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By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

The All Party Representative Committee proceedings are in the eye of a political storm. The recent decision to adjourn sittings indefinitely has lent itself to different interpretations.

Chief among them is a notion that the APRC has failed to evolve anything tangible after protracted meetings exceeding forty in number. But this impression is wrong because the APRC has quietly made progress on a number of matters.

Prof . Vitharana in an interview to a Colombo newspaper outlined crisply some of the APRC decisions to date. They are as follow -

-The province to remain the unit of devolution but the district to be strengthened as an administrative unit within the provincial framework and on this basis there should be devolution.

-The Concurrent List, provided for under the 13th Amendment, to be done away with. (This was agreed on in the APRC) Central and provincial lists of devolved subjects to be clearly defined. Executive and legislative powers would be devolved on these levels of administration.

-Within this provincial framework there would be a ‘pyramid of peoples representation’ from the Village Committee and Ward Committee levels up to the Pradeshiya Sabha and district levels. These arrangements will be tied up with the existing administrative systems so that the GA will be the chief executive at the district set up charged with channelling central and provincial funds with corresponding functions for the Divisional Secretary at the divisional level.

- Reduce the danger of separation as a result of power devolution by reiterating the powers of the President as the Head of State – as set out in APRC Chairman’s document. That is intervention by the President through the armed forces and police to defuse any separation threat or even dissolve any provincial government in the face of a separation threat.

- Strengthen the ’spirit of cooperative governance’, as set out in the South African constitution, so that different tiers of government would work cooperatively strengthening and protecting national sovereignty.

Prof Vitharana also told the Colombo newspaper that ” The APRC will be meeting early next week to put into shape its final proposals to resolve the conflict”.He emphasized that the APRC process was very much on track.

Clarifying the factual position, the APRC Chairman said that he had made certain amendments to the document submitted by him earlier to the APRC, on the basis of discussions the forum had conducted on some issues raised within it. These discussions started on Monday.

At Tuesday’s meeting, the representatives of the SLFP and MEP had said that they preferred to show the amended document to their respective party leadership before continuing the deliberations. The APRC had agreed to meet next week following these consultations.

The recent “hiccup” has led to speculation that the APRC has virtually collapsed.This has strengthened opinion that the APRC is a failed exercise.

There are many “pundits” on all sides who have been describing the APRC as a time – buying device of Rajapakse. They have anticipated doom and call it an exercise in futility.

Those supporting the APRC in a positive spirit are depicted as naive and stupid.Vitharana is projected by some as a “wise fool” and others as a “charlatan” working in tandem with Rajapakse.

But many of these commentators fail to grasp what is actually happening out there and why some of us including this columnist continue to support Tissa Vitharana and the APRC.

What is happening now is a re-play of earlier developments related to the APRC. There is a cold war out there betwen the forces of rationality and irrationality, tolerance and intolerance, hegemonism and democracy, centralisation and devolution,oligarchy and pluralism, hawks and doves.

Rajapakse’s intentions were not very honourable in appointing the APRC. It was a ploy to get the International Community and India off his back as they were insisting on a political process.

Many Sinhala rulers have in the past resorted to All party conferences and round – table talks to buy time or ease pressure. Nothing tangible was achieved.

Likewise Rajapakse was treading this time – tested path. With Gotabhaya Rajapakse and Sarath Fonseka promising an early military victory the APRC could be a convenient sideshow to distract and buy time for the military to do its job.

The idea was to alter ground reality through military might and then dictate an imposed solution on the Tamils.

But Rajapakse made one promise that “bound” him publicly. He pledged that he would abide by whatever decision reached at the APRC. Subsequently he re-iterated that position with many leaders and officials.

Rajapakse’s intention seemed to be that of manipulating the APRC into delivering at the correct time, a package that would be confined within the limits of his circumscribed vision known as “Mahinda Chinthana”.

Unfortunately for him there were some people belonging to different ethnicities who were not prepared to play along. These quiet and genuine patriots (as opposed to racist fanatics) were ready to do what was right regardless of might.

So we had the 11 member multi – ethnic majority report coming out. This was the most progressive set of proposals to emerge after the GL – Neelan package of Aug 3rd 1995.When Rajapakse spurned that Vitharana stepped in and came out with his own proposals that incorporated around 85 % of the majority report ontent.

The APRC received a boost when the UNP signed a MOU with the SLFP and participated actively in the APRC. So Rajapakse had to undermine the APRC. The Govt was turned into an Elephant orphanage and 18 UNP’ ers were enticed to cross over.

The UNP that had presented a positive set of proposals stopped attending the APRC but did not quit it altogether. But it then set a deadline before which the APRC should come out with approved proposals.

Rajapakse meanwhile threw another spanner in the works by coming out with SLFP proposals that made the district as devolution unit and the state to be unitary.

Valuable time was lost in discussing these issues. Yet Vitharana’s persistence paid off and finally the APRC has reached agreement on most matters barring two major issues.

What has been happening is a “cold war” within the APRC where a number of small parties have joined together in forging an acceptable package of Constitutional reform.

They are now trying to make Rajapakse abide by his assurance that he would accept and implement whatever decisions reached by the APRC.

Contrary to the impression that it is a “puppet” of Rajapakse the APRC has slowly and steadily turned the tables on him..

The APRC has boomeranged on the Ptresident and threatens to evolve a solution that goes against the grain of Mahinda Rajapakse’s political beliefs, consciousness and agenda.

Rajapakse’s latest move in association with his ideological “guru” JHU is to manouevre around the constituents of his Government.The ace up his sleeve is that almost all party leaders are members of his cabinet.

Tissa Vitharana, DEW Gunasekera, Rauf Hakeem. AHM Athaullah, Ferial Ashraff, P. Chandrasekharan, Riaz Badurdeen. Dinesh Gunewardena are all ministers. Even Thondaman would have been one but for the recent fiasco.

Technically, they are all ministers of the Rajapakse govt because they have all accepted Mahinda Chinthana. A key element of that vision is perpetuating the unitary state.

Another aspect is de – linking the East and “sinhalaising” it. So these party leaders who are also cabinet ministers have to accept Mahinda’s writ.

It remains to be seen whether these party leaders will be able to resist Rajapakse or succumb meekly. If they have the collective will and tenacity to stand firm they could make Rajapakse veer around to their thinking.

But this is a bold gamble and the party leaders must be prepared to resign their ministerial posts on a matter of principle if they fail.

I doubt very much that these cabinet seat ocupants will have that amount of integrity or grit. Their lack of unity is a big stumbling block. If one party takes up a principled stand the another party will do the opposite to curry favour.

Look at the recent “eastern victory” tamasha. Rauf Hakeem adopts a certain position in his Parliamentary speech and explains the reason for his participation. He criticises the regime for hurting Tamil sensibilities by such an elaborate celebration.

But what does Athaullah do? He garlands Rajapakse and wraps a golden shawl around him.Let us also not forget that Hakeem was constrained to join this Govt because many of his sidekicks (like the earlier lot) would have left him and joined the Govt on their own.

Then take the CWC. They take offence at Basil Rajapakse’s high – handedness and pull out. But the party bigwigs are unhappy. Even some MP’s were capable of going the Vadivel Suresh way and re- joining the Govt.

Besides Chandrasekharan utilises the chance to snuggle closer to the Govt. So the CWC eats humble “kanji” and backtracks from its earlier tough stance.

In such a situation it is very unlikely that these party leaders would dare defy Mahinda. But it is in their interest and Rajapakse’s interest to drag matters on instead of making conclusive decisions.

So they could postpone matters and prolong the issue for some time instead of a quick resolution.

