some security concern for China.

The Tibetans have a strong lobby in the U.S. seats of power. In the early years of Chinese occupation of Tibet, the U.S. had financed and sponsored revolt by sections of Tibetans against the Chinese forces. This historic memory could aggravate latent suspicions of the Chinese leadership about the U.S. stand on the Tibetan agitation and its resolution. So the U.S. actions in the coming weeks would come under careful Chinese scrutiny.

India is unlikely to allow any move of Tibetan activists across its borders with Tibet, particularly if Chinese troops are moved into the autonomous region to control internal situation. In such a situation, Nepal becomes a vulnerable region. However, the Chinese appear to have forced the Nepalese rulers to toe the Chinese line to quell any build up of agitation. The Chinese intelligence representatives are probably operating in border areas to sanitize the Nepalese side of the border also.

Given this situation, Myanmar’s troubled northern borders with China become vulnerable to activities of anti-Chinese elements. With loose government control, this region is a haven for operation of insurgent groups, drug smugglers and gunrunners. In the past the U.S., either directly or through NGOs acting as proxies, has armed and infiltrated tribal insurgents to fight the Chinese incursions in the region. This option would always be available for any international sponsor of the Tibetan agitation. While this is in the realms of possibility only at present, the Chinese with long memories are unlikely to ignore it. Given this setting, China would probably like the present client regime of military dictatorship to continue to be in power in Myanmar rather than have democratic parties (which have strong U.S. links) as rulers. With a referendum of suspicious intent on the cards looming in Myanmar in the coming months, China’s role in Myanmar is likely to be more firm and in support of the Than Shwe regime in the coming months.

Of course, there are tertiary fall outs as well. The Tibetan agitation close on the heels of an “independent” Kosovo engineered by the NATO allies has larger implications. In the run up to the Taiwan elections, where the opposition Kuomintang party is rooting for closer links with China, the Tibetan agitation and Chinese crackdown have drawn strong reaction. There is even talk of Taiwanese athletes not participating in the Olympics. However, these are early days for the public opinion to gather mass in protest against the Chinese. Only the future will tell whether this happens or not. That would also depend upon how well the Chinese handle a tricky situation without loss of face when the Olympic flame lights up.

Lastly, the Buddhist monks appear to be increasingly asserting their political role in many countries. In Sri Lanka, already the monks’ party is an important factor of right wing politics to be counted among the hawks. In Myanmar, the Saffron agitation saw monks leading from the front triggering a nationwide agitation against military regime’s oppression. In Tibet, again the saffron clad monks are in the front lines of national confrontation. Is there a latent Buddhist fundamentalist upsurge in the offing, after Islamic, Christian, Jewish, and Hindu fundamentalists? Unlikely, but only time can tell.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail colhari@yahoo.com)

A panel discussion titled ‘War, Peace and Human Rights: Sri Lanka after the Eastern Elections’, was held on Friday, March 14th, on the sidelines of the Seventh Session of the Human Rights Council in Room XXIV of the Palais des Nations from 13:20 to 15:05. The discussion was moderated by Dr. Nalaka Mendis, Professor of Psychiatry, University of Colombo.

[Panel Discussion, Mar 14th-pic:LankaMission]

The panel consisted of H.E. Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka, Ambassador/Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN, Geneva, Ms. Shirani Goonatilleke, Director Legal, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process, Mr. W.J.S. Fernando, Deputy Solicitor-General, Attorney General’s Department, Mr. Yasantha Kodagoda, Deputy Solicitor-General, Attorney General’s Department.

Ambassador Jayatilleka who laid the framework for the discussion traced the history of the conflict and the many attempts made by successive Governments to find a political solution to the war that has been waged on the people of Sri Lanka for more than 25 years by the LTTE.

“The Sri Lankan state did not start the war but a war of aggression has been waged on it by a ruthless terrorist organization, the LTTE” he reminded the international audience of 30 representatives from Permanent Missions, civil society organizations and Sri Lankan professionals attached to international organizations.

The Ambassador who divided the conflict in Sri Lanka into two parts as pre-1987 and post-1987 said that in July 1987 following the signing of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord all other Tamil armed groups had renounced violence and agreed to enter the democratic mainstream in order to secure the rights of the Tamil minority. However, the LTTE did started waging a war against the Indian Peace Keeping Force, the IPKF, by October 1987.

Dr. Jayatilleka highlighted that it was incomprehensible to many international observers why the LTTE had repeatedly and unilaterally withdrawn from peace talks in which successive governments has agreed to a degree of autonomy and political devolution.

Following the election of President Mahinda Rajapakse in November 2005 the LTTE launched a series of unprovoked attacks on civilians, armed forces and political leaders in spite of the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) being in place.

Ambassador Jayatilleka repeatedly stressed that Sri Lanka which has been a functioning and vibrant democracy since 1931 has been under siege from the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) which has been described by the FBI as among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world, having perfected the use of suicide bombers, invented the suicide belt, pioneered the use of women in suicide attacks, murdered some 4,000 people in the past two years alone; and assassinated two world leaders-the only terrorist organization to do so.

“Sri Lanka is waging a just war to defend itself and this is allowed under international law”, he stressed.

