federalidea.com

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Robert Browning’s My Last Duchess was a poem I read decades ago as a schoolboy. In the self-righteous narrative about his wife’s beautiful portrait, the Duke recites a litany of woes against her. Complaining loudly, he paints himself as the aggrieved party and places his dead wife in the dock.

At one point we realise that he had ordered her execution. Though the Duke tries to justify his action, it is he who stands condemned as the guilty one in the eyes of the reader.

The memory of My Last Duchess came back to me after I saw on TV, heard on radio and read in print the Great Heroes Day (GHD) address by Velupillai Prabakharan this year.

[The leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), V Prabakharan, on his annual Heroes' Day Speech - Nov 27, 2007]

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Leader, in his speech, was sharply critical of the Sinhala nation, state, political parties, India, the international community, etc., for the present predicament of the Sri Lankan Tamil people. The only unsullied entity in all this-according to Prabhakaran-is the LTTE.

Dead wrong

In this ‘us against the world’ kind of speech delivered in ‘a holier than thou’ style, Prabhakaran depicted the Tamil people as suffering underdogs. In that, he was spot on. But Prabhakaran was dead wrong when he heaped all the blame for this situation on others. The chief culprits are Prabhakaran himself and the LTTE.

Like Browning’s Duke trying to absolve himself for the crime he committed by accusing his wife, Prabhakaran too tries to absolve himself by condemning others. The Duke depicted himself as the victim and then blamed the real victim, the Duchess, for her fate; Prabhakaran points out that Tamils are being victimised but blames all others except the Tigers for this tragic situation.

Prabhakaran was not delivering an impartial and objective analysis of the current political situation. He was speaking in his capacity as LTTE Leader. His speech, therefore, was predictably lopsided. The partisan rhetoric was understandable from that perspective. It would however be a grave error to accept that GHD address as gospel truth. The revisionist rhetoric needs to be effectively challenged.

There are, however, some fundamental observations to be made before that. This year’s GHD address was the 19th of its kind. LTTE ideologue and political strategist Anton Balasingham authored 17 (1990-2006) of those. The first GHD speech in 1989 was an extempore one by Prabhakaran. Thereafter, all other speeches were written by Balasingham who passed away last year.

This year a team of LTTE ‘think tank’ members both within the Wanni and abroad collaborated in what was essentially a team effort. The speech was a virtual rehash of sentiments expressed in previous GHD speeches. When the BBC Tamil service radio interviewed me on November 27, I observed that “there was nothing new” in the speech.

Dreary and dull

Balasingham may have introduced a key element into the speech or presented it in such a way that would have enabled the address being perceived in a different, exciting light. In his absence, the new speech writers were apparently unprepared to try anything ‘new.’ So it was dreary and dull. Prabhakaran’s deadpan delivery did not help either.

Two further dampeners were Prabhakaran’s sorrow over Political Commissar Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan’s death. The LTTE Leader had cried when news of the death was conveyed to him by Pottu Amman and Pappa. Prabhakaran was accompanied by his son Charles Anthony when he paid his respects.

In a conspicuous departure from the past, Prabhakaran issued a special statement about Thamilselvan. The GHD speech too made special mention of him. None of the 20,000 LTTE ‘Great Heroes’ or ‘Maaveerar’ ever received such treatment.

If Thamilselvan was not killed, Prabhakaran may have stridently gone to town about the Anuradhapura attack. But the loss of his “loving younger brother” changed the situation.

The other dampener was the security situation. The Sri Lankan Air Force had conducted a series of aerial attacks throughout the week. In several instances, civilians were the victims. This prevented large-scale, public functions. Prabhakaran himself was a prize target.

So the usual public ceremony was scrapped and Prabhakaran participated in a low-key, clandestine one. His GHD address itself was pre-recorded. Thus, when the Air Force bombed the Voice of Tigers broadcasting station at H-hour thinking Prabhakaran was there, the Tiger Supremo was absent. Only a few cadres, civilians and civilian employees were killed or injured.

Ceasefire Agreement

There were other reasons too for the restrained tone and content of the GHD speech. Though a full-scale war is raging, neither the Government of Sri Lanka nor the LTTE have formally discarded the ceasefire. It remains like a ‘moth-eaten loin cloth.’

Despite all the bravura, neither side is willing to formally abandon the ceasefire. There is an inability or unwillingness to state certain matters. This was reflected in the GHD speech.

Another reason was the attempt to address different target audiences through one speech. LTTE cadres and supporters, the Sri Lankan Tamil people, Lankan Tamil diaspora, the larger worldwide Tamil community including those of Tamil Nadu, the Sinhala people and government, India and the international community, etc., were all addressed, in different degrees.

These constituencies were varied and the discourse required to address such constituencies were to some extent contradictory, constraining and countervailing factors. This resulted in an insipid ’sambaar.’

The ‘official English version’ provided by the LTTE may suggest a lack of direction or low morale on the part of the Tigers. But they say that the Devil is often in the details. In the case of Prabhakaran’s GHD speech, the crucial sentiments of the address are not translated into English. One has to go to the Tamil source to note those.

In this year’s speech, in the beginning, Prabhakaran waxes eloquently and poetically about the sacrifices and glories of the ‘Maaveerar’ or great hero martyrs. He describes them as the “wheels of history taking us speedily on the road to liberation.” Prabhakaran ends his speech with specific assertions.

No ambiguity

Prabhakaran vows that “we will continue to struggle on the path to liberation despite any amount of adversity or calamity as long as thousands of fighters are ready to fight with iron resolve.”

Prabhakaran also calls upon everyone to resolve on this GHD “to enshrine in their hearts the ideals for which the great heroes sacrificed themselves and pledge to struggle on until that ideal is achieved.”

What then is this ideal? Prabhakaran makes it clear at the end of his speech with the familiar refrain, “thirst of Tigers is the Tamil Eelam homeland.” No ambiguity here! No absence of aim here! No sense of frustrated desperation or desperate frustration either. Now, to the speech itself.

A glaring misconception or blatant error on the part of Prabhakaran is his inability to clearly distinguish between the Sinhala people, nation, state and regime. In this speech too he constantly refers to the Sinhala “nation” as an all-encompassing entity. He says the “Sinhala nation is moving on a path of destruction” and that “It is trying to destroy the Tamil nation and, in the process, it is destroying itself.”

Prabhakaran is wrong when he says the Sinhala nation is trying to destroy the Tamil nation as a whole. It is true that there is a lunatic fringe among Sinhalese which would like to destroy the Tamil people. Some of these elements are in positions of power under this government but it is unfair and incorrect to blame the Sinhala people in their entirety.

Also what about those Sinhalese who have consistently stood up for Tamil rights in spite of the risks involved?

Sinhala hostility

Sinhala hostility is mainly directed towards the LTTE and not the Tamil people. Many resent the break up of the country but accept that power has to be shared among all ethnicities. The Sinhala hawks equating devolution with division and unitary with unity are a different breed that has to be tackled separately.

The Rajapaksa regime wants to destroy the LTTE and many Sinhalese would like that too, but very few want to see the Tamil people destroyed. At the same time the Rajapaksa regime would like to undermine and dis-empower the Tamil people and for this it is likely to receive support from some Sinhala hardliners. But total destruction of the Tamil people is not on, as Prabhakaran says.

In addition, the Sinhalese are not the only ones who want to see the LTTE destroyed. Sections of the Tamil and Muslim people would also like it to happen for different reasons. So too would many Tamils in India and around the globe. Many segments of Indian and international society would like that to happen too. This too is about the LTTE and not the Tamil people.

But the LTTE for obvious reasons would like to hide behind the “Tamil nation” cover. Prabhakaran says the Sinhala nation, by trying to destroy the Tamil nation, is destroying itself in the process. There is no denying the fact that the Sri Lankan nation on the whole is destroying itself by this fratricidal conflict.

But what Prabhakaran ignores is the fact that the LTTE, by seeking to demolish the Sri Lankan state through war, is steadily diminishing and gradually destroying the Tamil people.

Then Prabhakaran speaks glowingly of Buddhism and laments that the Sinhala nation, despite following this philosophy for 2,000 years, remains “immersed in the poison of racism.”