Mahinda Rajapakse’s main worry now is Chandrika Kumaratunga. After her return he is concerned that she may entice loyalists and disgruntled elements to cross over as a large group.

If this happens the UNP crossers over could also change sides. Also the Tamil and Muslim parties will also switch sides then.

The acid test will be the budget vote. In such a situation Rajapakse is not likely to risk losing support from all those supporting him.

He will drag matters till November while wooing the JVP. But a determined effort by the smaller parties could unsettle him. But such a prospect seems remote

Compounding the issue further is the divided outlook within the United National Party. Though the UNP announced Aug 15th as a deadline for withdrawal , Wickremasinghe and Choksy later stated in letters to Vitharana that Aug 31st was the deadline.

But Tissa Attanayake says the deadline was August 15th. He says the UNP is out of the APRC.

The UNP signed a MOU with the SLFP and participated enthusiastically in the APRC. But the SLFP engineered mass defection of 18 MP’s from UNP ranks has made the greens hostile.

Now the UNP would love to see the APRC scuttled without blame attaching to itself.

But the UNP seems to be walking into a Rajapakse trap.

One of Mahinda’s stratagems is to create conditions where the UNP finds it impossible to co-operate in the search for a political settlement or Constitutional reform.

If the UNP maintains this tough stance then it will not participate in APRC proceedings. Then Rajapakse can lay the blame on Wickremasinghe for the APRC’s failure.

This was a motivating factor in enticing UNP Parliamentarians. The idea was to make the UNP react angrily and then blame it for not cooperating politically for a solution.

Rajapakse can also trap the UNP in another way. If he succeeds in browbeating the party leaders in his cabinet Rajapakse can impose his writ on the APRC. If so the APRC majority decision will favour things like unitary , de – merger etc.

Then the UNP will be forced to go along with it and lose International Community support externally and minority community support internally.

On the other hand if the UNP does not play along it will risk further erosion of support among Sinhalala people.

The UNP will be caught between a rock and a hard place.

If the UNP is to avoid this dilemma the party must participate fully with the APRC. It must lend political muscle and moral support to those doves within the APRC who are fighting a cold war with the hawks.

Ultimately the International Community must also play a hand. At present the IC is observing APRC proceedings keenly but remains detached because it believes that Sri Lankans must evolve a home – grown settlement.

This does not mean that the IC will support and accept whatever the Rajapakse regime places on the table.

The IC is going along with Rajapakse’s war because it feels that the LTTE has to be pressured militarily. But the IC is clear about the ultimate solution being a political settlement.

However much the antipathy towards the LTTE the IC is sympathetic to the Tamil predicament. It wants a reasonable solution addressing legitimate concerns of the Tamils.

The two sticking points now are the structure of the state and the North – East merger.

Whatever the final outcome it has to be credible in the eyes of the International Community.

According to a Western diplomat based in Colombo there can be no effective solution unless the state becomes federal in nature even if not explicitly stated so. This is not possible as long as the unitary structure of the state is retained.

Also any scheme under a unitary structure cannot be regarded as credible. If a credible offer is not on the table the rationale for pursuing war as a pressuring device to bring the LTTE to the table will be lost.

There is also the fact that Tamil public opinion (regardless of the LTTE) will not accept a solution within a unitary state .

But the IC has not grasped one thing. The Rajapakse regime will not budge from its avowed hawkish position unless pressure is exerted.

For this an important change is necessary in the IC ’s position.

The International Community has clearly and unequivocally ruled out separation. It stands for unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.

But the IC also says that the solution must be acceptable to all sections of the people. It does not stipulate the parameters of the envisaged solution.

Instead of leaving it open – ended the IC must explicitly state that the “unitary” state must go. Only then will the moderates get strengthened and extremists isolated.

The tussle in Sri Lanka is between the Sinhala dominated mono – state and the Tamil inspired separate state. The IC says NO separate state. But it does not say NO unitary state.

This smacks of double standards. More importantly it weakens those striving for a plural state vis a vis the mono and separate statists.

In the struggle between hawks and doves to re -invent Sri Lanka on plural lines the IC cannot remain spectators. It must support the doves.

This will make a big difference in the APRC cold war between hawks and doves.

Ultimately it will help establish lasting peace and durable justice in the Island.

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

“Reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated” is one among many sayings , Mark Twain is famous for. The American writer whose characters – Huckleberry Finn, Tom Sawyer and the Connecticut Yankee at King Arthurs court – fascinated us during childhood made this pithy observation when some newpapers reported erroneously that he had passed away.

If the All Party Representatives Committee (APRC) tasked by President Rajapakse to achieve consensus on Constitutional reform was a “Person” there is little doubt that it would have echoed Mark Twain when reports appeared about its pre- mature expiry.

It was left to APRC chairperson Prof. Tissa Vitharana to set the record straight by telling a news conference that the APRC is not defunct..

No one can be definite about what the APRC will ultimately achieve. It may succeed or fail. But the one sure thing for now is that the APRC has not put up shutters. It has only been adjourned and is very likely to be convened again next week.

The bottom line simply is that the patient – though not in the best of health – is very much alive still . Will there be a terminal relapse or miraculous recovery ? The answer will depend on the course of events in the coming weeks.

It would however be rash and unfair to write off the APRC as a lost cause. However much the dice was loaded against it the APRC thanks mainly to its indefatigable chairperson has survived so far.

Moreover the APRC in its quiet way has achieved significant progress. This is good news for those desiring an equitable solution within a united but not necessarily a unitary Sri Lanka. But to extremists on both sides of the ethnic divide such news was bad news.

It is because of this critical juncture that efforts are underway by Sinhala hegemonists to scuttle or stymie the APRC . If a recent “Tamilnet” news feature is any indication of the opposingg mindset , then the Tamil separatists too are relishing this situation.

A brief re-run of events leading to this state of affairs would be useful to understand current developments clearly.

The All Party Representative Committee was convened by President Rajapakse last year. Parties represented in Parliament with the exception of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) were invited to join.

Rajapakse announced that he would abide by the decision reached at the APRC. He re-iterated this stance to many international leaders and officials.

Initially the parties in attendance were the SLFP, UNP, JVP, JHU,CWC, SLMC,ACMC, NUA, NC,MEP, LSSP, CP,UCPF, EPDP and WPF. Subsequently the Western Peoples Front dropped out. Later the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna also followed suit.

The UNP which kept out earlier came in after signing a memorandum with the SLFP. It also submitted a very progressive set of proposals. Objecting to the lack of consensus among parties constituting the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) the UNP announced that it would withdraw if no consensus was reached by Aug 15th. Later Ranil Wickremasinghe and Nariman Choksy extended it to Aug 31st in writing.

The APRC has had 40 sittings so far. The last few months have been hectic with the APRC meeting at least twice a week to finalise matters. To some extent this “acceleration” was due to the deadline imposed by the UNP.

It may be recalled that President Rajapakse also appointed a panel of experts to advise the APRC. In the beginning the APRC opted to relax and place the onus of delivering a solution to the panel of experts. The expert panel too was proceeding slowly when Rajapakse imposed Dec 15th 2006 as a deadline because of Indian pressure.

The 17 member experts panel could not formulate a unified approach. So there was one majority report presented by eleven persons and a minority report endorsed by four persons.. In addition there were two others submitting a dissenting report each.

The majority report was multi – ethnic with six Sinhala, four Tamil and one Muslim signing it. The other three reports were signed by Sinhala persons.

There was thus an impasse. Then Prof Tissa Vitharana offered a way out by announcing that he would – in his chairperson capacity – draft a comprehensive report incorporating the best available in all four reports.

