Fusion Necessary Between Legislative And Executive Mandates Of 2004 And 2005
By R.K.H.M. Fernando
In pursuit of a sustainable solution to the ethnic issue, the current electoral or popular mandate has been interpreted by various parties to suit their views on the issue. In case a consensus is reached at least among those wielding political power, the eventual solution will have to be one that can be upheld and defended as being within the mandate given by the electorate or the constituency, unless it is to be approved specifically through a referendum. The purpose of this article is to discuss the direct or constitutional mandate given by the people on the basis of the last held parliamentary and presidential elections.
Whereas the last parliamentary election held in April 2004 resulted in the incumbent President regaining a parliamentary majority (not a clear one but only a plurality later increased and consolidated into a majority), the presidential election of 2005 resulted in a clear majority in favour of the present President despite insinuations, albeit not without basis, that there was large scale disenfranchisement in certain urban areas and the boycott of the election in the North. It should be emphasised here that the former election was to elect a legislature to formulate the government policy which would eventually operate as the national policy during the particular regime, the latter was to elect an individual to execute that policy through the new Executive President unless the winning President was to dissolve Parliament and get a majority of his own. In the interpretation of the two verdicts one should not underestimate the representative opinion obtained from the national electorate through the active participation of all major and minor political parties in the 2004 campaign to capture legislative power and the polarisation of all stakeholders of the nation in to two camps promoting the candidacy one or the other aspirants for the investment of executive power in 2005.
Whereas the former verdict points, among others, to a mandate to find a political solution to the present crisis whether it is an ethnic or terrorist issue, the latter can at best be interpreted as an endorsement of ‘Mahinda Chintanaya” what ever it may mean with its contradictory interpretations as to its stand on issues such as the ceasefire agreement, continuation of Norway as facilitator, proposed solution to the present crisis being a consensual one with the LTTE or a government imposed one, after the latter is militarily crushed or weakened.
In discussing this twin mandates in the aforesaid manner, it is pertinent to consider the background in which the two elections were held and the issues involved and bandied in the hustings and the factors that can be considered to have influenced the popular verdict.
The General election of 2004 was held at a time when the legislature had a clear majority for the party in power. The regime was in its third year and the President had given an undertaking not to dissolve Parliament so long as the party in control enjoyed its majority. A ceasefire was in force though with violations gathering momentum. Sensing the looming dangers ahead on its political fortunes, the JVP convinced the President that there was a possibility of defeating the Wickremesinghe regime if the JVP and the SLFP Join together with a combined list and a common symbol.
Whilst certain sections of the. SLFP were exploring the possibility of achieving more cooperation between the President, and the Prime minister others fell in line with the JVP thinking. The argument that national security was in danger was purely for public consumption as the subsequent events proved. The prerogative of the Executive was used to topple a democratically elected regime. Caught unawares and taken by surprise at a time when it least expected a snap election while attending to the macro-economic fundamentals with a long term strategy for economic recovery, the ruling party was defeated and the Opposition placed in power with all the blessings of the Executive President.
In contrast to the subsequent ‘Mahinda Chintanaya’, the UPFA election manifesto of 2004 did not uphold a totally new approach towards the national crisis. National security alleged to be in grave danger was due to the faulty ceasefire agreement; the newly set up LTTE camps in the east were to be dismantled by the new regime. But the proposed solution of the SLFP as much as that of the incumbent President remained the same. Thus any mandate received on the basis of what the UPFA stood for in this election would be more or less in harmony with what the previous government of the UNP stood for.
Now let us move onto the 2005 Presidential election. The incumbent President who had completed her two terms was not in the scenario. The Mahinda Chintanaya, the hastily set up manifesto of the common candidate of the anti UNP or rather anti Ranil forces adopted a totally new approach to the major issues before the nation. The ceasefire was to be called off or at least amended. “The facilitator, Norway was to be sent home. There were other promises catering to the Marxist and religio – racial forces. Once elected on this ill-conceived and mob driven popular platform, the President would be logically expected by the JVP and the Hela Urumaya to execute this suicidal policy in preference to the well nurtured, tentatively developed and internationally supported policy of the sitting legislature underwritten by the two main parties of the political divide as much as by the former President.
