by Dr. B. S. Wijeweera
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates. Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one Nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a Member indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a Member for Bristol, but he is a Member of Parliament.
(Edmund Burke, “Speech to the Electors of Bristol”, 3 Nov. 1774)
The Parliamentary Select Committee on Electoral Reform put out its interim report the other day at a press briefing. Almost simultaneously several political parties, both of the Opposition and Government, expressed their reservations and inability to go along with some critical recommendations in the report. In the previous Parliament too a similar Select Committee was formed in August 2003, but soon after it finalized its interim report Parliament was dissolved, and hence no action ensued. The present Select Committee took off from there but is stuck in a stalemate. So collectively after four years of deliberation it is back to the drawing-board.
Select Committees on sensitive issues have not found it easy. Today, another Select Committee on improvements to the 17th Amendment has been labouring for well over a year without result; in fact, it has sometimes found it difficult to muster a quorum. Due processes are observed, but when it comes to the crunch the members of these Committees, who are mere delegates of political parties, who are prone to protecting their respective turfs and doing nothing that would damage the party standing both within and without Parliament, find it extremely difficult to reach a consensus that would promote the common weal. The activities of the All Party Representative Conference is another case in point. For the past several months it has been piously promising (as reported in the mass media) the final proposals “within the next two months”, but the APRC is still struggling to deliver.
The point to be realized is that Parliament is a collection of political parties and, as members of political parties, those who serve on Select Committees are averse to finding solutions that would either damage their personal interests or that of their respective political parties.
From Electoral Reform to Parliamentary Reform
The Interim Report serves as a point of departure to reflect on a more fundamental issue, namely, the functions and composition of Parliament. We have been having a Parliament for the last 60 years, but with what result. Of course, it has enacted heaps of legislation, many of which create new bureaucratic structures without any concern for how to meet this additional expenditure. But Parliament has failed to provide redress to two chronic malaises that have been affecting society for a long time. Firstly, it is the economic system which has been characterized by slow and uneven growth, both sectorally and territorially. Now, some may point out that it is not Parliament but Government that should regulate and energize the economy. True, but constitutionally the eventual monetary and fiscal policies and sanctions for expenditure are given legal effect by Parliament. If Parliament is not allowed by the Executive to exercise any initiative, then, one has to probe why this has happened.
The second malaise is that of conflict of ethnic interests, which is as old as the economic problem. In fact, it could be said that they reinforce each other through a process of circular causation, i.e. one pushing the other into deeper and deeper crisis.
In the aftermath of the 1971 Insurgency, when most MPs were in a state of shock, Felix Dias Bandaranaike, as Government spokesman, made a very reflective observation which rings true even today: “the present situation marks, in my view, a total denunciation of the forms and procedures which we have been trying to emulate and ape, borrowed from a foreign culture, totally irrelevant to our present-day thinking and to the present day context” (Hansard, 04 May 1971). Tragically, soon after the Insurgency was brought under control, it was business as usual in Parliament.
To come back to the present a few months back, in a rare display of parliamentary activism, the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) put out a scathing indictment on the financial management of government enterprises and reported that a colossal sum of money (around Rs. 150 billion?) has been misappropriated. Parliament stands helpless in the face of Government’s tardiness to pursue this matter. Thus, we have now a pernicious third malaise over which Parliament has little control – massive corruption.
Election a Means to an End
Elections are only a means to selecting “suitable” persons to sit in Parliament. It is only a process leading to what should be a robust, virile and effective Parliament. Thus, the reform exercise should have begun with an empirical inquiry into the nature of Parliament and what sort of persons should be in it. When the role of Parliament and what is expected of it is clear, then, and only then, would an inquiry into the manner of electing persons to it become meaningful. It is sad that Parliament confined the activities of its Select Committee to the elections process.
Constitutional Guidance
In the two previous Constitutions and in the present one the functions of Parliament are clearly stated: to make laws (including amendments to the Constitution), authorize expenditure from the Consolidated Fund, raise revenue by taxes or other means, and maintain a supervision of government financial operations through reports made to it by the Auditor-General. These functions need greater emphasis today.