Tissa Vitharana presented his report in due course. APRC members continued to discuss and debate the report at a leisured pace. One lawyer representing his party at the APRC said that several persons siimply re- iterated their party positions or related their respective versions of the history of the ethnic crisis rather than make concrete suggestions.

Another factor affecting APRC credibility was the SLFP proposals which emphasised that the state would be unitary and that the unit of devolution would be a district.Rajapakse announced that this was his personal position too.

Many felt that the APRC could/would/should not go against President Rajapakse and the SLFP in such a situation. The APRC was not expected to deliver because of this.

But Cabinet minister and APRC chairman Prof. Tissa Vitharana was made of sterner stuff. He is an incurable optimist.So Vitharana persisted with his efforts to make the APRC deliver.

After consulting President Rajapakse, Prof. Vitharana decided that some external input was necessary to expedite APRC proceedings. Prol. Lakshman Marasinghe was appointed as an adviser.

Marasinghe an emeritus law professor from Windsor University in Canada has displayed constant interest in Sri Lankan Constitutional reform.

Marasinghe being an academic felt that further assistance was required to address nitty – gritty issues of a political nature particularly in relation to the North – East.. So Dr. Kasilingam Vigneswaran was also apponted as adviser.

Vigneswaran , former secretary to the North – Eastern provincial Council is also a member of the experts panel.Though some members objected at first, Vigneswaran’s appointment was also approved.

Prof. Vitharana ably assisted by his two advisers went about the task of revising his original document. This comprised laborious effort as the exhaustive minutes of each APRC meeting as well as presentations of each party had to be analysed in detail.

A positive outcome of this exercise was the discovery that there was unanimity of opinion among most parties on a number of issues.

Earlier during discussions it was crystal clear that the UNP, left parties, Up Country Tamil parties and two of the Muslim parties were more or less in agreement on most issues. Now this agreement was getting concretised in tangible form.

There was however a divergence on many matters between the SLFP, MEP, JHU and the others. Vitharana then sent proposals to the leadership of these parties outlining the areas of discord and possible options to breach the divide.

Rajapakse then met on Aug 7th with the leaders of these parties to sort out some matters.. He also met later with leaders of all parties represented in government.

This exercise led to greater flexibility on the part of the Govt and its constituent parties. Now there was the appearance of greater will and resolve to reach agreement

This enabled the APRC to expedite “amending” matters. In simple terms, Tissa Vitharana was amending his earlier document.

Each and every item of his earlier document was amended by enhancing, deleting or altering the original content . Most of them were approved by the APRC without much hassle.

Two acts of omission helped in this. One was the boycotting of the APRC by the JVP. Thus the Sinhala “national socialists” were not present to place obstacles.

The other was the brief absence of the Sinhala “ethno -fascists”. The Jathika Hela Urumaya’s representative Udaya Gammanpila for some reason was not present for quite a number of APRC meetings for a while.

This enabled the APRC to approve of the amendments to Vitharana’s original document without much obstruction from a Sinhala hardline perspective.

Wiswa Warnapala of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and Dr. Nalin de Silva of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna recorded their objections and reservations wherever and whenever appropriate but did not obstruct proceedings.

Thus about twenty different items were approved by the APRC. There were three major sticking points.

First was the structure of the state. Unitary or Federal or something in between?

Second was the unit of devolution. Province, district, region or village based?

Third was the North – East merger. To re- merge, de – merge or arrive at some creative compromise?

On one point there was a breakthrough outside the APRC. Prof. Vitharana and some like – minded persons were able to convince President Rajapakse that his brain – child of district as devolution unit was not workable or acceptable.

Finally Rajapakse relented. He agreed to the proviso that the province could be the unit of devolution. But appropriate administrative tiers at the district and village level were to be set up within the provincial unit.

But Rajapakse wanted the state to be explicitly unitary. Also the North and East were to be separate. These continued to be obstacles.

By August 11th – 12th week- end Vitharana assisted by Marasinghe and Vigneswaran had finalised the “amended” document on most counts.

Only two things namely the structure of state and the north – east merger remained problematic. They were left outside the scope of the APRC for the time being.

When the APRC convened on Monday Aug 13th the majority of participants were pleasantly surprised. A finished document was distributed to all.

The JHU representative marking his appearance after “a while” also registered surprise. “you all seem to have achieved a lot when I was not here” he quipped. Mr. Gammanpila’s “surprise” turned into “astonishment” after perusing the contents.

He was then engaged in several telephonic conversations.Thereafter he left the meeting telling a Muslim representative that the President wanted to see him.

It later transpired that Gammanpila and JHU cabinet minister of environment Champika Ranawaka had met President Rajapakse. Recent history repeated itself as the JHU began planting seeds of doubt and discord in Mahinda’s mind.

What happened thereafter is not very clear but the APRC met again on Aug 14th to stamp the final seal of approval on the APRC report. By doing so the APRC would have finalised a document 24 hours before the ides of August.

Prof . Wiswa Warnapala of the SLFP and Prof. Nalin de Silva of the MEP walked in late and asked for an adjournment of the APRC.

The SLFP and MEP representatives wanted some time till the documents were analysed and approved by their party leadership. They wanted the APRC adjourned.

Some minority community members at the APRC demurred. The adjournment motion turned into a limited debate. Prof Vitharana also stood his ground and insisted that the points agreed upon should be approved pending finalisation of the two residual issues.

At this point Warnapala said that President Rajapakse was of the opinion that both outstanding issues should be sorted out at the Govt. party leaders meeting.

Vitharana remonstrated that the President had not communicated anything of the kind to him personally. Warnapala then said that he had met Rajapakse personally and that the President had wanted this done immediately.

It was stressed that the report be discussed at the Govt party leader’s conference before approval at the APRC. It was also said that the report should not be approved without decisions being reached on the two outstanding points.

This dampened the spirits of many APRC delegates. Communist Party representative Raja Collure observed wrily “in that case let the party leaders come up with a solution themselves”

Muslim Congress representative Nizham Kariapper pointed out tongue in cheek that the APRC exercise was done at the behest of the President and that the question of adjournment too was at his pleasure.

Warnapala then informed the others that it would not take too long and that President Rajapakse intended summoning the party leaders conference on Friday Aug 17th or Saturday the 18th. Hopefully the APRC could re – convene early next week after the party leaders conference.

On that basis there was agreement on adjournment. Vitharana then asked about fixing a date for the next meeting. But with everyone disturbed by the new development that question went unanswered.So the APRC was adjourned until further notice.

With the wisdom of hindsight it is obvious now that the decision or non – decision of fixing a new date for re – convening was a blunder. The conspicuous absence of a fresh date led to an erroneous impression that the APRC had adjourned indefinitely.

Had a date been fixed this would not have occurred. A date could have been announced and postponed if necessary.This lapse has added to the confusion.

Apart from the mistaken notion that the APRC is suspended indefinitely there is also misperception about what has been achieved so far.

The APRC has achieved considerable progress in the quest for Constitutional reform but for two outstanding issues. To dismiss the APRC as a worthless exercise at this stage and predict its demise would be premature and exaggerated.

Of the two issues to be resolved the more important one is the structure of state. Rajapakse and the Sinhala hardliners want it to be explicitly unitary. Those who are for some form of the federal idea are against this.

But they do realise that Federalism has been distorted into a dirty “F – word” in Sinhala political discourse.So they are not insisting on federal to be explicitly stated. Some form of the federal idea in practice would be ideal.

But they are firm on one thing. There cannot be any explicit reference to unitary when it comes to the nature of the state. So some other alternative has to be found.

