Introduction

Relations between people of the different ethnic groups are crucial to maintain stability in the world of today. History tells us human activities and connections to secure resources create more tensions than harmony. Also, the politicization of ethnic relations in divided societies generates conflict and ethnic civil war. Sri Lanka’s six decades old ethnic conflict which led the island to the gruesome civil war between the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese is one of classic examples of politicization of ethnic relations. This essay, however, would attempt to examine relations between the Tamils and the Muslims of Sri Lanka, particularly the Eastern Muslims to explore possibilities to build a unity between these mutually suspecting groups.

The Sinhalese people who are predominantly Buddhist are the major ethnic group in Sri Lanka. They cover some 82 percent of the population and are migrants who arrived from North India as early as around 500BC.

The Sri Lankan Tamils, who are mainly Hindus, are the largest ethnic minority in the country. They composed 12.7 percent of the population in 1981. Sri Lankan Tamils immigrated to the island from South India. The Tamil elements in Sri Lanka drastically improved with the arrival of the Indian Tamils or up-country Tamils largely in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to work in the British-owned estates as workers: first for the coffee and then later for the tea and rubber estates in the highlands. By 1921, Indian Tamils shared 13.4 per cent among the total Tamil population of 24.8 in Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lanka Muslims or Moors, who practice Islam and speak Tamil, are another significant section of the minority in Sri Lanka. Muslims, who trace their ancestral roots in seafaring Arab merchants, prefer to be recognized by their religious and cultural identity. They constitute 7.9 percent of the island’s total population in 2001. They live throughout the island “in small communities,” and maintain smooth ethnic cohabitation with the Sinhalese for some obvious political and trade objectives. However, Sri Lankan Muslims claim majority in Amparai district of Eastern province, and regularly develop social and political tensions with the Tamils of the East. Muslims of the North and East became regular victims of ethnic instability that generated ethnic civil war between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Sri Lankan Muslims of the North and East now claim that they have some special problems. For this reason, they seek solutions for their grievances.

Tamil-Muslim Divide

The process of the modernization brings both progress and violence in deeply divided societies. Such a social condition could occur through the politicization of ethnic relations. The politicization of ethnic relations can ruin the unity among the ethnic groups at massed level, particularly among the low-income masses. The politicization of ethnic relations to gain a power can generate deep disharmony between the different groups and possibly violence if the trend continues unimpeded for political purposes.

Outbidding the opponents along ethnic lines could be one of the profitable strategies to win votes in societies. In Sri Lanka, politicians emotionalize ethnic relations. There was a trend in the Sinhala political establishment in Sri Lanka since S.W. R. D. Bandaranaike to effectively ethnicize the political system and relations between the different ethnic groups, to outbid the opponents on anti-Tamil platform. Sinhalese politicization of ethnic emotions by the Southern parties of Sri Lanka failed the country and it eventually drove the Tamils and the Sinhalese into grisly ethnic civil war.

The Muslim masses of Sri Lanka, in fact, caught between these deeply hated ethnic groups by war. The political establishment of the Muslims supports the Sinhala political leaders for political and commercial purposes. This led them to vigorously oppose to the Tamil demand of self-autonomy in the combined North and East and to support successive Sinhalese-dominated governments’ military actions against the Tamils. Roughly 25% of Muslims of Sri Lanka live in the pockets of the Tamil dominated North and East, where the Tamils have been confronting the Sri Lanka’s Sinhala dominated military. The point is that the political aspirations of the Hindu Tamils have not always had approval from Muslims of Sri Lanka, particularly Muslims of the east whose economy is, by and large, tied to land and put considerable interests in seeking a government jobs.

Muslims have their own concerns and issues pertaining to their identity and security. A notable feature of the Tamil-Muslim relations in contemporary Sri Lanka, according to McGilvray, is Muslim desire to develop a non-Tamil identity based on Islam, a religion which strictly calls obedient only to Allah, a profound emotional message that relentlessly resists any forms of obedience to all other human and spiritual powers.

Muslims’ decision to seek own identity based on the Islamic religion triggered Tamil anger, but the Muslims primarily blame the Tamils for their interests in non-Tamil identity: the Tamil threat for the Muslim existence cited as the key factor. This, as a matter of fact, goes back to the period of Ponnambalam Ramanathan. P. Ramanathan attempted to assimilate the Muslims into the wider Tamil community, arguing Muslims are but Tamils converted to Islam. This led to the historic Ramanathan-Azeez debate in which the latter using their mythical Arabic ancestral, argued that the Moors of Ceylon were of Arab origin and therefore racially distinct from the Tamils who claimed to originate from South India. Also, the political positions of Muslim elites concerning their interests and aspirations directed the Muslims, who speak Tamil, to develop their own identity as a distinct ethnic group based on the Islamic faith.

