Posts filed under 'by D.B.S. Jeyaraj'
by D.B.S. Jeyaraj
President Mahinda Rajapakse in his address to the nation on our 60th independence day observed thus
” Our challenge today is to be true to the nation”.
He also stated ” our resolve will take us to the creation of a truly free and independent nation in our motherland”
Brave words indeed!
But what is this nation that we are being challenged to be “true” towards?
What is this “truly free and independent nation” that we are resolved to create?
Sri Lanka is a modern state with an ancient civilization. Unfortunately the attempt to define Sri Lanka as a modern nation state has led to conflict and strife.
The idea of a single Sri Lankan nation is under severe threat. In reality we are a divided nation today.
Power is concentrated with the majority ethnicity leaving other ethnicities out in the cold.
It is a case of “Maha Jathiyata Kiri, Sulu Jathiwalata Kekiri”.
If we are to resolve these divisions and create a strong nation on the basis of equitable power - sharing , the structure of the state needs to be radically transformed. There is no consensus so far on that.
Meanwhile political differences have assumed proportions of a cruel, destructive war. The war is only a consequence resulting from political causes.
The conflict cannot be resolved by military means alone and requires a settlement that would address those underlying causes. This political solution cannot be dictated or imposed upon through military might alone.
In terms of political independence we are a young nation at sixty. The idea of Ceylon was a colonial construct.The British unified the Country into a single administration.
Sri Lanka was not the only one in this respect. Most Countries ruled by the British were their creations in a modern sense.
Ethnic conflict and strife erupted in many Countries after the British left. From the Indian sub - continent to Fiji Islands and from Nigeria to Malaysia there are many instances.
Sri Lanka too can be classified as an example of post - independence conflict within pre - independence boundaries.
Some ex - colonies have reduced and managed ethnic tensions by evolving new forms of power sharing. They have re- invented themselves as “new” nations on the basis of equality and forged a strong sense of common identity.
Ultimately the unity and integrity of a nation does not depend on its military strength or structures of governance but in the will of of its people. The nation state is essentially a state of mind.
The tragedy of Independent Sri Lanka has been majoritarian hegemony. Majority rule is a democratic principle. Here it has been interpreted as the Majority of the numerically largest ethnicity.
The years after independence has seen the Sri Lankan Tamils resisting this injustice and imposition. At first through non - violent struggle and later through an armed struggle.
The Tamils first thought of themselves as a founding people of Sri Lanka on par with the Sinhalese; They later shed this majority concept and perceived themselves as the principal yet All - Island minority.
Tamils did not demand a separate state or even federalism from the British. What they wanted then was a scheme of balanced representation where the Sinhala majority could be “balanced”through enhanced representation for the minority communities.
This failed and in a pragmatic approach the dominant Tamil leadership opted for responsive cooperation after Independence. The Tamil Congress joined the UNP Government.
New forces emerged. As Sinhala hegemonism assumed great stridency Newton’s third law came into play. Tamil nationalism also grew. Both re-inforced each other.
Under the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi (Federal party) the Tamils began perceiving themselves as a territorial minority. The Northern and Eastern Provinces were referred to as their traditional homelands.
Initially there was non - violent agitation for a federal form of government. Compromises were made and pacts signed. These were observed in the breach by the Prime ministers of the day. Satyagraha campaigns were suppressed through military force.
This led to the cry for Tamil Eelam. Secessionism brought forth violence and an armed struggle began. In the 1977 general elections Tamils voted overwhelmingly for the TULF contesting on a separatist platform.
Instead of redressing Tamil grievances and trying to accommodate legitimate aspirations the Sinhala dominated state came down heavily. It was thought that might could eradicate right.
This was not to be so and with the passage of time the LTTE established control over a substantial portion of the North and East. Territorial integrity and Sovereignty of the country was endangered and eroded.
The Tamil struggle for equality too underwent change. It lost its moral high ground and deteriorated drastically. Militarism ruled and authoritarianism reigned.
The LTTE’s “tigersism” became a mirror image of Sinhala hegemonism. Fascism is in the air.
Currently the Rajapakse regime has embarked on a military campaign to defeat the LTTE while paying lip service to the political solution concept.
The Country at large is being assailed with propaganda that the LTTE is on the verge of defeat. Any contrary opinion is dismissed as anti - national and anti - patriotic.
It is a moot point as to whether the LTTE can be defeated or destroyed through a military campaign alone
The important point is to note that the eradication of the LTTE will not automatically result in the problem being resolved. The LTTE is only a virulent symptom of the malady. Getting rid of the LTTE -even if possible - is no durable remedy.
What is required now is the creation of a just, egalitarian and plural society. There must be equitable power - sharing based on principles of the federal idea.
Broadly, three schools of thought are clashing. The ideas at conflict are hegemonism, secessionism and pluralism.
The Sinhala hardliners want Sinhala - Buddhist domination. They see this country as their’s alone . Others are excluded in this “chinthana”.
The Tamil hardliners want a separate state for the North - East known as Tamil Eelam.Just as Sinhala hawks say Sri Lanka is for the Sinhalese these Tamil hawks say Tamil Eelam is for the Tamils.
A state for the dominant ethnicity within ,excludes by definition, other ethnicities living within these real or imaginary borders
Both these ideas have brought about disunity, violence and destruction. The nation bleeds and the Country diminishes.
The third idea is that of establishing an egalitarian and plural society where all children of this country can live tigether in amity and fraternity.
It incorporates a vision where no one will claim superior rights on the basis of belonging to the majority race/religion or claim exclusive rights to their historic habitat.
Power will not be confined to Colombo but shared with the periphery. All people regardless of race, religion, caste or creed will have their say and a role to play.
Sri Lanka will belong to its people from Paruthithurai to Devinuwara and Mannar to Mullaitheevu.
At present this “vision” seems Utopian!
This is the vision shared by this writer. “Visionaries” of this nature are an endangered species. They are under attack by hawks on either side of the ethnic divide. They are dubbed derisively as ” jokers” and “traitors”.
It is this vision that will ultimately salvage Sri Lanka. Hegemonic and secessionist dreams are turning into nightmares.
The call for the third option between the hegemonistic one state and secessionist two - state schools of thought is a voice of sanity and sensibility. It is presently inaudible amidst the raucous battle - cries.
This writer however firmly believes that it will be heard and heard effectively one day. Sri Lanka will then be alive with the sound of concord.
In the clash of idea it is the superior one that will triumph Dialogue and discussion not bloodshed and destruction will prove to be final arbiters of our destiny.
When India gained freedom at midnight Jawarhalal Nehru spoke of its “tryst with destiny”. India’s Southern neighbour has been awaiting its true destiny for sixty years.
The Sri Lankan state needs to be re-structured and the Sri Lankan nation re- invented for its tryst with destiny.
Sri Lanka at sixty faces the unfinished yet challenging task of building a NEW nation!
February 5th, 2008
by D.B.S. Jeyaraj
The All Party Representative Committee (APRC) is facing a practical dilemma as D -day or January 23rd draws near!
The APRC chaired by Science and Technology minister Prof. Tissa Vitarana is in a quandary about what it’s future course of action should be in terms of presenting a final report on Constitutional reform to President Mahinda Rajapakse on Jan 23rd.
President Rajapakse last week changed the goalposts while the match was in progress when he asked the APRC to furninsh him with a comprehensive report on how the existing Provincial Councils system could be rejuvenated with enhanced devolution as provided under the 13th amendment to the Constitution.