Racism

In the first place, Sinhala cannot be equated with Buddhism alone just as much as Tamil cannot be done so with Hinduism alone. There are Christians on either side of the ethnic divide.

Hinduism too preaches tolerance and non-violence like Buddhism. Followers of Hinduism too are engaging in violence like their Buddhist counterparts. Likewise, there are Christians in both the Sri Lankan armed forces as well as the LTTE. There have been armed Muslim groups too.

Therefore, violence in this country is not the sole monopoly of one religion alone and violent elements among Buddhists are not the only ones violating core beliefs and tenets of their religion.

If the Sinhala people are to be blamed collectively for the poison of racism, then what excuse is there for the poison of racism among Tamils? How does one explain, let alone justify, the mass expulsion of Muslims, massacres at mosques, misappropriation of Muslim owned property, massacres of young Buddhist monks, attacks on the Dalada Maligawa and sacred Bo tree, among others?

The LTTE Leader also observes thus: “During the long history of the Tamil struggle, first through non-violence and later through armed struggle, the Sinhala mindset has remained unchanged. The Sinhala nation did not change even after so much destruction and lost lives. It continues on the path of violence. It only desires to find a solution to the Tamil question through military might and oppression. It cunningly evaded efforts to seek peace and is boldly taking forward its military plan.”

Selective view

This is a selective view of recent history by Prabhakaran. It is certainly true that Sinhala dominated governments were intransigent and unwilling to concede Tamil rights when non-violent protests were made. The few agreements reached were observed mainly in the breach.

The violent political struggle of the Tamils spearheaded by the LTTE succeeded in bringing about a change of heart in the power corridors of Colombo.

The last days of J.R. Jayewardene, the earlier phases of Premadasa and Kumaratunga rule, and Ranil Wickremesinghe’s prime ministerial tenure were all periods where the Sinhala leadership tried to make amends for past mistakes. Efforts were taken to achieve a political settlement.

The present Rajapaksa government is a war-mongering regime. But in fairness to Mahinda Rajapaksa, was he ever given ‘time’ to resolve the crisis peacefully?

It is grossly misleading for Prabhakaran to say the “Sinhala mindset remains unchanged.” No! It displayed many instances of flexibility and a desire to change. The silent majority among both the Sinhala and Tamil people is not for war but peace and justice through political negotiations.

The spoiler on the Tamil side has been the LTTE. It is the Tiger mindset which remains unchanged. It is the LTTE that did not change its mind despite Tamil destruction and loss of lives; it was the LTTE that continued on the path of violence instead of the path of peaceful settlement; it was the LTTE that relied on its so-called military might to resolve the Tamil question; and it was the LTTE that cunningly evaded efforts to seek peace and boldly pursued its military plan.

Indian dimension

The Tiger Supremo also chides the international community for letting itself be deceived by the Sinhala state. He refers to both India as well as the international community in this respect. Let me focus on the India dimension first.

This is what the Tiger Supremo says about Indian involvement:

“These one-sided involvements of foreign powers are not new in our prolonged struggle. India intervened in our national question then as part of its regional expansion. India signed an accord with the Sinhala state without the consent of the Tamils. The Indo-Lanka Accord was not signed to meet the aspirations of the people of Tamil Eelam. In fact, India then attempted to force an ineffectual solution on our people-a solution which did not even devolve powers to the extent of the Banda-Chelva pact signed in the 1950s.

“India tried to enforce that accord with the strength of more than 100,000 Indian forces, with the power of the agreement between two countries and with the assistance of treacherous Tamil paramilitary groups. However, even this ill-considered solution, which did not even address the basic national aspirations of the Tamils, was blocked by the chauvinistic Sinhala State.”

Prabhakaran’s utterance about the Indian role in Sri Lanka is like the proverbial saying about trying to hide a whole pumpkin in a plate of rice. We have heard of history being revised.

But it is grotesquely absurd for Prabakharan to distort events that took place only two decades ago. Many of us who witnessed what happened then are still around.

Indian intervention

Prabhakaran is partially correct when he says India intervened as part of its regional expansion. It was not, however, the only reason. Furthermore, the complicated factors involved cannot be explained so simplistically.

Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was primarily due to its enlightened self-interest. All states act in terms of their self-interest. But there are instances where there is a congruence of interests with different entities.

If the overall purpose is a good cause, then such interventions are benign. National sovereignty can be overridden.

Tanzania’s role in disposing of the tyrant Idi Amin in Uganda, Vietnam’s role in undermining the brutal Pol Potist regime in Kampuchea and India’s help in mid-wifing the birth of Bangladesh, etc., are some instances of benign intervention.

In the case of Bangladesh, it is no secret that New Delhi’s strategic interest was the dismembering of Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the oppression of East Pakistan by West Pakistan made humane intervention inevitable and justifiable.

Sri Lanka too was beset by problems in the ’80s. India’s intention here was to unite and not divide, as in Bangladesh. A rare combination of factors influenced India vis-a-vis Sri Lanka then.

Contributing factors

Firstly, there was the paranoia about the Jayewardene regime being in the US camp. New Delhi was suspicious about a Washington-Tel Aviv-Islamabad axis. India wanted external influences out of its backyard. So India wanted to clean up the mess here.

Secondly, there was the Tamil Nadu factor. The state, which once had a flourishing separatist movement, was now firmly integrated into the Indian fabric. Continuing anti-Tamil violence in the island was likely to cause unrest there. The presence of thousands of Tamil refugees on Indian soil provided the locus standi for Indian involvement.

Thirdly, there was the personality factor. There was pronounced antipathy between Indira Gandhi and Jayewardene. The TULF had been sympathetic towards her during the years Indira was in opposition. The UNP regime had cosied up to Indira’s bete noir Morarji Desai.

In such a situation, India wanted to resolve the situation here. In a bid to pressure Colombo and also prop up the weaker Tamil side, New Delhi trained and armed Tamil militants. This, however, was a device to exert pressure and nothing more. India’s policy in this was cruelly Kautilyan. Both Sinhalese and Tamils were victims.

But if handled properly, there would have been light at the end of the tunnel. Jayewardene displayed commendable statesmanship and revised his policy towards New Delhi. By stooping slightly, he salvaged the country from chaos and ultimately snatched victory from the jaws of defeat.

But the LTTE, on the other hand, went about it the wrong way. After agreeing initially, though with reluctance, the LTTE then went back on its word.

Indo-Lanka Accord

Though a separate state was out, it was in the best interests of the Tamil people to go in for an India-guaranteed political settlement. But the LTTE revolted and ultimately snatched political defeat from the jaws of victory for the Tamils.

Prabhakaran is not being truthful when he says that the Indo-Lanka Accord did not have the consent of the Tamils. There was consent-grudgingly or reluctantly-but there was consent. The TULF, PLOTE, EPRLF, TELO and EROS signed a document enabling New Delhi to sign on their behalf. They also submitted some reservations.

The LTTE too consented overtly. As a result, the LTTE was given a monthly grant of Indian Rupees 50 million. The Tigers were also given pride of place in the interim administrative council. In a touching expression of India guaranteeing Tamil security, Rajiv Gandhi personally presented Prabhakaran with a bullet-proof vest.

If Prabhakaran were to read his famous Sudumalai speech after his return from India, he would find that he has implicitly stated his acceptance of the accord. He also predicted in the speech that Sinhala racism would devour the agreement. Ultimately, it was the LTTE that stymied the accord from being implemented properly.

Prabhakaran also observes that India tried to impose a solution that did not even have the powers proposed through the Banda-Chelva pact of the ’50s. The LTTE Leader is either an ignoramus or charlatan to make such a comment. I do not think the self-styled national leader of the Tamils is an ignoramus.

B-C pact

In the first place, the B-C pact of 1957 did not outline specific powers to be devolved to the periphery. The pact was only an embodiment of agreed principles in the spheres of decentralised administration, language, land alienation, etc. There was much work to be done in terms of administration and legislation on the basis of principles enunciated in the B-C pact.

This was not done and the pact was unilaterally abrogated by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. One cannot therefore compare the B-C pact of 1957 to the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987.