Above and beyond, Muslims have nurtured certain fears that in a unified north and eastern province or ethnic Tamil state aspire by the Tamil nationalists would not protect the interests of the Muslims of the North and East. This shows the way for what I call the security crisis. The security crisis of the Muslims has dramatically shaped the Muslim preferences toward the Tamil national struggle. As a result, Muslims have changed their preferences and strategies to contain the ethnic Tamils' cultural and political domination. This suggests one key rational for the formation of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) in the mid of 1980’s, when the Muslims also established some informal contacts with the Sri Lanka state forces.

As it happens, no ethno-political group would proffer their cooperation to a fellow oppressed ethnic community when it is systematically targeted by a group that itself is subject to the major, dominant group’s political and military oppression and discrimination. Evidences suggest that Sri Lanka’s north and eastern Muslims do not cultivate much trust on the delivery of the Tamils. This reckoning largely based on the past bitter experiences Muslims confronted from the Tamils: Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan vigorous defense to protect the Sinhala political leaders who openly involved in anti-Muslim violence in 1915 still fresh among the politically aware Muslims. Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan’s support to the Sinhala leaders “has become a ‘racial memory’ for the Muslims.”

[Kids in Karambai - file pic By Dushiyanthini Kanagasabapathipillai]

Apart from this pre-independent memory, northern Muslims were expelled forcefully by the Tamil Tigers, commonly known as the LTTE from Jaffna in October 1990. One hundred and three Muslim men from Kattankudy were killed at a prayer time inside their mosque on August 3, 1990, and wealth belonged to the Muslims is confiscated, particularly both in the Baticolaoa and Amparai districts of the eastern province. All this evidences that the irrational approaches of the Tamil resistance movement toward the Muslims of the North and East was the key component of Muslim frustration, and thus some (affected) Muslim youth eventually embraced violence against the Tamils and joined the state security forces, either as low-level cadres or as informants.

Tamil violence against the Eastern Muslims, however, raises the key question, ‘why did the Tamils target the Muslims?’ One theory argues that the role played by the Muslim political leaders centered in the South could have frustrated the Tamils: Muslims leaders have been collaborating and supporting the Sinhala political class for political and commercial positions and gains. Muslim political leaders in the mid of 1930’s and 40’s turned around and came to side with the Sinhalese leaders, who had direct connections with the anti-Muslim riots, especially D.S.Senanayake, who was one of the prime beneficiaries of Ramanathan's deeds in 1915-17, and opposed the Tamil politics.

In 1940s the Muslim leaders deviated from the 1915 thinking and joined hand with D.S.Senanayake for plums of office and patronage. Likewise, the Muslim political class’ outright rejection for a fifty-fifty demand, which was a brainchild of G. G. Ponnambalam, South-centered Muslim elites’ deep disinterests in Chelvanayagam’s Federal demand, needless to say, their opposition to the separate state demand of Tamil resistance movement, the major thesis of the Vaddukoddai resolution of 1975, and the explicit support for military offensives against the Tamils of the North and East since 1977 have contributed for the growth of Tamil anger toward the Muslims.

Furthermore, according to Hussein, Muslim political leaders “supported the iniquitous the Sinhala Only Act, and the subsequent University admission policies that were clearly detrimental to Tamil interests. During the State terrorism of 1983 a Muslim Minister disgraced Islam by unleashing his thugs in central Colombo against the Tamils. The Muslims of the Eastern Province were alleged to have got together with the STF in terrorist exploits against the Tamils there.” The Muslim politicians’ anti-Tamil policies may help to maximize commercial and personnel interests of elite Muslims. But it seems they are actually counterproductive and contain some solid ingredient to cause security crisis for the Muslims of the East.

Also, the Muslims in the East are accused of confiscating Tamils land and are “perceived as taking advantage of Tamil misfortune,” according to the study on the Eastern Muslims. It further notes, “Muslim purchasing of paddy land from Tamil absentee landlords, buying up Tamil owned shops, the creeping spread of Muslim villages into Tamil villages is part of the contemporary reality of the Eastern Province.

All this could have contributed to the violent Tamil response: “Thousands of Muslims were expelled forcefully from Jaffna in October 1990; three hundred Eastern Muslims were killed at prayer time inside their mosque in 1991 and Muslim wealth confiscated in the Jaffna, Baticolaoa, and Amparai districts of the North-Eastern Province.” And, according to Hussein, “there is every possibility that the EP Muslims will be ethnically cleansed from there some time in the future. The facts clearly show that it was not humanly possible for the Muslims to have gone further in their support for the Sinhalese against the Tamils.”

Why Unity?

History will answer as to whether the choices of Muslim political establishment to cooperate with the Sinhala political class are appropriate moves or whether the Tamil response to punish the Muslims has logical weight. However, communities have to move forward to meet the challenges presented by modernization, and to seek a meaningful truth and reconciliation.

Both the Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka have been facing common challenges and problems. Since independence, the Sinhalese politicians and leaders formulated the policies to weaken the interests and status of the minorities, and to strengthen the unitary state structure, a kind of political symbol of the Sinhalese. There is a common fear among the Sinhalese that the minorities, due to their substantial external connections, would harm the territorial integrity of the island. Such fears motivate the Sinhalese to support aggressively against any power-sharing schemes that goes beyond the current form of unitary structure. It is important to point that many Sinhalese, as Mahavamsa advocates, believe that the entire island is the sacred home of the Sinhalese and Buddhism and thus, oppose power-sharing with the minorities.

Such Sinhala fears help the Sinhalese to advance hegemonic desire to violently preserve the unitary state structure and to weaken the position and interests of the minorities who dare to challenge the monopoly of the Sinhalese. On the other hand, the Sinhala hegemony causes deep security and identity crisis among the minorities. The Sinhala project to build a strong Sinhala Sri Lanka can be understood as (1) Sinhala supremacy in the course of colonization of North and East (2) pro-Sinhala employment and development policies (3) anti-power sharing attitude, and (3) militarization of the Eastern region.

The bottom line is that the minorities in Sri Lanka have some special problems. These problems are associated with the issues of identity and existence, and thus they need special solution. The fact is that the problems of the minorities would not draw some reasonable attention and human solution from the Sinhala political class as long as these comminutes distrust each others and present obnoxious political position. In other words, solidarity and cooperation between the Tamils and the Muslims could mount some pressure on the Sinhala political class to sincerely attend the legitimate aspirations of the minorities.

Toward Unity

Unity between the Tamils and the Muslims is the key to gain justice and peace. To gain unity, there must be efforts to embrace truth and reconciliation. Ethnic reconciliation is a product of progressive efforts engineered by rational forces. And it would not occur among the conflicting groups at the masses level as long as there are no sincere attempts at elite level to arrest ethnic hatred.

The North-East Muslims, who share linguistic and cultural ties with Tamils, prefer to be recognized by religio-cultural identity which has been playing a significant role in shaping their ideas, values and life style, in other words, Muslims desire to maintain non-Tamil identity should be respected, despite the rational doubts of such identity based on religion. The point here is that a sense of insecurity emerges among the members of a group when they feel that their identity is being threatened by the dominant group of the society.

The Muslims of the North and East have some reasonable fears about the Tamils. These fears are based on sheer demography. In the east, Muslims, Tamils and Sinhalese constitute a third each of the population. If the northern and eastern provinces were to be merged as part of any political deal, the Muslims fear they would have to live under the Hindu Tamils of the north.

Muslims also have fears living under the regional administration led by a Tamil chief administrator. It seems that this was the key reason behind their demand for Muslim chief minister in the concluded Eastern provincial elections in June 2008. The Eastern Muslims, particularly those who backed the SLMC reacted angrily when the government of Sri Lanka appointed Mr. Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pillaiyan, an armed cadre of the pro-government Tamil Makkal Viduthal Puligal (TMVP) as the Chief Minister of the Eastern Province. The Muslim fears (whether they real or perceived) over the Tamil domination was one of major fundamental ingredients of separate identity for Muslims, based more on religion than on language.

Tamils, therefore, if they are committed to ethnic reconciliation, need to calm the Muslim fears. The Tamil Tigers demonstrated some willingness to ease the Muslim concerns. An accord signed between SLMC leader, Rauf Hakeem, and Tiger supremo Prabhakaran on the 13th of April, 2002, was reflective of this. The deal specifically underlined the acceptance of the position that the internally-displaced Muslims of the north would have a right to return to their homes as part of the peace process. Moreover, the LTTE’s initiatives such as an apology for Muslim expulsion from the Northern Province in October 1990, and permission for resettlement, release of 25% confiscated lands from the Eastern Muslims and negotiations with the Muslim civil society organizations such as North East Muslim Peace Assembly (NEMPA) helped ease some Muslim security concerns and contributed to build some trust between the Tamils and Muslims. The Muslim of the East can reduce their fears if there is consistency in Tamil efforts to check the Tamil domination.