The APRC appreciated this difficulty and came up with a viable alternative. The concept in Tissa Vitharana’s amended draft was to call Sri Lanka Single, Sovereign and Independent where the Centre and Provinces would exercise powers in their respective spheres.

On the question of North – East merger the APRC itself has not arrived at a conclusion. The four options proposed in the majority expert panel report are under consideration.

The majority opinion within the APRC seems to be in favour of re- merging the North and East for a period of time and then deciding through referendum whether the East wants status quo or not. But some Sinhala and two Muslim parties are opposed to any form of merger.

Now that Rajapakse and cohorts have suspended sittings of the APRC and are subjecting the amended document to fresh perusal by individual and collective Govt party hierarchies the situation is fluid.

The only thing certain in an uncertain climate is that the Rajapakse regime would try hard to dilute all what has been achieved and reverse matters if possible.

Whatever the final outcome of these efforts there are a few points to be taken note of if a viable settlement is to be achieved.

First and foremost is the fact that the Tamil national question can be resolved within a united Sri Lanka only through appropriate power sharing arrangements.

For this the unitary state concept has to go. Various arguments can be made about devolving powers to regions under a unitary set up.

But these will not work in Sri Lanka where the judiiary displays a distinct “unfriendly” attitude towards minority rights and grievances.

Moreover the 13th amendment was found to be wanting in many respects despite powers being devolved. A major problem was the central government extracting back from the provinces many of the powers devolved.

So the bottom line in this respect is that the Central Government should not be able to take back any of the powers given to the Provinces without the consent of the units of devolution particularly the North and East.

Any Constitutional amendments affecting powers of the provinces should be ratified by the provinces themselves.

This would be the acid test determiing whether genuine devolution amounting to quasi – federalism is enshrined or not. For this the unitary state must go.

But it need not be replaced by federal state . Something else is necessary. Insisting on “ekeeya” can only prevent Sri Lanka becoming truly “eksath”.

The other point is about the North – East merger. It was never allowed to work. Now with the LTTE alienating the Muslims and the Karuna led breakaway faction raising Eastern regional demands the merger has become almost a lost cause.

But recent developments like the “sinhalaisation” of the “nagenahira” after recent military successes is transforming the situation. Substantial sections of Tamils and Muslims are worried. There is a resurgence in thought for a merger.

Under these circumstances some form of a N- E merger subject of course to a proviso for an eastern referendum in the near future is necessary. That merger must entail a sub – unit or units for the Muslims and Sinhalese with adequate autonomy.

It is entirely possible that the East may separate from the North in the future. But as of now, a merger in some form is necessary for a feasible solution to be realised.

The APRC draft proposals are yet to decide conclusively on the structure of state and the North – East merger. The issues are being diverted towards the Govt party leaders and Govt ministers now.

Whatever the decision reached any solution that preserves the unitary state or firmly de – links the Northern and Eastern provinces cannot be effective. Instead of establishing peace it can only exacerbate conflict further.

DBS Jeyaraj can be reached at djeyaraj@federalidea.com

By Thomas Johnpulle

Supporters of federalism have spun up ahead of the ‘final’ battle in the North. Most of them fear that if the armed forces defeat the LTTE militarily, along with it the devolution endeavour will die. There are both supporting and opposing arguments; however, the real issue is the desirability and sustainability of a federal set-up.

Federalism cannot bring peace

A simple question posed by many opposed to federalism is ‘can it bring peace’. The answer is no. Many proponents of federalism argue that a utopian devolution mechanism to which everyone would eventually subscribe will cause things to happen in favour of bringing about peace. But the causal connection is too remote to rely on. Our bitter experience is that there can never be any practical devolution unit/mechanism/degree that all stakeholders can agree upon. Also the few available devolution mechanisms failed miserably to achieve any hint of peace. On the contrary; it was the 13th amendment and the resultant PCs that dragged the LTTE back to war (with the IPKF); it was CBK’s ‘package’ that caused so much pandemonium within and outside the parliament and eventually led to the untimely demise of her 2000-elect administration; devolution and its extent (ISGA verses nothing from the government) was the cause for the breakdown of peace talks in 2002. This is why successive governments call it a two-pronged strategy, a military strategy on one hand and a devolution attempt on the other. What this means is that Fed. or no Fed. war will continue until the annihilation of one fighting party.

Suppose a federal structure was put in place; then what? If the armed forces continue to remain in the N-E thereafter and even after the LTTE is ‘militarily weakened’, what are the chances of peace in the N-E? Many fear a jobless army is more dangerous as the US army in Japan, the IPKF in Jaffna after they ‘liberated’ it and the Russians in East Germany! On the other hand, if the armed forces leave the N-E, the ‘weakened LTTE’ will bounce back.

More complex issues exist about the police force.

Therefore, federalism cannot bring peace and only law and order can. For peace to hold, unlawful armed groups should be disarmed and lawful armed groups should uphold the law!

What does federalism has for the majority Sinhalese?

If nothing or nothing significant, call them whatever you will, they won’t support it; it is as simple as that. When a new election system was proposed recently, the SLMC declared that it will reduce the number of Muslim representatives in parliament and therefore they oppose it. Same fate will befall the federalism endeavour if the majority are not awarded substantial or at least significant benefits. In this context, it is important to consider the plight of minority Sinhala settlements in Trinco, Batti, Ampara, Vavuniya, Nuwara-Eliya, etc. under a federal set-up. They should be convinced that they will be better-off than they are under the central government. This is a very difficult thing to achieve given the complete lack of Sinhala representation among the political parties that are in strength in the N-E including TNA, SLMC, EPDP, PLOTE, TMVP, etc. The bottom line is they don’t trust these race-based political parties however much they try to contradict the ground realities – they are unable to command any trust from the Sinhala voters.

I have not seen anywhere how federalism can (as opposed to any other set-up) give the Sinhalese anything ‘extra’. Hence, most of them will not support a federal system. Their desire for a peaceful settlement of the ‘conflict’ should not be mistaken for a ‘federal system’ that places them under Tamil and Muslim political parties in whom they have zero trust and will add another overhead burden on the country just as the PCs.

A sustainable solution as opposed to one adopted under duress

If the international community pressurise the voters, parties and the government to agree to a federal set-up, the question arrises how sustainable it is?

Suppose, a federal solution is put in place after a lot of haggling, pressurising, etc. If it cannot bring about economic and political betterment in tangible proportions, the opposing forces will amass votes to bust it and that’s exactly what they will do when elected. Therefore, federal systems will not be able to be sustained unless they can add sizable amount of value to the aspirations of the majority. There is no point calling them names in order to avoid such an eventuality as it will surely happen. Can the international community suppress the opposing forces forever and can they continue to sustain the fragile ‘yes’ vote in favour of it? Very unlikely.

On the other hand, if a resolution can be reached that gratifies the popular vote base; such a system will be protected and promoted by the masses.

It is regrettable that most ‘political solutions’ disregard the aspirations of the majority and I do not think they will keep silent once the federalism matter hots up. Some of their (popular) leaders should be blamed for their part for not actively engaged in the process apart from opposing it outright.

Economics of federalism and the economic resources of regions

Who should benefit from the economic benefits of the Trincomalee harbour; the so-called ‘oil reserves’ off Manar; the remnants of the Mahaweli project in the N-E; huge mineral deposits especially along the N-E coastline?

Should it be the residents in these regions or the nation as a whole? Should these be sold outright, processed and then sold or left untouched?