His dismissal of the Indo-Lanka pact as worthless deserves strong criticism. The Indo-Lanka pact was not without its flaws. It was not perfect either, but it did go a long way in accommodating Tamil aspirations and redressing grievances.

The accord acknowledged for the first time that Sri Lanka was a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual nation; it recognised the Northern and Eastern Provinces as areas of historic habitation of the Tamil and Muslim people; it merged temporarily the Northern and Eastern Provinces into a single Tamil linguistic province with the proviso of a referendum to determine its final status; it brought about the establishment of devolutionary units of power in the form of provincial powers; and it also elevated Tamil as an official language of Sri Lanka

The Indo-Lanka Accord was not perfect, but it did go a long way by way of helping to resolve Tamil problems. A responsible Tamil organisation would have cooperated with India to help implement it. Instead, the LTTE began sabotaging and then opposing the accord.

LTTE at fault

Prabhakaran also accuses the chauvinist Sinhala state of blocking the agreement. Once again, he has omitted reference to the LTTE’s own role in this exercise. It was the LTTE that began targeting north east provincial councillors and bureaucrats in a bid to disrupt its smooth functioning.

The Tigers aligned with Ranasinghe Premadasa, the head of this so called “chauvinist Sinhala state,” and fought the Indian Army that was stationed in Sri Lanka to ensure, among other things, the smooth functioning of the North East Provincial Council.

After getting aid from Premadasa to fight the IPKF, the LTTE got him to send the Indian Army away. The Tigers then exterminated the civilian volunteer force set up by the Indians. Then it exerted pressure on Premadasa to dissolve the North East Provincial Council. [To be continued next week]

[D.B.S. Jeyaraj can be reached at djeyaraj@federalidea.com]

Related:Great Heroes Day Speech 2007: Rhetoric and Reality-2

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Operation Carpet Arrest

Tamil people living in Colombo, suburbs and several outstation areas underwent a humiliating ordeal last week. In what seemed a Lankan variation of a Western cattle roundup, more than 3,000 Tamils were rounded up and herded into various places of detention over a three-day period.

Their inalienable human rights were callously violated and human dignity shattered. In one deliberate move, the Rajapaksa regime showed Tamils that they were indeed the children of a lesser God without even ‘third class’ rights.

There was no mention in the media about any code name for this inhumane exhibition of state power. It was a coordinated exercise involving 18,000 Police and Security personnel and so deserves a military nomenclature.

[Mano Ganesan MP]

Western People’s Front Colombo District MP Mano Ganesan voiced Tamil sentiments when he described it as “Operation Carpet Arrest.”

Collective punishment

Nobody denies that the government is well within its rights to mount security operations to ensure the protection of the people. What is disputed here is how it is being done.

The mass-scale arrests and detention of Tamils is not the best way to protect the people. Inflicting humiliation on a whole people as a form of collective punishment clearly violates international humanitarian law.

The presumption of innocence unless proven guilty is the bedrock of our judicial system. In this case, it was the other way around. Tamil people were presumed to be guilty unless proved innocent.

There were no prescriptory standards regulating the manner and mode of arrest. Sinhala speaking persons in uniform had the power to arrest or detain any Tamil-speaking person for “some, any or no reason” at all. Such is the power of the Emergency Regulations.

It was only some time ago that the Attorney General’s Department laid down some principles and procedures for Police personnel to follow in arresting and detaining persons on suspicion for complicity in terrorism.

All those directives were disregarded in the latest operation, where the rights of Tamil civilians were trampled upon ruthlessly.

If one were to trace the origins of this ‘mass arrest’ phenomenon, one must go back to the early days of the Rajapaksa presidency where Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) strongman and retired Police DIG H.M.G.B. Kotakadeniya was ruling the roost as defence advisor.

[An unidentified ethnic Tamil woman, suspected to be a suicide bomber, waits by the road side as a Sri Lankan Army soldier with the bomb disposal unit, unseen, examines an ambulance for explosives, near the National Hospital in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Wednesday, Dec. 5, 2007. Police searched an ambulance and the Tamil woman traveling in it for explosives, but found nothing.
[Courtesy: AP Photo/Gemunu Amarasinghe via Yahoo! News]

Kotakadeniya’s legacy

Kotakadeniya, during Chandrika Kumaratunga’s presidency, was in charge of Colombo. Under his directive, the Police, aided by the Army, began mass-scale arrests. Hundreds of Tamils were rounded up. The Police stations were overflowing with Tamils arrested on suspicion.

Saumyamoorthy Thondaman was a cabinet minister. The CWC and TULF were supporting the government from opposition ranks then. The CWC and TULF took up the issue with Kumaratunga. Neelan Tiruchelvam also had a plan of flooding the courts with writs of habeas corpus and fundamental rights petitions.

A meeting with then Attorney General Sarath N. Silva (current Chief Justice) was held. Soon the arrests ceased and those detained were released.

Kotakadeniya himself was transferred out. He was also denied promotion as IGP. Adding salt to Kotakadeniya’s wounds was the fact that a Tamil, Anandarajan, was made the new IGP.

An aggrieved Kotakadeniya put in his papers for retirement. He soon became a Sihala Urumaya (precursor of JHU) activist. The Sinhala supremacist agenda of the party was appealing to people like Kotakadeniya. He became the senior vice president of the JHU.

With the emergence of Rajapaksa as President, the JHU began tasting political power. Kotakadeniya became senior defence adviser. Soon it became obvious to Tamils in Colombo that “Kotaka was back,” because the old practice of rounding up Tamils en masse to Police stations was resumed.

Once again there was an outcry. This time the Tamil parties who had supported Ranil Wickremesinghe were yet in the opposition and had no political clout.

But mercifully for the Tamils, several diplomats representing powerful nations on a global and regional level exerted pressure on President Rajapaksa. The mass-scale detentions ceased.

Nightmare

But this Orwellian nightmare was not a thing of the past for Tamils. In the middle of this year, hundreds of Tamils staying in metropolitan lodges and boarding houses were rounded up. They were herded into buses and sent to the north and east.

Once again there was an outcry. Several human rights organisations condemned the move. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) went to court seeking justice.

The Supreme Court was remarkably benevolent. In a commendable order, the bench ruled that the expelled people be brought back to Colombo. Courts also prohibited further such action.

Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa was furious. Despite widespread condemnation, the Presidential sibling began defending the mass expulsions in the name of national security.

For Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, individual liberties as well as group rights were something to be infringed upon when national security was at real or imagined peril.

It is against this backdrop that the current phenomenon has to be viewed. In terms of sequence, one must first refer to an intriguing circular sent out by Senior Superintendent of Police Tennekoon to Police stations in the Nugegoda and Nawala areas on November 10.

SSP Tennekoon inquired from the Police officers in charge of these stations as to why there was “inaction” in arresting Tamil residents in their areas on “suspicion.”

Newspapers published news items in the last week of November about UNP MP Ravi Karunanayake raising queries about this circular. There was no official response to Karunanayake.

Narahenpita blast

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran delivered his annual Great Heroes Day address on November 27. He concluded by asserting that the Tigers would continue to struggle for their ideals. Prabhakaran ended his speech by saying in Tamil, “thirst of the Tigers is the Tamil Eelam homeland.”

On the following morning, November 28, there was an explosion at the Social Services Ministry office in Narahenpita. It was announced that a young woman had exploded herself when she was about to be searched.

It was said that according to her NIC, she was 24-year-old Sujeinthra Megamannan from Anandapuliyankulam in Vavuniya. It was believed that the real target was EDPD Leader and Social Services Minister Douglas Devananda.

In the evening another incident occurred. The security guards at the No Limit shopping centre in Nugegoda discovered a suspicious looking parcel, with wires jutting out, which they suspected was a bomb. There are two versions about how the bomb came there.

According to news reports, a man in shorts had handed it over at the entrance and obtained a token. He had then gone in and suddenly turned back and gone away without taking the parcel. An alert security guard had noted this and tried to call the man back but failed.

The second version was provided by Cabinet Minister Jeyaraj Fernandopulle. According to Fernandopulle, a woman had handed over the parcel at the entrance.

