federalidea.com

By MSM Ayub

Has the United National Party actually deviated from federalism? During the last two weeks the print media was inundated with various articles, news items, cartoons and many other features on the UNP’s reported policy shift in which UNP leaders made conflicting statements. Some of them said that the party has “repositioned” itself while claiming that they never stood for federalism, raising the question as to what is the controversy all about.The bombshell was dropped first by a news item which appeared in Lankadeepa of September 25 which read that the UNP has decided to drop the concept of federalism in finding a solution to the ethnic problem, but will continue to support devolution of power. The paper also said that the party wanted to strengthen the provincial council system and amend the ceasefire agreement signed in 2002 during the United National Front regime with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) to suit the present situation.

Without denying a single word in that report UNP heavyweight Ravi Karunanayake on the same day at a press conference said that it was the media that implicated the party with the federalism and they never proposed the concept as the solution to the ethnic conflict. So many UNP leaders over the weekend being interviewed by Sinhala and English newspapers had repeated this adding that they always advocated maximum devolution for the resolution of the national question.

However, going by the various responses made by leaders of other political parties none of them seem to believe that the UNP has not done away with the federal concept or that they never stood for it. Main among the reasons perhaps is the famous Oslo Declaration (Communiqué) issued on December 5, 2002 by the Norwegian Government, the essence of which was the agreement between the United National Front (UNP) Government and the LTTE on a settlement based on federal structure. Another reason is that the term used by Ravi Karunanayake to explain the party position, “repositioning”, gives the impression that the UNP’s stand had gone through some change.

UNP’s claim that it never supported the federal solution and there is no policy shift is in a way pathetically wrong since there is clear evidence to that effect on the paper with an international witness. The Oslo communiqué which was issued at the end of the third round of peace talks between the representatives of the UNF Government and the LTTE says without leaving any room for ambiguity, that “responding to a proposal by the leadership of the LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka”.

The “repositioning” of the UNP has not apparently been able to earn any new friends to the party in the political circle. Even the nationalist and most anti- federalist parties suspected the move calling it as one to lure the 37 votes of the JVP which is frantically needed for the UNP to topple the Government in parliament. The JHU in a statement expressed doubt on the motive of the UNP and hinted again that the main opposition is attempting to hoodwink the people and the JVP in order to form a coalition with the former southern rebels.

Almost all Tamil political parties viewed the “repositioning” of UNP as letting down the Tamil people, and the official organ of the LTTE Ealanatham published on September 30 warned that the UNP’s decision to strip the federalism leaves the Tamil people with the armed struggle as the only option for their liberation, as if the LTTE accepted something short of armed struggle and Tamil Eelam .

The irony is that almost all political parties that criticize or ridicule the UNP for the “repositioning” do not at the moment support the idea of federalism as the solution for the ethnic problem. Even the LTTE that agreed with the UNP to “explore a solution based on a federal structure” went back on the agreement as far back as 2004 and the former eastern leader of the LTTE Vinayagamoorthi Muralidharan alias Karuna said after breaking away from the outfit in 2004 that the federal agreement in Oslo did not have the full blessings of LTTE leader Prabhakaran. The veteran journalist the late Dharmaratnam Sivaram who was sympathetic to the LTTE during his last days wrote in an article in one of the weekly editions of Weerakesari in 2004 that agreeing to federalism was a flaw on the part of the LTTE, and the rebels soon seemed to have accepted it.

However, now that the UNP has distanced itself from the term “federal” and the LTTE did it years ago, and also President Mahinda Rajapaksa to whom the Oslo agreement has been officially passed on , was on record to say at a meeting with the newspaper editors in 2006 that he wished to start the peace talks afresh, the Oslo Communiqué has been left destitute in the hands of the Norwegian Government.

While UNP’s repositioning is being interpreted as one to woo the JVP and also as a nationalistic turn proportionate to the Government’s militaristic turn, JVP parliamentarian Wimal Weerawansa on October 1 questioned as to how the UNP can drop federalism and at the same time go for broad power devolution. His question prompts us to question in turn as to what is federalism, is it another term for devolution or else what is the physical form of it and so on.

It will be worthwhile here to pick out a few relevant paragraphs and sentences in this regard from an explanatory memorandum by Professor CG Weeramantri, the former vice- president of the International Court of Justice when the provincial council system was initially being discussed in 1986, to the Overseas Sri Lanka Organization for National Unity (OSLONU) based in Melbourne, Australia, which was then headed by Weeramantri himself.

“Whether a state is unitary or not is determined by realities of the distribution of power within itself, rather than the terms to describe it… “The term ‘unitary’ is used in constitutional law in contradiction to the term ‘federal’ which means an association of semi autonomous units with a distribution of sovereign powers between the units and the centre. “In a unitary state there is no division of sovereign legislative power. Various forms of state power can be delegated, with supervisory control being retained by the centre, as in the case of delegated legislation. “The delegate can never legislate in its own right.

“Provincial councils will have powers to enact legislation on subjects specified; the arrangement which proposed is thus clearly a federal one, but even within the federal constitutional systems it is one which gives more power to the separate units than most of the other contemporary federal systems”. Federalism can in other words range from the extreme of a nearly unitary state to that of a loose confederation of nearly autonomous units.

