Designing a pluralist peace process in Sri Lanka

April 18th, 2008

By Harim Peiris

Sri Lanka’s peace process faces two strategic challenges, firstly transforming the Sri Lankan state to accommodate the full diversity of its society and secondly transforming the LTTE from a military organization to a socio-political one.

Transforming the state

A permanent and durable solution to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and a just and democratic peace with full respect for human rights extending to the LTTE-controlled Wanni and the Tamil dominated North and East would require changes to the nature and functioning of the Sri Lankan state. The state would have to be more inclusive and structurally accommodating with stronger democratic institutions and practices. A more pluralist political order would necessarily entail some form of devolution or distribution of power, likely either expressly or implicitly in federal terms. It would also have to improve its capacity and track record on the protection and promotion of fundamental human rights, particularly in the areas of personal security, rights of the internally displaced, and political and religious opinion.

Transforming the LTTE

The LTTE have fought a bloody war with the Sri Lankan state and an internecine war with other Tamil militant groups since the early 1980s. In the process it has become a highly militarized and authoritarian organization. The Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) of February 2002 succeeded in stopping medium- and large-scale military clashes, but did not stop political violence in the forms of assassinations, other killings, forced conscription of children or similar attacks on individuals. The Tsunami of December 2004 provided the political space for the PTOMS between the GOSL and the LTTE and together with the CFA provided an opportunity and a foundation on which to build towards a durable peace and ethnic reconciliation. The resurgence of fighting since mid 2006 provides a fresh challenge of transforming the conflict from a violent military confrontation between the parties to a non violent political engagement. However, to achieve a positive peace we also need to deal with the challenge of transforming the LTTE from an authoritarian militant group that uses terror, to a political force that engages normally, democratically and politically, with the state and does not resort to violence to make its arguments heard. It must transform itself from a military force to a socio-political force, which renounces terrorism as a means to advance political goals. Whether it has the capacity and will to do so on its own volition is another issue.

Transforming the conflict from violence to non violence

Transforming a deep seated and protracted ethnic based civil conflict such as Sri Lanka’s conflict, towards a sustainable and durable peace is an arduous and long term process. It is a process that would require both the development of a strategic end goal, namely the transformation of the parties to the conflict, the Sri Lankan State and the LTTE as well as and more challengingly the envisioning and maintaining a road map to reach the strategic objective. The road map would require constant and skilful navigation through the multiple political dynamics of both the Sri Lankan Southern polity and the Tamil nationalists. It would also require a sufficient consensus of the members of the international community that carry weight in Sri Lanka, namely the Co-chairs and India.

The current political scenario in Sri Lanka has retarded the peace process considerably from its earlier gains of the CFA and the PTOMS. However, options for peace must be strengthened to move once again from a purely military approach to a more political approach. Civil conflicts typically move cyclically and the current phase of heightened conflict will be replaced with a more political approach that seeks to address the underlying political causes of the conflict.

Opportunities to strengthen peace options should be created when political openings present themselves, the initiatives of parties and policies that are pro peace should be strengthened and efforts to undo the past gains of the peace process should be challenged, minimized and mitigated.

There are four strategic long term areas of the peace process, irrespective of medium term fluctuations in violent military confrontations.

a. Reducing violent hostilities through a cessation of hostilities to aid a return to political talks.

b. Strengthening human rights and addressing the humanitarian issues of the conflict affected civilians, especially the internally displaced persons (IDP)s.

c. Rebuilding the war-torn / tsunami-affected areas of the North and East: implementing the inclusive and shared humanitarian and reconstruction concept of PTOMS and reworking important elements of the concept in a way that will both expedite reconstruction and including the Muslim community in the process.

d. Working out an inclusive political solution by building on existing proposals for devolving power in a state structure with federal characteristics with suitable transitional arrangements.

These four areas of the peace process are individually important and together may be mutually reinforcing and propelling. However, the ways in which the four areas of the peace process complement or possibly contradict each other need to be carefully analyzed and honestly discussed and addressed by the different political actors and the relevant stakeholders. Progress on the same would contribute to deescalating the conflict and contributing towards a pluralistic process for peace in Sri Lanka. [dailymirror.lk]

(The writer was an advisor to President Kumaratunga and served as Presidential Spokesman from 2001 to 2005)

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