When Rajapakse appointed the APRC in 2006 he had mandated it to present a comprehensive scheme of Constitutional reform. He also promised to abide by its report.
The President however changed the APRC’s direction when he announced on Jan 9th this year that the APRC should take up a fresh task.
He wanted the APRC to give urgent priority to compiling a report on how the existing Provincial Councils scheme could be revived and maximum possible devolution made feasible.
Rajapakse also submitted a 4 page document titled “A Political Proposal: The Way Forward” at the meeting held with party leaders and APRC representatives.
This document outlined the guiding principles under which the President wanted the APRC to compile its report.
Rajapakse also wanted the APRC to come up with proposals about how the defunct Provincial Councils in the North and East are to be revived and also how advisory bodies are to be set during the interim period.
These bodies in essence were to be interim administrations without being described as such.
The President wanted the APRC to put on hold their regular function and focus on the report on 13th amendment plus. He also wanted the APRC to present it as its “own” proposal.
Furthermore the President imposed a two - week deadline and wanted the APRC to present him with a full report on Jan 23rd.
The APRC had earlier planned to visit Britain on Jan 14th. The plan was to examine power - sharing in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The trip was cancelled.
Rajapakse also indicated that he would begin implementing the report on rejuvenating Provincial Councils quickly and that all work on Constitutional reform should be shelved until implementation begins.
The APRC held a special meeting to discuss the issue on Jan 10th. While agreeing in principle to complete the fresh task set by the President APRC members found themselves sharply divided about how it should be done. Most members - quite naturally - were concerned about the APRC being undermined.
Unable to arrive at a firm decision the APRC decided to continue as usual on the one hand and also work on the 13th amendment report on the other. In short the APRC decided to adopt parallel courses of action for the time being.
It was also decided that at least three APRC meetings be held before the January 23rd deadline. The next meeting was to be on Jan 17th.
Meanwhile Prof . Tissa Vitarana underwent tremendous anxiety in contemplating upon his future course of action. It may be recalled that the veteran Sama Samaajist was in a similiar predicament when the APRC’s experts panel “delivered” in December 2006.
It was a fractured result with eleven of the seventeen experts submitting a “majority” report and four others endorsing a “minority” report. Two others presented a dissenting report each.
The majority report was hailed as the most progressive of its kind. It had the added advantage of multi - ethnic backing. Six Sinhala, Four Tamil and One Muslim signed it while the other three reports had only Sinhala signatories.
Rajapakse egged on by the Sinhala supremacists in his camp refused to accept the majority report though the International Community (IC) was strongly behind it.
Everything was at a standstill.
It was Prof. Vitarana who saved the day then by announcing that he would select the best of all four reports and compile his own report.
He then presented his own report as a working paper. He left out some of the contentious issues and forged a document that included a lot of the salient recommendations made in the “majority” report.
The past year saw the APRC using the Tissa Vitarana report as the basis of discussions. It was a case of fine - tuning the working paper. It was this manouevre by Vitarana that has kept the APRC going.
Now the Trotskyite cabinet minister decided to repeat what he did earlier. He decided to submit a draft of his own.
Obtaining assistance from Constitutional experts and also drawing on previous recommendations on similiar lines ,Prof. Vitarana evolved a document outlining proposals on how devolution content under the 13th amendment could be enhanced and how the Provincial councils could be rejuvenated.
The document also explored ways and means of reving the defunct Provincial Councils in the North and East including the setting up of advisory councils to handle administration in the interim period.
It may be recalled that during Chandrika Kumaratunga’s presidency plans were afoot to revive the North - East Provincial council and regulations about an interim administration were gazetted.
The idea was abandoned due to the insistence of Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) leader Kathiravelu Devananda alias Douglas that he head the Interim Administration while being a cabinet minister.
Even when the 13th amendment was introduced in 1987 , devolution was perceived as an “evolving” concept. It was not very satisfactory devolution and it was expected that the substance of devolution would be enhanced as time went on.
In fact former President Junius Richard Jayewardena has in a document dated Nov 7th 1987 agreed to enhance devolution in certain aspects of the Provincial Councils scheme.
When the APRC met on the 17th a parallel track approach was patently visible. Work went on in respect of completing its original mandate. At the same time the APRC also addressed the 13th amendment plus issue.
When the meeting commenced the APRC delegates continued with the work in progress namely the finalization of a report on Constitutional reform. With the Jan 23rd deadline drawing near the APRC began identifying areas and items on which there was a broad consensus.
Matters were made easier by the recent decision to confine APRC proposals within the framework of a unitary state. Earlier there was much resistance within the APRC towards the imposition of a unitary state by President Rajapakse.
Recently the APRC showed “flexibility” by agreeing to explore power sharing within a unitary state framework. This was in deference to the President’s specific request that all devlolution had to be within a unitary state.
Rajapakse had placed this constraint on himself during the Presidential elections where he campaigned on his “Mahinda Chinthana ” (Mahindas vision) manifesto.
Since Mahinda had then explicitly stated his preference for the unitary state he was unable to go back on that concept the President had explained.
However he had said that he was supportive of maximum devolution within the unitary state framework.
It was on this basis which the APRC was functioning now.
Some of the parties represented at the APRC were not supportive of the unitary state . It is also the opinion of this columnist that true federalism or authentic quasi - federalism is not possible in a state designated clearly as unitary.
It would have been a satisfactory compromise to leave the nature or structure of the state explicitly undefined . If the state was neither unitary nor federal then some form of quasi - federal system could have been evolved.
This however has been ruled out firmly by the President. This meant that either those opposing a unitary state had to pull out or compromise.
There was also the possibility that the parties - though small - opposing a unitary state were in the majority at the APRC.
Practically, outvoting the unitary proponents at the APRC would have yielded nothing tangible because President Rajapakse would then have dissolved the APRC.
Besides there was also the reality of these parties being constituents of the Rajapakse Government. They could not defy the President and yet hope to remain in the cabinet.
It was against this backdrop that the APRC focussed on areas and items where there was agreement. With the element of intra - APRC hostility over the structure of the state concept removed, participants found it easier to forge consensus.
During this exercise participants dicovered the vast number of matters on which there was total agreement. Contrary to ill - informed comment in sections of the media that the APRC was bogged down in disagreement, the participants found that they had indeed progressed very far.
This does not mean that everything is humky - dory because there are some outstanding issues to be resolved. These are likely to be taken up at the next APRC meeting.
What is of significance here is that notwithstanding areas of disagreement the APRC has also achieved substantial success . It is a question of positive or negative emphasis. Is the glass half - full or half - empty?
After discussing and finalising some aspects of the proposed Constitutional reform package the APRC participants were given copies of the draft prepared by Prof. Vitarana. They were asked to examine it and propose any amendments, deletions or fresh suggestions.
The document was titled “Recommendations made by the APRC for the full implementation of the 13th amendment”. The document took its cue from the paper given by the President and was drafted within guidelines set out.
It basically explained the history and principles behind the 13th amendment and what it sought to achieve. The draft recommendations were to be discussed and approved with appropriate changes where deemed necessary.
The fundamental guiding principle was to explore ways and means of identifying existing bottlenecks and proposing suitable remedies. The important requirement was that all recommendations had to be implemented without recourse to Constitutional amendment.
