IPKF should have been allowed to finish the job”-Gen. Ranatunga
General Cyril Ranatunga VSV, rcds, psc, was the first General Officer Commanding the Joint Operations Command (JOC). He was given this appointment after he retired as Chief of Staff from the Sri Lanka Army. He went on to become the Secretary Defence.
General Ranatunga is of the opinion that the Indo Lanka Peace Accord was forced down Sri Lanka’s throat at a time when the then President, J.R. Jayewardene wanted no such thing. While the ongoing military operation at the time had to be called off due to the Accord, Gen. Ranatunga is confident that, had the operation continued, LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran would have been captured and the LTTE defeated.
In a wide ranging interview , Gen. Ranatunga spoke about how the forces were demoralised by stalling the operations. He also said President Premadasa should have let the IPKF finish the job it started, and how he opposed arms, ammunition and explosives being supplied to the LTTE by the government
By Keith Noyahr
Following are excerpts:
Q: As JOC Chief, you had advised President J.R. Jayewardene to stand by his commitment on the Draft Agreement of the Indo Lanka Accord. Minister Lalith Athulathmudali did not budge from his position. Do you think your advice was prudent?
A: In the first place, the Accord was not a thing that the President wanted at that stage. But, because of the pressures that were brought on him by the big neighbour, he had to give in. It all started with Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, not seeing eye to eye with President Jayewardene. As a result, this unpleasant feeling prevailed between the two leaders and India was not giving in. That was how it all started.
Q: The military operation at that time had to be called off. Could you tell us the exact military situation at the time the operation was called off?
A: It was the Thennamarachchi Operation that was called off. I had successfully finished the Vadamarachchi Operation. We were very careful to protect the innocent people there. The whole of Vadamarachchi consists of the principal towns Thondamanarachchi, Velvettiturai (VVT) and Point Pedro. It was a densely populated area. We dropped leaflets and told the people to go into school buildings, churches, kovils, temples and other such places to secure themselves.
When fighting, these terrorists go into houses and push the inhabitants out. We finished Vadamarachchi and I had planned the whole operation, including Thennamarachchi. I had already started the operation from the Jaffna end and all troops were down in Thennamarachchi up to Jaffna.
Q: Is it correct that if the operation had continued, Velupillai Prabhakaran would have been captured?
A: That is absolutely correct. Prabhakaran, who was there at the start of the operation, had managed to escape to India.
Q: Did he slip out since there was disagreement among the service chiefs who insisted on pushing northwards while General Denzil Kobbekaduwa, who had wanted to push eastwards, eventually gave in?
A: Absolutely wrong. I take full responsibility for the plusses and the minuses of the entire operation. I am the one who planned the operation, of course with the three service commanders and the IGP. I was living in Jaffna throughout, long before the operation started. I did not go anywhere as I had to be on the spot to influence the battle.
When the battle starts, you can’t stay in Colombo in an air conditioned office and conduct operations in Jaffna. I am a firm believer of being with the troops and on the ground and that is how it all went. I was fully aware of what was going on. When the Thennamarachchi operation started, we had the airdrop.
Q: Didn’t General Kobbekaduwa complain to you that his plans were being disrupted by the then Army Commander, Cecil Waidyaratne?
A: That was subsequently, long after Vadamarachchci, when I was Defence Secretary. General Kobbekaduwa wanted to do various operations and the operations he was planning and doing were quite good. But the then Army Commander blocked him. As Defence Secretary I did not want to interfere even though I monitored the situation.
As Defence Secretary, it is not your business to go and put your finger in military operations on the ground. But when they started complaining, I couldn’t ignore them. I told the then JOC Chief, General Wanasinghe to sort out those matters.
Q: Two decades on, the LTTE is very much stronger, alive and fighting, despite being badly hit by the world’s fourth largest army and the Sri Lankan forces. Do you feel that the Tigers wriggle out of tight positions by settling for talks? Was it the same with the Accord?
A: Absolutely correct! But I don’t think that the Indo Lanka Accord was signed for that purpose. J.N. Dixit was the High Commissioner in Colombo. In his book, Assignment Sri Lanka, he says that if they had allowed the Sri Lankan Army to continue, there would have been no Tigers left, not even Prabhakaran himself.
Q: What was Jayewardene’s motive for agreeing to the induction of the IPKF? How did the military top brass react to such a move at that time?
A: Well, I was still in command at the JOC at that time. But it was a time of real international politics where we had no choice in the matter. The President rang me in Jaffna during the operations and spoke to me saying, ‘Please don’t do anything, the Indian Air Force is coming in now.’ The only thing I could not tell him was that I could not have done anything even if I had wanted to as they were coming in very powerful aircraft which escorted the normal planes that undertook the airdrop.
Q: What was the reaction of the other top military officers at that time?
A: They were naturally demoralised. That is to be expected, because when you undertake something, you want to continue it, and if you cannot, you become disappointed. Our chaps were in a real mood for victory. I was cautioned when I was going to undertake Vadamarachchi. I told them that was the reason why I was personally going with the troops.