Moreover, Muslims of the North and East claim they have some special problems pertaining to their ethnic identity and security, and expect these issues should be discussed at the negotiating table by their own representatives with the major stakeholders in the context of core issues of the ethnic civil war between the Tamils primarily led by LTTE and the Sinhalese dominated Colombo government so that viable measures could be made, backed by political will on the part of the Government and the LTTE, to redress Muslim grievances without delay. Since Muslims seek non-Tamil ethnic identity, “they wish to be represented clearly and solely on the basis of their own interests whether or not those interests converge with the interests of the Government and the LTTE, and that is what they are asking for”

The section of the global opinion considerably reinforces Muslim case for a separate participation at the peace talks. Tamil nationalists need to understand the mood of the global community, and thus they need to openly support for an independent Muslim participation at the peace talks. There cannot be a feasible final and durable power-sharing to the ethnic civil war “unless the Muslim community is heard and accommodated in its own right and not by proxy.” Tamil support for Muslim participation could open a new chapter for the Tamil-Muslim relations and radically weaken the anti-Tamil chauvinistic forces among the Muslims.

The Muslim politicians demand for a separate representation at the peace negotiations has an ethnic logic. But that logic may suffer some reasonable political difficulties when Muslims refuse to voice for a political solution that aims to go beyond the unitary state structure. It is highly unlikely that the Muslims of the North and East will win any meaningful power-sharing unit, a kind of Muslim Unit that would ensure administration and security of the Muslims in the region, in the pockets of the north and east to decide their own destiny as long as the Tamils win irrevocable devolution package from the Sinhala ruling class.

Moreover, Muslim claim they have certain fears over the behaviors of the Tamil nationalists. It is equally true that the political choices and position of Muslims aggravated Tamils, particularly in relation to their political leadership as well as participation of some Muslims of the East in violence against the Tamils. International Crisis Group (ICG) publication on Muslims of Sri Lanka evidences one such anti-Tamil violence by the Muslim forces. According to the report, "security forces were implicated in several violent confrontations between Muslims and Tamils. One of the worst was an attack on the (Tamil) village of Karaitivu of April 1985, when Muslims youths, apparently with the support of the security forces, went on a rampage, killing several people and burning hundreds of houses. Thereafter, violent incidents became relatively common between Tamil militants and Muslims. Some Muslims were armed by the government for their own protection but they were also involved in vigilante action against neighboring Tamils, provoking more reprisals."

The minorities of Sri Lanka are at the cross-roads. Both communities face major crisis and threat from the Sinhala hegemonic project that seeks to build a Sinhalese-Only Sri Lanka to advance a mono-ethnic modernization programs. Therefore, to meet the challenges posed by the Sinhala hegemonic agendas, there must be a rope of unity and understanding among the minorities of Sri Lanka. The need of unity and understanding can raise some success through the efforts of truth and reconciliation. In Hussein words, “let both sides acknowledge the wrongs done to the other side as the necessary prelude to the reconciliation without which ethnic harmony will never be restored. Let neither side think of itself purely as the victim of the other side.”

Conclusion: Road to Peace

The meaning of the unity is beautiful, but it would not merely crop up among the yesterday’s enemies. Both the Tamil and Muslim communities, as other ethnic groups across the world, particularly in non-industrial societies, extend strong commitment to their (either primordial or constructed) identity, which naturally combines with the elements of emotional, cultural, and religious symbols.

In ethnic politics, symbols are important. They used to influence the people; to appeal to values; to refer to ideas; to stir emotions and to stimulate action, and symbols can become tools for politicians and ethnic leaders to influence the masses. Moreover, these symbols generally trigger emotional appeals and regularly invite hatred toward ethnic or religious others when the bad elements of the society manipulate them or when the ethnic others represent the different symbols.

Both the Tamil and Muslim groups deeply respect their respective symbols. These symbols works vigorously at the masses level, particularly among the economically and socially weakened sections. But the mission to weaken the bad energy of symbols is not- at- all impossible. Obviously, that requires sincere human imagination to seek a future of hope and amity, energy to vigorously challenge a bad nature of symbols that push members of the group to classify ethnic and religious others as an enemy or bad group, and efforts to seek a truth and reconciliation. In other words, the road to peace can be opened if desire for harmony dominates among the subcultures both at elite and masses level.

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