No Limit blast

The Police were notified of the suspected parcel bomb thrice but failed to turn up even after half an hour. A traffic policeman on the road was then informed.

The well-meaning cop came and wanted a pair of scissors to cut the wire. He also had an announcement made that people should come and take away their parcels as a parcel bomb was suspected.

Even as people gathered at the counter to retrieve their parcels, the policeman was seen fiddling with the parcel. And then the bomb exploded, killing and injuring many innocent people. Except for two or three Muslims, all the victims were Sinhala.

No Limit itself was in the news some months ago at the height of the “abduction for ransom” crisis. The Muslim owners were abducted and a hefty sum demanded for release. Representations were made to a powerful person and a compromise was allegedly reached.

A portion of the money demanded was paid. But like most abducted businessmen, a deafening silence was maintained about what had happened.

The two bomb incidents on the same day caused great embarrassment to the Rajapaksa regime. The government had been projecting the impression that the LTTE was on the verge of oblivion as a result of successful military action.

This was incorrect. Several commentators including this columnist have consistently stated that the Tigers are down but not out. Government propaganda however painted a rosy picture of the LTTE being on the run.

Three types of violence

The Anuradhapura attack dented this image but the successful air strike killing Tiger Political Commissar Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan helped restore the government image.

After the fall of Kudumbimalai/Toppigala, analysts had predicted that the LTTE would conduct three types of violence in the future.

The LTTE would fight like a conventional militia in defending territory in the north; the Tigers would fight like a guerrilla movement by engaging in hit and run tactics in the east; the Tigers would engage in terrorist actions like assassinations and bomb attacks on civilian targets in Colombo and the south.

While the first two aspects were visible in the north and east, the third was not happening in Colombo. This lull in southern violence was attributed to the efficiency of the security apparatus. The Tiger elements had been weeded out and Colombo effectively sealed off security-wise, it was felt.

It was reported recently that Gotabhaya had made statements to that effect at a gathering where his brother, the President, was present. The elder sibling had reportedly thumped the table when his younger brother made this pronouncement.

The two bombs burst that illusion. Apart from the increased security threat, there was also concern about the political fallout. Since most of the Nugegoda victims were Sinhalese, a backlash against the government was feared. The UNP and JVP could exploit this, it was feared.

It was therefore necessary for a massive ‘diversion’ to contain or deflect this potential threat. What was required from the government perspective was not merely strengthening of security arrangements but making an elaborate ’show’ that action was being taken against the suspected perpetrators-the LTTE.

Presumed guilty

Now the Tigers, allegedly responsible for the acts, were nowhere to be seen. The perpetrators had vanished but ordinary, innocent Tamil were blatantly visible. Tigers were Tamil, so by extension all Tamils were potential Tigers.

All Tamils were presumed guilty and the onus was on the Tamil people themselves to prove their innocence.

In another sense, Tamils had to bear vicarious responsibility for the alleged actions of the LTTE. The fact that a whole lot of innocent Tamils were going to suffer did not matter.

Under the Rajapaksa regime, most Tamils are treated as an inferior species. Besides, were not the victims at Nugegoda innocent civilians? What did it matter if innocent civilians were rounded up and detained en masse?

On November 29, various road blocks were erected in Colombo and random checks proliferated. Sniffer dogs were running all over Colombo. All vehicles entering Colombo were stopped and checked. Within Colombo, sudden roadblocks were set up and route changes ordered.

There was collective punishment for northern Tamils too. The trains plying to Vavuniya from Colombo were subjected to a change. All trains were to stop and start from Medawachchiya.

The Omanthai entry/exit point on the A-9 highway was closed. People wishing to travel outside the LTTE controlled regions had to go through a complicated red tape procedure where applications had to be sent through the grama niladhari-divisional secretary-GA route to the military authority in Vavuniya to obtain permits.

Rounds-ups and arrests

The round-ups and arrests began on Friday, November 30 and continued until Sunday, December 2. Most areas of Colombo and suburban areas were subjected to security action. A house-to-house search of Tamil residences was done from Narahenpita to Nugegoda.

Businesses in Keyzer Street, Main Street, and the First to Fourth Cross Streets were cordoned off and searched. Tamil employees, customers and even passers-by were detained. They were publicly humiliated by being forced to stand on the road for hours and hours.

The arrests increased over the weekend. People were taken from their homes during night and day. People were plucked from vehicles; they were picked up on the roads at random; they were arrested at checkpoints.

In many instances, the criterion for arrest seemed to be ethnicity alone. This resulted in many Tamils staying at home without daring to venture outside for fear of arrest.

It soon became apparent that there was really no uniform methodology being followed. People without NICs were arrested. But a large number of people with proper ID cards were also arrested.

Tamils were hit both ways. The absence of an NIC was an offence but having one was also a liability if one’s birthplace was the north or east.

Most of those taken in were young men and women but some in the older age category were also taken. A few students, all of them minors, were arrested. In Borella, a mother and her two children were arrested. In many instances, young parents were taken away while the children languished.

Heart-wrenching

The worst thing was that no family member or relative was informed officially of the arrest. People assumed that their dearest ones were arrested if they failed to turn up.

Elderly parents and relatives gathered outside almost all Police stations in Colombo to ask about their kith and kin. It was a heart-wrenching sight to see those suffering people.

The Police stations were crowded. Arrested persons could not sleep because they were packed like sardines. Toilets were full. Food and water was not given to those arrested for many, many hours.

In Colpetty, about 400 were taken to a school. In Wellawatte, around 300 were taken to a school. They were detained and interrogated there.

Similar round-ups were done in Negombo, Puttalam, Malwana, Biyagama and Matale too. On Sunday, buses coming to Colombo from the up country areas were stopped at various places and several youth were arrested. A large number of Indian Tamils were arrested in Colombo and suburbs too.

Many of those arrested, both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils, had been residing in Colombo for many, many years. Most of them were working or studying in Colombo. They had all the proper identification. Yet they were detained. This included some schoolmasters and domestic employees too.

This is also the time when devotees of Sabarimalai Shree Aiyappan Temple in Kerala observe the Maharajyothi Viratham. These devotees wear black clothes during this time. Ignorant Policemen were suspicious and harshly questioned whether they were Black Tigers.

Many of the Policemen were candid enough to admit that the exercise was being done on the orders of the Defence Ministry. Some said that apart from government officials, businessmen and top professionals, all other Tamils would be systematically “cleaned out” of Colombo.

Another feature was the presence of pre-signed detention orders in bulk at cop shops. The Police had to simply fill them out and detain people. Some were produced in courts and sent to Kalutara jail but others were detained at Boossa in Galle.

Walk to Temple Trees

A pathetic scene went on in Kotahena where about 150 relatives gathered-100 arrested youth were to be sent in buses to Boossa. UNP Colombo District MP T. Maheswaran and Up Country People’s Front (UPF) Deputy Minister P. Radhakrishnan also arrived there. Howling parents complained to them, but the buses proceeded to Boossa as scheduled.

The two MPs contacted President Rajapaksa, who asked them to bring the distraught family members to him. So the people began walking to Temple Trees, but were stopped near the Taj Samudra Hotel. A large contingent of Army and Riot Squad personnel converged on the spot.

The MPs then phoned the President again and were told that the President would not meet them. Senior DIG N. Illangakoon would meet the family members, it was said. After waiting for a while, they were informed that the DIG would not meet them either. Thereafter, the weeping relatives were put on buses and sent back to Kotahena.

Maheswaran took some relatives on Sunday to Boossa. He later told the media that there were altogether 410 detainees in Boossa-359 were males and 51 females. The place was overcrowded and people were not given meals, he said.

Meanwhile, Western People’s Front Colombo District MP Mano Ganesan began informing all diplomatic missions of what was happening. The international media, as well as human rights organisations, were also alerted by Ganesan. He also began collecting particulars of those arrested.

CWC General Secretary Arumugam Thondaman and UPF Leader Periyasamy Chandrasekaran contacted President Rajapaksa from Kotagala and Talawakelle over the weekend.

President Rajapaksa gave appointments to both cabinet ministers on Monday, December 3. Thondaman brought 30 relatives of arrested persons to meet the President for a photo opportunity.

With the Emergency extension voting scheduled for Thursday, November 6, and the third reading of the Budget on December 14, the votes of CWC and UCPF were crucial. This made the President promise that people of up country Tamil origin would be promptly released.

International pressure

More importantly, international pressure was being exerted on President Rajapaksa. Tamils in Sri Lanka are grateful for the quiet diplomacy practised by several missions in Colombo. Tamils are also appreciative of the telephonic efforts made at higher levels from a friendly neighbour.

‘Operation Carpet Arrest’ was now blowing up in the face of the government. While a certain number of detainees had been gradually released in trickles, the order now went out for mass releases, in a sharp reversal.

An earlier plan to transport 750 detenues to Boossa was aborted. Gotabhaya’s ‘Chinthana’ of keeping Tamils away from Colombo was going awry.

Tamils were now released in large batches, thus enabling Minister Jeyaraj Fernandopulle to announce in Parliament that the bulk of the arrested persons were now free. The figures he gave, however, are disputed and regarded as inaccurate. According to unofficial estimates, around 3,200 and not 2,554 –as alleged by Fernandopulle-were arrested.

Some of the arrested persons were produced in courts and released. By Friday, December 7, it appeared that only about 100 of the arrested persons were being detained. Ganesan is now compiling a list of all released persons.

Fresh anxiety

The releases have brought relief to families but also caused fresh anxiety. It is the practice in the north east for released detainees to be assassinated by paramilitaries and intelligence operatives. It is feared that some of those released may be killed by ‘unknown’ persons in the near future.

The arrests have demoralised the community at large. Many of those detained have been shattered by the experience.
Several plantation area youths have vowed never to return to Colombo again. Many Tamil families are renewing efforts to leave Sri Lanka.”

This humiliating experience has been terrible. The biggest fear is that this type of mass arrest operation may occur again and again in the future.

The CPA and CWC have filed fundamental right petitions over this issue. It remains to be seen as to how the Supreme Courts will deal with them.

The recent ruling on roadblocks in Colombo has earned the Chief Justice a lot of respect. Helpless Tamils, both affected and afraid, are looking up to the Judiciary for respite at this critical juncture.

[D.B.S. Jeyaraj can be reached at djeyaraj@federalidea.com]

V. Suryanarayan

The unprecedented November 2007 demonstration by Malaysian Indians before the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur, under the sponsorship of the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf), has brought into sharp focus the pathetic situation in which the Indian community finds itself today. Hindraf, a coalition of 30 non-governmental organisations, is committed to the preservation and promotion of Hindu identity in Malaysia. The coalition had been agitating against what it calls the unofficial policy of temple demolition and the steady introduction of Sharia-based law.

The memorandum submitted to the British High Commission demanded that the United Kingdom should move a resolution in the United Nations condemning the “ethnic cleansing” taking place in Malaysia. It also wanted the issue to be taken to the World Court and the International Criminal Court of Justice. In August 2007, Malaysian Indians moved to approach the British courts demanding a compensation of $4 trillion — which works out to $1 million per Malaysian Indian — for bringing their forefathers as indentured labourers and failing to protect their rights and interests on the eve of Malayan independence.

The Malaysian government, true to its authoritarian traditions, refused permission for holding the rally, arrested the leaders, and used tear gas and water cannon to disperse the demonstrators. The leaders of Hindraf should know that historical wrongs perpetrated during the colonial era like the indenture system cannot be undone. Presumably, their objective is to highlight the increasing marginalisation of the Indian community in the social, economic, political, and cultural life of Malaysia.

At the end of the Second World War, the ‘Indians’ (the term today includes Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Nepalese, and Sri Lankans) constituted about 14 per cent of Malaya’s population. A number of them returned to India during the communist insurgency and the time of troubles that followed the communal riots of May 1969. By 2000, Indians numbered 1.8 million, representing 7.7 per cent of the Malaysian population of 21.89 million. Approximately 80 per cent of them were Tamils. North Indians (mainly Sikhs) constituted 7.7 per cent; Malayalis 4.7 per cent; Telugus 3.4 per cent; Sri Lankan Tamils 2.7 per cent, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 1.1 per cent; and others 0.4 per cent. Religion-wise, Hindus comprised 81.2 per cent of the Malaysian Indian population; Christians 8.4 per cent; Muslims 6.7 per cent; Sikhs 3.1 per cent; Buddhists 0.5 per cent; and others 0.1 per cent.

Statue of Lord Murugan at Batu Caves, Malaysia – [Pic By charlietyack]

We should make a distinction between the Indian middle class (mainly non-Tamils and Sri Lankan Tamils) whose standard of living is fairly high and the working class (mainly Tamil), which is poor and getting marginalised. The working class is drawn from Dalit and other non-privileged sections of society. They continue to be weighed down by low social esteem, a condition made worse by a lack of interaction between the well off and the less well off.

A notable feature of the Indian community is its changing socio-economic profile. In 1970, 47 per cent of the Indians were engaged in agriculture, 74 per cent of them in the plantations. With rapid economic expansion and diversification, plantations have been converted for other purposes, including the construction of luxury homes. The uprooted Indians were only paid a pittance as compensation. They naturally migrated to urban areas and joined the squatter population. A few years ago, Samy Velu, president of the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), deplored the plight of thousands of estate workers “living in squalor in slums in dozens of long-houses and squatter settlements all over Selangor.”

A few years ago, Aliran, the journal of the Malaysian reform movement, provided statistical details that made disturbing reading: 40 per cent of serious crimes in Malaysia were committed by Indians; there were 38 Indian-based gangs with 1,500 active members; Indians contributed the highest number of those detained under the Emergency Regulations and banished to Simpang Rengamm prison. In Kuala Lumpur, 14 per cent of the squatters were Indians; they had the highest suicide rates; 41 per cent of vagrants and beggars were Indians; and 20 per cent of child abusers and 14 per cent of juvenile delinquents were Indians.

The Indian-Malay communal clashes that took pace in March 2001, the worst since May 1969, sent shock waves through Malaysia. Ethnic tensions in Malaysia are generated mainly by Sino-Malay rivalry but the heavy Indian involvement in 2001 (five of the six killed were Indians and the other was an Indonesian) was a sad reminder that in Malaysia’s progress towards prosperity Indians were being left behind.

The disadvantaged status is clearly visible in the economic sphere. The Chinese are firmly entrenched in trade, business, and industry. They are apparently reconciled to a subordinate status in political life; at the same time, they have sharpened their entrepreneurial skills and become indispensable. The status of Malays has improved steadily as a result of the energetic drive of the Malaysian government since the days of the New Economic Policy.

The deplorable status of Indian Tamils is directly related to poor educational attainments. Although the Malaysian government has expanded educational facilities in a big way since independence, the fruits of education have not percolated to the most disadvantaged sections of the Indian population. Tamil medium primary schools are in a sorry state. A single teacher handling multiple classes, ill-equipped schools with teachers lacking commitment, and high dropout rates are some of the serious drawbacks. Family life is characterised by alcoholism, violence against women, and addiction to Tamil TV channels. Obviously, all this does not provide a congenial atmosphere for study. As a result, only limited numbers of Tamil children are able to go to university.

Compounding the complex situation is a general perception that the government is not serious about preventing the destruction of Hindu temples. In the midst of fast-changing lifestyles in Malaysia, temples and religious festivals are the only visible attachment to traditions and the Indians cling to them tenaciously.

There is a close nexus between religion and Malay politics and the policies of the Malaysian government have proved to be double-edged. On the one hand, the leaders of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) are committed to the promotion of Islam in all possible ways. Such a policy is judged to be necessary to mobilise Malays under the UMNO banner. Else the Malays might flock to the Partai Islam (PAS) for leadership and inspiration. At the same time, the realities of Malaysia and the needs of modernisation dictate that the government must encourage a less exclusivist approach towards Islam. When the desecration of Hindu temples began in 1978, the most notable incident being the destruction of the Murugan temple in Kerling, Prime Minister Hussein Onn came down heavily on Islamic extremists. But the situation has been allowed to drift during recent years. According to Hindraf, a Hindu temple is demolished in Malaysia every three weeks, the latest outrage being the demolition of the Mariamman temple in Shah Alam.