Logically, People should have the opportunity to elect to Parliament persons possessed of professional competence to discharge the above functions. This is not to say that we should have in Parliament only lawyers, accountants and auditors but that the People should be absolutely free to elect such persons or others of professional standing if they so wish. Rousseau observed sometime back (Social Contract) that the people of England are free only at the time of electing Members of Parliament. Even this freedom is curtailed today because the electoral process is so dominated by political parties that People have only a limited choice of voting for persons pre-selected for them by the bosses of political parties. Thus, we end up with representatives of political parties, not of the People. This subtle difference, in turn, inhibits the behavior of elected Members who owe a greater obligation to the promotion of party interests rather than that of the People in whose name they seek election.
The situation in Sri Lanka today is that the party hierarchy is all powerful. In the screening process for party nominations loyalty to the leader ranks very high. Previous contributions to promoting the interests of the party at elections count more than the good of the public in whose name election is sought. Certainly, “gentlemanly politics” ranks very low in the evaluation; “hook or by crook” is the preferred norm.
Some Guidance from the Past
Thucydides has left a useful contemporaneous account of how mid fifth century B.C. Athenian society functioned, giving both the good and bad features (The Peloponnesian War, Rex Warner translation). Equality before the law, obedience to those placed in authority, a lively interest of citizens in affairs of the state, proper discussion before important policy decisions, death penalty for embezzlement of public funds, stripping of office or exile upon failure to perform ones duty (Thucydides himself was sent into exile), were some of the positive features of that society.
The most pertinent feature for our discussion is the comment: “When it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of responsibility, what counts in not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses”. The class referred to here is not in the economic sense, but very probably the factions into which that society was divided. This principle of merit is violated in our society, when a political party (which is a class of persons by association) is given the indirect power to nominate persons to that assembly which makes laws and decisions that are binding on us all. We have to go back to basics and insist on merit not as determined by political parties, but by the voters themselves.
The recent spate of crossovers in Parliament brings in another empirical dimension. Earlier it was pointed out that MPs are not representatives of the People but of political parties that nominate them. When crossovers take place in defiance of party wishes even this representation is thrown into confusion. They then represent only themselves. The positive side of this development is that, may be, they are asserting the right to free themselves from the shackles of party domination, a point of view supported in this essay.
The other inspiration that has been chosen in support of this essay is the victory speech made by English legislator-cum-statesman, Edmund Burke, soon after he was declared duly elected at the conclusion of an election petition hearing. He makes an impassioned plea for freedom of conscience, especially against the practice of “Instructions” that prevailed then by which the electors could dictate to an MP how he should vote or behave on an issue before Parliament. He distinguishes between the parochial interest and the national interest and places the MP’s responsibility squarely on the side of the latter in the event of a conflict. His reference to hostile interests are pertinent today to the interests of political parties, whose “agents and advocates” MPs have become. Of course, it has to be admitted that Burke failed in his mission and later had to seek a safer constituency in order to retain his seat in Parliament. More importantly, he left behind for posterity a role for the MP as a pursuer of the national interest, referred to as the “trustee” model.
We should desist from the conclusion that this may lead to MPs becoming a law unto themselves, and end up by representing nobody but themselves. This does not necessarily follow. Anyone seeking re-election will have the good sense to keep in touch with voters, feel their pulse on important issues. Having done this he should be free to act in, what he perceives to be, the national interest.
The Political Party in Political Theory
It is often explained that a political party performs an aggregative function in society, i. e. to put together diverse opinions and expectations of various groups into a coherent form and when in power to translate them into executive and legislative action. Without such an institution, it is argued, if would not be possible to formulate a programme of measures, nor have the necessary support in the legislature, for implementation. This argument is more valid in a parliamentary executive type of government.
What is the empirical reality in Sri Lanka? Except for a few rare occasions when public opinion moulded public policy, most of the time political parties aggregate popular bases not public opinion. The most loyal supporters are those who seek personal favours and benefits in return, not the implementation of agreed programmes. Notoriously, the corporate business sector hedges its bets at election time and also spends lavishly on the party that it feels will carry the majority vote. Attachment to individuals, families and kinship relationships count more than policies. The negative vote of protest against the incumbent Government can swing the result more than the relative merits of the programmes on offer. Finally, the resort to thuggery, intimidation and election malpractice robs the political party of any claim to performing an educative and positive role in society. In fact, it has introduced a further fragmentation of society.