When summed up we can gather that once power is devolved to the units in the periphery they will have the power to enact legislation on devolved subjects, and thereby they will have mini legislatures. In other words if a country has only one legislature it is called ‘unitary’ and if there are more than one legislating council it is called a federal system. If we are to accept this explanation the UNP or any other party cannot abandon federalism and embrace devolution at the same time.However, so long as the term is an anathema in the southern parts of the country the main political parties would at times accept it only with hesitation or vacillate it. This is the case not only with UNP but also with the SLFP. The famous “package” drafted by Professor GL Peiris in collaboration with late Dr. Neelan Thiruchchelvam in1995 called Sri Lanka a union of regional councils, and not a unitary state, thus accepting the basic federal nature of the proposed constitution. Another constitutional draft presented in parliament by President Kumaratunga on August 3, 2000 amidst uproar in opposition benches too envisaged a federal state. Thereafter the party was silent on federalism until the Oslo communique was issued which President Kumarathunga endorsed in principle

The party changed the tune towards the last general election and championed the notion of devolution under a unitary constitution. Months ago on May-day held on April 30 the SLFP General Secretary and Minister Maithripala Sirisena announced his party’s proposals for the resolution of the national question envisaging district as the unit for devolution and days later the All Party Representative Committee (APRC)concluded that the unit of devolution would be the province, with SLFP being party to it.During the late seventies and early eighties the JVP in a book titled “A Marxist analysis on the National Question” recognized the self determination of the nations which was interpreted by the party in no uncertain terms as the right to secession and recommended regional autonomy. And soon after the party was proscribed on false charges by the JR Jayawardene Government they abandoned both concepts of self determination and regional autonomy while struggling to face a crackdown.

Shifting ideas and allegiance is not always a bad thing as all forms of human gatherings such as seminars, meetings including parliament, are meant for the mind changing of all the participants or some of them in order to build consensus. But the shift would be considered genuine only if it is in accordance with principles and not in pursuit of power and wealth. [Courtesy: Daily Mirror]

By Asanga Welikala

Much has been said and written about the UNP’s supposed abandonment of federalism during the past weeks. Much of it completely misses the point. Whatever are the politics and motivations behind the UNP’s statement, in terms of the substantive contours of a possible constitutional settlement it delineates, there is nothing to suggest that the party has abandoned the federal idea as a method of power-sharing in a negotiated peace.

The statement sets out the objectives of conflict resolution and constitutional reform as addressing the grievances of the Tamils, meeting the concerns of the Muslims of the northeast, and assuaging the fears among some sections of the Sinhalese that devolution would lead to separation. The fundamental principles of such a negotiated political solution are respect for human rights, democracy and the recognition of the plural character of Sri Lankan society in which democratic support for peace must secure both majoritarian support as well as the inclusive support of all groups constituting the Sri Lankan polity. The non-negotiable basis of a settlement is the territorial integrity and unity of Sri Lanka and the sovereignty of its people.

Three tier structure

On this normative basis, the statement envisages a three-tier structure of government which reflects the national, regional and local levels in a credible system of power-sharing. It leaves open the question of the precise territorial unit at the regional level, presumably to be dealt with as an aspect of future negotiations in which regional aspirations and needs can properly be addressed. This ambiguity on the territorial unit of devolution is not a weakness of the UNP’s position but a strength, in that it leaves open the question of asymmetric treatment of the northeast to be decided not prescriptively from the south but through appropriate negotiations with that region in the future. Indeed, the consistent use of ‘north east’ suggests that the UNP remains open to the re-merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces or other special arrangement so as to meet (subject to competing interests such as those of the Muslims) one of the fundamental principles of the Tamil nationalist position. The statement further argues that devolution of power so as to ensure regional and local self-government must be countervailed by national-level shared-rule and power-sharing at the centre. Finally on the substance of ‘credible power-sharing’ between the national, regional and local levels, the UNP statement goes to great lengths to establish that the power-sharing settlement must be assured through a ’system to safeguard the devolved powers.’

Structure of government

Thus the statement contemplates both regional and local self-rule coupled with national shared-rule along a division and sharing of powers between multiple orders of government which is enshrined in a negotiated settlement that contains safeguards for the agreed spheres of authority of all three orders of government. This structure of government is founded on a democratic and rights-based political foundation as explained. If this does not look and sound like a federal constitutional order, this columnist at least has difficulty in seeing what would.

Naturally there is space as other commentators have done, to question the UNP’s reasons and motivations for coming out with a statement on the parameters of a constitutional settlement to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict at this particular juncture, which conspicuously omits express reference to the word ‘federalism’ in what seems to be an opportunistic abandonment of a constitutional concept that has become a political burden. However, there is limited use in speculation that fundamentally misapprehends what the party is stating in substantive terms.

Pragmatist and conservative

Perhaps more importantly, it also fundamentally misunderstands the UNP’s modus operandi, which is and has always been a pragmatist and conservative approach to politics that seeks to build broad electoral support and which is wholly uncomfortable with reformism and ideas purely for reform’s sake, and for that matter, nationalism of the Rajapakse-Weerawansa-Ranawaka variety unless there is a clear electoral advantage. From Oslo through Tokyo to the present statement, the UNP’s attitude to federal-type options for a settlement of the conflict has to be seen in the proper context which is rapidly negotiating some form of settlement that would enable it to pursue policy issues that really animate it such as economic growth and development. Thus, the UNP has not in any substantial way shifted its policy perspectives on the substantive parameters of an acceptable constitutional settlement or the role and relevance of the federal idea therein.

