Fiftieth Anniversary of the Aborted Banda-Chelva Pact

July 20th, 2007

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

The coming week will mark the fiftieth anniversary of a landmark event in the modern, political history of the country. It was on July 26th 1957 that the then Prime Minister Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike and Samuel James Velupillai Chelvanayagam, the leader of the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi - known as Federal party in English - signed an agreement that came to be known as the Banda - Chelva or B- C pact.

The B- C pact which intended resolving, some of the major grievances facing Sri Lankan Tamils , was the first of its kind , in the post - independence history of the Country. The B- C pact recognized several key elements of the Federal Idea through a scheme of power - sharing. The story of how this aborted pact evolved, deserves to be narrated on its golden jubilee week.

[SWRD Bandaranaike]

The 1956 elections had seen a deep polarisation between the Sinhala and Tamil communities. While the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna joint front headed by SWRD Bandaranaike swept the polls in the South the Federal Party led by SJV Chelvanayakam won six out of nine seats in the North and four out of seven in the East.

[a Federal Party pamphlet with portraits of key members]

One of the first acts by the new Govt was the enshrining of Sinhala as the sole official language of the Country .On June 5th Tamil Satyagrahis peacefully protesting at Galle face were beaten up by thugs as the Police did nothing. Anti - Tamil violence resulted in several parts of the Country.On June 15th Sinhala was made the only official language by a vote of 56 to 29.

Federal Party convention

There was much tension in the Country when the FP held its party convention in Trincomalee during August 17th - 19th 1956. FP members and supporters marched for ten days from Jaffna in the North and Thirukkovil in the South of the Eastern Province to Trincomalee . The FP convention passed a unanimous resolution incorporating four basic demands.They were -

1. The establishment of an autonomous Tamil state or states on a linguistic basis within a Federal union of Ceylon.

2.The restoration of the Tamil language to its rightful place, enjoying absolute parity of status with Sinhalese as an official language of this Country.

3.The restoration of the citizenship and franchise rights to the Tamil workers in the plantation districts by repeal of the present citizenship laws.

4. The immediate cessation of all policies of colonising the traditionally Tamil - speaking areas with Sinhalese people.

The convention resolved that one years time be given the Govt to respond positively to these demands. If there was no response the FP was to commence a “direct action” campaign of non - violent protest. The deadline given was August 20th 1957.

The new 1957 year dawned with much friction over the issue of “Sri” letter in vehicle number plates. The earlier system was to use English alphabet letters from the Country’s name CEYLON. (CE, Cl , CN, EY, EN etc). Now the new Govt wanted it to begin with the Sinhala “Sri”. The Tamil politicians resented this as a form of Sinhala imposition. They protested and demanded that the Tamil “shree” also be substituted. Ironically there was no letter Shree in theTamil alphabet. The Shree used was derived from Sanskrit.

On January 19th the FP began an anti - shree campaign in the North - East. Vehicles began running with Tamil letters. The “Sinhala” Shree was changed into the sanskrit derived “Tamil” shree.

‘Black Day’

On February 4th the FP observed independence day as a “black day”of mourning. A Hartal paralysed normal life in the North - East.

A counter - campaign began in the Sinhala majority provinces. Tamil letters were tar - brushed or blacked out on street signs and name boards. There was widespread incidents of communal friction on a minor scale.

The FP also called for a boycotting of Govt ministers and deputy - ministers visiting the North - East for “official” purposes.Satyagrahis would surround places where ministers were scheduled to go and curtail movement.

Cabinet ministers W. Dahanayake and M. Marikkar were mobbed in Batticaloa. Stanley de Zoysa was treated to a massive show of black flags in Mannar.

Deputy minister of Labour M.P de Z Siriwardena who went by the mail train to Jaffna found his path blocked outside the railway station by youths led by the then “enfant terrible” Appapillai Amirthalingam. He returned to Colombo by the next “Yarl Devi”.