These are the questions that can cripple any federal set-up. Regional leaders and national leaders will have widely opposing views. It is easy to say the whole country will eventually benefit, but practically it is very difficult as evidenced from around the world. Matters will get even worse if foreign parties enter the fray which is very likely to happen. Should we end up as East Timor where its oil resources are used by Australian companies with no benefits to East Timor and Indonesia?

On another count, should the Centre manage foreign investment inflows based on national criteria or should the regions manage it. The USD 300 million annually collected from the Tamil Diaspora will play a major role (it is approximately 1.3% of the GDP and without an obligation to repay) if utilised to achieve sectarian ends.

Already many concerned individuals have pointed out this matter and there will surely be more forthcoming.

Diplomacy

Should the regions be allowed to formulate their diplomatic priorities or should they follow the central government? If they do not have such powers, the regions will surely demand it. It is no secret that Tamils want much closer ties with Canada, UK, Switzerland and Tamil Nadu than now and similarly Muslims would want closer link-ups with the Islamic World. Tamil Nadu, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Iran are likely to have heightened diplomatic importance to the various regions. Apart from obvious conflicting interests among Saudi and Iranian interests (there were a few disturbing developments in the East last year), how can Tamil Nadu and Indian interest be managed by the Lankan central government and the regions? These conflicting interests will surely interplay with other matters like the Chinese developments in H’tota that includes a navel base.

Simply we are heading into diplomatic anarchy under federalism. On the other hand, if the regions’ rights to diplomatic interests are curtailed, would federalism achieve its desired targets?

National elections

Federalism can bring about more or less self-governing authorities in the regions. As a result, people’s interest in national elections may reduce. It should be noted that the voters’ turnout at the last presidential elections from 1988 to 2005 has been below 40% for the N-E as a whole. In the 1994 general election only 8 (eight) votes were cast from Jaffna district. If this happens, the significance and influence of national elections will reduce and as a result, the rights of individuals of certain communities will reduce. This is a very dangerous situation especially for the minorities living outside the N-E.

It is impossible to sustain a similar level of interest for regional elections and national elections at the same time when the regions enjoy substantial autonomy. Making it compulsory to vote as in some other countries would achieve little in this country.

Conflicts over water resources

A classic example is the Murrey Darling Basin development program of the Australian federal government. This is not supported by states amidst a severe drought that has hit Australia. Victoria has repeatedly and decisively declined to cooperate as it has enough water resources. Sri Lanka is not too far away; it should be recalled that this concern was embedded into the ISGA-2003 proposals by the LTTE which stated (the reality) that most waterways flow from outside their territory and hence water users in upper areas should use it carefully. The severity of this is so enormous that the government restarted the war in 2006 following the Mavilaru incident.

It will be unimaginably chaotic in a federal set-up and the army will have to be called-in to settle the matter given the fact that water is as important as gold in the dry zone. Prolonged and persistent conflicts can take a heavy toll and things will surely escalate when political forces interplay with them.

It is foolhardy to expect that our politicians would have national interests in mind than their Australian counterparts!

The risk of outside interferers

Another big risk for the country and the regions is the risk of heightened outside interference. NGOs and even the UN may run their own zones within some regions. In the absence of an acceptable regulator to both the regional and the central governments, these issues are likely to take the centre stage in any federal setting in Lanka.

There are a few defence pacts the country has already signed and there will be conflicts if the regions refuse to honour them. For an example consider the ’super secret’ defence pact with the US. Can US ships (en route to an attack in the Middle East) call at the Trinco navel base when it comes under a predominately Muslim council?

Should the state be selective in its arms purchase that Israeli weapons will not be deployed in certain areas?

If the World Tamil Congregation (banned in India recently) tries to hold their rally in the N-E with the approval of the regional council, can the Sri Lankan government ban it likewise? I doubt it as the government couldn’t ban such events as the ‘Pongu Thamil’ that was nothing but separatist propaganda.

Can India allow federalism to take root in Sri Lanka?

May be yes in 1987 but not now. In 1992 India banned the LTTE not because of Rajeev Ghandi or Sri Lanka, but rather because its influence on India’s own territorial integrity. This was evident in the report that called for a continued ban on the LTTE that was presented to the Indian parliament in 2007. Citing this, prominent constitutional lawyer HL de Silva stated that division of Lanka would be the epitaph of India.

Provided that a federal set-up will result in a more disintegrated Lanka, it is unlikely that India would support it wholeheartedly. It is also concerned about possible Western/Islamic influence in its backyard. This may in part explain why India has played a dormant role as regards federalism in Lanka; even the 13th amendment 20 years ago had little Indian input.

However, what is considered in Sri Lanka is much more dangerous than federalism itself; it is a strange variant that can be described as ‘racial-federalism’. This doesn’t sound well but that’s exactly what most politicians in favour of federalism demand. A separate Muslim Unit within the Tamil Homeland? Separate Sinhala units within each of them? How ridiculously racial? We are likely to fall into a bigger ‘ethnic’ trap if we try to solve the ‘ethnic’ conflict by federalism. My personal view is that we should be moving in a different direction that can integrate the ethnic groups. We don’t differentiate ethnic celebrations, ethnic foodstuff and ethnic attire. We need more than Dosai Villas, Buhari Cafes and Bath Kades; we need our fellow citizens who run them to live and thrive in our nation among us.

Federalism, however, goes against this Lankan spirit to start with! No wonder the forefathers of Lankan federalism were not from Sri Lanka

By Surendra Ajit Rupasinghe

Sinhala Buddhist supremacy remains the basic character and essence of the Sri Lankan state, even though there have been some grudging recognition of Tamil also as an official language. This defining character of the state contains several decisive political implications and explosive consequences. One fateful implication is that Lanka is exclusively the land of the Sinhala Buddhists. That is to say, only the Sinhala-Buddhist nation has an exclusive claim to the land and the right to form a state. It implies that there is but one nation, and that is the Sinhala-Buddhist nation. All other identities are to be tolerated as alien ethnic minorities.

This definition of the Sri Lankan social formation effectively negates the historically evolved character of all other identities as distinctive nationalities. It denies equality of status to the Tamil nation living predominantly in the north-east, the Tamil nationality living predominantly in the hill country and the Muslim nationality living in non-contiguous areas throughout the country. It also denies equality and dignity to the Hindu, Christian, Islamic and other ethnic-religious communities. This definition effectively subordinates all other identities to the hegemony of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation and its state.

The truth is that this ideology is based on a gross falsification of history. The Tamil people have also cohabited the north and the east historically from ancient times. This is an indisputable fact.Sri Lanka is equally their home. The fact that they are numerically a minority does not negate the fact that they too have an equal claim to regard Lanka as their traditional homeland.

However, even though having to grudgingly acknowledge the fact that the Damila people of the north and east have also cohabited this land from ancient times, this ideology claims that they were always subordinated to the dominance of the Sinhala-Buddhist centralised unitary state except when occupied by Dravidian “invaders.”

The interpretation of external (alien) invasions by Dravidian kingdoms is a modern invention. The fact is that at that time, Lanka was part of a larger political, economic and cultural region connected by two dominant trading centres — Mathurai and Thambapanni. There was as much integration and multi-cultural linkages between South India and Lanka than there was separateness.

There were political, economic and cultural linkages that interpenetrated to form a distinct regional identity formation. Invasions and occupations as well as cultural interpenetration through cohabitation and marriage among various kingdoms and empires occurred as an internal phenomenon. The Ven. Mahanama, author of the great historical chronicle — the Mahavamsa, nowhere refers to ‘alien’ invaders and particularly in the case of the Dravidian King, Elara. Indeed, he recounts with great care, detail and concern how the Sinhala King, Duttagamini, decreed that the highest respects be accorded to this Damila king, whom he had vanquished through direct combat.