By Dr. A. R. M. Imtiyaz

There was speculation in Colombo that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the major ethno-political movement of the Sri Lankan Tamils, is planning to declare the formation of a separate state for the Tamils in Sri Lanka’s violent North and East on January 18, 2008. Sri Lanka’s violent conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese has denied its people an opportunity to embrace ethnic peace. Peace is the key to the stability of the island and security of ethnic groups, particularly the conflicting Tamils and the Sinhalese. The question here is what we have to do to begin to make peace right? The simple but the right answer can suggest only two alternatives – power-sharing and partition.

[Peace hoarding, sponsored by a Sri Lanka media organization at the dawn of last year - Pic: HumanityAshore.org]

Sri Lanka has witnessed a few power-sharing deals between the Tamils and Sinhalese since 1957. These pacts represented a wide ranging and comprehensive devolution of power to alleviate ethnic disharmony. Sadly, but as expected, these pacts could not defy the Sinhala opposition. For instance, when S. W.R. D. Bandaranaike signed what is popularly known as the B-C pact with Federal Party leader S. J. V. Chelvanayakam on July 26, 1957, the UNP opposed it saying that it would lead to the collapse of the unitary state. A senior UNP politician, Junius Richard Jayewardene organized a “peace-march” to Kandy making his way through the Sinhalese heartland.

What Sri Lanka’s five-decades old post-independence history evidently proves is that the Sinhala political class whether they hail from the UNP or the SLFP, employ the emotions of the Sinhalese to outbid their opponents on anti-Tamil and/or anti-devolution programmes. The JVP and the JHU which vehemently oppose political power-sharing to end the ethnic conflict are the latest addition to this Sinhala ethnic club. It is important to point out that war and anti-Tamil policies have been the serious agendas of the Sinhala political class rather than brokering an honorable peace and genuine democracy.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa is not ready to retract his 2005 election policies, which rejected a federal solution, in order to outbid Mr. Wickremesinghe who favoured a federal solution to win the trust of the minorities, particularly the rebelling Tamils. Mr. Rajapaksa knows that he would face tough opposition from his constituencies and Sinhala nationalist groups if he negotiates a political solution based on a federal system. In fact, this is the phenomenal consequence of symbolic politics which is a new term in political science meaning the use of ethnic symbols to win or hold on to votes. When politicians employ such a deadly strategy to lock votes, they can certainly win the votes of the lower middle and working classes, but that strategy hardly would allow them to secure harmony and reconciliation among the different ethnic groups.

One alternative to improve the situation is to bring global pressure upon the key actors who like to break the circle of violence. It seems there are some forces prepared to do this and have been making some efforts to carve out a political solution to the three-decades-old deadly ethnic conflict. It is, indeed a good sign as far as Sri Lanka’s peace is concerned, because a liberal peace is convincingly a better option than an inhuman war, which only helps strengthen ethnic and religious identity, as well as give breathing space for ethnic mobilizers to manipulate ethnic and religious symbols.

The question here is whether the global community can win its quest for a political solution based on substantial and sustainable autonomy and power-sharing in Sri Lanka? The Sinhala political class is doing pretty good job in defying global concerns and pressures. This is another side of symbolic politics which is capable of producing leaders like Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who thinks the existence of Israel is an “insult to human dignity” and suggests that Jews do not deserve Israel is and should be relocated to parts of Europe or even Alaska. Those who cuddle symbols for their political profits would use all their political capital, just to consolidate power and to resist external pressures.

Hence, it is highly unlikely that the political class in the South would easily abandon its symbolic ethnic agenda which has roots in Mr. Bandaranaike’s 1956 Sinhala-only slogans.

However, all is not bad. Power-sharing democracy still can shine as the only viable alternative even though it confronts strong resistance from the Sinhala political class for electoral gains. Scholarly studies on Sri Lanka’s violent ethnic conflict suggest different reasons for the failure of the peace accords administered by the Sinhala political class. One major reason is that the Tamils in the past, particularly before the inception of the violent movements, did not have a strong and territorially well-established leadership to challenge the Southern political class. Mr. Perumal, the leader of the EPRLF briefly demonstrated cohesive leadership in 1990, when President R. Premadasa drastically reduced the devolved powers under the 13th amendment. Mr. Perumal, who was frustrated with the behaviour of the UNP regime, declared Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) at the end of his tenure. Sadly, Mr. Perumal was not politically and ideologically strong enough to challenge Mr. Premadasa and his clique. Also, he neither represented territorial control nor mobilized a mass movement to run the Tamil state under UDI.Winning meaningful power-sharing is tough political business. But the Tamils need a strong leadership to resist the Sinhala people’s unwillingness to share power. The current brutal war against the Tamils can be understood in this theoretical understanding. Mr. Rajapaksa, who won the elections in 2005 on an anti-Tamil and anti-federal programme, would love to negotiate a peace solution with a politically and militarily enfeebled Tamil leadership for an obvious political reason. Hence, it is highly unlikely that marginalized Tamils would get a sustainable and substantial power-sharing arrangement that addresses the grievances and aspirations of the minorities, particularly the Tamils if the current war continues without international intervention.

Practically speaking, power-sharing can produce good progress provided it deals with those strong actors who have territorial control with the ability to establish an independent state. In other words, territorial domination by an ethnic movement can become an important factor for any power-sharing leading to a successful solution. This understanding has been well proved in South Sudan (2005) and hopefully would be confirmed in Kosovo which has been exercising UN administered autonomy for a while from Serbia. This success exercise recommends “a loose integration model” to facilitate “more than autonomy, less than independence.” The point here is that both in South Sudan and Kosovo, ruling elites have agreed to give substantial autonomy in the face of fear that territorially based (rebelling) movements would disintegrate the state.

The major problem with the Sinhala political class is that they neither have any serious respect for the minorities of the island nor entertain any fears that refusal of respect could lead to the collapse of the state.

This mentality is dangerous, and would never lead to any meaningful solution accommodating the interests of the minorities. Thus, it is the duty of global actors to pressure the ruling class for a substantial political solution. If not, global actors ought to extend tactical support for Tamil aspirations. The global community’s support to the Tamil struggle could build some genuine fears. Such a mental-pressure from the fears of opposition to the state in its own backyard, may compel the Sinhala political class to negotiate a sustainable political solution through the channel of power-sharing democracy.

Sri Lanka’s ethnic civil war needs a peaceful political solution. We have only two alternatives to confront the continuing vicious war. They are (1) an ethnic partition or ethnic un-mixing, and (2) a power-sharing. The latter can best serve as a viable solution provided the dominant actor realizes the fact that the failure to accommodate the reasonable aspirations of minorities would strengthen the hands of ethnic partitionists who are sufficiently able to run an ethnic state. This would answer the basic question-will fear of partition engineer sustainable peace through power-sharing?

(The author is a Sri Lankan political scientist who is currently affiliated as a visiting scholar at the Department of Political Science, Temple University, USA.)

I wish to thank His Excellency the President for inviting me to visit Sri Lanka and the Government of Sri Lanka for facilitating my program. I would like to thank Minister Samarasinghe and the many government officials, representatives of political parties, religious leaders, members of civil society and UN colleagues who have taken the time to share with me their perspectives. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to the many individuals who approached me with testimonies of their own experience.

Yesterday I visited Jaffna. I am grateful to the military authorities for facilitating my visit and my particular thanks are due to the Bishop whose warm welcome and hospitality I very much appreciated.

I regret that time did not permit me to visit the Eastern Province. I also regret that I did not have the opportunity to visit Killinochchi, where I would have liked to convey directly to the LTTE my deep concern about their violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including the recruitment of children, forced recruitment and abduction of adults, and political killings. I am very concerned by the many reports I have also received of serious violations by the TMVP and other armed groups.

I was struck in my discussions by the fact that broader human rights issues affecting all communities on the island have largely been eclipsed by the immediate focus on issues related to the conflict. These include issues of discrimination and exclusion, gender inequalities, the low participation of women in public and political life, the rights of migrant workers and press freedom. These challenges will remain before and after any peace settlement, and they are deserving of greater and more focussed attention.

Sri Lanka has many of the elements needed for a strong national protection system. It has ratified most of the international human rights treaties. It has justiciable human rights guarantees in the Constitution. It has longstanding democratic and legal traditions. It has had a national human rights commission for more than a decade. Sri Lanka has an active media and benefits from a committed civil society.

However, in the context of the armed conflict and of the emergency measures taken against terrorism, the weakness of the rule of law and prevalence of impunity is alarming. There is a large number of reported killings, abductions and disappearances which remain unresolved. This is particularly worrying in a country that has had a long, traumatic experience of unresolved disappearances and no shortage of recommendations from past Commissions of Inquiry on how to safeguard against such violations. While the Government pointed to several initiatives it has taken to address these issues, there has yet to be an adequate and credible public accounting for the vast majority of these incidents. In the absence of more vigorous investigations, prosecutions and convictions, it is hard to see how this will come to an end.

While Sri Lanka has much of the necessary human rights institutional infrastructure, critical elements of protection have been undermined or compromised. The application of treaties in domestic law has been questioned by the Supreme Court in the Singarasa case. The Government’s proposed legislation to address this problem, tabled this week in Parliament only partially addresses the issues and risks confusing further the status of different rights in national law.

Throughout my discussions, government representatives have insisted that national mechanisms are adequate for the protection of human rights, but require capacity building and further support from the international community. In contrast, people from across a broad political spectrum and from various communities have expressed to me a lack of confidence and trust in the ability of existing relevant institutions to adequately safeguard against the most serious human rights abuses.

Some of the institutions themselves acknowledge their limitations in this respect. Members of the Commission of Inquiry pointed out to me that some state officials had failed to appear in response to their requests. They also stressed that the absence of an effective witness assistance and protection system was a major constraint on their work. The Commission would, in my view, gain greater public confidence and support by conducting public hearings. In any event, the Commission of Inquiry is an ad hoc response to a series of particularly shocking incidents and should not be a substitute for effective action by relevant law enforcement agencies. Nor should it divert from the need for a forward looking, comprehensive and effective human rights protection system.