Responding to questions from the audience, Ambassador Jayatilleka quipped about the “extraordinary rendition” of events contained in the recent U.S. State Department report on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka. The references in the report to paramilitaries were ironic given the experiences in Diyala and Anbar provinces in Iraq, where former Sunni fighters, referred to by some as paramilitaries, were now part of the stabilisation effort. This was even truer in other parts of Iraq such as Basrah, where power was handed over to armed Shiite personnel belonging to the government, but condemned by some as paramilitaries led by warlords. This reliance on so-called paramilitaries and the holding of elections under less than normal, even violent conditions was an inevitable feature of stabilisation efforts in conflict zones. Recently, when in South Asia, an election campaign was marred by suicide bombings and an Opposition Presidential candidate was killed by a suicide assassin, the West kept urging the holding of elections as the best answer to terrorism, but in Sri Lanka they urged exactly the opposite concerning our Eastern province.

Dr Jayatilleka explained Sri Lanka’s current disinclination to accede to the demand for a large scale standing presence of the OHCHR as arising from 3 reasons:

Firstly he explained that Sri Lanka was not an emerging democracy recently liberated from a one party democracy or military dictator ship. . Sri Lanka has had parliamentary democracy since 1931 and independence since 1948 and therefore had well-developed national institutions.

Secondly, he said that several counties which had field offices of the OHCHR advised Sri Lanka in discussions with the Minister of Human Rights and our delegation, that given their experience, and Sri Lanka’s situation, the most effective solution for Sri Lanka is to strengthen our national institutions.

Thirdly he said that many countries within the Human Rights Council had called for better regional representation and transparency of the OHCHR. Once this has been achieved, Sri Lanka may be able to consider a new equation with the Office, but until then certain questions did not arise.

Mr. Yasantha Kodagoda, Deputy Solicitor-General who updated the audience on the current state of military operations against the LTTE said that in April 2003 the LTTE has unilaterally abandoned peace talks, de facto withdrawn from the CFA and then committed a series of violations of the CFA including attacks on Mavil Aru and Muttur which were villages located in the Eastern Province and outside the control of the LTTE.

During the course of 2007 the Sri Lankan forces were engaged in clearing the Eastern Province of LTTE terrorist and liberated Vakarai and Toppigala with near zero civilian casualties, and to do so these operations required time, meticulous planning and implementation.

Mr. Kodagoda said the earlier this week the first round of local governments elections had been held in Batticoloa and those elections for the Eastern Provincial Council would be held in May as part of the commitment of the government of President Rajapakse to restore full civilian administration in the Province.

Referring to the current military operations being conducted in the Northern Province he said that the LTTE was now in control of only two and a half districts which are Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and a part of Mannar and that he was hopeful that the forces will be able to liberate these areas shortly from the illegal occupation of the LTTE.

Mr. Kodagoda once again stressed that the government and the forces are committed to avoiding civilian casualties, upholding human rights and protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

Ms. Shirani Goonatilleke, Director Legal, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process spoke on the multiple dimensions of the peace process in Sri Lanka. She stated that though the peace process had had through the many years of the conflict its ebbs and tides, it was never extinguished. She emphasized that it did not neatly fit into theories of conflict resolution and that this has contributed to at times a poor understanding of its complexity by observers.

Ms. Goonetilleke reminded the audience that the peace process in Northern Ireland had taken numerous years to reach fruition and that the Good Friday Agreement itself had taken almost three years to be concluded.

She outlined the confidence building and stabilization measures undertaken by the government including the process of striving to achieve political consensus engaged in by the All Party Representatives Committee (APRC) which is composed of political representatives of all ethnicities. Even those parties which have not participated had been allowed to make written submissions to the APRC.

In the Eastern Province the first batch of Tamil policemen and women had recently passed out. These recruits had been drawn from the local communities in the Eastern province and have been deployed back to serve their communities in yet another confidence building initiative.

Ms. Goonetillake who briefly explained other work undertaken by the Peace Secretariat. She spoke of programs inititated by the government to promote bilingualism and multilingualism as this was one of the most divisive issues in Sri Lanka. However, she was hopeful for the continuation of the dialogue in this critical area. She urged the audience to join in the quest for peace and justice.

Mr. W.J.S. Fernando, Deputy Solicitor-General said that the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka which is an independent institution and the apex court of the country had on several occasions in recent times reversed policies of the government, such as ordering the removal of security check points and also ordering the return of Tamils expelled from the lodges in Colombo. The government was even ordered to bear the cost of bringing them back to Colombo.

He also stated that expanded field presence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was unnecessary in Sri Lanka as it has robust institutions for the protection of fundamental and human right. However, he said that Sri Lanka could further benefit from capacity building and technical assistance in this area.

Mr. Fernando who expressed his skepticism about such an Office also reminded the audience to keep in mind the domestic repercussions of such an expanded OHCHR presence especially since the people in Sri Lanka had full faith in the national institutions.

“Given the recent negative experience with the IIGEP, we do not have the appetite for another international monitoring mission”, he said.

Further elaborating on the subject Mr. Yasantha Kodagoda, Deputy Solicitor-General said that the fundamental objection to the presence of an OHCHR field office in Sri Lanka was the lack of predetermined objective criteria that would determine whether a country’s situation warrants presence.

He also stated that such an Office would also have to bring tangible benefits to all communities of Sri Lanka.

Related: Sri Lanka: US Dept. of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices