federalidea.com

by H. L. de Silva

The choice of the appropriate territorial unit in the State, to which a greater measure of autonomy through the assignment of powers is sought to be granted in respect of matters of government, has to be considered in relation to the specific political context prevalent at any given time in Sri Lanka. Its success or failure would be greatly conditioned by such factors operating nationally, as well as internationally. Many significant changes have taken place in the twenty years since 1987 when the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was introduced. It has to be decided in the best interests of the whole Country and not with a view to placating or appeasing any sectional interest that threatens the territorial integrity of the State and which has assiduously sought to do this for nearly three decades in devious ways.

Broadly speaking, the undermentioned factors have varying degrees of importance and relevance which need to be taken into account, and borne in mind in considering the general objectives to be achieved. While certain specific problems need urgent attention and are of particular salience, yet they too cannot be dealt with except in relation to the general welfare and the just needs of all citizens of this country, which cannot be sacrificed to satisfy partisan political interests that have been the bane of our Country and have impeded its progress since Independence.

Among the cardinal considerations and values relevant to our decisions (without attempting an exhaustive enumeration) are the following:

(a) The general acceptance of the principle of equality of treatment of all People living in this Country, notwithstanding perceived differences among them as to their physiognomic features, economic and social status, cultural attributes, religious beliefs, and identity consciousness. While not ignoring such differences which are part of the human condition yet living as we do in one Country notwithstanding heterogeneous elements, being common heirs to a shared history, all Sri Lankans consider themselves to be one People transcending these differences.

(b) While recognising that some groups have a special attachment and affection for particular regions in the Country, there is a general acknowledgement among all its inhabitants that they have a common right to live in any and every part of the Country that they may choose as part of their common inheritance and common homeland. The Constitution guarantees to every citizen the freedom of movement and of choosing his residence within Sri Lanka by Article 14 (1) (h) and negatives any exclusivist claims to the enjoyment of rights in any region or spatial division of the Island. Accordingly, any arrangement that would result either immediately or in the foreseeable future, in the dismemberment or separation or partition of the Country that leads, directly or indirectly to the loss of its territorial integrity is unacceptable and must be rejected. This is a fundamental postulate from which there can be no derogation

(c) The underlying assumption or the essential presupposition upon which powers of government are to be conferred must be that they are all to be exercised in accordance with our common understanding and acceptance of the principles of democratic government, that is, through the process of discussion, deliberation without coercion or violence, under procedures which guarantee opportunities for full and effective participation for all, in the business of governance and a guarantee of political pluralism. Along with the conferment of governmental powers any authority so granted must be conditional on the full protection of basic human rights and freedoms and made enforceable under a Constitution and a legal order that ensures that the Rule of Law which is to be maintained at all times in all parts of the Country. It must be made clear beyond doubt to all who assume authority and wield power that the resort to authoritarianism the repression of these fundamental rights and freedoms and subversion of the Rule of Law would entail an automatic nullification of the constitutional arrangements that provide for power sharing. No political group can be allowed to claim for itself the right to be the sole representative of any ethnic group for that would strike at the very root of democracy.

(d) While adhering to the principles of constitutionalism which envisage that state power should be exercised within the framework of the Constitution and the law subject to the restraints, prohibitions and doctrines which regulate the powers, duties and functions of government agencies with due regard to the rights of the individual and considerations of legitimacy, the paramount need is the recognition of the sovereign authority of all the People that remains inalienable. Sovereignty is here to be understood to mean not the capacity to wield absolute or unconditional exercise of power or authority, but as the final and ultimate authority duly exercised by the appropriate organs to which it is delegated in trust on behalf of the whole Nation.

(e) An honest and serious awareness of the various changes brought about in the political arena during the last three decades that have transformed the political perspectives of the people among the different segmented divisions in the Country. In seeking to introduce system innovations that may have worked satisfactorily in other parts of the world, due regard must be paid to the altered political milieu the social environment and the sensitivities that exist consequent on the traumatic experiences of people at many levels in the recent past. This would suggest caution and care in making changes in sensitive areas and the avoidance of a cavalier and an overly adventurous approach that makes light of difficulties that may be encountered.

(f) In considering the appropriateness of the unit to which powers are sought to be assigned or devolved it has also to be borne in mind that the success or failure in the actual operation of governmental power as regards efficiency is to a large extent dependent on the administrative structures that are adopted in the actual implementation and execution of powers and functions exercised, arising from the determinations made by the policy-making body at the appropriate level of the territorial unit vested with such power. If there be existing administrative machinery that is found to be working efficiently and successfully endowed with personal experience in handling such powers and functions at the peripheral level then it would be unwise to forgo such advantages.

(g) President Mahinda Rajapakse when he indicated in his election manifesto and his address to the All – Party Conference that those engaged in formulating constitutional proposals should seek to come up with a “home grown solution” among other things, envisaged proposals that would meet the overall needs of the whole Country and commended itself to the widest possible spectrum of Sri Lankan opinion, while not ignoring the consequences of experimental changes elsewhere in the world. It would be a mistake therefore to be hide bound by previous failed attempts that were overly ambitious or blindly adopt a model designed for a sub-continent with a billion people with different historical experiences and enormous problems of its own, if more appropriate and suitable alternatives are available. Nor should less familiar ventures be rejected merely because they may appear to be innovations or deviate from traditional models which have come down with their own baggage of problems from the past two centuries, if such a new venture meets with our own particular need.

(h) It is also necessary that our approach be flexible and not be hamstrung by the shackles of a juristic classification or nomenclature, over which there is no agreement but endless debate, which would inhibit creative innovation. In order to keep abreast with contemporary changes it is necessary that we allow for a considerable amount of fluidity and hybridity since legal concepts such as unitary and federal are increasingly becoming otiose or obsolescent in constitutional jurisprudence and are being overtaken by dynamic advances which seek to meet the new challenges and the avoidance of these two controversial terms would be a distinct advantage.

These are some of the general considerations on which we could find a measure of general agreement

Before a consideration of the main question, it would seem necessary and appropriate to pause awhile to consider the precise nature of what has been compendiously termed “the ethnic problem / conflict”. It is a generic term for the various problems, conflicts and causes for dissatisfaction, the pervasive sense of grievance and discontent arising from deprivation, denial, unfair discrimination or unequal treatment that exist allegedly on ethnic grounds, as perceived by those affected. Even without seeking to identify them or determining the range and extent of their incidence and location, credible evidence of their existence, or seeking to ascertain whether many of them are problems that transcend ethnic boundaries and frequently exist across the board and are common to other ethnic groups as well – to consider remedial measures or propose changes in the constitutional structure or particular Acts of legislation or changes in the administrative structure would appear to be singularly mistaken and misconceived.

To commence a consideration of the remedial or reform measures without a proper understanding or diagnosis of the causes of these pathological phenomena in the body politic that are found to exist, would be singularly unwise, even though there be some who assert vehemently that there are “genuine or admitted grievances’ without even attempting an itemization, enumeration or specification of such ‘grievances”. It is not clear whether this reluctance is in order to avoid any danger of trivializing them or reducing their seriousness when the case for remedy or reform has been pitched at a higher or more elevated level, with a view to satisfying “the aspirations” of the group for self-determination either at the level of internal self rule or in relation to the creation and existence of a separate state. More often than not, it is a convenient expression used by politicians with a superficial knowledge of the problems, who are incapable of engaging in rigorous analysis. This is not to deny the existence of perceived grievances which merit attention and remedial action. But it is unwise to make decisions on the basis of unproved hypotheses and popular slogans adopted by politicians to mobilize support

On the other hand, despite all the political rhetoric, it is quite possible and reasonable to find that the vast majority of Sri Lankan Tamils do not share the political vision of their leadership and the professional politicians who claim to act on their behalf, but are content to adopt a more pragmatic approach and a willingness to negotiate on specific problems and use their not inconsiderable influence in resolving problems which are of immediate concern or direct interest to them and thus adopt a common sense approach in their daily life. More often than not, they focus on particular grievances in relation to the hardship caused by the use of the official language in the transaction of business, inequitable and unjust treatment in the availability of employment opportunities along with the rest of the population, the non-availability of educational facilities at every level, lack of adequate economic development in areas where they are a significant presence, apprehensions of marginalisation by reason of changes in demography by the influx of other ethnic groups to their areas of dominant habitation, greater recognition of their rights as a cultural group and as one of the core elements in the composition of the Sri Lankan Nation The rubric of rights which are encompassed under these various heads are often claimed as rights of internal self-determination. Bit it is far from clear whether the kind of structural changes in the exercise of governmental powers for which Tamil politicians crave will provide solutions to the needs of the affected citizenry in other areas of the Country where they do not enjoy a dominant presence.

