2008: Year of Pyrrhic victory or Political maturity
by Rajan Philips
In terms of numbers and resources, the phrase, Pyrrhic victory-meaning a short-lived victory that is undone by its costs and casualties-applies more to the LTTE than the Government of Sri Lanka. In that sense, it is the LTTE that is now paying the price for the Pyrrhic battle glories that it achieved in the past. But a comprehensive military victory for the government that is being declared as the goal for 2008 may well prove to be Pyrrhic in terms of the total political, economic and social costs, for the island as a whole and for a long time.
The origin of the phrase goes back to the third century before Christ, when King Pyrrhus, the last of the Grecian King in the tradition of Alexander the Great, won two costly wars against the Romans but could not prevent them from eventually overwhelming the peoples and principalities of Greece, Italy and Carthage. Western civilization moved on from its Hellenic roots to Roman hegemony. So does history brainwash us to believe in the grandeurs of war.
Historians are mostly to blame for the common tendency to portray wars in grand terms involving states and civilizations and ignore the real traumas and tragedies of people who suffer and perish in them. The most susceptible to this tendency are invariably the most powerful and the influential-the elites, who also suffer the least from the effects of war, and some of them hugely profit from it. The victims and sufferers of war, whether as soldiers or collaterals, are always the poorest and the weakest sections of society.
In the history of ideas eschewing violence and advocating non-violence as an alternative means of politics to waging war, South Asia boasts a great tradition from Gautama the Buddha and Emperor Asoka of old, to 20th century Mahatma Gandhi. Sri Lanka is very much part of this tradition with its own messianic beliefs. It is the manifestation of this tradition in modern times that the Political Scientist from Wales has called the “saintly language” of politics.
More often than not, the saintly language of politics has been ignored in twentieth century South Asia, which has been the theatre of some of the worst form of political violence and wars in the world. Mahatma Gandhi himself became the first political leader to be assassinated after independence, leading off a long line of victims from every South Asian country. Benazir Bhutto was the latest politician to join that tragic list.
Military Exuberance
As I wrote earlier in these columns, the LTTE is totally illiterate in this language, but the question is whether the State of Sri Lanka should pretend equal illiteracy or demonstrate at least a “reasonable use” of this language. No one is asking the State to preach non-violence to the LTTE, not to defend itself against LTTE attacks, or not to take pre-emptive strikes the LTTE. But is it the right approach for the State to mirror-image the LTTE and allow itself to be consumed by militarism to the exclusion of its political responsibilities? The New Year (2008) will mark 60 years of Sri Lanka’s independent existence as a modern state, and after sixty years should not the State act with political maturity rather than act out of military exuberance.
The highly infectious military exuberance manifests itself in different ways among different people. For some, who have never carried a catapult, let alone a gun, military exuberance could be a form of voyeurism for violence. Others, like Bush and Blair, invoke the almighty in support of their exuberance.
President Rajapakse has publicly dismissed the idea of a political solution prior to or independent of a military victory, and asserted that only a victory in war will lead to a political solution and force the LTTE to accept it. He has once again avoided giving us the benefit of what he thinks that ‘political solution’ could be.
Two different answers to that question were provided last week by two different sources, both reflecting the conflicting pressures under which President Rajapakse willingly labours. According to one, defeating the LTTE and destroying its leadership and military assets is a ‘must do’ for Sri Lanka in 2008. A cut-down-to-size and democratically converted LTTE could then join the political process, but within the framework of a reactivated post-demerger Thirteenth Amendment. The second answer rejects that there is even a Tamil problem in Sri Lanka except the terrorist problem of the LTTE, and that the first order of business is to eliminate the LTTE and then there is no harm in devolving power administratively at the Provincial level within the unitary constitution for the sake of economic development.
The debate over a political solution will turn out to be no more than an academic exercise in the aftermath of a comprehensive military victory for the government. What will be the compulsion for President Rajapakse after crowning himself with such a victory to implement any version of the Thirteenth Amendment? What will prevent him from going back to his earlier offer and lower the unit of devolution from the provincial to the district level? Why not just stipulate ‘zero’ devolution and ignore all the other changes in regard to language rights provided by the Thirteenth Amendment in theory but left unimplemented in practice?