The Human Rights Commission has in the past played an important role in this respect. However, the failure to resolve the controversy over the appointment of commissioners has created a crisis of confidence in the HRC both locally and internationally. The HRC’s failure to systematically conduct public inquiries and issue timely public reports has further undermined confidence in its efficacy and independence. Indeed, the Commission may lose its accreditation to the international body governing these institutions.

In my view the current human rights protection gap in Sri Lanka is not solely a question of capacity. While training and international expertise are needed in specific areas, and I understand would be welcomed by the Government, I am convinced that one of the major human rights shortcomings in Sri Lanka is rooted in the absence of reliable and authoritative information on the credible allegations of human rights abuses.

Many state that the LTTE is quick to manipulate information for propaganda gain. In my view this only accentuates the need for independent information gathering and public reporting on human rights issues.

OHCHR is willing to support the Government of Sri Lanka in this way. I am aware that there is a lively national debate about the need for international support in human rights protection. In light of the gravity of the reported ongoing abuses, and in particular of threats to life and security of the person, I believe that we should urgently resolve our ongoing discussions about the future of a productive relationship between OHCHR and the Government of Sri Lanka.

A final observation: It would be highly desirable for the government to consider an early ratification of the new International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. In light of the documented violations of international humanitarian law, Sri Lanka should seriously consider joining the 105 countries which have ratified the Rome Treaty creating the International Criminal Court.

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

“Pona Machan Indru Thirumbi Vanthane – Poomanathode – Ennidam Puthumanathode” (My cousinn who went away has returned to me today with a fresh, flowery fragrance).

These well – known lines from a very old Tamil film song sung by P. Leela came to my mind when I saw pictures of the Ceylon Workers Congress returning to Government ranks on Thursday October 11th. The five MP’s of the CWC were now back hovering around the President like the “Mahabharatha”s Panchapandavas surrounding their consort Draupadhy.

[CWC Representatives with President Mahinda Rajapaksa - Pic: Daily News]

Two months ago the CWC had tendered their resignations in a huff after a tiff with Basil Rajapakse. The Government did not totter let alone fall. Now the CWC was back like cockerels returning to the coop.

All five were sworn in before the President at Temple Trees.They were given the posts they held earlier.Arumugam Thondaman took oaths as Minister of Youth Empowerment and Socio-Economic Development, S. Sellasamy as Deputy Minister of Posts, M. Sivalingam as Deputy Minister of Estate Infrastructure, S. Satchithananthan as Deputy Minister of Education and S. Jegadeeswaran as Deputy Minister of National Integration.

The unwarranted crisis is seemingly over.

It all began when Basil Rajapakse , the President’s brother and intermediary in dealings with the CWC got embroiled in a heated argument with the Plantation Tamil politicians. The causes were childish. The consequences puerile.

The villain of the piece or peace was Mahindananda Aluthgamage. The CWC’s Muthu. Sivalingam had set up an electricity scheme in Nawalapitiya through funds allocated under the de – centralised budget.

Aluthgamage had allegedly demanded prominence in the ceremony but was refused. He had then met Presidential Adviser Basil Rajapakse and allegedly conveyed a distorted version about what happened.

Basil Rajapakse was apparently misinformed that Sivalingam had criticised “Mahinda Chinthanaya” and refused to give due credit to the Government. When Rajapakse accused Sivalingam about it without clarifying whether it was correct or not a heated argument ensued.

The usually unflappable Basil lost his cool and used harsh language on Sivalingam compelling Arumugam Thondaman to enter the fray on Sivalingam’s behalf.

This resulted in Thondaman and Rajapakse engaging in a verbal slanging match threatening mutual destruction.

There were media reports that Rajapakse had called Sivalingam “Para Demala” but this was denied by both sides publicly. It was admitted however that intemperate language was used in a fierce argument.

According to informed sources a thoroughly upset Sivalingam was distraught. Emotionally worked up, he wanted the CWC to quit the Government instantly and return to government ranks only after a public apology was tendered.His colleagues Sellasamy and Jegatheeswaran felt such a response was too drastic.

CWC officials and important supporters then met at the Taj Samudra hotel and discussed the issue further. There was divided opinion but an emotionally charged Sivalingam was adamant.

Arumugam Thondaman was visibly moved by his senior colleague’s state of mind. Sivalingam was an ardent Arumugam loyalist and had stood through thick and thin by him.

Thondaman was constrained to express solidarity with Sivalingam though it was against his better judgement. A decision was taken to submit letters of resignation from ministerial posts. It was implemented promptly.

It was also decided that the CWC summon a meeting of branch officials to discuss pulling out of the Government completely.

The CWC hierarchy was in for a shock when a meeting was held in Kotagala. The overwhelming opinion among branch officials was that the leaders had acted hastily. Branch officials felt that this was not an issue requiring pull – out from the Government.

The branch officials were also worried about repercussions if the CWC pulled out. The Rajapakse regime was a vindictive one it was pointed out. The prevailing security situation of the Country could be used as a pretext to crack down on the CWC it was feared. Active members could be incarcerated as suspected terrorists it was pointed out.