Factional feud

The question should be legitimately asked — how effective is the Malaysian Indian Congress, which represents the Indian community in the Malaysian government, in living up to its primary ideal of safeguarding the interests of the Indian community? An Indian observer of the Malaysian scene cannot but come to a downbeat conclusion. Factional struggle and disunity have been the lot of the Indian community for six decades now. The fight for power, petty politicking, and mudslinging have been its major attributes. It is an unrelieved tale of strong man rivalry and factionalism within the MIC: Devaser vs Sambandan; Sambandan vs Manickavasagam; Manickavasagam vs Samy Velu; Samy Velu vs Padmanabhan vs Subramaniam vs Pandithar.

Self-help measures initiated by the MIC with much fanfare, have not led to any worthwhile results. For example, the Maika Holdings Bhd, started in 1982 as an investment vehicle for Malaysian Indians, incurred heavy losses, resulting in the wipe-out of the savings of a large number of indigent Indians.

Recent events in Malaysia have naturally attracted the attention of Indian leaders. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and Foreign Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee have all expressed concern over the recent turn of events in Malaysia. They have made it clear that the objective is not to interfere in the internal affairs of a friendly country but only to influence the Malaysian government to initiate immediate steps for the redress of long-pending grievances. The Malaysian official response has been unfortunate. Representatives of the Malaysian government, including the Prime Minister, have demanded that the Government of India and the Government of Tamil Nadu keep off an internal matter of Malaysia.

What is the record of the Malaysian government in this respect? As a leading member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Malaysian government has sharply criticised many governments for pursuing policies that have adversely affected the Muslim communities. UMNO and PAS, the two leading Malay parties, have on several occasions since independence criticised the policies of the Thai government, which has led to the alienation of the Malay minority in southern Thailand. Malay leaders have also criticised the government of Singapore for pursuing allegedly discriminatory policies against the Malay minority in the island. Malaysian official criticism of India, for intruding into its internal affairs, certainly sounds strange.

(Dr. V. Suryanarayan is a retired Senior Professor and Director of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras.)

By Tissa Jayatilaka

I offer the following comments as a citizen of our deeply troubled country with the caveat that my places of work be not held responsible in any way for them.

I was present at an event held on the 15th of November organised by the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, The United Nations Country Office in Sri Lanka and the UNDP Regional Office for Asia to mark the UN Day that fell on 24 October. The event centred round a lecture by Jayantha Dhanapala followed by a brief ceremony to release a new book. Mr. Dhanapala spoke on the UN and the rights, responsibilities and obligations of its member states with particular emphasis on Sri Lanka. This presentation, as indeed all such made by Mr. Dhanapala usually are, was balanced, nuanced and well crafted. During the lecture, Mr. Dhanapala re-iterated the urgent need for Sri Lanka to respond to criticism and warnings from the international community instead of merely seeking to react to them in knee-jerk fashion. Sri Lanka, as a member state of the UN, needs to heed the message of that world body instead of trying to shoot the messenger is in essence what Mr. Dhanapala sought to convey to his audience. As some of us are rather painfully aware certain senior officials of the UN who have visited Sri Lanka in recent months to carry out their official duties as international civil servants have not been afforded the customary traditional Sri Lankan hospitality. Rather they have been abused and dubbed ‘terrorists’ by loose cannons and hurrah boys of our political establishment. Detailing Sri Lanka’s rights, responsibilities and obligations as a member state of the UN, Mr. Dhanapala drew attention, among other things, to R2P(Responsibility to Protect). R2P is a concept that was discussed at length by Gareth Evans, the former Australian Foreign Minister and the present President of the International Crisis Group based in New York, while delivering the eighth Neelan Tiruchelvam Memorial Lecture on 29 July, 2007, at the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall (BMICH) in Colombo.

During the Q & A period following the lecture, Minister G.L. Peiris who was also in the audience intervened not actually to ask a question but instead to make an ‘extended comment’ (for which we gather he has been given a Presidential pat on the back according to a recent newspaper report) consuming a considerable amount of time set apart for questions in so doing. If the time taken by the Minister for his intervention in his inimitable style was longer than it ought ideally have been, the substance of it left a great deal to be desired. Several of my friends and I who were in that audience felt that this Ministerial intervention was not quite cricket. In his impromptu mini-lecture on what the Minister perceives to be Mr. Evans’ dangerous advocacy of R2P, he sought to educate us on the subject of the competing claims of intervention and state sovereignty. In the process, I, for one, felt that the Minister, for all of his learning, was disingenuous. The burden of Minister Peiris’ intervention was to convey to us that the R2P concept that Mr. Evans advocated at the Neelan Tiruchelvam Memorial Lecture in July is perilous because Mr. Evans wants arbitrary intervention by external actors even when such intervention is not made with the imprimatur of the UN Security Council. The suggestion in the Ministerial argument is that Mr. Evans is a trigger-happy neo-colonial bureaucrat hell bent on bulldozing his and the global North’s way into the sovereign terrain of certain nations in the South who, like Sri Lanka, are heroically engaged in the complex business of harmonising and balancing national security needs whilst protecting the freedom of the individual citizen.

Let us first clarify what this concept of R2P is that we are talking about here. We are referring to a principle that was adopted unanimously by the member states of the UN at its 60th anniversary General Assembly in September 2005. It must be noted with care that the Outcome Document was endorsed and agreed to by the over 150 Heads of State and Government, including the then Head of State and Government of Sri Lanka, who attended the Meeting of the UN General Assembly in 2005.

Here are the relevant excerpts of R2P from the Outcome Document:

Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

Thus all member states of the UN, including Sri Lanka, represented by their highest governing authority, solemnly undertook upon each of themselves this ‘responsibility to protect’ as a commonly adopted Declaration of the General Assembly – - the closest to inclusive representative democracy within the international system and in the world body.

In his lecture of 29 July, 2007 in Colombo, Mr. Evans sought to explain the genesis, principles and application of the R2P concept.

My own understanding of Mr. Evans’ position is somewhat different from that of the Minister. A close reading of the text of his lecture shows us that Mr. Evans suggests such external intervention only in exceptional and extreme conditions of “catastrophic human rights violations–genocide and other mass killings, large scale ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity–occurring within the boundaries of a single country” to use the author’s own words. And the only place I detect Mr. Evans providing qualified support for intervention without the authority of the UN Security Council is to be found on pages 3 and 4 of the published text of his lecture and here let me allow Mr. Evans to speak for himself:

It is understandable that sovereignty should be a very sensitive subject indeed with many states who gained their independence during the decolonisation era–states in all cases proud of their new identity, in many cases conscious of their fragility, and generally inclined to see the non-intervention norm as one of their few defences against threats and pressures from more powerful international actors seeking to promote their own economic and political interests. But the trouble with this approach, like anything taken to extremes, is that it has had a terrible downside, one which came to a head in the 1990s in the international response to the series of conscience-shocking man-made catastrophes that erupted in the Balkans and Central Africa–most horribly the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, followed by the almost unbelievable default in Sebrenica just a year later. Over and over again, when situations seemed to cry out for some response, the international community reacted erratically, incompletely, counter-productively or not at all. And when killing and ethnic cleansing started all over again in Kososvo in 1999, and the international community did in fact intervene militarily as it probably should have, it did so without the authority of the Security Council in the face of a threatened veto by Russia, raising anxious questions about the integrity of the whole international security system (my emphasis).

A stern, unbending and inflexible critic might insist that acting thus outside the UN Security Council despite the humanitarian tragedy is unacceptable. This would, however, be to embrace the letter of the law in preference to its spirit. Hence perhaps the qualification Mr. Evans makes here by referring to ‘anxious questions’. More on this issue anon.