The suggestions have to be legalised and implemented through simple majority in Parliament and executive decisions by the President and cabinet.
13th amendment plus is deemed necessary at present on the premise that a Constitutional amendment is not possible due to lack of a two - thirds majority. It is assumed that such a majority cannot be procured even though genuine efforts at achieving a bi - partisan consensus have not been made.
Another reason necessitating a Provincial Council renaissance is the fact that the people of the North and East have not tasted the fruits of devolution since 1990.
Ironically the Provincial Councils were primarily set up to address North - Eastern needs but the PC’s function in the seven Sinhala majority provinces but not the North or East.
With the discussions on a new Constitutional reforms package getting prolonged and the Government feeling that a two - thirds majority was impossible to secure at this stage, reviving the existing Provincial councils on a new basis seems to be the best option as far as the Government is concerned.
There is also a sense of urgency as the Eastern province “liberated” from tiger control last year is yet to acquire a proper , devolved administration. This could be politically counterproductive.
In Prof. Vitarana’s draft pride of place was given to the issue of clearly demarcating powers to be handled separately by the Central government and provincial governments as well as those designated as “concurrent” between both.
Though it was anticipated earlier that the concurrent list of powers should be eliminated totally it has been realised subsequently that such action is not possible.
While some powers can be clearly separated there are other powers requiring some element of concurrence due to practical considerations.
Among the 36 items coming under the concurrent list there are many that can be handled by the Province alone. In those instances an executive decision needs to be taken whereby those areas are “devolved” in practice to the Province.
In other areas enabling legislation has to be passed by simple majority in Parliament whereby the limits and functions of the central and provincial governments are clearly and unambiguously defined.
There are areas where the central government in practice has re - acquired powers given to the Province. These areas are mainly in the spheres of health, education, social services, rehabilitation, agriculture etc. Provisions have to be made whereby such powers and institutions are “returned” to the Provinces.
There is also the need to identify areas where under “principles of national policy” the Central government can overide the provincial administrations and set in some checks and balances
There are also areas where provisions set out under the 13th amendment have not been implemented. For example, no machinery exists at present to set up the Provincial Police service as envisaged under the 13th amendment.
Prof. Vitarana’s draft document also outlines the need for two five - member advisory councils to be set up for the North and East respectively. They will be virtual “interim administrations ” but will not be called so.
President Rajapakse is firmly opposed to the nomenclature “interim” as he believes the word has acquired negative connotations.
The interim administration concept has been given a bad name through the antics of the tigers and the EPDP in the past.
The APRC chairman after distributing copies of his document recommendations for implementing the 13th amendment requested participants to study it thoroughly and come up with comments at the next meeting
Two more meetings of the APRC are scheduled for Sunday Jan 20th and Monday Jan 21st. The report on recommendations for implementing the 13th amendment is likely to be finalised within these days.
If everything goes well the special report relating to the 13th amendment enhancement and implementation will be formally handed over to President Rajapakse on Jan 23rd as requested by him.
There are however difficulties about fulfilling the original mandate of the APRC. Despite vast areas of agreement there are problematic issues too.It is doubtful whether a final report can be formulated by the 23rd.
Since the emphasis will be on finalising the set of recommendations regarding 13th amendment implementation there will be very little time to focus on resolving areas of disagreement concerning the original mandate.
One option to meet the Jan 23rd deadline is for the APRC to compile different formulations and to “vote” on those. . Thereafter two or more reports could be prepared on the basis of support indicated by such voting.
The chances are that the SLFP, MEP, JHU will be on one side and the Tamil and Muslim parties will be on the other. The left parties may be neutral or adopt a different position.
This could result in a repetition of what transpired in the experts panel. There was a majority report, minority report and dissenting reports.
Given the fact that the Tamil and Muslim parties are in a majority within the APRC their report could become the majority report.
In “realpolitik” this would be of no consequence and be even detrimental to the quest for greater devolution.
In the experts panel the majority report had multi - ethnic endorsement. The strength of that report lay in the fact that Six Sinhala persons had signed it. It would not have carried weight if there was no multi - ethnic backing.
Likewise a “majority” report in the APRC would be of no significance if the signatories were all minority community parties. Also the minority parties are actually “small” and basically have only “ethnic” constituencies.
If a report is to be truly “majoritarian” it should have multi - ethnic approval and not from particular ethnicities alone.
The reality of the situation is that any report needs substantial Sinhala endorsement to gain acceptance.Minority parties may be the majority within the APRC but that does not make it a valid majority. It would be an artificial construct.
It must also be remembered that the APRC was convened to forge a Southern or Sinhala consensus. Any APRC report lacking adequate Sinhala approval will not be a Southern consensus.
Such ethnic polarisation within the APRC is not desirable either. If such a fracture on ethnic lines occurs, it is in practical terms the death - knell of the APRC.
There can be no forward movement thereafter. The APRC will be “dead as the Dodo” regardless of whether President Rajapakse dissolves it or not.
Despite its ups and downs and the hot air generated, the APRC still remains the only ray of light in a dark, gloomy scenario. The challenge is to stay the course and strive for a multi - ethnic, multi - party consensus. It would be unwise to precipitate an APRC downfall.
The prudent course would be to gain more time and work pragmatically towards a consensus. This requires time but President Rajapakse’s Jan 23td deadline is a definite constraint posing a difficult dilemma.
One possible solution would be for the APRC to prepare a progress report of sorts and submit it to the President. The vast progress in areas of agreement could be pinpointed. The President could be requested for some more time to finalise the APRC report.
It appears from a statement made by Tissa Vitarana to the “Daily Mirror” that the APRC would be presenting two reports to the President on Jan 23rd.
One would be the APRC report proper and the other on implementing the 13th amendment satisfactorily. The 13th amendment report draft is not likely to cause many problems as there is an “unofficial” consensus on implementing it.
The main APRC report however will certainly pose problems as work is incomplete . Unless the APRC makes a gigantic effort to resolve differences and arrive at a consensus the report is unlikely to be finalised by the 23rd. In that case the APRC can only present an interim or preliminary report outlining all areas of agreement and perhaps the options available to resolve outstanding issues.
What the APRC should be careful about is to prevent efforts by powerful elements to substitute the 13th amendment implementation report in place of the Constitutional Reform report. Both are different.
The 13th amendment plus report is aimed at removing obstacles and implementing the Provincial Councils scheme set up under the 13th amendment. It is a case of improving and enhancing what is already available but not implemented properly.
The Constitutional reform report by the APRC is the fundamental task for which it was convened. This report should not confine itself to the 13th amendment alone but recommend far reaching proposals affording maximum devolution. Basically it would be a “southern” consensus on power sharing.
Proposals for greater power sharing may entail Constitutional amendments or a new Constitution requiring two - thirds majority and ratification through referendum. This may not be possible at the present juncture.This however does not mean that such efforts should be abandoned, aborted or down sized.
It is imperative that the APRC come up with a report advocating power sharing to the maximum extent possible. This would instil the Tamils and Muslims with the hope that a just and honourable solution is possible. For practical reasons the 13th amendment could be implemented until a proper climate for greater Constitutional reform is created.
What the Tamils fear is that implementation of 13th amendment plus would be the “end” of all attempts at Constitutional reform and power sharing. Thus it is essential that the APRC refrain from constricting its mandate to the 13th amendment alone.
Besides the Constitutional reform package to be recommended by the APRC is not confined to Devolution alone. It is much more comprehensive and includes at present several proposals relating to electoral reform, public service, judicial service, second chamber, vice - presidency, modifying the presidency etc.
Thus attempts to substitute the 13th aqmendment report for Constitutional reform must be resisted. One should not replace the other. If one report advocates what should be desirable in the long term the other recommends what could be attainable in the short term. They are complementary and not contradictory.
The APRC also faces the danger of being jettisoned totally. The National Socialists masquerading as marxists have renewed demands to that effect. It remains to be seen whether these demands are “orchestrated” or whether they are independent.
Time is of the essence for the APRC.
Just as the APRC is hard - pressed for time so too is President Rajapakse. According to informed Indian sources, there is a very good reason for the President to insist on the Jan 23rd deadline.
[President Mahinda Rajapaksa, meeting India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, December 28th, 2005: Pic: Sudath Silva-mahindarajapakse.com]
Apparently the question of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh attending the 60th independence day celebrations in Colombo remains a probability still.
New Delhi had told Colombo that things would be a lot easier for the Indian PM to makea bi- lateral visit if the Lankan Government could demonstrate substantive progress on power sharing before that.
According to Indian sources New Delhi is of the view that an Independence day “visit” could be arranged if positive announcements on power sharing and devolution are made by Feb 1st.
It is because of this :unofficial” Feb 1st deadline that Rajapakse has set a Jan 23rd deadline. Indian circles feel that Rajapakse needs some days to fine - tune the APRC recommendations and come out with it publicly by Feb 1st.
India has evinced great interest in the APRC and has provided President Rajapakse with some advisory input on how to effect maximum devolution under the 13th amendment.
Since the Sri Lankan President is very keen that the Indian Premier should mark his appearance on Feb 4th, he is pressing the APRC to deliver on or before Jan 23rd , opine Indian circles.
Government sources deny this. They say that the possibility of a Manmohan Singh visit though most welcome is not the criterion influencing President Rajapakse’s deadline.
The President is very keen on announcing the proposals to implement the 13th amendment before Independence day. He wants to reach out to the estranged people of the North and East before Independence day . Thereafter his message on the historic 60th anniversary of Independence would be statesmanlike , stretching out a hand to the minority communities.
All this however has increased the pressure on the APRC. With the Jan 23rd deadline approaching it is in a quandary about its future course of action. Will there be one or two reports?
Today (20th) and tomorrow (21st) will see the APRC in crucial deliberations. It is to be hoped that the APRC will find a way to resolve this practical dilemma even “time’s winged chariot draws near”.
Related: President Rajapakse wants “APRC River” to Flow Backwards
DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com
January 19th, 2008
by D.B.S. Jeyaraj
“Rivers do not flow backwards” was a favourite saying of Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike. It was almost as famous as his “trials of transition” used frequently to justify all what was going wrong during the revolution of 1956 that he ushered in.
SWRD’s 1956 revolution has spawned many political off-spring. President Mahinda Rajapakse is perhaps the greatest product of that revolution. Last week however saw this “Panashaye Daruwo” (child of 56) going against the wisdom of SWRD when he tried to make the “APRC river” flow backwards.
[President Mahinda Rajapakse-Pic: Sudath Silva]
When President Rajapakse convened the All Party Conference (APC) and its related All Party Representative Committee (APRC) in 2006 he solemnly pledged that he would abide by its decision and implement them. A multi - ethnic panel of experts was appointed to assist the APRC.
There were many who doubted President Rajapakse’s sincerity and suspected the APRC of being a time buying exercise till the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was concluded victoriously. Others felt that Rajapakse would utilise it to evolve and push through a weak scheme of devolution as his Political solution.
The APRC under Prof. Tissa Vitarana’s dedicated leadership progressed positively and well. When the President and his Sinhala supremacist cohorts found the APRC proceeding smoothly they began adopting an obstructionist course. Blatant attempts were made to manipulate the APRC into delivering downgraded devolution both substance and unit wise.
There emerged a cold war between the hawks and doves within the APRC. The President instead of maintaining impartial neutrality placed himself in the hard - line camp. Thus the nation and world at large witnessed the jocular sight of a President trying hard to sabotage the work of a committee appointed by him.
The enlightened steering of Tissa Vitarana has prevented so far the APRC changing course drastically, going off track or being derailed.
In a way all this is old hat and the progress of the APRC has been traced consistently by this writer in a series of columns in the “Nation” and another newspaper.
Even last week this column spotlighted the fact that the APRC was under great pressure to evolve a “solution” consisting basically of “enhanced” powers under the existing Provincial Councils set up in terms of the 13th amendment to the Constitution.
It was a case of “13th amendment plus” being projected as the solution.
Here are some relevant excerpts from last week’s column on current APRC developments -
“What is President Rajapakse’s response going to be to the APRC product?
This question assumes tremendous importance in view of what the President wants from the APRC. If Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) leader and Social Services Minister Douglas Devananda is to be believed the President only wants powers under the 13th amendment to be enhanced.
Many APRC participants were in for a shock on December 17th when Devananda addressed them. Devananda told the APRC that there was no point in formulating an elaborate scheme as it required a two - thirds majority in Parliament. Since the Govt did not enjoy such a majority it was not practical , Devananda said to draft a new scheme.
The pragmatic approach he said would be to go along with the existing devolution provided under the 13th amendment. Presenting his three - stage formula , Devananda suggested that powers under the 13th amendment could be upgraded without a two - thirds majority.
For this, Devananda wanted Interim Administrative Councils to be appointed for the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The interim councils will have five members each. There will be another committee to co-ordinate activity between both provinces. There will also be a panel of experts to advise the interim councils.
What really upset the APRC was Devananda’s request that the APRC abandon the power sharing draft it was working on and approve the interim admnistration idea with 13th amendment plus powers as the APRC proposal.
There was no point in formulating a scheme that needed two - thirds majority in Parliament he said. So the APRC should recommend 13th amendment plus , Devananda argued.
Devananda dropped his bombshell. “His excellency the President wants the APRC to adopt 13th amendment plus as the interim solution and present it as the APRC report” the EPDP leader said.
When APRC members observed that President Rajapakse had not indicated anything of the sort to them , Devananda said that the “His excellency” had asked him to convey this message to the APRC when he met “His excellency” the day before yesterday (Dec 15th).
Several APRC members were upset at this. Exchanging “off the record” comments among themselves the delegates noted that the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) had “saved” the Government on Dec 14th by abstaining on the budget vote.
Since the JVP wanted the APRC dissolved many members felt that the President had arrived at this decision as part of the alleged “deal” with the Crimson comrades.
What Devananda was telling the APRC was that the President wanted it to commit “hara - kiri” in Samurai style. In LTTE parlance he wanted the APRC to “Kuppiyadi” or swallow a cynaide capsule.
Prof. Vitarana then said that the APRC was scheduled to meet with the President soon and will discuss the issue with him then. When Devananda mooted the interim administration proposal to be endorsed by the APRC , Vitarana pointed out that it could be set up under existing laws and that it need not go through the APRC.”
The above extracts from last week’s column provides an insight into the pressures exerted on the APRC.
Now to focus on latest APRC developments this week.
President Rajapakse met with party leaders and APRC members on the 9th of this month. It was the moment of truth for the APRC .
The meeting began around 4 .30 pm and went on for nearly two hours. Prof. Vitarana apparently met the President a little earlier to brief him on a one to one basis.
When the meeting began the President seemed to be in a belligerent mood. According to some participants at the discussion, Rajapakse seemed upset over some provisions in the APRC draft on Constitutional reform.
He seemed to be of the opinion that some of the proposed powers to the Provincial units were not desirable and would lead to secession. Funnily enough some of those powers were already in force.
“The impression I got was that the President had been wrongly briefed by interested parties. He seemed prejudiced” a minority party leader told this columnist.
At one stage the President wanted to summon Treasury secretary PB Jayasundara to find out about fiscal devolution issues.
Rajapakse however is a lawyer and an experienced politician. As discussions continued he seemed to realise that the yet to be finalised APRC draft was not detrimental to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Country.
He became much more relaxed when made aware of adequate safeguards being incorporated to prevent any threat of secession..
The President then requested the APRC to expedite matters and finalise the report within two weeks. He set Jan 23rd as the deadline for handing over the final report of the APRC.
The President was his amiable self again and tensions eased.
But this was a deceptive lull.
Like a magician pulling out a rabbit from a hat the President displayed a document. It was in Sinhala and Rajapakse began reading from it.
Within minutes he realised that there were several Tamil and Muslim members in the meeting who could not understand the official phraseology in high flown Sinhala.
Rajapakse then produced an English version and asked Tissa Vitarana to read it out.
The four page document was titled “A Political Proposal - The Way Forward”. It had twelve sections. Only the last one referred to the APRC work in progress.
APRC participants discovered to their shock that the document was an endorsement of “13th amendment plus”. The document recommended that the 13th amendment be implemented with enhanced powers. It called for the setting up of advisory councils.
The advisory councils were an euphemism for an interim administration. The word interim was being avoided because the President felt it was discredited after the LTTE wanted an interim authority.
Three other points made by President Rajapakse upset many APRC members. One was that the APRC should work out proposals based on “The way Forward” document and adopt it as the APRC’s formal proposal.
The second was that this should be presented to him on Jan 23rd as the “Preliminary Proposal”. The APRC could work out their own proposal thereafter at a leisured pace.
The third was that the provisions in the preliminary proposal were to be implemented first. “Thirteenth amendment plus” was to be implemented in full. There would be a moratorium on accepting or implementing any other proposal or scheme.
Douglas Devananda chortled with glee at the visible discomfiture of certain APRC members in the gathering. Devananda had made the same suggestion and been rejected. Now he sat there with a smirk.
It was crystal clear now that Devananda was telling the truth on Dec 17th when he told the APRC that “His excellency wanted this done”.
This was indeed Mahinda Rajapakse’s brainchild.
He had sent Devananda earlier to bamboozle the APRC but the EPDP leader had failed to convince the APRC.
Now the President was personally trying to bulldoze the proposal through.
When some minority party representatives began to express reservations the President got tough. Exuding a sense of steely determination, Mahinda Rajapakse made it obvious that he would not tolerate dissent on this matter.
It was his wish and had to be regarded as a command. The APRC had to toe the line or else ………………………………….
This column has often pinpointed the inherent weakness of the APRC. Almost every party in the APRC was a constituent of this Government. The respective party leaders were all cabinet ministers. There was a conflict of interests here.
The chief opposition United National Party could have made a vivid difference if it had not pulled out of the APRC. If the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader was present he may have objected strongly to Rajapakse. But Rauff Hakeem was not invited.
Seeing that the President was in no frame of mind to lend ear to alternate views most participants demonstrated the “eloquence of silence”.
Mahinda Rajapakse’s rationale for suggesting the “13th amendment plus” solution was that any far reaching proposal would require a two - thirds majority. This he said was impossible because the UNP and Ranil would never support it. So one had to be practical and improve on what was available said the President.
The President found unexpected support for this viewpoint from Karu Jayasuriya. ” Ranil Wickremasinghe will not support it” Jayasuriya affirmed.
What Rajapakse and Jayasuriya failed to mention was the reason for this state of affairs. The UNP had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Wickremasinghe agreed to cooperate on arriving at a bi - partisan consensus.
The situation changed suddenly when Basil Rajapakse enticed 18 UNP Parliamentarians into Government ranks by dangling offers of ministerial office. It was none other than Karu Jayasuriya himself who led this herd of rogue elephants away from the UNP kraal.
It was this that caused the UNP to revise its stance. The party pulled out of the APRC too. Yet the UNP position is that it may support a viable scheme of genuine devolution if evolved by the APRC.
Minority party pressure and requests by the International community could make the UNP supportive of a comprehensive package proposed by the APRC. But it has to be genuine power sharing.
The probability of the UNP supporting a genuine APRC proposal cannot be ruled out. At least not yet.
But Rajapakse aided by Jayasuriya were jumping to the conclusion that the UNP will not support and so a two - thirds majority was out of the question.
Nobody can predict the final outcome buit it is certainly premature to arrive at such a negative decision about the UNP. Particularly when it was the ignoble conduct of the Rajapakse regime and UNP crossers over who caused the situation.
It was obvious that the President’s reasoning for jettisoning the quest for greater power sharing was flawed. The reality was that Rajapakse was reluctant to go in for comprehensive power sharing amounting to quasi - federalism. He was emotionally and intellectually opposed to such a concept
Besides there was pressure from the Janstha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP). Mahinda Rajapakse has visions of conquering the LTTE and imposing a sub - standard solution. In Mahinda’s mind the conviction that the Tamil people and not the tigers require maximum devolution has not sunk in.
Thus President Rajapakse wants the APRC to revert to the 13th amendment. After 47 meetings of the APRC’s expert panel and 58 meetings of the APRC itself, the President of Sri Lanka wants to go back to the 13th amendment. If that was to be the final solution it could have been reached years ago.
The meeting with the President ended on a troubled and confused note. An emergency meeting of the APRC was held and the matter discussed . Many options were proposed but no firm decision was arrived at. Prof. Vitarana hopes to have at least three more meetings of the APRC before Jan 23rd.
It remains to be seen as to what desision is ultimately taken by the APRC. Notwithstanding the pressures of the President most APRC participants realise that they are skating on thin ice . The political credibility of minority party participants is at stake here. They cannot afford to let their constituencies feel that they have been taken for a ride by President Rajapakse.
This is applicable in the case of Tissa Vitarana too. His political and personal credentials have been impeccable so far. It would be a tragedy indeed if all his worthwhile efforts come to nothing as a result of Presidential perfidy. In the case of the veteran Sama Samajist , there is a historical precedent too.
The Laka Sama Samaja Party ’s (LSSP) Dr. Colvin R de Silva was one of the most enlightened and progressive intellectual to straddle the Sri Lankan political arena in the 20th century. The great Trotskyite fell from grace when he piloted the 1972 Republican Constitution through.
Despite his progressive outlook Colvin let himself be pressured into including certain obnoxious clauses into the Constitution. Some of those like doing away with section 29 of the Soulbury Constitution, Giving Official language status to Sinhala Consdtututionally, providing foremost place to Buddhism, entrenching the unitary state constitutionally were controversial to say the least.
SLFP pressures particularly from Felix R Dias Bandaranaike compelled that these provisions be included in the new Constitution and Colvin adhered reluctantly. Yet it is Colvin as acknowledged architecht of the republican Constitution who is blamed nowadays.
Likewise Prof. Vitarana would surely realise that if he gives in to unreasonable demands of the President , posterity will blame the Science and Technology minister. Would Dr. NM Perera’s nephew like to suffer the fate of Dr. Colvin R de Slva ?
While the APRC is yet to finalise matters there were inspired leaks in sections of the media that the 13th amendment was going to be the APRC solution. This upset significant sections of the diplomatic community in Colombo.
The International community views the APRC as the only glimmer of light at the end of a dark, dark tunnel. All this time the IC nourished the hope that the light at the end of the tunnel emanated from an Angelic halo. But now, news reports suggested that the glow was from a fire - breathing dragon’s nostrils.
Diplomats from many countries now wanted to know from the Government about what was going on? Why was the APRC regressing? Why was the search for a political setlement going forward to the past?
There were many queries and once again it was troubleshooter Basil Rajapakse’s lot to engage in damage control. Obfuscating media interviews were given.
It is highly unlikely the sharp diplomats would be taken in by these puerile exercises.. It is becoming increasingly clear that “games” are being played. The natural course of the APRC is sought to be reversed for cheap political gain.
The way forward document was actually showing the way backward!
Mahinda Rajapakse may want the APRC river to flow backwards but as SWRD said “rivers do not flow backward”. Scientifically too it is not possible.
According to engineers “Water always flows from a higer level to a lower level The only way it can be made to flow backwards is to oppose the flow with a powerful tidal current (as can be observed in estuaries during high tide. This effect is used in tidal power generation projects). But the effect, as it is an externally forced one, is transient, unnatural and unsustainable.”
Mahinda Rajapakse’s crude attempt to force the APRC river to flow backwards is unscientific as it is ahistorical. The APRC chairperson being a scientist understands this fully well.
Related: A Political Proposal: The Way Forward
DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com
January 12th, 2008
By D.B.S. Jeyaraj
Much maligned and mis - understood in recent times , the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) continues to forge ahead with its task of drafting a comprehensive scheme of Constitutional reform that would provide maximum power sharing between centre and periphery.
Despite the disinformation and misinformation being dished out the APRC chaired by the indefatigable Samasamaajist Tissa Vitarana has quietly progressed and is on the verge of completing its mission .
[Prof. Tissa Vitarana]
It has been constrained by the insistence of President Mahinda Rajapakse that all Constitutional reform should be under the framework of a Unitary Constitution. Though unsatisfactory to most parties at the APRC the participants have adopted a pragmatic approach towards the issue.
Apparently the APRC will draw up a scheme providing maximum devolution to the Provinces but within a unitary Constitution. The substance of devolution would be of a quasi - federal nature but within a Unitary Constitution. This to some extent is a contradiction in terms.
It is the considered opinion of this columnist that the best and most durable solution for a united Sri Lanka can only be evolved through principles of the federal idea. Nevertheless current realities suggest that such an option is not viable at this juncture.
The refusal of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)to climb down from its unitary stance and the reluctance of the United National Party (UNP) to participate constructively at the APRC has weakened proponents of the federal idea.
The minority community parties and the leftists have been unable to assert themselves powerfully in a situation where the two chief parties took up different positions. The fact that these parties are members of the Rajapakse Government has diluted their independence greatly
In spite of these adverse circumstances the APRC has made commendable progress in evolving a scheme of power sharing. Although the draft is yet to be finalised this columnist opines that it is significantly far - reaching in content.
It appears that this APRC draft is way above the present scheme of devolution under the 13th amendment. It is also a vast improvement on the 2000 draft bill formulated by the Chandrika Kumaratunga Government. However the power sharing scheme suggested in this draft is “lower” than what was proposed in the GL Peiris - Neelan Tiruchelvam package.
The inherent weakness of the APRC is that the man who convened it is against the federal idea. President Mahinda Rajapakse appointed the APRC and stated that he will implement its decision. But when he found it was going to formulate power sharing based on the federal idea , Rajapakse became the biggest obstacle to the APRC’s success.
It became crystal clear that the President wanted the unit of devolution to be the district. It was only International pressure that compelled him to endorse the Province as the unit.
It was ironic to see the APRC working at cross purposes with that of the President. There was an undeclared cold war within the APRC between hawks and doves on power sharing issues.
Despite Presidential pressures the APRC under Prof. Vitarana has progressed immensely. If the UNP did not shirk its responsibility and had participated constructively in the APRC much more could have been achieved.
Still the APRC has done well!
Two meetings of the APRC are scheduled for Jan 7th and 8th. Thereafter the APRC members will meet President Rajapakse , either on the 9th or 11th of January. On the 12th the members will fly to Britain for a study tour of power sharing schemes in Scotland , Wales and Northern Ireland.
The APRC will also be taking their draft with them to Britain. Utilising the wisdom gained in Britain the APRC will meet on the 20th and 21st at a British venue and fine tune the draft.
After returning to Sri Lanka and formally finalising the draft into a report they would present it to President Rajapakse. If all goes well D - day for the APRC report will be Jan 25th.
There is however a very big doubt!
What is President Rajapakse’s response going to be to the APRC product?
This question assumes tremendous importance in view of what the President wants from the APRC. If Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) leader and Social Services Minister Douglas Devananda is to be believed the President only wants powers under the 13th amendment to be enhanced.
Many APRC participants were in for a shock on December 17th when Devananda addressed them. Devananda told the APRC that there was no point in formulating an elaborate scheme as it required a two - thirds majority in Parliament. Since the Govt did not enjoy such a majority it was not practical , Devananda said to draft a new scheme.
The pragmatic approach he said would be to go along with the existing devolution provided under the 13th amendment. Presenting his three - stage formula , Devananda suggested that powers under the 13th amendment could be upgraded without a two - thirds majority.
For this, Devananda wanted Interim Administrative Councils to be appointed for the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The interim councils will have five members each. There will be another committee to co-ordinate activity between both provinces. There will also be a panel of experts to advise the interim councils.
What really upset the APRC was Devananda’s request that the APRC abandon the power sharing draft it was working on and approve the interim admnistration idea with 13th amendment plus powers as the APRC proposal.
There was no point in formulating a scheme that needed two - thirds majority in Parliament he said. So the APRC should recommend 13th amendment plus , Devananda argued.
Predictably Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) Representative Udaya Gammanpila was in support of Devananda but many others disagreed.
Ceylon Workers Congress Representative R. Yogarajan voiced the sentiments of the majority in the APRC when he said that the perceived lack of two - thirds majority was not an issue. “If a good scheme of power sharing is evolved the UNP could support it” he pointed out.
International opinion was strongly behind the APRC and therefore a bi - partisan consensus was quite possible. If the SLFP and UNP acted together two - thirds majority was possible with the aid of Tamil and Muslim parties , he pointed out.
Devananda then changed track and said that India was strongly supportive of 13th amendment plus as a solution. New Delhi also wanted interim administrations to be set up he said.
Devananda’s puerile attempt to mislead the APRC was effectively countered by the chairman. Prof.Vitarana pointed out that India viewed both issues as separate matters. The 13th amendment was already in existence. It was up to the Sri Lankan Government to upgrade it and implement it .
The search for greater power sharing and the elusive Southern consensus was a different issue. Those efforts should continue regardless of the 13th amendment. Proposals for 13th amendment plus or interim adiministrations cannot be a substitute for meaningful Constitution reform. One need not hinder the other .
It was then that Devananda dropped his bombshell. “His excellency the President wants the APRC to adopt 13th amendment plus as the interim solution and present it as the APRC report” the EPDP leader said.
When APRC members observed that President Rajapakse had not indicated anything of the sort to them , Devananda said that the “His excellency” had asked him to convey this message to the APRC when he met “His excellency” the day before yesterday (Dec 15th).
Several APRC members were upset at this. Exchanging “off the record” comments among themselves the delegates noted that the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) had “saved” the Government on Dec 14th by abstaining on the budget vote.
Since the JVP wanted the APRC dissolved many members felt that the President had arrived at this decision as part of the alleged “deal” with the Crimson comrades.
What Devananda was telling the APRC was that the President wanted it to commit “hara - kiri” in Samurai style. In LTTE parlance he wanted the APRC to “Kuppiyadi” or swallow a cynaide capsule.
Prof. Vitarana then said that the APRC was scheduled to meet with the President soon and will discuss the issue with him then. When Devananda mooted the interim administration proposal to be endorsed by the APRC , Vitarana pointed out that it could be set up under existing laws and that it need not go through the APRC.
Two weeks later on Dec 31st the Peace secretariat released a statement from Vitarana as a communique .It is reproduced below
“The APRC discussed a proposal regarding the implementation of an interim solution to the situation in the North and East presented by the EPDP leader, Hon. Douglas Devananda, at its meeting on 17th December 2007. It was the opinion of the APRC members that the setting up of an Interim Administration could be done within the terms of the present Constitution and there was no need for the APRC to be involved in the matter. The APRC decided to continue its mandated task as speedily as possible.
In addition the APRC members generally agreed to a suggestion that local government and provincial council elections should be held in the East and North as early as is feasible.
Prof. T. Vitarana
Chairman - APRC
It is surmised that Prof. Vitarana would not have issued such a statement without consulting the President. The APRC members will however get an opportunity to clarify matters from the President himself when they meet him this week.
Devananda continued with his efforts to “sell” the interim administration when he met the Mahanayake Theros of the Asgiriya and Malwatte chapters. He sought their blessings for the interim administration scheme. Later he met some Hindu priests in this regard also.
Douglas Devananda is aggressively pursuing the objective of setting up two interim administrative councils for the North and East. The hitch is that he wants to head both administrations as well as retain his cabinet portfolio.
Since he is part of a Government that is delegating its powers to an interim body Devananda cannot be part of both. There is a conflict of interests in this and is in a way “anti - Constitutional”.
Devananda explains this by saying that to develop the provinces, effort is needed at the central and regional level. He compares it to the Up - Country trains of old where one engine “pulled” at the front and another “pushed” at the back. Likewise one has to pull at the periphery and push at the centre he says.
An apt comparison indeed but the problem is Devananda wants to do both the pulling and pushing! That’s impossible.
The underlying motive behind the EPDP leader’s quest for an interim structure is to quench his thirst for power. If Prabakharan wants to be the “sole” representative, Devananda wants to be “sole” alternative. In that they are mirror images of each other.
If Devananda cannot get anything for himself through a project he would sabotage it if possible. In this he is like the LTTE leader.
It was Devananda who sabotaged the Interim administration scheme during Kumaratunga’s time because he could not be head of it. It appears that history may repeat itself.
This columnist wrote about Devananda’s desire to project 13th amendment plus as a “solution” almost a year ago in another newspaper. Much of what was written then is applicable in the current context also.
Let me conclude then with excerpts from that article -
” While Anandasangaree plays unwittingly into Rajapakse’s hands , the EPDP’s Douglas Devananda is wittingly becoming a cat’s paw in Rajapakse’s hands. Apart from actively collaborating in acts of state terror, Devananda is also involved in helping Rajapakse to sell a political dummy to the Tamils.
Devananda has been talking much of his earlier three - stage scheme of 13th amendment plus. This is music to Mahinda’s ears. What Rajapakse hopes to present as “political solution” is nothing more than the 13th amendment with modifications. Douglas “Malli” is helping Mahinda “Aiya” by harking back to the 13th amendment again.
Devananda has conveniently forgotten the background to this three - stage scheme. Actually this proposal was not that of Devananda’s but his erstwhile political adviser Dr. K. Vigneswaran. It was this former secretary of the North - Eastern provincial council who came up with this suggestion in the late nineties.
Chandrika Kumaratunga was President then and the war with the LTTE was raging. The people of the North - East needed some regional administrative set - up with political leadership . The practical alternative was to work the defunct N- E provincial council and enhance powers under the 13th amendment.It was for this that the three - stage formula was proposed.
The first stage was to set up an interim administrative council for the North - East. The representation in the Council was to be of the same proportions that North - Eastern political parties were represented in Parliament. Since the EPDP held nine seats out of the total thirty - one the party was to get the most representatives as well as the interim chairman post.
The second stage was to enhance devolution . The idea was to do away with the concurrent list in keeping with the Mangala Moonesinghe report. This would give greater powers to the periphery. Sec 154 (G) enables greater powers being given to the Provincial councils by legislative amendments through simple majority. All Provincial Councils should pass legislation to that effect in their respective councils. If all PC’s were united in this then Parliament too could pass legislation through simple majority.
The third stage was implementing enhanced devolution through an interm council for the N- E while the overall search for a political solution continued. The rationale was that the absence of a political solution should not prevent the North - Eastern people from enjoying the benefits of devolution.
Kumaratunga was very sympathetic towards the idea and even gazetted provisions for a N- E interim council. Since the UNP and SLFP had agreed during the Mangala Moonesinghe committee sittings to do away with the concurrent list thre was no hitch to enhanced devolution. Besides the Peoples Alliance controlled all Provincial Councils then. The N- E would have the interim body. All councils were expected to support greater powers for themselves.
[Douglas Devanananda]
Everything was hunky - dory but nothing positive happened. Why? The cause was none other than Devananda - who in the words of the late Kethesh Loganathan - fancied himself as the sole alternative to Velupillai Prabakharan the so called sole representative. When Kumaratunga wanted names from the EPDP for the interim council Douglas wanted to head it himself. Kumaratunga disagreed as he was then a MP. But Douglas wanted both posts and refused to budge. So the project was shelved.
Now the very same man who killed the idea then is reviving the 13th amendment plus project. It is seemingly at the behest of Mahinda.
The 13th amendment plus proposal was thought of at a particular time under different circumstances. Much water has flowed down the Mahaweli, Kelani, Aruvi and Verugal rivers since then.
DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com
January 5th, 2008
By D.B.S.Jeyaraj
The latest decision by the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) to quit the Government led by President Mahinda Rajapakse has caused controversy. The timing of the SLMC’s move has led to much speculation that the party decision was tied up with the Budget’s third reading vote on Dec 14th.
While this may be true to some extent it would be a mistake to regard the SLMC move from that perspective alone. The political compulsions that caused the SLMC to act as it did are much more complex and problematic.
Unless the Rajapakse regime extricates itself from its majoritarian mindset and addresses minority concerns reasonably , such tensions and convulsions seem inevitable.
Before delving into the motivating factors behind the SLMC’s current decision a brief re- run outlining the reasons that compelled the party to join the Govt is necessary. Examining the past history of the SLMC is also required to understand the present.