With increasing communal tensions the Country seemed to be heading for a blood bath. SWRD who was arguably the most intellectual of all Sri Lanka’s prime ministers realised that the situation had to be checked and reversed. He understood that the Tamils had genuine grievances that had to be redressed.

Bandaranaike the man who espoused federalism for Sri Lanka in 1926 knew that the federal idea in the form of effective power - sharing was the only solution. He now proposed extensive de - centralisation through the setting up of regional Councils.

It is widely believed that the Regional Councils scheme was introduced by Bandaranaike as a result of the B - C pact. Actually, a draft bill for Regional councils was published on May 17th 1957. The B - C pact came later in July.

Understanding with Tamil leaders

After presenting the Regional councils bill SWRD wanted to arrive at an understanding with the Tamil leaders and modify it further.

Meanwhile the FP was getting ready for its “Direct action” campaign scheduled to begin on Aug 20th. 25, 000 volunteers were registered.

Some Sinhala leaders began a move to mobilise 100, 000 volunteers to combat the Tamil campaign. A major showdown seemed inevitable.

It was then that saner counsel prevailed .. A meeting between SWRD and SJV was mooted. It was done on the personal initiative of the Prime Minister himself.

Two Tamil lawyers P. Navaratnarajah QC and AC Nadarajah arranged for the rendezvous. Navaratnarajah was a personal friend of both SWRD and SJV.

Nadarajah was a vice - president of the SLFP. From the Govt side Finance minister Stanley de Zoysa played a commendable role in promoting this dialogue.

S.W.R.D could not read or write Sinhala

The first meeting was held on June 22nd at the Premier’s residence in Horagolla. SWRD himself came up to Chelvanayakam’s car and helped him get out. Both men seemed to realise the gravity of the situation.

Those present on this historic occasion were SWRD Bandaranaike and Stanley de Zoysa from the Govt; Navaratnarajah as an intermediary; SJV Chelvanayakam, C. Vanniyasingham, NR. Rajavarothayam, VA. Kandiah, EMV Naganathan and V. Navaratnam from the FP.

The first meeting was held in a cordial atmosphere.SWRD tried to downplay Tamil fears by saying that it would take many years for Sinhala to become the official language in practice.

[Sir John Kotelawela]

Bandaranaike himself had given evidence at the Theja Gunawardena case that he could not read or write Sinhala. ” I dont intend making Sinhala the language of administration till I learn it and I must confess that I am a slow learner” he chuckled. He also took a swipe at Sir John Kotelawela by referring to a politician ” who learnt French between bedclothes in Paris”.

The FP appreciated Bandaranaike’s position but insisted that provisionary arrangements on the status of Tamil will have to be made. SWRD concurred.

When the question of power sharing arose the FP presented its case for a Federal state.The FP pointed out that SWRD’s own viewpoint in the twenties that Federalism was the ideal solution had been a source of inspiration for the party in demanding federalism. SWRD replied by saying that though he espoused federalism then he had subsequently changed his mind.

Besides he had no mandate for introducing federalism.”Could not the FP think of an alternative solution short of federalism that would redress Tamil grievances and address aspirations”? he queried.

The FP understood the Prime Minister’s situation and agreed not to press for a federal solution.Both parties agreed to seek ways and means of power sharing within the prameters set out by the Choksy Commission report on de - centralisation and the draft bill on Regional Councils

The PM then suggested that the FP should come up with alternative proposals envisaging “massive de - centralisation” but not “federal autonomy”. The FP sgreed and departed.

The FP consulted former Law College Principal Brito Muthunayagam and Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson, the son -in - law of Chelvanayakam. Wilson then a university lecturer went on to become Political Science dean at Peradeniya and New Brunswick in Canada.

Northern Ireland example

Interestingly Muthunayagam felt 50 years ago that the status of Northern Ireland in Britain was the ideal model to follow.The Northern Ireland parliament was subordinate to the British Parliament but retained a lot of powers not amounting to federalism.

The FP was given a copy of the Northern Ireland Constitutional Act by the Law College principal. Wilson provided copies of several federal Countries.

Former Kopay MP C. Vanniyasingham and ex - Kayts MP V. Navaratnam set about drafting an alternative scheme.The FP leaders accomplished the task in three days and forwarded the draft through Navaratnarajah for SWRD’s perusal.The Ulster model influenced the draft greatly.

The north - east was to be a subordinate state with a unicameral legislature and cabinet.External affairs, Defence, Currency, Stamps,Customs,Inter-Regional transport, would remain with the central government.

Block grants would be made by Colombo while domestic taxation could also supplement revenue. Policing was a state responsibility.

The subordinate state would be represented in Colombo through elected MP’s. There would be a central cabinet minister for Tamil affairs.

The second round of talks was at SWRD’s Rosemead place residence. Chelvanayakam, Vanniyasingham, Naganathan and Navaratnam represented the FP.Bandaranaike pointed out that the proposals in essence amounted to federalism.

He suggested that the scheme be whittled down in point form to emphasise administrative de - centralisation.He also objected to words like “parliament” and “cabinet” saying they smacked of a separate state.

Regional Council concept

The FP then returned and revised the document by summarising proposals in point form. Since the regional Council concept was a brainchild of Bandaranaike the FP replaced “Parliament” with “Regional Council”. “Cabinet” was substituted by ” board of directors”. The substance of the original proposals was retained to a great extent.

Thereafter a series of discussions took place among Stanley de Zoysa, Navaratnarajah and FP leaders. The PM did not participate but proposed many changes through his representative de Zoysa.

The FP was persuaded to accept most of them though they diluted to some extent the original proposals. But on one point the FP remained firm.

The FP wanted the North - East to form one single regional council. SWRD was willing to allow the North to be one unit but he wanted the East to be separate with two or more units.

The man who was adamant on this issue was FP strategist V. Navaratnam dubbed as the “golden brain” of the FP.Finally AC Nadarajah persuaded Navaratnam to accept a compromise. The North and East were to be separate Councils with the provision to amalmagate if so desired.

Finally D - day dawned.

The conclusive meeting took place on July 25 th 1957 at the Prime Ministers office in the old Senate building.Several cabinet ministers were in attendance. Many FP leaders also participated.Navaratnarajah the “facilitator” was also there. It began at 7.00 pm.

The cabinet ministers were firm that the status of Sinhala as official language should not be eroded. After protracted discussion a compromise was suggested by William Silva that Tamil be recognized as the language of the national minorities.. Tamil was to be language of administration in the N- E.

On the unit issue the FP consented to the premier’s stance that the North be one council and the East be divided into two or more councils. The Councils could merge if desired even cutting across provincial boundaries. Existing boundaries could be re- demarcated if necessary.

When it came to powers of the council several minsters led by Philip Gunewardena refused to delegate their powers. The FP members retired to another room while cabinet ministers sorted out the issue. Subsequenty “line” ministers agreed to devolve their powers.

The PM was willing to stop colonisation and also agreed to land settlement procedures satisfactory to the FP.

On the question of citizenship Bandaranaike stated that he would resolve the issue through discussions with Plantation Tamil representatives. He suggested the FP should “leave it at that”. The FP complied.

It was well past midnight now and July 26th had dawned. At 2. 00 am on July 26th V. Navaratnam read out in point form the agreement reached. Both sides formally agreed.

Break through

At 2. 30 am the members of the fourth estate, waiting eagerly for a sensational breakthrough, were called in to the cabinet room.

Amid flashing cameras Bandaranaike apologised in his courteous manner “My friends, I am sorry to have kept all of you awake. But it is a historic night for you, for us and for the country”.

Ranji Handy was then a Lake House journalist. The irrepressible Ranji who became Mrs. Maithripala Senanayake in later life blurted out “tell us the result please”.

Then Stanley de Zoysa announced “We have reached an agreement”.