The Need for a Stable Government
The root of the problem is our attachment to the parliamentary executive system. Even with the introduction of the Executive Presidency and a formal statement of the separation of powers in the Constitution, the attachment to a parliamentary cabinet (including the PM) continued. This nexus has created immense problems
Firstly, in order to govern a person has not only to win the presidential election but also has to ensure for his party a parliamentary majority. When this fails a stalemate ensues in which neither institution can function effectively. Secondly, when the Executive presidency was first mooted in the then National State Assembly by J. R. Jayewardene, the stated justification was a stable Executive with a fixed term of office “not dependent on the whims and fancies of the House”. Experience has shown that this is not necessarily correct. Parliament can still manipulate things, using the arithmetic of party seats, to frustrate the Executive. Conversely, the wheel can turn a full circle with Parliament at the mercy of the whims and fancies of the President through the operation of the power to dissolve Parliament.
The Interim Report’s answer to this dilemma is to recommend a “hybrid” of FPP and PR voting systems to ensure a stable government: 140 seats for the winners of single member constituencies; and 70 seats for the losers of these constituencies to be distributed on a district PR basis. Additionally, 15 seats are to be allocated from “national lists” based on the proportion of votes polled by each party nationally, subject to five of them going to the party that polls the most number of votes. An obnoxious feature of the “national list” allocation is that a candidate with little support in a constituency (a reject) can theoretically find his way into Parliament through the “national list”, thus, making it very obvious that he is a party representative in Parliament.
A Parliament Without Political Parties
The issue of a stable Executive can be easily resolved by cutting the nexus between Parliament and the Executive without having to gerrymander the results of parliamentary elections. In a judicial interpretation given recently by a seven member Special Bench of the Supreme Court it is the “executive power of the People” that is exercised by the President. If so there is no need to compel the President to select the Cabinet from Parliament, because the Executive President derives his power directly from the People. Moreover, there need not be a PM in Parliament, because the President is the Head of the Cabinet. These contradictions have crept into the present Constitution because in 1978 we had the hang-over of a Parliamentary Executive operating in this county for thirty years. It is now time to decide between a pure parliamentary Executive or a pure Presidential Executive.
If the option is for the former then we run the risk of a powerful parliamentary Executive acting in a dictatorial manner as happened in the administrations of 1970-77 and 1977-89. Also, the political party system will have to stay with all its attendant evils. If it is the latter then it would be possible to keep in check the dictatorial tendencies of an Executive President by having a Parliament without political parties.
Notionally, an independent Parliament without political parties is nothing new. We have got used to an independent Judiciary, an independent PSC, an independent Police Commission and an independent Auditor-General all in the name of Rule of Law and good governance. An independent Parliament will be just another institution that will buttress the same objective.
Effective Checks on an Executive President
In a Parliament elected on a non-political party basis and in their individual capacities (actually membership of a political party would be made a disqualification) there are several checks available to control the Executive. Firstly, there would be the Impeachment of the President and he will not have his party men in Parliament to abort it. Additionally, by doing away with the constitutional Article on immunity, the President will be treated as an equal before the law and made legally answerable for his actions. Secondly, a simple No Confidence Motion will keep in check all members of the Cabinet. The President will be free to choose his cabinet members from whatever source he can rely on paying heed to ethnic representation, except of course Members of Parliament. However, he will not be able to protect them in Parliament using party muscle. If the No Confidence Motion is carried the Cabinet member resigns and someone else will have to be appointed. The President will be free to appoint officials such as Secretaries of Ministries and members of statutory bodies such as corporations, but all of them will be screened prior to appointment, for integrity and competence, by the Committee on High Posts. That special institution called the Constitutional Council, envisaged in the 17th Amendment, can be made operative as another Committee of Parliament, because there will be no Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and other party groups to assemble it. It will be necessary to make it mandatory for the President to abide by the decisions of the Constitutional Council. Finally, Parliament will have a completely free atmosphere in which to examine the reports of the Auditor-General. Collectively, all these measures will contribute to good governance on the part of the Executive. Of course, the first requirement would be that the power of dissolution of Parliament would have to be withdrawn. Parliament, like the President, will serve for a fixed term.