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In considering solutions to problems of this sort, structural constitutional changes in power sharing alone are unlikely to yield results that are either perceptible or immediately visible and are unlikely to be sufficiently satisfying to a discontented minority group who have memories of wielding more influence and enjoy greater benefits and privileges in colonial times. Hence even in considering the provision of opportunities for direct participation and involvement in the decision making process, the question of effective access and opportunity for a wider class of the citizenry rather than an elite group must be kept in mind when deciding on the territorial unit which affords the venue for the citizen’s participation and the fulfilment of his aspirations. Accordingly an emphasis on this aspect of the problem in necessary when we decide on the size of the unit and the various fora available for the expression of their views and the opportunities and access available to the ordinary citizen to influence and make his presence felt on those who regulate the levers of power in addressing their problems. It is very unlikely that the administration of affairs at the provincial level will make a tangible difference to the resolution of such problems or satisfying the psychological needs of making their presence felt in local affairs. But unfortunately the professional politicians who hanker after prestigious positions and trappings of office are not likely to be attracted by what is beneficial to the people.

It is a fact that the trajectory of political agitation of the group known as Sri Lankan Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces is, at the present time, by the adoption of violence decisively determined by an armed group, namely – the LTTE (which unilaterally claims to be their sole representatives) and the Tamil diaspora in the safety of their foreign sojourns who voluntarily or otherwise provide the financial sustenance for the rebellion. This group seeks to project itself as being engaged in a liberation struggle from majority “oppression”, which it is claimed can only be remedied by the establishment of a separate state – Tamil Eelam. At an earlier stage when democratically elected political parties formed the vanguard of a political agitation of the Sri Lankan Tamils, it was under a formula of “power sharing”, whether through devolution of powers or under a federal framework, that the political leadership sought power sharing at the Centre and at the periphery, up to the time of the Vaddukoddai Resolution of 1976. The alternative route of realising Tamil aspirations through the euphemism of “direct action” was rather vaguely presented to the Tamil people in coded language which concealed the alternative of violence that it entailed. It is very doubtful whether the ageing leadership ever contemplated being in the vanguard of such an armed struggle despite platform rhetoric and their abdication from political power was inevitable. Realising the inability of the old leadership to undertake this task the impatient youth took control and the rest is history. With the virtual extinction of the Tamil intellectual elite through political assassination, forced exile and the enforced silence of those left behind, the prospect of negotiating a settlement seems only a remote possibility. The foreign intermeddlers know this all too well. As long as the LTTE makes the effective decisions because the complete surrender of arms as was provided in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987, would be unacceptable to them there is likely to be no dramatic changes. Likewise the government of Sri Lanka under President Rajapakse is unlikely to agree to their retention of arms as any constitutional settlement will be in jeopardy as happened in the case of the Ceasefire Agreement of 2001 and the intervening gulf seems unbridgeable.

Even after the 1976 declaration right up to about the end of about 1986, the TULF was prepared to consider power sharing arrangements as a viable alternative and their elected representatives negotiated on that basis, until they were effectively marginalized through threats and intimidation. The political leadership of the Tamils was forcibly taken over by the LTTE a one party dictatorship that systematically eliminated their political rivals and activists of other political groups or made others, who were more pliant, subservient to their will as in the case of the TNA, – a group that claims to be the elected representatives of the Sri Lanka Tamils in Parliament yet are considered to be marionettes faithfully echoing the current views of the LTTE who have not resiled from their ultimate objective which is the establishment of a separate State encompassing at a minimum the Northern and Eastern provinces of the Island. Accordingly, unless the LTTE ceases to be an effective force that can determine the course of events, no political proposal that does not advance the establishment of a separate State is ever likely to succeed because of LTTE opposition