Then there was also the danger that charges of corruption and abuse of power could be brought up against some CWC officials. Mahinda Rajapakse was accused of using these methods as a tactic to coerce the CWC into joining the Government then. Now the same tactics could be used again. Some persons whose hands were unclean feared the worst.

There was also the question of political upmanship. The Up Country Peoples Front was already in the Government. So too were CWC dissidents. If the CWC pulled out of government these sections could strengthen themselves at CWC expense. The President could promote them to teach the CWC a lesson.

Thus it became apparent that a wholesale pull – out from the Govt was unwelcome at this point of time. A pull-out was desirable and practicable only when the regime faced imminent collapse.

By now Sivalingam’s passion had subsided.Under prevailing circumstances the CWC refrained from pulling out from the Government and joining the opposition.

Thondaman however explored his options. One was to probe the possibility of defections. Mangala Samaraweera with whom Thondaman enjoyed a close relationship had quit the Government and was trying to engineer more defections.

If Samaraweera was sure of success then Thondaman too could throw in his lot against the regime. One to one discussions with Mangala revealed that such a possibility was remote at this point of time

So the CWC did not cross over to the opposition from Govt ranks despite resigning their posts. When tricky money bills came up for voting the CWC supported the Government.

Thondaman also attended party leader meetings of the Government though he was not a cabinet minister.

Meanwhile President Rajapakse too did not accept the CWC resignations. They were kept in a state of limbo. The CWC security or staff were not reduced. Their official vehicles were also not removed. But they did not receive their ministerial emoluments.

Both sides were in a stand – off situation. Tragi-comically this situation was not over some matter of principle or key policy differences but due to wounded pride and hurt ego.

In a mature democracy no party would have resigned over such frivolous reason.

Likewise no Presidential adviser worth his salt would used such intemperate language with a constituent party. Even if he did such an adviser would have tendered his apology and made amends

But it did not happen here as both sides dug in stubbornly .The situation was actually a tempest in a tea cup but allowed to develop into a grave, political crisis.

Comic relief was provided when Basil Rajapakse took his oaths as MP. One of the first to shake Basil’s hand heartily was Muthu Sivalingam. The broad grin on his face made a mockery of the so called reason for CWC splitting.

[Crack of dawn, Dambatenna, -Photo: HA]

Arumugam’s grandfather Saumiyamoorthy Thondaman was a master strategist. He often adopted tactics bordering on political brinkmanship. The grandson has in recent times demonstrated that he is a chip of the old block as far as political manouevring was concerned.It was now his task to extricate the CWC from an unenviable situation without losing face.

Thondaman was faced with a prickly predicament soon after Rajapakse became President in 2005 . The CWC had supported Ranil Wickremasinghe. The new Government began cracking down.There were two police raids.

The first police raid was on November 25. A special Criminal Investigation Department (CID) team was sent from Colombo to search a youth centre run by the CWC-controlled Nuwara Eliya divisional council at Kotagala . The pretext was to find evidence of misappropriation of funds allocated from the estate infrastructure ministry. According to police, they found a large stock of TVs, sewing machines, bicycles and roofing sheets meant for plantation workers and reported that the store had been rented by CWC MP V. Puthrasingamani.

The police sealed the store but no charges were laid. Media reports, however, implied that the stock of goods had been obtained fraudulently.

A second raid, again by a special CID team from Colombo, took place on the home of Arumugam Thondaman.. Police claimed to be looking for evidence of misappropriated funds, but gave no indication that they had found anything. No charges were laid.

In further developments the security given Thondaman was reduced. CWC MP for Badulla Vadivel Suresh was enticed into the Government with a deputy minister post. Attempts were also made to undertake development activities in the estates without CWC involvement. The CWC was to be undermined on its home turf.

But Thondaman struck back. In a controversial move the CWC leader flirted with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. He made a trip to Kilinochchi and met tiger political commissar Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan for political discussions.

Thondaman spoke to the press on his plans to form a united effort among the Upcountry and Western Province Tamil political parties. He told the media that his party and the LTTE discussed the strategic need to form a broad Tamil front to meet the challenges from the Southern polity and to further the common aspirations of both the Tamil communities in the Northeast and the Upcountry.

Although the challenges faced by the Tamils in the Northeast and the Upcountry are different in scope, both communities have to face the common challenge posed by Sinhala nationalism, Thondaman told the media then.

“Emerging new political formations in the South have created an urgent strategic need for NorthEast and Hillcountry Tamils work together. Such a broad front will be able to confront the rising threat to the security and welfare of Tamil people living in all areas of Sri Lanka, and to resist attempts from the Southern Polity to relegate the status of Tamils to second class citizens,” Thondaman was quoted by media.

This overt shift by the CWC towards the LTTE sent alarm bells rimging in India House. Indian High Commissioner Nirupama Menon Rao intervened to bring about rapprochement between Rajapakse and Thondaman. Meetings were set up.

After some haggling and hiccups an understanding was arrived at. Arumugam Thondaman ditched the LTTE and his plan of a broad Tamil front. Instead the CWC joined the Government.

The CWC now needed an issue that could exert pressure on the Goverment like the brief “affair” with the LTTE.

The dangerous tactics used then could not be repeated now. The LTTE card was a non-option. But Thondaman had another ace up his sleeve. This was the Collective agreement signed with estate managements in December 2006.