The notion that historically, the whole of Lanka was ruled under one unitary state is also a gross fabrication. Tamil kingdoms existed independently in the north and so did the various tribal chiefdoms throughout the Wanni and elsewhere. In fact, there existed several independent Sinhala kingdoms that had different dynastic lineages such as in Ruhunu, Maya, Pihiti and Malaya.

The last kingdom of Kandy was ruled by descendents of the Damila Nayakkar dynastic lineage. Even these kingdoms were not unitary in character but functioned as loosely held confederations. It is true that even under the reign of kings such as Dutugamunu and Wijeyabahu who reigned over the powerful states of Anuradhapura, and King Para- kramabahu in Polonnaruwa, these states remained a form of a loose confederation of independent kingdoms and chiefdoms. Even in these times, the various units retained their distinctive character and independence. Tamil kingdoms and chiefdoms remained Damila in structure, character and form, with their own distinctive language, religion, laws, customs, norms, rituals and social practices. There was never a unitary Sinhala-Buddhist state that exercised undisputed hegemony over all others. The centralised unitary state is a creation of British colonialism forged through blood and betrayal. It is defended only by those who seek to perpetuate archaic colonial hierarchies and privileges.

It is true that the Sinhala-Buddhist identity has played a distinctive role in the formation of the Lankan social order. This truth is readily acknowledged. A glance at the historical landscape would attest to this fact. But recognition of this truth does not negate the fact that the Tamil people have also lived in this land since ancient times and have contributed integrally to the formation of a shared Lankan civilisation.

It does not negate the fact that they have shared territory, tilled the soil, shed their blood, sweat and tears to nourish this land. It cannot negate the fact that the Damila nation, formed as part of the great Dravidian civilisation also forms a distinctive cultural tradition. The Muslim people came later, married and settled in this land. They too made this land their home. They also contributed towards the formation of a shared Lankan identity.

Then the hill country Tamil workers were conscripted by the British colonial power as a plantation labour force. They too shed their blood, sweat and tears to nourish the land and the people of Lanka. They too made Lanka their home. The people of Lanka, made up of all these nationalities, have contributed in building the foundations of the modern Sri Lankan nation.

There is not a single person in Lanka who can claim that they descend from a pure race. The Aryan/Dravidian racial dichotomy is a perverted construct of British colonialism. These concepts scientifically refer to ancient linguistic families and traditions which themselves have been formed through cultural interpenetration.

Yet, these concepts and definitions are being used by ignorant chauvinist ideologists to project racial superiority and hegemony. We have all evolved from a shared multi-cultural tradition. This is the source of our pride and strength as a nation. It is not true to claim that Lanka is exclusively the property of the Sinha- layas. Nor does the status of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation as the preponderant majority, nor recognition of its unique and distinctive contribution constitute a basis for exercising any form of hegemony. It forms the basis for a pluralist political order and culture that derives its essence and purpose from the richness and strength of its diversity.

The argument for exercising the hegemony of a Sinhala-Buddhist unitary state is promoted by a group of highly privileged chauvinists who wish above all to preserve and perpetuate their power and privilege even at the cost of destroying our shared traditions and foundations in a bloody theatre of perpetual war! This is the ideology enshrined in the Mahinda Chinthana.

The Mahinda Chinthana is a product of a particular history. It is the culmination of the state and nation building project crafted by the British as a prerequisite for transferring state power to its chosen and trusted lackeys in the form of the indigenous ‘comprador’ capitalist ruling class.

This local comprador ruling class is comprised predominantly of the most powerful, wealthy, high caste Govigama Sinhala feudal landlords and capitalists groomed by the British to replace them, in partnership with Tamil and Muslim compradors. This comprador ruling class is mainly represented today by the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) are in the game of rivalling them as the sole defenders of the unitary Sinhala-Buddhist comprador state, as their way of seizing state power. All these parties have staked their claim to state power as the one, true defenders of the hegemonic, chauvinist, unitary Sinhala-Buddhist state.

All of them have taken turns in upholding the hegemony of the Sinhala-Buddhist state and in ruthlessly suppressing the national-democratic rights of the Tamil and Muslim nationalities and other communities, including the hill country Tamil nationality. Mahinda Chinthana is a culmination and crystallisation of the ideology and politics of this comprador ruling class. It is a culmination and a crystallisation in that the Mahinda Chinthana and the present regime openly avows and advocates a centralised, unitary, theocratic, fundamentalist Sinhala Buddhist state surpassing all others.

It seeks to institutionalise this fundamentalist, theocratic state in a manner that qualitatively surpasses all previous regimes. However, it is merely following in the tradition of all other regimes that have ruled before. All successive regimes and their various coalitions, without exception, have acted to intensify the suppression of the national-democratic rights of the national minorities while propping up the centralised, hegemonic chauvinist, comprador state and the ruling class.

The nearly six decades of neo-colonial politics of division and supremacy, of systematic and intensifying subordination and violent suppression of fundamental human and democratic rights, have brought us to the threshold of yet another decisive historic conjuncture.

Either we can dismantle the centralised, hegemonic, chauvinist, feudal-colonial unitary state and begin constructing a modern, democratic pluralist state that belongs to, and is shared by all nationalities and communities of Lanka and achieve peace — or we can choose to hold on to the unitary state and live in a perpetual state of terror, horror, misery and war while the country continues to decompose and disintegrate under a defunct and corrupt state and political system imposed on us by the colonial power, and perpetuated by the global imperialist order.

The Tamil nation living predominantly in the north-east have the right of national self-determination to decide their future, as does the Sinhala nation. Neither the Sinhala nation nor its state has the right to determine their future nor dictate their destiny.

And so it is with the hill country Tamil nationality and the Muslim nationality and all other ethnic-religious communities. Voluntary union is the basis for building a modern, democratic state and a united people. The state has the supreme obligation and responsibility to present the constitutional framework for sharing this land as equal and integral partners of the one indivisible people of Lanka.

It is infantile to define the problem simply and exclusively as one of militarily defeating separatist terrorism. This is an expression of Neanderthal minds and of bankrupt politics of the worst kind. The real challenge is to present a set of constitutional proposals that will make division and separatism unnecessary and impossible, where all nationalities and communities will find common refuge and joy in being part of the one indivisible and invincible Lanka!

By Rajan Philips

The official Sri Lankan view is that the only threat to the territorial unity of Sri Lanka is the LTTE’s fight for a separate Tamil State. What is equally true but not equally recognized is that the fight against the separate state is also a grave danger to the island’s territorial unity. By winning and holding territory the LTTE has not been able to create a separate state. Equally, defeating the LTTE and repossessing territory alone will not be enough for the government to unite the country anymore than it is now. The task before the state is not only one of militarily preventing Lanka’s break-up but also that of politically bringing together its currently broken pieces.

Jaffna was repossessed in 1995 and the lesson from what happened over the next twelve years has not been lost on many Sri Lankans. A number of them have expressed concern that a purely military victory in the East will go nowhere if it cannot be sustained politically. It is for this reason that some commentators have floated the idea of holding a referendum in the East to allow the people of the East to say whether they want to stay as a single Province or be merged with the Northern Province.

Referendum on politically sensitive issues is a difficult exercise in the best of times and holding a referendum in the current circumstances in the East would be ill advised, to be sure, and potentially explosive. The same risks are involved in hurrying to hold a Provincial Council election in the East. One has only to be reminded of the 1981 District Council elections in Jaffna and its consequences not only for the Peninsula but also for the whole country.