Among the problems of determining the nature, extent or size of the geographical area ( i.e. territorial units) to which powers are sought to be assigned under the new constitutional arrangements the foremost question that one needs to take note of is the foundational character of Sri Lanka as a Sovereign State. This is important for reasons which may not appear obvious at first sight, but which may come to the forefront in later years in the event that power sharing does not prove to be a satisfactory remedy and breaks down and the secessionist movement is revived, with a threatened break-up of the State, along territorial cum ethnic fault lines. In the event of such a breakdown the immediate historical antecedents of the territory become relevant though not conclusive in determining the new boundaries following upon such a change, as was seen in the case of the break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (The Badinter Arbitration). It may be argued that the Yugoslav breakup is not an applicable precedent because the constituent states that came together to form the federation with the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires were distinct entities that were aggregated whereas the Northern and Eastern Provinces did not form an independent state in Sri Lankan history, though the Sinhala Kingdoms lost control some of these areas at various times following invasions and rebellions. But the formation of a federation and even more a confederation in the midst of secessionist tendencies makes Sri Lanka more vulnerable to a break-up.

In essence there is a fundamental difference between a State that at all relevant times has been and has maintained the character of a single sovereign state and one which has historically come into existence from being formed by disparate entities that were enjoying independence,

and have come together through annexation or by voluntary agreement to form a new State. In the former case i.e. a pre-existent single state which adopts a scheme of sub-division of territory for purposes of governmental administration and the grant of autonomy to such units for specific purposes, the process of state formation is one of disaggregation of a single entity. In the latter case where separate entities enjoying degrees of independence come together to form a union, the process is one of aggregation of what were hitherto separate entities. Since in the latter case it is a decision which in most cases is taken voluntarily, influenced by considerations of self interest the resultant union is conditional and contingent upon the original motivating considerations continuing to remain valid. In other words, it has been argued that there is an inherent and implied reservation on the part of such joining units which claim a reserved right of secession or separation from the metropolitan state and there is an implied right to exit from the union, if the underlying bases or assumptions later turn out to be no longer true or operative. The case would be quite different when there is a voluntary democratic decision taken by a State which has been at all material times a pre-existent unity and a single state which decides to provide for purposes of internal administration or the grant of autonomy subdivision into territorial units. In such a case there is no moral or legitimate claim to break up the territorial integrity of the State

In the latter case the internal division for the purposes of implementing the constitutional scheme does not automatically entail a loss of sovereignty over the whole territory which has adopted internal sub division for improved governance. The demarcation of internal boundaries of units within a state for the better realization of sectional interests or regional welfare and for the more efficient achievement of diverse objectives ought not in themselves to affect the territorial integrity of the State. In certain circumstances however the strident expression of ethnic consciousness of a dominant group within such a territorial unit despite the limited purpose of such division, may give rise to apprehensions of secession and promote fissiparous tendencies. The existence of such harmful tendencies may warrant caution on the part of the political leadership in the grant of powers that would be advantageous for self rule within that territorial unit and would warrant the imposition of controls that inhibit such centrifugal trends. On the other hand if trust and confidence be generated in relation to the centre and the periphery national solidarity and national integration is likely in the course of time to be strengthened. But it would be unrealistic and plainly irresponsible on the part of the State to be unmindful of such pernicious tendencies that have not completely disappeared, but remain latent, given the decades of long conflict. In such a situation a conservative approach in the grant of autonomy would be justified and wise in the circumstances and should not be interpreted as mere selfishness and niggardliness in the grant of powers, because even if the powers granted are later found to be excessive their withdrawal would be near impossible and would be strongly opposed and is likely to be the subject of international criticism.

Having regard to the likelihood of such negative tendencies continuing for some time in the Country after an inter-necine conflict, in the event of a substantial devolution of power it would be prudent to introduce checks and balances into the constitutional scheme to avert such a breakup of the State. Unfortunately such cautious measures are interpreted by critics as a reluctance to part with power. In deciding on the area of authority the Government may think it prudent to scale down the area of control for the unit so as to ensure that the centre can effectively intervene in the interests of national security and decide on the sanctions and penalties that ought to be imposed in respect of violations of legal provisions and the abuse or misuse of powers. There should be a clear understanding that there would be a withdrawal of powers by the Central government if the trust is violated or the freedom of action allowed to an autonomous unit is abused. In other words, the terms of the grant would have to be conditional and contingent upon the proper exercise of these powers and the penalty of withdrawal and dissolution of the Constitution should automatically follow if the trust is violated.