Mr. Evans takes great pains to explain his position on R2P in the course of his lecture. He traces clearly the concern of the UN as the world body listened to the fractious debate that took place in the 1990s over the competing claims of intervention and state sovereignty. On one side of the argument was the concept of the ‘right of humanitarian intervention’ coined by Bernard Kouchner, the current Foreign Minister of France, then renowned as the founder of Medicines Sans Frontiers. On the other side, from the global South, came vehement claims about the primacy of the concept of national sovereignty. Mr. Evans quotes former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan’s anguished response to this debilitating and acrimonious debate:

If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Sebrenica, to gross and systematic violations of human rights?

Mr. Evans then spells out the work done by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This Commission, put together by the Canadian government, was co-chaired by Mr. Evans and its primary task was to meet the above challenge posed to the UN and the international community by Kofi Anan. The outcome of the work of the ICISS was its report presented at the end of 2001 titled The Responsibility to Protect. Apart from introducing the R2P concept, the ICISS report also insisted on a new way of talking about sovereignty. Arguing that the essence of sovereignty should now be seen not as ‘control’ but as ‘responsibility’, the report notes that -

The starting point is that any state has primary responsibility to protect the individuals within it. But that is not the finishing point: where the state fails in that responsibility, through either incapacity or ill-will, a secondary responsibility to protect falls on the wider international community. That, in a nutshell, is the core of the responsibility to protect idea, or ‘R2P’ as we are all now calling it for short.

For international organizations, including the UN, as Mr. Evans observes, R2P means the responsibility to warn, to generate effective preventive strategies, and when necessary to mobilize effective reaction. R2P which initially won a significant constituency among academic commentators and international lawyers received a fresh impetus in September 2005 when, as mentioned above the UN 60th Anniversary World Summit was held consequent to the release of the report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Both the High Level Panel (2004) and Summit Outcome Document (2005) embraced the R2P concept with over 150 heads of state and government unanimously approving the latter report.

Between pages 10 and 16 of the published text of his lecture, Mr. Evans deals concretely with four noteworthy misunderstandings about R2P and gives the disinterested reader convincing and unambiguous answers to each of them. Any such reader should find it easy to grasp the wisdom inherent in the observation that state sovereignty is not a license to kill.

In his concluding remarks on the relevance of R2P to Sri Lanka, Mr. Evans makes a number of very helpful observations. While pointing out that Sri Lanka is not yet a country where large scale atrocity crimes–Cambodia-style, Rwanda-style, Sebrenica-style, Kosovo-style– are occurring or likely to occur soon, Mr. Evans categorically states that Sri Lanka is in a situation which is capable of deteriorating to that extent. He suggests that Sri Lanka should co-operate with the international community to implement an effective preventive strategy to halt the descent to ultimate degradation and chaos. While Mr. Evans does not offer us a comprehensive prescription for such a preventive strategy, he indicates that the following key elements should form the basis of such a strategy:

1. Take steps to ensure that all citizens of Sri Lanka are accorded the equal protection of the laws;

2. The Government of Sri Lanka must resist the temptation to continue its military campaign into the areas of the Northern Province held by the LTTE; and

3. Seek a political settlement that is responsive to such justice as there is in the Tamil cause using a package of political and constitutional reforms that appeal to non-separatist Tamils and non-LTTE Tamil Parties, and at least capable of discussion by the LTTE itself.

Nowhere in his presentation does Mr. Evans specifically advocate outside intervention in Sri Lanka without the authority of the UN Security Council. As pointed out above, he talks of a co-operative effort between the Government of Sri Lanka and the international community to prevent the possible further erosion of the remaining elements of the rule of law. But a suggestion of coercive, unilateral action by the UN or any other external actor without Security Council support is not to be found in Mr. Evans’ lecture. An implied or oblique reference to possible intervention in Sri Lanka without such Security Council approval is perhaps found only at the beginning of Mr. Evans’ lecture (already referred to above) where he refers to what happened in Kosovo in 1999. This is the only evidence, if indeed this be evidence, indirect at that, that I can find to suggest that Mr. Evans, as Minister Peiris asserts, would like the international community to intervene arbitrarily in Sri Lanka without Security Council sanction.

But Kosovo was as long ago as 1999 and much water has since flown under the intervention bridge! One of the key issues the High Level Panel (2004), of which also Mr. Evans was a member, took up per Kofi Anan’s challenge (see above), was the complex issue of striking a balance between legality and legitimacy in responding to security threats and challenges. A careful perusal of the High Level Panel report illustrates the fact that the panelists including Mr. Evans were of the strong opinion that both legality and legitimacy were required in instances of intervention. Hence received wisdom now is that although the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 had public ‘legitimacy’ it lacked the ‘legality’ that a UN Security Council resolution would have brought to it. ‘Kosovo 1999′ hence was a case of the right thing being done in the wrong way! The right thing to do, as we know, is as important as doing the thing right. Accordingly, the current UN thinking is that situations like ‘Kosovo 1999′ should be strenuously avoided due to the blot they will leave on the UN and on the rule of law.

In the light of the above developments, it would be unfair and wrong to accuse Mr. Evans of recommending arbitrary action against Sri Lanka outside the framework of the UN Charter without the authority of the Security Council.

Furthermore, as we see below, the Outcome Document of the UN 60th General Assembly Summit mentioned above incorporates the basic principles the ICISS underscored:

State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

As Mr. Dhanapala pointed out in his lecture this international responsibility to protect is not to be arbitrarily exercised by anyone in the international community. And military intervention is only the last resort and may only be justified after all other options have been explored “with reasonable grounds for believing less measures would not have succeeded”. The right and proper authority to exercise this R2P is the UN Security Council which has to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes.

Be the above arguments as they may, the dispassionate and non-jingoistic Sri Lankan constituency albeit a dying breed, is unlikely to oppose international intervention in Sri Lanka the claims of the champions of the now out-moded concept of absolute national sovereignty notwithstanding, if the country were to descend to the ‘conscience-shocking man-made’ catastrophic state that prevailed in the Balkans and Central Africa in the 1990s.

I find it hard to believe that such a distinguished student of international law as Minister Peiris is on the wrong side of the barricades. As an admirer, colleague and friend of the Minister in his pre-lapsarian days in the academic world, I cannot but regret noting that the murky world of politics has, as ever, claimed as its own a fine member of our tribe.

by Dr. Sudath Gunasekara

Today we are passing through one of the most critical periods in the history of this island nation. Political treachery and conspiracies, naivetes and stupidity and administrative bungling over the past few decades have already made this Paradise Island a land of abject poverty and uncertainty. Added to this legacy of miserable postcolonial governance today we are wedged between a terrorist war waged by a misguided minority group of Tamils on the one hand and an extremely chaotic and uncertain political environment on the other, Meanwhile two prominent myths, one is that of ‘ethnic discrimination” and the other of ‘devolution of power’ appear to have driven the majority of our politicians completely out of their normalcy and made them a set of blind men groping in the pitch dark not knowing what to do and where to go.

Most politicians, who know no history or politics, but only poly-tricks to remain in power, talk of ethnic discrimination being present in this country and also the need to devolve political power to resolve the present political crisis particularly in the North and the East and by doing so they all, inadvertently support the permanent division of this country on ethnic grounds.

But thanks to the consistent course of action currently pursued by the Rajapaksa government, one can see a distant ray of hope, once again for a better future, particularly in the light of recent victories in the east and the North. But it appears that in most circles we are still not clear as to what the final political solution should be to end this, divisive political legacy, cleverly set by the colonial powers before they left.

It is in this backdrop that the following proposal is made with the best of intentions with a view to rescuing the country from this tragic situation by bringing all communities together as one nation. To achieve this noble goal, under this proposition, it is suggested that we go back to the re-establishment of the ancient Tun-Sinhale. This division will ensure equitable distribution of resources among the three units (land, water, coast line and even people), and also ensure the best use of the vertically arranged top-down resource dependency, particularly water, set by the unique morphological lay out of the island and bring back sanity and peace and once again firmly establish a permanent geopolictical framework that will once and for all put an end to the present political crisis and lay the sound foundation for re-building a strong and vibrant nation state. This, I am confident will provide the golden key to the portals of a united, prosperous and peaceful future Sri Lanka.