Lest I be accused of being rather ungenerous to the President, the good reader should note that some of us-Burghers, Muslims, Tamils and Sinhalese, females as well as males-have been asking of the President for some time to tell us what he would consider to be a fair and just political solution, and what, in his opinion, is achievable now and what could come later. In the APRC that he himself created, he has a ready made forum to externalize his views. It is the President’s deafening silence that leads us to speculate seemingly ungenerously.
It would be disingenuous to argue in the same breath that the LTTE is not the sole representative of the Tamils and that no political solution can be proposed until the LTTE comes to the table. If nothing else, the memories of Neelan Tiruchelvam, Lakshman Kadirgamar and Kethish Loganathan deserve a more forthright response from the President than the stonewalling that we have seen so far. Glorifying Kadirgamar’s foreign policy initiatives and jettisoning the political solution that the man obviously stood for is an inexcusable insult to his memory.
Majority Argument
The President was not at all, as we recall, hedging or taciturn in declaring his commitment to uphold the unitary constitution because he owed it to those who voted for him to do so. The same logic appears to underlie the current military exuberance-84% of Sri Lanka’s 75% homogeneous majority supports the President’s war effort and therefore it would be undemocratic to question the northern march of the government’s forces. If this polling logic is going to be the basis for decisions about war, then why bother to prattle about language rights and made-in-Sri Lanka devolution.
Qadri Ismail, in his recent path-breaking book on Sri Lankan politics, vigorously questions the role of numbers in democratic political decisions and the unequal consequences for those who are in a majority and those who are not. I have disagreed elsewhere with his argument that this anomaly is inherent to the principles of representative democracy, but there is no question that these principles have been repeatedly violated in Sri Lanka for forty of our sixty years of independence. The Thirteenth Amendment, in 1988, represented a partial attempt at reversing some of these violations. The Kumaratunga presidency coincided with the introduction to our own political discussions some aspects of the current thinking on the functioning of democracy, particularly in regard to giving political saliency in the structures of the State to those who are marginalized or fewer in numbers. With the 84%/75% assertion, in support of the war effort, we are back to where we started sixty, if not seventy seven years ago. Hector Abhyavardhana used to call this approach the Prussian version of democracy and national consolidation.
The homogenous-majority assertion specifically targets the Western countries, reminding them that Sri Lanka is no synthetic Yugoslavia but a state formation of some antiquity and continuity (whatever they might mean), and reminding the government that it should not yield to Western pressures and slow down the war effort. Ironically, the West is the favourite scapegoat not only for the cheerleaders of the war effort but also for the leadership of the LTTE, which too has been whining for sometime about the West’s indifference to the government’s aerial attacks in the North and East. The LTTE’s protests would have carried some credibility if it had earlier paid even a token attention to the repeated admonitions from international organizations about the LTTE’s record on human rights. The advocates of the government’s war effort are now insisting that the government show the same indifference to human rights complaints by outside agencies as the LTTE has been doing all along.
Pitfalls of victory
The main practical problem with a politically uninformed military victory is about what comes after the victory. The aftermath of the defeat of the JVP has no relevance to the LTTE and the Tamil situation. The JVP arose as an aberration and for all the destructions it caused it did not make any major dents on the structures and institutions of the State and the Sinhalese society. The defeat of the JVP and the readjustments thereafter were therefore manageable and normalcy was restored rather quickly.
The LTTE and the government’s ‘wars’ against it, on the other hand, have destroyed much of the institutions of the State especially in the North and devoured the Tamil social structures beyond recognition and repair. Tamil people have evacuated en masse, and the physical habitats of the remainder have been ravaged by war and displaced, for the most part, by military and LTTE garrisons. In the face of overwhelming government offensive and without a negotiated settlement, the LTTE forces are more than likely to melt away into the surrounding communities carrying whatever weapons they can with them. The LTTE may be destroyed as a formal fighting force, but only to be replaced by dispersed pockets of resistance, anarchy or lawlessness.
The glaring but still unaddressed absence of Tamils and Muslims in sufficient numbers in the armed forces will finally catch up after a military victory, when the government embarks on restoring law and order and normal life in the North and East. The Eastern Province is already proving a handful, and if the North also has to be managed post-victory, the government’s resources will be spread miles wide and inch deep. Quite apart from the expenses involved, there will be little progress to show on the ground.
The situation may not be as bad as in Iraq or what was in East Timor, but will point in the same direction. It is unlikely to be as contained and as positively evolving as in Northern Ireland now or in Punjab earlier. The experience over the last two decades has shown that deteriorating situations in the North and East cannot be confined to those areas, but that it will be only a matter of time before they spill over into Colombo and the rest of the country.