Three Special Problems
In a system in which an Executive President and an independent Parliament operate, three special problems have to be addressed. Firstly, how will the Executive get its legislation passed. The usual procedure will be followed. The Bill will be sent to be placed on the Order Paper. On the appointed day the relevant Minister together with other officials will appear in Parliament and explain the provisions of the Bill and the reasons for proposing it. After a discussion and exchange of views on both sides the Bill will be passed, rejected or passed with suitable amendments, just as it happens now. Certainly, there will be less acrimony because those in Parliament will be more objective and reasonable than those in an Opposition whose primary objective is to oppose and embarrass the Government.
The other problematic issue is how does the Executive secure the authority for expenditure and raising revenue. Whether it is the annual budget or a supplementary estimate its smooth passage through Parliament is essential to the maintenance of public services. Today, the annual budget is an assemblage of “shopping lists” put forward by different Ministers, who put forward projects to make a name for themselves. Some compromise is reached in the Treasury, but the outcome is bloated expenditure for which finance has to be found somehow. Even with high expenditure, basic needs such as medical services and education are inadequately financed. When the number of Ministers is large there is very little control that even the Treasury can maintain on expenditure.
In a Parliament without political parties and Ministers, prior discussion with the different Consultative Committees of Parliament will precede the formulation of the annual budget. The Ministers will be supplicants for funds. Even their very existence will be questioned. Superflous departments (of which there are large number) will be axed and their functions re-assigned to others, thus, cutting down overheads expenditure. This will surely lead to a curtailment of burgeoning recurrent expenditure and a leaner but financially viable annual budget.
The Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act gives some guidelines on prudent financial management: budget deficit less than 5% of GDP, reduction of public debt, and reducing total government liabilities progressively to 60% of GDP by the year 2013. This is now law, and Parliament can insist on its observance before approval of the annual budget. Furthermore, printing of money would require approval of Parliament.
It is not fair to assume that the new type of MP will become obstructionist by habit. If public services are stalled because of a deadlock, then, not only the Executive but also Parliament will come in for blame. Thus, it is not unrealistic to assume that both parties will work together (especially because they are not in political competition) in the public interest.
The third special problem relates to minority representation in Parliament. The Interim Report has opted for a member each from 140 single-member constituencies, 70 on district PR from the losers and 15 from the National Lists. The Delimitation Commission is assigned the responsibility of providing for minority representation. Perhaps, it has assumed that since many political parties are based on pure ethnic lines that this fact will look after representation of minorities. In the envisaged independent Parliament there will no PR seats nor National List seats, both of which are off-shoots of the party system. Hence, there may be a necessity to have multi-member constituencies, as in the past, in order to provide for adequate representation of minorities.
Two Relevant Objections
It may be asked whether the people themselves will prefer to have an MP who will not have any Government clout to fix jobs for their children, to get for them other favours and benefits. The simple answer is that they will have to decide this at the Referendum, if at all one materializes. As it is, it would be difficult to find MPs or political parties that would want to sponsor a proposal that would undermine their own positions. However, an idea does not lose value simply because there are no takers; experience has shown that it has to wait for its time.
The second objection is that whether this would benefit those with money to spend on elections. We cannot eliminate the advantages that money can confer on individuals. Even today, the nomination by a well-funded political party confers a definite advantage to that candidate, but we do not complain of undue advantage here because the political party has become an article of faith. If someone wants to spend his money to gain a little prestige or honour in becoming an MP, it does no harm to society. Fortunately, the corporate sector of big business, the most corrupting financial influence in electoral politics, will not back an ordinary MP who will have no executive power. They will reserve their funds for the presidential election, which will be run on political party lines.
Conclusion
This is but a very sketchy formulation inspired by what has been proposed in the Interim Report on Electoral Reform. The Select Committee could not exceed its mandate, but no such inhibition restricts the writer. In this sense, it is not a critique but a separate conceptualisation that reaches out way beyond the Select Committee mandate. The inspiration is also very genuine and well intentioned – to urge a reform of Parliament. Parliament will be better served if the deadweight of the parliamentary Executive is taken off its shoulders.