This, of cause is not a new proposal. In fact this is the political division we have had in this country almost from 427 BC up to 1815 AD in one form or the other. It is within this geopolictical framework we reached the zenith of civilisation in the past with fame that spread in all corners of the orient as well as the occident. The destinies of this Island nation have been shaped during the 24 centuries prior to 1815 within this geopolictical framework. I do not think any other country in the world can boast of such unbroken political continuity or stability within one political map. Arguably it is time- tested and therefore today, under the present situation, it presents an ideal model of geopolictical division for the country for effective and just governance.

It treats the whole country and its territorial waters as one state with a strong government at the centre supported by three semi-independent regional political entities, thereby simultaneously preserving the territorial integrity and the regional identities of the island. It takes into account regional variations in both physical and human factors. It is also important to note that the early rulers of this island were obviously fully aware of the vertically- arranged resource dependency, in addition to regional cultural variations, between the different altitudinal zones of the country and also the inseparable relationship between nature and development, which the present generation of politicians and administrators has miserably failed to comprehend. That is why the ancient people perhaps guaranteed that each Rata extends from the high hills up to the very sea thereby ensuring integrated and balanced development. Each of these Ratas also had its own physical and cultural individuality that warranted separate treatment. The boundaries between these Ratas were also natural and fixed and as such there was no room for boundary disputes either.

Under this system, even though persons belonging to different ethnic groups were resident in different part of the island, the whole country was treated as one kingdom and one nation with three political sub-divisions, which were called Ratas. The country was known as “The Sinhale” or Lanka.

This was the position up to March 2 1815. The Rajarata continued to be the main seat of power almost for 20 centuries until it was shifted to Gampola in the mid-14th century. The king of Anuradhapura was usually acclaimed king of Lanka. While he directly ruled Rajarata, the viceroys or sometimes Regional Kings who swore allegiance to the king of Anuradhapura and paid their dues as well ruled over the other two. Under this system Sri Lanka was one kingdom and one nation with maximum devolution of power to the sub-kingdoms, as they were known then. For those who cry for a federal system of government for this country this could be cited as one of the earliest examples of a “federal state” known in the world. So why not adopt it now?

Under the new proposal the island will be divided into three regions called Rata, namely, Ruhunu, Pihiti and Maya. Each Rata will have nine districts. There will be a Rata Sabha for each Rata headed by a governor appointed by the President. The capital of the country should be located in Mahanuwara on a ground carved out from the three Rata with the present city as the nucleus. Mahanuwara Division could be taken as the 28th district. But it will be independent from the other three Ratas.

However, this, district will also have its representation in the National Assembly. The number of representatives assigned to this district will be six. It will also have one senator. Three members will represent this district in the three Rata Sabha. This arrangement will strengthen the inter-state relationships. Each Rata Sabha will have a Council of Ministers headed by a Chief Minister and it will have about 50 MPP elected by the people to represent the districts. (This can vary).

A President, elected directly by the people, as it is done now, who shall be answerable both to the Parliament and the people, will head the central government under this system The President shall be the head of a Cabinet and a of Ministers not exceeding 15-will advice and assist him. It is proposed that the three Chief Ministers of the three Rata Sabhas should also be included in the Cabinet of the central government to ensure better coordination between the center and the Rata Sabhas. The Parliament shall not have more than 125 MPP to represent the 28 districts. The Commissioner of Elections is to determine the allocation of seats for different districts based on population and area. The Parliament of Sri Lanka should be vested with the supreme power of governing the whole country. Devolution of power to Rata Sabhas should be confined only to running their local affairs.

In addition to the House of Representatives and the three Rata Sabhas there shall also be a Senate of 31 members, 28 representing the 28 th districts and three to be nominated by the President to represent the three Rata Sabhas to enlist the services of the best talented men in the country to run the affairs of state. This will make the total number of politicians 310 for the whole country. This will include the President, The Prime Minister, and 13 Cabinet ministers, including the three Chief Ministers, Rata Sabha ministers, MPP of Parliament, Rata Sabha members, three governors and the 31 senators. Drastic reduction of politicians and superfluous political and administrative institutions in this country is a crying need to reduce waste and cost of governance. It is important to note here that even the United Kingdom has decided to reduce the strength of its Parliament by 100 members.

At present there are 225 members of Parliament, 109 Ministers of the central government (As at today), 638 Provincial Councilors,nine Governors, nine Chief Ministers, 45 Provincial Council Ministers, 638 Provincial Sabha councilors and a President totalling 873 politicians. (Add Pradesiya Sabha members here ).

Under the new proposal this will be brought down to 310 as stated before, and as such there will be a reduction of 563 politicians. These 563 parasitic politicians thereafter could engage in some productive work that will benefit the country. This will reduce the maintenance cost of politicians at least by 65 %.

One can just imagine the amount of money that could be saved as a result. Pradesiya Sabha members and members of other local bodies like Municipal councils and urban councils who will be retained, even under the new system are not counted in this context. This is only an outline proposal. Details of the demarcations and the modus operandi have to be worked out in the event of this proposal being accepted by the authorities.

The proposed model will benefit the country in the following manner:

1. Firmly establish a sound geopolictical framework that will consolidate the political map of the Island that conforms to regional, physical and cultural differences and lay the foundation for building a strong and vibrant nation state.

2. Provide a framework for maximum devolution of political power to the periphery that will bring about better democracy to the people and ensure balanced development.

3. Discourage ethnic segregation and promote ethnic integration and regional harmony that leads to national integration.

4. Do away with the Provincial Councils, the white elephants, and reduce the number of politicians and superficial politico-administrative institutions to a workable and economic minimum that could be afforded by the country.

5. Drastically cut down government expenditure and make more funds available for development that will improve the standards of living of the common people.

6. Put an end to colonial administrative and political legacies that nurtured ethnic polarisation and a divide and rule policy that seriously hampered the forward march of post-independent Sri Lanka and open up new vistas for a united and prosperous new Lanka.

7. Ensure fair and equitable distribution of resources among the regions and promote maximum regional development and ensure the best use of vertically arranged resource dependency set by the morphological lay -out of the country.

8. Provides a political framework where all people will begin to think, firstly, as members of a Rata (either Ruhunu, Pihiti or Maya), and secondly, as one nation instead of the present tendency of thinking as Sinhalese (Low country and Kandyans), Tamils , Muslims etc.

9. Restore the lost historical, political, cultural and economic heritage of the people of this island nation and lay the foundation for future political stability and socioeconomic prosperity.

Amnesty International condemns the mass arrests of more than 1000 Tamils by the Sri Lankan police, allegedly in response to the suicide bombings carried out in Colombo on 28 November 2007, for which the government has blamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Amnesty International is deeply concerned that the arrests have been made on arbitrary and discriminatory grounds using sweeping powers granted by the emergency regulations. Those arrested may be detained in inhumane conditions; denied access to lawyers, courts and family members; and face the risk of torture, other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and prolonged arbitrary detention.

According to reports, “Tamils were bundled in bus loads and taken for interrogation”. More than 400 of those arrested, including 50 women, have been taken to the Boosa Camp near Galle in the south, a facility that is reportedly overcrowded, lacking proper sanitation facilities and adequate drinking water.

While the government has the right to carry out security measures it must never do this in violation of basic rights. Detainees are reportedly being held ‘on suspicion’ under the Emergency Regulations, and no formal charges have been pressed against any of them. Lawyers have told Amnesty about the lack of clarity surrounding the types of detention orders people are held under. This contradicts a July 2006 Presidential Directive under which the Sri Lankan Human Rights Commission (SLHRC) must be informed of any arrest and of the place of detention within 48 hours, and families must be allowed to communicate with detainees.

Amnesty International reminds the Sri Lankan authorities that any arrest and/or detention must be in strict compliance with its obligations under international human rights law, and in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Sri Lanka is a state party.

The Sri Lanka authorities must:

- Immediately release those arrested, unless they are charged with recognizably criminal offences and remanded in custody by a civilian court;

- repeal or revise the Emergency Regulations so as to bring them into line with international human rights law and standards;

- adhere to the Sri Lankan President’s Directive on the registering of detainees and informing their families and the SLHRC of the place of arrest.

[Full Text of Amnesty International Press Release]