The advent of the SLMC was a watershed in the politics of this country.The SLMC’s charismatic leader MHM Ashraff through his vision and political acumen demonstrated that the geographically dispersed Muslim community could be weaved into a vibrant entity. The political base of the party was the Eastern Province in general and the Amparai district in particular.
The dominant Sinhala political class had been long used to pliable Muslim politicians of both green and blue hues. Ashraff was different and stridently independent. He was however prepared to co-operate on the basis of principles and self - respect..
Ashraff forged an alliance with Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in 1994 through a memorandum of understanding.The SLMC tasted political power as a key constituent of the Kumaratunga regime. The SLMC was able to satisfy its voters on a number of issues by sharing power.
But Ashraff himself was an authoritative “Thalaiver” (leader) who would not brook inner - party dissent. By the tail - end of that Govt’s tenure Ashraff had fallen out with at least five MP’s like ULM “thoppi” Mohideen,MM Zuhair,SM Aboobucker, MAM Hizbullah and Dr. M. Illias.
Rauff Hakeem remained the most loyal and strongest of Ashraff’s deputies. He was the rising star of the party. After Ashraff’s tragic demise Hakeem took over the reins but there were elements hostile to him. Some of these people got around Ferial Ashraff and promoted dynastic politics.
Even as cracks began to appear in the seemingly monolithic Muslim Congress the dominant political establishment began to exploit these. The political unity of the Muslims under a strong party was unpalatable to many.
Ashraff had enjoyed a close relationship with Chandrika Kumaratunga but Rauff Hakeem did not. Complicating matters further was the unfortunate chasm between Ashraff’s widow Ferial Ashraff and his political heir Rauff Hakeem.Deep divisions were visible within the SLMC after the elections of 2000.
Though Ashraff developed the SLMC as a party of the Muslims he eventually realised that a broader alliance was needed to expand politically in the multi - ethnic East. The SLMC leader also perceived himself as a national leader who could help establish ethnic amity and national unity.
As a result the National Unity Alliance (NUA) was born. Sadly Ashraff died in the Air crash before he could give shape to his fresh political ideals.
In Ashraff’s absence the SLMC itself began to fragment. The able and articulate Hakeem was too young and inexperienced at that point of time to handle challenges to his authority. Parting of the ways with Ferial Ashraff saw her leading the NUA while Hakeem retained his hold on the SLMC.
One of the mistakes Hakeem made was to assume that the party would accept him as leader in the same way it did Ashraff. What he failed to note was that Ashraff virtualy built up the SLMC after he ousted Kattankudi’s Ahamed Lebber in 1986.
Also Ashraff was a son of the eastern province and Amparai district soil. Hakeem born in Galagedara was not a “Kizakku Muslim” (eastern Muslim).
As such Hakeem was forced to rely on local politicians from the East to maintain his leadership. He contested against formidable odds in Kandy district and was elected to Parliament in 2001.But people like AHM Athaullah and the late Anwer Ismail emerged as powerful SLMC leaders in Amparai district..
Egoistical clashes and temperamental incompatibility led to further splits. Encouraged by those in power , Athaullah split and eventually formed the National Congress.
The saga of SLMC fragmentation continued.The SLMC contested the 2004 Parliamentary polls in association with the United national Party (UNP). It was confined to the opposition with the UNP as the SLFP - JVP combine fared better electorally.
The elections also saw the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) with its Sinhala - Buddhist hegemonic ideology winning several seats. Several of the JHU policies were anti - Muslim in character.
Once again SLMC splits were promoted. Ministerial portfolios were dangled as carrots. As a result MP’s like Rishard Badiudeen, Najib Abdul Majeed, Ameer Ali and Hussein Bhaila went over to the Government.
They formed the All Ceylon Muslim Congress. This left the SLMC with only six seats in Parliament.Hakeem however proved a point by winning handsomely in the Amparai district.
While these amusing yet deplorable antics went on a clear political truth was being established firmly in Muslim politics. Though MP’s elected on the SLMC ticket were fickle and politically dis - loyal the average Muslim voter was not. The SLMC continued to win most of the seats entitled to the community and remained the single largest Muslim party.
It was the most credible Muslim political voice and Muslims identified with it as their party. At the last Local authority elections the SLMC captured 11 of 13 Muslim dominated local bodies in the East.
The 2005 Presidential elections saw the SLMC hitching its wagon to the Ranil Wickremasinghe star. Wickremasinghe got overwhelming support from the so called “minority” communities , the Sri Lankan Tamils, Up Country Tamils and the Muslims.
Rajapakse got more Sinhala votes than his rival. The Tigers in an act of political stupidity and betrayal enforced a boycott. As a result Tamils in the North - East could note vote in large numbers. Rajapakse won with a razor - thin majority.
Now the SLMC was in a quandary. With Ferial, Athaulla and Rishard etc enjoying ministerial power there was pressure from within sections of the SLMC that the party should join the Government.
Hakeem however wanted to do so on a principled basis. He began negotiating another MOU with set conditions before joining the Govt.
Meanwhile the Rajapakse regime was also accelerating its campaign to win over opposition MP’s with ministerial posts. Overtures were made behind Hakeem’s back to some SLMC Parliamentarians. These MP”s had neither the patience nor the self - respect to work out a respectable MOU.
Soon it became apparent that at least three of the six Muslim Congress MP’s would cross over defying Hakeem. In such a situation SLMC stalwarts decided to join the Govt as a party without an adequate MOU being worked out.
The SLMC could not afford another split at that juncture. So the party as a whole decided to join. The rebellious MP’s decided and the leaders followed.
The “marriage” was by no means an act of free will. It was virtually a shot gun wedding in which the minds of the groom and bride did not meet. It is doubtful whether the union was ever consummated politically.
The bitter irony is that the SLMC which gained entry into the Govt to prevent another split is once again torn apart by its exit.Only four MP’s Rauff Hakeem., Basheer Segu Dawood, SM Hassan Ali and Faisal Cassim have resigned their portfolios and crossed over to the opposition.
SM Najibudeen and KA Baiz have not. They went “missing” amid rumours that lavish hospitality was being shown them at a posh hotel.
It can be seen therefore that recent history is repeating itself as far as splits in the SLMC are concerned. The important question then is why did the SLMC risk another split to cross over? what compelled the party to discard the trappings of Govt office and seek the bleak desert of opposition? The simple answer is strong grass roots pressure exerted by the rank and file!
There is no denying that the Muslim community faces many problems generally and particularly in the East. Muslim MP’s are duty bound to try and alleviate them to whatever extent possible.
If the MP’s are unable or unwilling to do so and the people who voted for them perceive it that way then the political future of those Parliamentarians is in jeopardy.
The pivotal base of the SLMC is the Eastern Province.When the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE) was a dominant force in the province there was much friction between the tigers and the Muslim community. Other problems were not felt acutely.
But now the LTTE is no longer a force to be reckoned with in the East. With that contradiction removed other contradictions are coming to the fore as far as the Muslims are concerned.
One of the major , legitimate grievances of the non - Sinhala ethnicities in Sri Lanka has been that of the Sinhala majoritarian state imposing its hegemony on the minorities.
The greater contradiction has been that, as far as the minority nationalities were concerned. Friction between the minority communities themselves amounted to lesser contradictions.
The conquest of the East opened up hopes for the Muslims who suffered at the hands of the LTTE. But such hopes turned into dupes soon.
This Govt run by the Rajapakse brethren and the Ethno - fascist saffron brigade soon de