Nonetheless, those who moot idea of a referendum in the East have their democratic hearts in the right place, and politically they take the view that failure to consult the people in the East will render the current military victory in the East a pyrrhic victory at best. On the other hand, the opponents of merger from the time of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987, and who successfully litigated against the merger last year, are not at all in favour of holding a referendum in the East.

Their opposition is based on a constitutional argument that holding a referendum in the East alone would be inconsistent with, if not a violation of, the 1978 Constitution, as well as a demonstrative argument, apparently based on experiences in Canada and the former Yugoslavia, that re-merged Northern and Eastern Provinces under a Tamil-majority, if not LTTE, government may become the launching pad for a separate state.

Taken together the two arguments convey a simple message of intransigence, of reluctance to change anything in the constitutional status quo to meaningfully address the political problems of the Tamils and the Muslims. Worse still, the only constitutional change that seems to be contemplated by this school of intransigence is a change that will take the country backward, a reversal of the Thirteenth Amendment itself. The most telling evidence of this contemplation is the official position of the Rajapakse-SLFP to create a system of devolution based on districts as units of devolution.

The Provincial Councils system and the provision to merge the Northern and Eastern Provinces in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 did not come out of nowhere but were simply operationalizing political decisions, discussions, understandings and agreements that had been going on since 1956. The situation in the Eastern Province is very different now and a great deal more complex than it was in 1987. There is fear, mistrust and insecurity gripping all the three communities in the Eastern Province.

A new politico-spatial solution involving the Northern and Eastern Provinces has to be found on the basis of an appropriate unit, or units, of devolution and arrangement for power sharing to address the collective political concerns of the Tamils of the North and East, and the specific concerns of the Muslim, Tamil and Sinhala communities in the East. The devolution detractors are not interested even in this approach.

The constitutional argument against a referendum in the East and against re-merger, and potentially against a new modified unit of devolution, has been advanced in three parts: (a) the Constitution does not provide for a referendum to be held only in one Province, but only to be held countrywide and open to all citizens; (b) even if a merger of the two Provinces were to be approved in a countrywide referendum, it still has to be supported by a 2/3 majority in Parliament before the President could give effect to the verdict of the referendum; and (c) no government could pass legislation to enable the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces before the LTTE is decommissioned of its weapons and law and order is restored in the North and East – even then the law requires endorsement at a referendum.

Never mind that the Provinces did not exist as constitutional entities when the 1978 Constitution was adopted and it would not be very democratic, direct or representative, to deny the people of a Province or Region the opportunity to express themselves on a matter that is more important to them than others in the country. Of course, the people of a Province could express themselves on a particular matter in a normal election that is free and fair, and the verdict should be respected by the rest of the country, democratically speaking, if the matter had been actively canvassed during the election campaign.

Let it not be forgotten that this was precisely the route taken by the winning political parties in 1970 and 1977 to replace the constitutions that they inherited with ones that they designed in the most politically partisan and ethnically majoritarian manner. At least the 1972 Constitution made itself flexible and replaceable, whereas the 1978 Constitution made sure that it would not be easily amendable or replaceable, and included in it for this sinister purpose the requirement of a referendum. The only use of the referendum so far has been in 1982 to forestall elections, ironically a recourse to ‘direct democracy’ to thwart Sri Lanka’s tradition of ‘representative democracy’.

The same instrument of referendum is now held as the holy hurdle that has to be passed by any measure that is intended to resolve the National Problem involving the country’s ethnic co-existences – a problem that antedated the 1978 Constitution and was recklessly aggravated by it.

There is another limitation placed on any government, and parliament itself. No government, it has been warned, could legislate the merger of the North and East before the LTTE is decommissioned and law and order is restored. Tying the full implementation of a political solution to the decommissioning of weapons and restoration of law and order is an important political and negotiating consideration. But why should it be asserted as a limitation on what Sri Lanka’s parliament can do and cannot do?

It says something of the sovereign competence of the Sri Lankan State when it is said on its behalf that the State cannot proceed with constitutional changes because a rebel group that opposes the changes is holding the State hostage by possessing arms. The premise for the assertion is not so much the conviction that the LTTE will never give up arms but the intention to foreclose any devolutionary possibility that could force the LTTE to ultimately give up arms. Put another way, if the government pre-emptively forecloses a merger, or insists on district-based devolution only, what incentive is there for the LTTE to give up arms?

The ostensible reason for opposing the North-East merger or any devolution beyond the district is the concern that the merger would create a contiguous territory that will form the basis for future separation by the LTTE, through a unilateral Provincial referendum followed by an endorsement of it by the international community as a fait accompli. The devolution detractors have cited, rather misleadingly, the Canadian example to illustrate the possibility of a unilateral referendum, and the Yugoslavian experience as an example of international endorsement.

The 1998 Canadian Supreme Court ruling on the question of Quebec separation has been used to project a Sri Lankan scenario in which an amalgamated North-East Provincial unit (or, by extension, any new devolved unit) could hold a successful referendum on separation and bind the Sri Lankan Government to negotiate on it. This formulation is misleading in that it fails to inform that the Canadian Court ruling actually denies the Province of Quebec with a majority of French Canadians, the right of self-determination and unilateral secession under Canadian law and under international law. The Court’s reason is that Quebec has been able to achieve self-determination within the federal system of Canada and therefore has no need to seek one outside Canada.

However, the Court went on to opine that if in a Quebec referendum on a ‘clear question’, a ‘clear majority’ of Quebeckers opt to secede from Canada, then the rest of Canada would be obligated to address that with Quebec; but the latter cannot still secede except on negotiated and mutually agreed upon terms that will include the status of minorities within Quebec. This aspect of the Court ruling, contrary to the interpretation given in Sri Lanka, actually makes it very difficult, almost impossible, for separatists to succeed in a referendum on Quebec sovereignty.

The issue of presenting a ‘clear question’ in a Quebec referendum and the need for a ‘clear majority’ supporting separation has long been the crux of the debate between separatists and federalists within Quebec. The separatists have previously argued that a 50% plus one vote majority to an ambiguous question would be enough to take their Province out of Canada. The Federal Government of Canada led by a French Canadian Prime Minister from Quebec decided to call the separatist bluff and took the question to the Supreme Court. The Court ruling has taken the game away from the separatists.

It would be grossly inadequate to use one Supreme Court judgment to encapsulate the rich experience of Canadian federalism and the Quebec factor in it. The real lesson from Canada is that it has survived for one hundred and forty years as an open federation, accommodating, and not suppressing, the self-determinist ethos of a section of French Canadian Quebeckers. Quebec has survived two referenda both of which were held when the Prime Minister of Canada was a French Canadian, and in this year’s Quebec Provincial election the separatist Quebec Party was relegated to an ignominious third place. In contrast, post-Tito Yugoslavia took the sword to deal with its multiple nationalities and has ended in shambles, wrecking in the process the promise of a multi-national, socialist democracy that was once a beacon to many developing countries.

Those who oppose the North-East merger and any form of substantial devolution also question the international community’s and particularly India’s assurances of opposition to the break-up of Sri Lanka. The fact of the matter is that the biggest insurance for Sri Lankan unity is India’s opposition to Sri Lanka’s break up. The reason for doubting India’s sincerity is again a perverse one – for acknowledging India’s sincerity would entail a price, the price of changing the unitary character of Sri Lanka’s state structure.