The alternative path of offering a just and fair political solution and combining it with military firmness will be the more difficult path for the government to take than that of pursuing a military victory. But that will be the path of a State that has attained maturity after sixty years and of a leadership that is genuinely sincere and not cunning in regard to offering and implementing a political solution. There is no denying that the government can move only so much and for it to be effective the LTTE too should reciprocate. It is here that the government, demonstrating political flexibility and military firmness in equal measures, could turn to the international community to bring relentless pressure on the LTTE and force the organization to slowly embark on the path that the IRA in Northern Ireland and the Sikhs in Punjab took in their respective situations.
Such a course of action, combining political flexibility and military firmness, is not beyond the realm of possibility even for the Rajapakse regime. Should President Rajapakse take this course, he is sure to get the support of more than 85% out of all Sri Lankans, not just 75% of them. All of this could happen in 2008, but won’t.
Narendra said,
December 30, 2007 @ 2:53 pm
As Sri Lankans we should all unite behind the president and help him destroy the LTTE once and for all in 2008. That will ensure peace and prosperity for everyone Sinhalese, Tamil or Muslim.
jay said,
December 31, 2007 @ 9:27 am
To me the sun is shining brightly,because never ever , a mass of 85% agreed on one matter, in sri lankan history
For me being a sinhala buddhist hailing from a down south village had the opportunity to gain higher studies through my native sinhala language. I am being so selfish, unfortunately should admire the language transition from english to sinhala which helped me immensly. On that selfish note i thank who ever paved the way for millions of sinhala buddhists from the villages to gain higher studies and enter “elite” jobs.
Otherwise i would have to convert myself to christianity to learn english and then be eligible for higher studies.
70% sinhala buddhists specially from villages had this genuine threat, during and after british rule.
The very same problem existed among village thamil hindus. Unfortunately because of the majority (70%),sinhala buddhist grievences were fulfilled as a matter of urgency. It would have been too late when thamil hindu grievences were accommodated. May be due to shortedsightedness of sinhala politicians, minority population , geography, fear among sinhalease due to equal share demands by thamils, and many more..
However in the past three decades moderate sinhalease never were a force behind the seperate issue.
We had a cruel sensation, hidden satisfaction when LTTE killed sinhala politicians, specialy if the politicians were unpolular. We were justifying passanger train bombings in the south assuming that army might have killed innocent thamil civilians in the north, or surrendering ourselves for the barberic thuggery on black july carried out by political killers.
However we were awakened by the continued LTTE butchery towards innocenet boarder villages, killings of the elderly at religious places while observing rituals, massacre of a bus load of buddhist monks, bombing the innocent passengers on bus stands, threatening to kill school children, to name a few.
We were awakened when our thamil friends boast about this butchery of their “boys”. When they share and watch videos of the victories of their “boys”. When they hung sun god in their shrine rooms. When they spread false allegations on ethnic cleansing. When they baptise thamil girls to human bombs & Village boys to cannon fod.
We never boast about black July. We never felt happy when innocenet civilians were killed. We never ever endose sri lankan army to kill innocent civilians.
85% is a killer force to win anything. This force would see that LTTE is eliminated. This very same force would see innocent poor village thamils as well as sinhalease & mulims are saved from the politicians who are no longer fit to the 21st century. The very same force will eliminate politicians who are short sighted and ill prepared for the new era.
Anonymous said,
January 1, 2008 @ 1:53 am
It is the high time for all the moderate forces of Sinhala, Tamil & Muslim communities to get together and bridge the gap between these communities and defeat the vocal forces of extremism & non-tolerance.
May the year 2008 be victorious for the whole Sri Lankan nation!
Athos said,
January 2, 2008 @ 11:08 pm
/*
The debate over a political solution will turn out to be no more than an academic exercise in the aftermath of a comprehensive military victory for the government. What will be the compulsion for President Rajapakse after crowning himself with such a victory to implement any version of the Thirteenth Amendment?