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It has also to be borne in mind that in the determination of the size and the location or situation of the territorial unit vis a vis other units, the likelihood of such disintegrative tendencies being fostered or encouraged are relevant. In other words boundary lines must be so designed that they would not intrinsically or inherently by their very nature, be conducive to separation or otherwise provide an incentive to secession. Indeed to a shrewd observer of the workings of real politique the adoption of the province instead of the district as the unit would then make the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces seem more plausible and capable of achievement with substantial external pressure which is evident even now. The cry then would be: if merger comes can Eelam be for behind? (vide the comments of LTTE Advisers Professor Sornarajah and Dr. Rudrakumaran at a Conference in Paris). Likewise, similar considerations would need to be borne in mind in deciding on the nature of the subjects and functions to be assigned to the territorial unit to which autonomy is sought to be granted.

If the rationale for the grant of autonomy is the achievement of a greater democratisation, a recognition of the principle of subsidiarity and a wider and more effective opportunity for peoples’ participation in the working of government through the articulation, practical realisation and actualisation of the needs of the people, then it seems clear that the more appropriate territorial unit that would effectively cater to such objectives is the administrative district that was adopted as best suited for administrative purposes in 1955, rather than a relapse to the colonial demarcation of the boundaries of Provinces that was appropriate to conditions of the 19th Century mainly for the collection of revenue and served the imperial interests of government. While the adoption of the Province as the unit of devolved powers today may suit the dispensation of political patronage to supporters and the exercise of influence and authority by the political elite, it would not benefit or suit the needs of those who ought to be the real beneficiaries of decentralised political power. Decision-making and administration ought to be within the control and influence of the residents of the territory and their interests are clearly better served by adopting the district as the territorial unit for the grant of such autonomy.

The linkage between such a unit of administration and a democratically elected policy-making body in regard to matters that significantly affect the day-to-day lives of people seems obvious enough. The influence that electors can bring to bear on a smaller body dependent on local support rather than a larger one which is likely to be less sensitive to local interests also seems clear. The opportunities for direct participation in decision making, through lobby groups, civil society organisations in local affairs brings government closer to the people in matters which are exclusively assigned to such a body composed of representatives of the district.

The adoption of the province as the territorial unit for devolution of power by the 13th Amendment in 1987 on a uniform basis throughout the Country was of a precipitate decision taken without due consideration or proper debate and no rational justification was offered for the change from the district as the appropriate unit to the province which had earlier received a large measure of acceptance from political parties that participated in the All Party Conference. The Government of the day (the J.R. Jayewardene Administration) slided into an acceptance of the new proposal to make the province as the unit of devolution under relentless pressure from the Indian Government without sufficiently appreciating the hidden dangers to the territorial integrity of the State inherent in vesting governmental powers in such a large unit, with no lack of agitators thirsting for separation. The dangers may not have seemed obvious as the envisaged division was symmetrical in form applicable uniformly to the rest of the country as well, with no obvious suggestion of favoured treatment of any one group and presumably the safeguards against secession were considered adequate enough and not treated with sufficient seriousness. As is well-known the Government of President Jayewardene eventually succumbed to Indian Government pressure to agree to a merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, as India believed that it was a sufficient incentive or bribe to secure the LTTE’s acceptance of the proposals embodied in the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. It has little or no claim to legitimacy considering that India had failed to fulfil the corresponding and contingent obligations it had undertaken to disarm the LTTE thereunder, for an inordinately prolonged period of time.

Considering the intermittent genocidal forays into Sinhala and Muslim villages in the Eastern Province and the periodical ethnic cleansing that has gone on for many years a merger of the two provinces if revived would be a disaster. The recent attempts to disrupt and destabilise civic life were thwarted when the LTTE sought to interfere with basic rights of thousands of people residing in these areas. This was seen over the regulation of water flow along the Mawil Aru, not to mention the threats to the defence of the State through the attempted control of Trincomalee harbour. It raises questions in regard to the feasibility and wisdom of entrusting functions that are vital to the life of the community in a mixed population of almost equal proportions as in the Eastern Province even with Central Government oversight.