Q: Could you name a few officers under your command who really excelled?
A: Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Vijay Wimalaratne. Then there was Gerry Silva who was sector commander when I walked in as JOC Chief, Asoka Jayawardena and Colonel Lucky Wijeratne…. Those are some of the names that strike me, as my memory permits.
Q: Wasn’t there an issue at that time where Wimalaratne was asked to spy on Kobbekaduwa by President Premadasa?
A: Absolute rubbish! We had absolutely no problem. When my book appears, the truth will be told unedited. It will, no doubt, hurt. I have been very happy and fortunate that there were no squabbles even though there were differences of opinion from time to time. There was no nonsense; I would not have tolerated any such thing.
Q: Hadn’t Wimalaratne himself told others that he respected Kobbekaduwa but there were the President’s orders?
A: I don’t think so. I know Denzil. I have known him from his school days, from the officer cadet days at Sandhurst and from staff college, and Denzil was in the armoured corps. Denzil was a fine soldier, a professional, and there were many people who were jealous of him. They used to say everything was being given to Denzil. There was no such thing. He was a real sportsman. I never saw any difference between Denzil and Vijay Wimalaratne. They were very good soldiers.
Q: Did he actually consider the option of taking to politics?
A: No. He was a good professional and politics was the last thing on his mind.
Q: President Premadasa ordered the IPKF out unceremoniously. Of course, he had a truck with the LTTE and he knew the new Indian Government was of the same mind. Do you think it was a correct decision – sending the IPKF packing?
A: I don’t think it was a correct decision at all because, you see, terrorism started here because the Tigers were trained, armed, housed and clothed in India where they had about 30 camps where the ex-servicemen of the armed forces trained these fellows. I am not trying to sling mud at India, but it is a fact. What happened at the end of it? They came and they burned their fingers.
After the IPKF came in, it should have been allowed to finish its job. We had a very good rapport with them; all senior officers came and met me personally in Jaffna. General A.S. Kalkat, General Depinder Singh, they have all come to my house and enjoyed meals with me. When you are professionals, you don’t have a problem, whether it is the Indian Army, British Army or Sri Lankan Army.
Q: Gen. Kalkat has said arms, ammunition and explosives were supplied to the LTTE by Lankan government agencies and safe havens were provided to Tiger cadres just outside the north eastern provincial boundary, outside IPKF writ. He said he discussed it at the JOC and a promise was made to investigate. What came out of it?
A: At that time, President Premadasa was the one who made the decisions. As you know, I was opposed to it. I went and told him personally that he didn’t have to give weapons to a terrorist organisation. But he said they would come back to normal life and they would contest elections. However, I told him it was my bounden duty to advise him and said, ‘Please don’t give weapons to a terrorist organisation.’
He didn’t tell me about it and even General Attygalle, who knew about it, said nothing to me. When I came to know about it, I rang the President at about five in the evening. He said, ‘Sorry I can’t see you tonight as I have given appointments until 10 in the night.’ Then I said, ‘Sir, can I see you at five tomorrow morning?’ and he agreed.
I was at Sucharitha at the appointed time, but he got angry with me for telling him not to do it. Finally, he said, ‘I did not ask your opinion.’ I was almost crying while returning home. I was hurt and I was very angry but there was nothing I could do.
There was a very good rapport between President Jayewardene and Premier Rajiv Gandhi. President Jayewrdene once told me to brief them and help them along as they hd come t help us. They were professional soldiers, and we had a good rapport.
Q: Going by what you have said, in effect, the LTTE was first armed by the Indian Government to fight the Sri Lankan forces and later given arms by the Sri Lankan Government to fight the Indian forces. It had also obtained money from the Indian Government and from two Sri Lankan governments, as alleged. What do you make of the LTTE playing one against the other?
A: I hate to say this, but the fact is, I raise my hats to the LTTE as it knows how to play one against the other and get the best for itself. It has done this throughout. Take, for example, the support it has received from the Tamil diaspora.
Q: From all that has been written and said, the security forces are capable of taking on the LTTE in its lair. However, the forces have still not been successful. Do you feel that the LTTE has been able to hold out for two decades owing to a number of factors, including a clash of generals and clash of service chiefs?
A: At the end of the day, what President Jayewardene did was to have a coordinating headquarters called the JOC, which I headed. The job of the JOC was to draw up plans and conduct operations. The JOC had nothing to do with recruitment and training. The three services had to recruit, train and provide advance training to their staff.
At JOC, the full time job was to draw up operations, plan them, coordinate them and execute them to produce results. Even today you have a similar arrangement with a chief of defence staff whose job has to be to plan operations and to be on the field to make sure they are implemented properly.
What I always say is that Colombo ought to be the rear headquarters; all headquarters, the JOC and the operational staff must be out in the operational areas. You can switch fronts as you can see what is happening on the ground. Compared to my times, the army is 10 times bigger. Once you have made up your mind, you have to do it. How they do it is their business.
[Courtesy:The Nation.lk]

