*/
It’s a catch-22 situation isn’t it Machang? Without LTTE there will be no compulsion to yield major power devolution. On the other hand, no power devolution is possible with LTTE. The approach adopted thus far by Jaffna Tamil “moderates” have been to use international actors to force the govt to devolve power whilst LTTE remain a major force. Hasn’t it proven to be an utter failure due to LTTE intransigence? Have you considered switching force you are exerting on the govt back to LTTE? Isn’t it curious there is no Jaffna Tamils parading in streets of London and Brussels demanding LTTE negotiate to end the problem? Perhaps there is still some niggling hope a separate state is still possible. Protesting against LTTE to negotiate would not help if this were the case. As you can see, the military solution preceding political solutions is unavoidable. The military solution is needed to destroy whatever hope you have Eelam is possible or until LTTE realise it cannot win. The order, which comes first, is not important.
Kng said,
January 3, 2008 @ 4:45 pm
I wonder if any of you are of the opinion that Hillary Clinton, as well as the many U.S. attorneys, like Bruce Fein, will use the GoSL’s unilateral withdrawal from the CFA as fodder for the proposed breakup of Sri Lanka starting in 2009 once Hillary is elected.
What chance does the GoSL foreign ministry have of combatting Clinton and Congressmen Pallone, both of who are already deep in the pockets of the Tigers. GoSL Foreign Ministry seems to have no capacity to do its job of convincing US media (like PBS and NPR which have GoSL bashing interviews with HRWatch and the like, with no opposing view point whatsoever.
The GoSL FM refuses to look at the blindspots it is facing, namely the Clinton-US attorney angle (I am referring to Bruce Fein and the other high powered US lawyers who are preparing lawsuits against GoSL for war crimes). How will GoSL even pay for the legal expenses starting in 2009?
It is foolish to ignore this blindspot. Does GoSL think it can ignore the West at the Security Council? What did Russia and China do for Serbia? And the Russians are related to Serbia and still failed to deliver protection.
Finally, when Clinton removes the ban on the LTTE in 2009, and the LTTE is using advanced U.S. Military equipment and trainers (not Pakistani discards like GoSL), how do you think this will turn out, especially when GoSL has no diplomatic media reach, and no legal preparation for what is coming in the Clinton US.
dias said,
January 3, 2008 @ 7:18 pm
Author’s narration is an excellent assessment of the present situation and possible future potentialities for the nation.
Few seem to comprehend the inextricable link between a political solution and progress in the military front. Most Sinhalese seem to view the LTTE as the core problem and thus the 84% support for the linear process, first, destroy the LTTE and only thereafter, once this task is complete, formulate a solution. Though well intentional, what they appear to overlook is, when one of the extremes (the LTTE) to the conflict is weakened, the other extreme, Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism is bound to re-emerge and strengthen thereby making it politically impossible for the Rajapaksa government to table a fair political solution. As has been the case throughout the last 60 years, a newly empowered extremist Sinhalese-Buddhist segment will only fuel the fires of chauvinism once again strengthening their extremist causes thereby disabling the government to formulate a fair proposition to the great dismay of our Tamil and Muslim brethren. This would set the stage for another 60 years of expanded misery and another breed of cats in the future.
An illustration of similar political abandoning is the shunning of federalism by the UNP recently. In the wake of impressive military victories by the Rajapaksa administration, upon realizing that they could no longer politically survive by adhering to a political construct based on federalism, the UNP conveniently abandoned the once much touted notion. [And of course in doing so the UNP has demonstrated to the entire world their duplicity and the total absence of integrity among their leaders - despite the world class credentials of some of them.]
President Rajapaksa must not fall into the same trap – and must recognize that tabling a political solution construct (note: not implementing) is essential prior to any complete annihilation of the LTTE. The President must recognize that the LTTE is an imperative counter to balance the destructive, but powerful effects of extreme Sinhalese-Buddhist forces and accordingly manipulate the LTTE-factor to evolve a political formula while destroying the terror outfit.
Having decided to take-upon the LTTE with all its might, the opportunity is perfect for the Rajapaksa administration to simultaneously embark upon the solution discovery process with equal vigor. May be the results of both campaigns, military and solutions discovery, would converge and the nation finally achieve at peace. To believe that a military victory alone will solve the national challenge, or that a solution would be possible upon taming the Tiger – at best, both these notions are very naïve.
A Sinhalese-Buddhist US expatriate.
Rani said,
January 4, 2008 @ 2:57 pm
I hide my name, I report under names with English last name and non ethnic first name, I have no guts because I am from a land where monsters rule and the murders are committed on name of democracy
Athos said,
January 4, 2008 @ 11:24 pm
/*
Though well intentional, what they appear to overlook is, when one of the extremes (the LTTE) to the conflict is weakened, the other extreme, Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism is bound to re-emerge and strengthen thereby making it politically impossible for the Rajapaksa government to table a fair political solution.