There is a considerable amount of well-researched material in works of scholarship of social scientists, anthropologists, historians, geographers, cartographers archaeologists and epigraphists which negate and contradict the claims made by certain political parties and their fellow-travelers who have propounded the theory ( partly inspired by sentimental memories and emotional ties with the Peninsula and partly designed for political mobilisation and territorial aggrandisement) that the Northern and Eastern Provinces constitute “the traditional Tamil homeland” on the basis of which they seek to assert a historic title to this extent of territory as the foundation of the claim for a separate State. There has however been no convincing or effective response to the objections of the Sinhala majority which contradict and refute the claims so advanced and reject it as a latter day myth and fabrication of politicians to support the claim for establishment of a separate State. It is unnecessary for the present purpose to recapitulate them here.

Conscious of these infirmities in establishing the territorial claim on a normative basis, Tamil political parties have sought to overcome this difficulty by pre-empting all contra arguments and asserting that the demand is one which is non-negotiable as though it was a self-evident and axiomatic truth. The same approach is evident in its recent articulation by Dr. Rohan Edirisingha – viz. that it has the status of “an article of faith”, a theological concept which affirms an unshakable belief in something without the need for proof or evidence -suggestive of a new kind of fundamentalism which all true believers of Tamil nationalism would be required to accept on the threat of diverse pains and penalties. It is an arbitrary way of foreclosing argument in advancing the case for secession. One is reminded of the story of the old lady who silenced a troublesome interlocutor with the words: “I am thoroughly convinced, don’t confuse me with the facts.”

If one were to delve into this question more deeply it would become obvious that the true ground of opposition to adopting the district (and not the province) as the appropriate unit is that the choice of the former would be an initial impediment to the creation of a mono ethnic enclave encompassing the Northern and Eastern Provinces as a single territorial entity. If the Province were to be recognized as the unit for granting governmental powers then it would be a short step in the process to press on with the demand for a merger of these two contiguous Provinces ( with some external pressure) as a single territorial entity. Once that is secured, the State of Eelam would be within sniffing distance and with an armed group ensconced in the seats of power in the merged territory comprising one third of the land mass that constitutes the State of Sri Lanka and the rights appurtenant to the control of this territory, the sequence of events that would follow is not hard to imagine. To imagine that the LTTE would adhere to the niceties of constitutional government and act in accordance with the restraints and limitations imposed on it by the Constitution is to live in a dream world, having regard to its record of over 5000 violations of the Cease Fire Agreement. Yet the peace lobby and the NGO enthusiasts and fellow travelers would continue to plead for more and more appeasement, regardless of the consequences.

The provision in a constitutional document of prohibitions against promoting and furthering secession and prescribing penalties and sanctions against their contravention would be as fruitless an exercise as relying on paper tigers as a defence. They would prove to be ineffective and inadequate to meet the challenges from tigers of flesh and blood. A surer safeguard against secession is to build into the constitutional structure devices for surveillance and control as part of the machinery that provide for the disposal and dissemination of power, create organic incapacities in the exercise of powers against the abuse and misuse of such powers to prevent and control any advancement towards the creation of a separate state, which the government security forces have striven to prevent for over a quarter of a century.

Far from bemoaning the cautious approach that characterizes the constitutional proposals of the SLFP, I am sure that there would be many in that Party and outside it, who would heave a sigh of relief that the large number of trusting and guileless members among them have at long last ceased to be enticed and entranced by the band of Pied Pipers who were leading them to Eelam!

In conclusion, may I add a word of explanation as to why the Minority Report of the Panel of Experts did not recommend a reversion to the district as the first tier of territorial units for power sharing. In fact I had submitted a paper advocating the district as the appropriate unit on practically the same lines as argued in this article. But the majority without stating any rational ground were opposed to it and I was persuaded by some of my colleagues not to press the same in order to reach a consensus which unfortunately did not materialize. I remain convinced that the administrative districts that now exist with suitable adjustments in the demarcation of boundaries, taking in to account the changes which have taken place since 1955 are the most suitable territorial units for power sharing with the Centre and would commend is adoption.
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The writer is an eminent Constitutional lawyer and serves on the APRC panel of experts.This article first appeared in “The Island”.
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Related: The voice of conscience: (In response to “Determining the appropriate territorial units for the grant of internal autonomy in Sri Lanka” by H. L. de Silva.)