After privatisation In 1998, the first collective agreement was signed between the Employers’ Federation of Ceylon (on behalf of the 21 Regional Plantation Companies) and the Trade Unions consisting of the Ceylon Workers Congress, Lanka Jathika Estate Workers Union and the Joint Plantations Trade Union Centre. Since then, every 2 years wages have been revised through Collective Agreements.

The last wage agreement was re-negotiated and revised in December 2006. The parties to the agreement remained the same. The parties agreed then that the agreement will be effective up to 31st December 2008.

According to the Dec 2006 agreement the total wage package of a plantation worker was revised to Rs 260/- per day. The package consists of a basic wage of Rs 170/-, price share supplement of Rs20/- and an attendance incentive of Rs 70/-.

[Tea Estate workers, Dambatenna: Picture by Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai]

But now Thondaman felt the time was opportune to strike at this Collective agreement. Cost of living had increased drastically. Plantation workers were particularly hit due to steep rise in the price of kerosene, flour and infant milk food.

The CWC hoped to strike a responsive chord among workers by exploiting the issue. At the same time it hoped to use the issue and exert pressure indirectly on the Government.

So the CWC used a clause in the agreement where a signatory could opt out by giving a month’s notice. The CWC informed the managements of its intention. The CWC demanded a revision of the agreement to increase the daily wage to 200 rupees per day.

Thus a person working for 25 days will get a minimum wage of 5000 Rupees monthly. This was on par with President Rajapakse’s decision to increase the minimum wage of all workers to 5,000 Rs per month.

Negotiations began with the estate managements under the auspices of Labour minister Athauda Seneviratne. Even as discussions were on CWC spokespersons told media that “work slow” and “work stoppage” campaigns will commence if agreement was not reached.

In a separate development Thondaman increased pressure on the President by raising further demands.. He began pressing the Government to implement the 10-year action plan for the welfare of the plantation workers. The plan with a multi – billion rupee budget envisaged improvement in education, health and housing facilities.

The CWC also submitted a charter of demands to the President to improve the lot of the plantation sector workers. The charter included demands for appointment of Tamil co-coordinators and an expanded secretariat in the National Education Ministry for promotion of Tamil language.

Even as the CWC began mounting pressure the Government started planning retaliatory measures.

According to newspaper reports the government began discussing issues described as “custodianship of the estate population under its purview”.
Under a strategic plan, the government proposed taking over the education and health sectors and “immensely increase State influence in the plantations sector”. The take-over of 110 estate hospitals was contemplated.

Health Minister Nimal Siripala de Silva publicly declared that there was absolutely no need to deal with the estate population through a third party. Addressing estate superintendents, teachers and principals at Badulla, de Silva emphasised the importance of the government dealing directly with the estate population.

Even as the Govt – CWC cold war continued fresh political developments increased Thondaman’s bargaining power. The Ranil – Mangala combine was canvassing JVP support against the Government on the budget vote. Also moves were on to submit a no confidence motion against Milinda Moragoda. It appeared that the JVP could support it.

The possibility of the JVP voting with the UNP against the Government posed a dicey situation where the CWC with five MP’s could hold the power balance. In a scenario of equally matched division the CWC could tilt the scales either way if it wanted to.

CWC spokesperson R. Yogarajan kept the CWC’s options open by declaring that the CWC would decide on its course only after examining the budget in detail.

The political animal in Mahinda Rajapakse became sharply alive. The President stepped in and quickly resolved the workers wage issue. A daily wage of 200 was agreed upon. A person working 25 days would get 5000 Rs. With other emoluments it could exceed Rs.7000.

With that “victory” in hand the road was clear for the CWC to re- join Government and accept their old portfolios. That has now happened and the Plantation prodigals are back in Govt folds.

It cannot be denied that the CWC had used the legitimate aspirations of plantation workers to pressurise the Government. The CWC was essentially a trade union with a political wing earlier. The political wing was to help workers win their benefits and dues.

But now the roles were reversed. Politics had overshadowed trade unionism. Sharing political power was seen as being more important than trade union activism. The CWC was now a political party with a trade union wing. In 2006 the plantation workers agitated for 300 Rupees as daily wage. The CWC however abandoned protest and compromised with managements for 170 rupees as basic wage.

The new rate of 200 rupees and promise of a minimum monthly 5000 rupee wage is a mirage. Rarely do estates provide work after a Friday. A five day week means only 20 – 23 working days per month. Thus 25 days of work is not guaranteed. The 75 % work attendance is also rare. So the attendance incentive is not guaranteed. The price share supplement will fluctuate according to the market rates.

So expectations of an all inclusive 290 rupee daily wage as well as a 25 workday guarantee are likely to result in disappointment.

What the workers need is a guaranteed monthly salary and not one based on accumulated daily wages.

The CWC however had created a worker issue for its own political interests, used it as a pressure tactic and compromised easily . The gain was more to CWC Parliamentarians than the hard – pressed worker whose monthly subscription is the mainstay of the union.

The tempest in a tea – cup has subsided and the CWC has become part and parcel of the Government again.

There are doubts however about the bona fides of both parties in this reconciliation..

The Government has reluctantly given in due to CWC triggered pressure and also because of its indispensability in maintaining a Parliamentary majority.