It is not so much that the opponents of devolution defend the unitary constitution because it will prevent the country from breaking up, but rather they raise the bogey of a separate state to deny any constitutional changes that will address the legitimate political aspirations of the Tamils and the Muslims. Preventing separation is the pretext, while the objective result is the protection of the constitutional status quo without accommodating even the more reasonable demands of the Tamil and the Muslim people.

by “Kalaignar” M. Karunanidhi

The DMK is of the view that for proper and ideal Centre-State relations, there should be more powers for the States. To be more appropriate and precise, there should be autonomy for the States and federalism at the Centre.

The demand for restructuring Centre-State relations is as old as the adoption of the Constitution of India in 1950. The creation of a new structure of constitutional government for independent India deserves to be seen in historical context, particularly by taking into account the objective political situation that existed then. In fact, political imperatives emerging out of the independence movement historically as well as the immediate imperatives of the Partition of India influenced the design of government incorporated in the Constitution. On the one hand, the framers, drawing the spirit of the independence movement, found the federal scheme appropriate for India; on the other hand, Partition created a fear of centrifugal elements in the nascent nation.

["Kalaignar" M. Karunanidhi]

Indeed, the major part of the history of the struggle for self-rule and independence reflects efforts to find a solution to India’s gigantic diversity. Even the mobilisation for the national movement was based on federal principles. The acceptance of language as the basis for redrawing the provincial boundary, for example, was a result of such a mobilisation. The history of federalism and Centre-State relations in India is marked by political mobilisation and intermittent struggle to fashion a more federal set-up. Even though such efforts have not yet resulted in any major constitutional changes towards a more federal orientation, the struggle has not been entirely fruitless.

In the phase lasting until the last 1960s, the task of nation building and development was the main concern of the nation’s rulers. However, this period was not solely dominated by the trend of centralisation. One of the major democratic movements in the post-Independence period-the movement for the formation of the linguistic States-took place in the 1950s, which resulted in the formation of linguistic States in 1956. The Central government resisted this demand and gave in-in the face of strong popular movements. This laid the basis for the later assertion by the States for greater powers.

“It is the Sappers and Miners who go in advance clearing the bushes and the thorns and preparing the way for the tanks in the Army. I plead with the ruling party to use us as Sappers and Miners to clear the way for them. We are not mindful of the dust we would gather in the course of this task. The ruling party should utilise our services for getting more powers transferred from the Centre to the States.” It may be borne in mind that these were the words Arignar Anna [C. N. Annadurai, who became Chief Minister a decade later] spoke fifty years ago, on May 6, 1957, in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly.

The second phase began with the 1967 general elections. Non-Congress State governments came into being. The demand for restructuring of Centre-State relations picked up momentum. In this connection, it may be useful to recall the impression of Arignar Anna, gathered by him as the Chief Minister. In his last epistle to his brethren titled “Hail, The Dawn!” published in Home Rule in January 1969, he wrote about “Federalism” and about our Constitution, “w hich on paper is federal but in actual practice tends to get more and more centralised.” After the passing of Arignar Anna in February 1969, when I was asked to bear the burden of responsibility, I continued the tenor and tone of our towering teacher and mentor.

The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam decided to carry on a campaign on Centre-State relations in a systematic and scientific manner. It was on March 17, 1969, during my first visit to New Delhi as Chief Minister-in the course of answering searching questions on a wide range of subjects by over fifty newsmen representing newspapers from all over the country-that I said the Government was considering the setting up of an Expert Committee to go into the question of Centre-State relations and recommend the powers that should be transferred from the Centre to the States. On August 19, 1969, I announced on the floor of the Legislative Assembly the formation of a Three Member Committee with Dr. P.V. Rajamannar as Chairman and Dr. A.L. Mudaliar and P. Chandra Reddy as Members.

In February 1970, in the DMK Conference in Tiruchy, in order to take the Will of Arignar Anna to the hearts of partymen, a popular slogan, “Autonomy for the States; Federalism at the Centre,” was given and it started reverberating through the length and breadth of the States.

With a view to taking the concept of State autonomy to the people, the DMK conducted on September 12 and 13, 1970, a State Autonomy Conference at Anna Nagar, Chennai. Thanthai Periyar E.V. Ramasamy, Quaid-e-Milleth Ismail, the then West Bengal Chief Minister, Ajoy Mukherjee, Pranab Mukherjee, N. Srikandan Nair, Arangil Sridharan, S.M. Krishna, and a number of MPs and leaders participated. I presided over the conference.

In its 1971 Election Manifesto, the DMK announced: “Though the Constitution of India is described as a Federal one, the balance is more tilted towards the Centre and hence the States are not able to function freely in the administrative and financial spheres. Only such powers as are necessary for the Centre to preserve the strength of India should be assigned to the Centre and all the other powers should be left to the States without impairing the ideal of a strong India.”

The report of the Rajamannar Committee was received on May 27, 1971. On April 16, 1974, I moved a historic resolution in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly requesting the Central government to accept the views of the Tamil Nadu government on State autonomy and the recommendations of the Rajamannar Committee and proceed to effect immediate changes in the Constitution of India to establish a truly federal set-up. In 1974, Murasoli Maran, an inimitable ideologue of the DMK, brought out a brilliant treatise on State autonomy. He explained in simple and effective language decentralisation and federalism; devolution and provincial autonomy; the nature of the Indian Constitution; and the basis for State autonomy.

For the first time, in 1989, a National Front coalition government headed by V.P. Singh, which included major regional parties like the DMK, took office at the Centre. Though short-lived, this government took certain steps to strengthen the federal principle. The Inter-State Council was constituted in 1990. The entry of regional parties in coalition governments at the Centre became a regular feature in 1996 with the formation of the United Front government and in all subsequent ones-and presently in the United Progressive Alliance government functioning under the esteemed guidance of Sonia Gandhi. The Left parties, which supported both the National Front Government in 1989 and the United Front government in 1996-1998 and the present UPA government, are strong supporters of the federal principle.

Attempts have been made to impose a unitary form of government in the country. The character of India as a multinational, multilingual, multi-religious state has been blatantly ignored. The relevant recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission on the restructuring of Centre-State relations have not been accepted and implemented in true spirit-as a result of which there has been a persistent trend of centralisation of economic and political powers in the country. The time is ripe now [for a transformation] with almost every major political party realising-by sheer experience and because of objective conditions-the need to establish a true federal system that would strengthen the bonds of mutual cooperation, unity, and cordiality between the Centre and the States.

It needs to be remembered that only the spirit of “co-operative federalism” – and not an attitude of dominance or superiority – can preserve the balance between the Union and the States and promote the good of the people. Under our constitutional system, no single entity can claim superiority. Sovereignty does not lie in any one institution or in any one wing of the government. The power of governance is distributed in several organs and institutions-a sine qua non for good governance. Even if we assume that the Centre has been given a certain dominance over the States, that dominance should be used strictly for the purpose intended, not for oblique purposes. An unusual and extraordinary power like the one contained in Article 356 cannot be employed for furthering the prospects of a political party or to destabilise a duly elected government and a duly constituted Legislative Assembly. The consequences of such improper use may not be evident immediately. But those do not go without any effect. Their consequences become evident in the long run and may be irreversible.

As the DMK is wedded to the principle of more powers to the States to ensure a true federal set-up in India, it has been ceaselessly and tirelessly underlining this principle wherever the occasion arises. It may be recalled that in the Governor’s address of January 20, 2007, in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, it has been explained that “this Government, holding Arignar Anna’s principle of State Autonomy close to its heart, while voicing its demand for rights and at the same time extending a hand of friendship, shall endeavour to secure the due rights and benefits for our State from the Union Government.”

[The writer is Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and president of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. His unprecedented record of half a century as a legislator was celebrated recently in Chennai.]

Courtesy: The Hindu