SWRD then turned to SJV and said” Chelva they want to hear from you” Chelvanayakam said an agreement had ben worked out and that the details will be given by the PM.

Bandaranaike then asked the press whether there was time to catch the printing deadline. Joe Segera shouted spiritedly that special arrangements had been made to print late and wanted the full details. SWRD then read out from V. Navaratnam’s notes.

The press persons asked FP leaders whether they were satisfied. Naganathan, Vanniyasingham, Rajavarothayam and Amirthalingam replied in the affirmative.

Chelvanayakam then stated that the FP would postpone its “direct action” campaign scheduled for Aug 20th.

The press rushed out and the morning papers came out later than usual with full text of the agreement. The evening papers came out earlier than usual with more details.

It may be hard to believe but the funny thing was that no pact had been signed by Bandaranaike or Chelvanayakam at that point. There was no B- C pact. It was like a gentleman’s agreement

Chelvanayakam and Navaratnam returned to the FP leader’s residence at Alfred House gardens. It was there that Navaratnam pointed out that there was nothing concrete in writing that an agreement had been entered into. There would only be media reports.

SJV then suggested that Navaratnam take some rest and handle the matter in the morning.Getting up early morning, Navaratnam drafted in triplicate, the terms and clauses of what is known as the Banda - Chelva pact now.

It was in two parts.Part A was a summary of discussions and agreements reached. Part B was about the structure, powers and composition of proposed Regional Councils.

‘Historic agreement’

Chelvanayakam then took the copies and went at noon on July 26th to the Prime Minister’s office. It was there that the old Thomians - solomon and Samuel - endorsed the historic agreement known as the Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam pact. It was done quietly away from the media glare.

Bandaranaike had one copy and Chelvanayakam the other. Navaratnam the “draftsman” kept the third copy.

[V.Navaratnam]

Years later Navaratnam told this writer in a conversation at his son Mohan’s house in Toronto, the sad tale of how that “historic document” copy was destroyed by EPRLF militants during the Indian Army period.

It was at his residence in Jaffna which the EPRLF had taken over then.

Navaratnam the driving force behind the B- C pact also told me that the FP was not happy with all aspects of the agreement but compromised in a spirit of pragmatism.

The veteran Tamil leader who split from the FP in 1968 and founded the Tamil Self - Rule party passed away some months ago in Montreal.

In retrospect the B - C pact seems to have been one signed by leaders who realised that the ethnic problem had to be resolved if the nation was to realise its full potential.

There was also a sense of urgency then to arrive at an understanding in order to contain the rising mood pf ethnic confrontation in the Country.

Sadly the pact was never implemented. There was much opposition to it. JR Jayewardena and the UNP on the one hand and the Sinhala - Buddhist hardliners on the other whipped up a sustained campaign.

Opposition campaign

The Tamil Congress on its part also opposed the pact for its own reasons.

The provocative act of sending new buses to the north with “sinhala”shree numer plates saw the FP resorting to a tar brush campaign again. This evoked counter measures in the South.

200 Budhist priests and 300 others squatted outside Bandaranaike’s house on April 9th 1958 demanding the pact be revoked.

Finally SWRD caved in and repudiated the pact unilaterally, tearing up a copy to symbolise it . He blamed the FP tar brush campaign for his action.

Both Bandaranaike and Chelvanayakam entered into the agreement to avoid an ethnic conflagration. Yet a month after the BC pact was aborted ethnic violence erupted on a large scale.

The ethnic crisis deteriorated into open war and the Country is bleeding fifty years later.

The B- C pact was a golden opportunity to resolve the problem at its early stages through a solution comprising elements of the federal idea. Yet it never worked or was allowed to work.

How and why the B - C pact ended in failure is a sad story that needs to be related on another occasion.

Related: Text of Bandaranaike - Chelvanayagam Pact, 1957

DBS Jeyaraj can be contacted on: djeyaraj@federalidea.com

Entry Filed under: Federalidea, by D.B.S. Jeyaraj