The CWC has joined the Government only due to fear of consequences and also a lack of alternative options..

Two qustions arise at this point.

Will the Government abandon its plan of dealing with Plantation workers directly and sidelining a “third Party” like the CWC?

The other is will the CWC remain steadfastly loyal to this regime by not voting against it at a critical juncture?

The coming days will provide answers to these questions. Interesting times lie ahead!

10th October 2007

Madame Louise Arbour
High Commissioner for Human Rights
United Nations
Geneva

Dear Madame Arbour:

Independent Human Rights Monitoring Mission for Sri Lanka

We are sure that you are well aware of the history of human rights violations in Sri Lanka and of the various recommendations made oover the years by special mechanisms of the UN human rights system. Most recently, recommendations have been made by the Special Rapporteur on Extra – Judicial Executions, the Working Group on Disappearances and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children in Armed Conflict.
In Sri Lanka, human rights violations have been committed by the state as well as by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). Violations have also been committed by a range of other armed non-state actors. A pervasive climate of impunity, the existence of draconian laws that facilitate human rights abuse and the slow and steady erosion of democratic freedoms, have created a situation in which those who are victims of human rights abuse and who are human rights defenders have few channels through which they may seek justice and redress.

Over the past two years, as a result of the escalation of the conflict, there has been a significant increase in the intensity and magnitude of the violations of human rights and humanitarian law, both by state and non-state actors. These violations have been well documented in other communications addressed to your office.

Sri Lanka has also witnessed a steady erosion of the independence and effectiveness of many of its democratic institutions including the police, the public service, Parliament, the Attorney General’s Department, the judiciary; and most recently, the Human Rights Commission and the Police Commission.

The failure to implement the 17th Amendment to the Constitution which enabled a multi-partisan Constitutional Council to recommend members to the independent Commissions, has contributed to the deterioration of human rights and democratic practice in the country. Moreover, the many different Committees and Commissions of Inquiry set up by the government, including the Commission set up in November 2006, have had no impact in reversing the deteriorating human rights situation.

At the moment there is no national institution that commands the credibility and respect of all sections of Sri Lankan society and it is in this context that human rights defenders have turned to the international community and to the OHCHR for support.

It is a matter of urgency to create such a national institution that will be independent and objective in its composition, in its mandate and in its practice.

We, as members of civil society, believe that the most effective way of paving the way for such a national institution and of addressing the culture of impunity that has existed for over 30 years is through the independent monitoring of human rights on the ground and the establishment of a field office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Sri Lanka. This can only be done by an international field presence that has the credibility and the stature to win the confidence of victims of human rights abuse and break the cycle of silence and impunity that we live in.

For such a field office of the OHCHR to be effective and to be able to reverse the deteriorating human rights situation it should be able to perform a broad range of functions. These must include:

Investigations

Its mandate must include the capacity to investigate all violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, either at its own initiative or on the reception of a complaint from a victim or other person.

Physical Access

It should have the capacity to access all areas of the country, including those areas under the control of the LTTE, the Karuna Faction and other para-military forces and visit police stations, army camps, places of detention (both acknowledged and unacknowledged) and other installations which are under the control of government forces or non-state actors.

Advocacy

It should be enabled to engage with all government officials, including members of the armed forces, the police, other special forces, the Human Rights Commission, the Police Commission, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, members of civil society and other institutions either through written or verbal communications and share its findings with these officials and institutions and make recommendations and offer advice. It should be able to perform a similar role with regard to the LTTE, the Karuna Group and other non-state actors.

Public Reporting

It should be mandated to document all violations of humanitarian law and human rights law and to disseminate these reports to those responsible for such violations; to the organs of the United Nations; to civil society and to the public.

Composition

It should consist of trained and experienced human rights monitrs from the global north and the global south with a field presence in different parts of Sri Lanka, but especially in those areas that have been the venue of serious human rights violations.

We would urge you to raise this issue, as a matter of priority, with the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE during your visit to the country.

Sincerely,

1. Rt. Rev. Rayappu Joseph, Bishop of Mannar
2. Asian Human Rights Commission
3. Association of War Affected Women (AWAW), Kandy
4. Centre for Human Rights and Development (CHRD),
5. Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA),
6. Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (CPR), Jaffna
7. Centre for Peace Building and Reconciliation (Cpbr),
8. Centre for Society and Religion (CSR)
9. Centre for Women and Development (Jaffna)
10. Centre for Society and Religion (CSR)
11. Christian Alliance for Social Action (CASA)
12. Community Trust Fund, Puttalam
13. Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA)
14. Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT)
15. Equal Ground Sri Lanka
16. Home for Human Rights (HHR)
17. Institute of Human Rights (IHR)
18. International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES)
19. International Friends for Global Peace
20. International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR)
21. INFORM Human Rights Documentation Centre
22. Janasansadaya, Panadura
23. Law & Society Trust (LST)
24. Mannar Women’s Development Federation, Mannar
25. Mothers and Daughters of Lanka
26. Nadesan Centre for Human Rights Through Law
27. Peace Direct
28. Rights Now Collective for Democracy
29. Secretariat of the National Alliance for Peace (SNAP)
30. Mario Gomez
31. Shreen Saroor
32. Sweta Velpillay
33. Mihiri Weerasinghe