*/
Oh, c’mon Dias, why do you think Sinhalese always ‘overlook’ things? It looks as if typical underestimation is at play here. The Sinhala nationalism was never responsible for unleashing of organised terror for decades, ethnic cleansing or land hogging. The language issue was probably the most extreme it has reached. But then again, this is a country with a population of 75% Sinhala speakers. Many will not see it as unreasonable to make majority language the common means of communication with a clause for reasonable use of Tamil considering this fact. After all, if 75% were English speakers, Tamils would not have opposed majority language – isn’t that so? Preferring a language for reasons other than administrative convenience is not a grievance.
Anyway back to your original point. Say we gave the benefit of the doubt to Tamil extremists. What is the worse case scenario from our (Sinhalese) perspective? The death and suffering will continue and large parts of land resource that we have a right to live and benefit from will remain inaccessible. On the other hand, what if we bet on our own extremists to give a fair go for the minorities? No one will die as a direct consequence. The power devolution on the other hand will be weakened if not totally rejected. How is power devolution for NE going to solve the problems for majority of Muslims, Tamils of Indian origin as well as local Tamils who have established themselves many areas in the south anyway? The minorities will have rights on par with the majority with few exceptions where common sense must prevail just as in other countries such as UK and US. As you can see betting on the Sinhalese extremists give better outcomes for everyone including the innocent Tamils and Muslims.
dias said,
January 14, 2008 @ 2:16 pm
/*
As you can see betting on the Sinhalese extremists give better outcomes for everyone including the innocent Tamils and Muslims.
*/
Oh, c’mon Athos, you know well that it was Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism that was the cause for the emergence of the LTTE – and the subsequent unleashing of terror. As for the language issue, like Sinhalese often overlook and never plan (”plan” is a 4-ltr word in our Sinhala vocabulary), it was not so much the unfairness of the cocept of a national language the one spoken by the large majority 75% – but the demeaning manner in which it was implemented – with the brash announcement of “Sinhalese in 24 hours” by SWRD to the total insensitivity and insult of the minorities. How do you expect the minorities to feel? Are they not human? Do they not have feelings? Should they not have self-respect and dignity?
Why is it that we Sinhalese are unable to acknowledge our past errors (irrespective whether they were intentional / or not) and simply apologize? Why is it that we always try to cover these up with one excuse after another? Is it that despite our Buddhist upbringing we are spiritually bankrupt and unable to bring ourselves to apologize – a seeming quality of most Sinhalese leaders.
As for your assertion of giving the benefit of the doubt to Tamil extremists – this is decidedly not what is suggested. But neither, as you suggest, giving the benefit of the doubt to Sinhalese nationalist extremists. Your assertion that ‘innocent’ minorities will roughly have their rights if we bet on the Sinhalese extremists is clear indication that the Sinhalas are dead scared of their survival unless they feel ultimate political control is in their Sinhalese hands. Read the Minority Experts Report – probably all 4 experts were overdosed on phobia pills.
No – the answer is not with the extremist fascist LTTE nor with the equally brown-necked Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalists. The answer lies in the center among the moderate Sri Lankans – the common sensed good folks among Muslims, Tamils, and Sinhalese – an answer that no Sri Lankan leader (irrespective of ethnicity or religion) has been able to harness to date. Tamils intellectuals must share in this national failure.
My friend, we Sinhalese don’t have to be so phobic about our minority brothers. A disparity in education – that had existed during our parents generation has now been corrected, we no longer have to feel that we Sinhalese are any less to anyone else in the world. It would be to all our advantage to get over the phobia over our Tamil friends, create an inclusive national identity, join hands to create a strong Sri Lanka team, compete and win in international markets. Our nation could never achieve prosperity – unless we create an even dance floor for everyone to dance, the dance of freedom. Nationalists such as your self seems to think you can shove it down Tamil throats a Sinhalese solution – no majority community of any nation has been able to do so – not even the mighty powerful White establishment of America. The Whites tried for nearly 180 years (1776 to 1965) to shove down Black throats White solutions of various blends – it never worked. After much blood and much grief the Whites finally came to their senses. Today we have a Black presidential candidate. Though terribly slow, America has learned and changed.
So must Sri Lanka. If any help – think ‘team’, think ‘cricket’, think Murali, and think Sanath!