It should be mentioned here that the 2005 Presidential election was held in a context where the international community, wary of finding an everlasting solution to the Sri Lankan national problem, was fast coming to the view that this issue cannot be solved internally by mutual consent without international intervention. All the chances of achieving a ‘win-win’ situation were disappearing and a solution imposed by the international community led by the co-chairs underwritten by India was seemingly inevitable. Unfortunately, this international perception was exploited by the winning candidate to a home made solution in preference to proffer a home made solution in preference to an empirically tested one proposed by the international community with the potential approval by all the minority parties.
The resulting imbroglio greeted the newly elected President who had to walk on a tight rope from day one. The inherited legislative majority built up by the former President as much as the possibility of achieving a solution to the national problem with international blessings was in jeopardy as the two parties that helped in the victory, the JVP and the Hela Urumaya insisted on the speedy implementation of ‘their contribution to the Chinthanaya’ i.e. economic nationalism and religio racial extremism. Alarmed at the possibility of losing the parliamentary majority, the President turned towards the UNP – already in a leadership crisis in the aftermath of two electoral defeats in two consecutive years.
The emerging situation led to some kind of horse trading between the President and the UNP much to the chagrin of the two co-partners of the former, particularly the JVP. Where as the President aimed at strengthening the government group throwing up some portfolios, the UNP leader preferred a combined government with a major stake for the newcomers. A group of Parliamentarians from the UNP who had revolted against the leadership desperately uncertain of the possible outcome were in a hurry to join the ministerial ranks and the emerging situation resulted in some of those who were ready to cross over being sworn in as cabinet ministers, non cabinet ministers or at least as deputy ministers.
The step taken by the rebel group was not only natural, but pragmatic in the present political environment. The consultations between the President and the UNP were ab initio with the ultimate objective of joining the government and enjoying the perks of the members of the executive and not to support it from outside as in the case of the JVP. It should be observed here that the long term aspirations of the UNP and the JVP were totally different, the former being a right-of-the-centre party and the latter an extremely leftist party which would come into power only if it could eclipse the left-of-the-centre SLFP.
The prospects of the government consolidating itself with the JVP had to be forestalled once and for ever and the perks in being a part of the executive were too attractive to resist. In short, whereas an Opposition parliamentarian had to be content with his meagre salary and a vehicle which though with duty free concession had to be maintained at his own expense with an inadequate fuel allocation, even a deputy minister would get several additional perks such as several vehicles, with fuel virtually unlimited, foreign travel on one pretext or the other, a rent allowance in cash, not to speak of other opportunities of earning money and in the present context an increasing cloak of immunity.
The dilemma faced by the President and the way he attempted to wriggle out of it resulted in a hilarious scenario with the largest cabinet in the world and almost the entire government group in the legislature forming the executive. This is, to say the least, an unethical way of combining the executive and legislative mandates.
The entire country as well as the international community awaits the eventual outcome of this saga. The fusion of the two mandates, however, is by all means the need of the hour.
Whether an executive mandate as expressed by the last verdict of the electorate is to be pursued or one in keeping with the last legislative mandate, the defendants of or rather the apologists for the mandate overlooked can be silenced only by a referendum. Hence a referendum on the solution selected will have to be held. This will be a sine qua non if the courts hold this to be a constitutional requirement.
Which mandate can be or should be pursued and whether the solution thus selected can be sustained will depend, among others factors, on the international community. The level of international involvement thus far, the need to satisfy the Tamil diaspora, and the Indian attitude influenced by the Tamil Nadu factor have made this purely local issue, an issue of international concern.
The writer is a former director – General, Public Finance, General Treasury.
Mr. HERATH said,
July 16, 2007 @ 1:12 am
Response:
The electorates like myself don?t see two mandates here, but one. It is anti-LTTE & anti-UNP as UNP correctly exposed as LTTE sponsor. There is no argument on the destiny of LTTE with the public Tamil cry against them. It is a matter of learning this reality by the international community and act without hidden agenda.
HERATH