Foiled attempts and bad faith

Early attempts to settle the ethnic issue before it escalated to a vicious conflict were foiled by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. With the rise in the politics of power, the main political parties were sensitive to the whims and concerns of the ethnic Sinhala majority. As mentioned by ‘The Island’ columnist Shanie (9 August 2008 – ‘The Travails of being a Tamil’), it could have been solved in 1956 and 1965 and again in 1977 at much less cost. An opportunity arose in 1983 - at the time of annexure C when India intervened following the anti-Tamil pogrom and later in 2000 when President Chandrika Kumaratunga presented her constitutional proposals. All the opportunities were not grabbed for political expediency, ignoring the consequences to the future well-being and unity of the nation.

However, it was a clear case of deception in 1977. The UNP election manifesto very clearly stated that the Tamils have real problems and these need to be addressed speedily and justly. It also specifically mentioned some of them. Soon after gaining the unprecedented five-sixth majority seats at the poll with the support of the Tamil voters, their problems were dumped. The then UNP leader, JR Jayewardena had the power and the means to get parliamentary approval for remedial actions but he opted to ignore the Tamil grievances. The cruel ‘punishment’ meted out to Tamils after the 1977 election victory was shocking. Violent mob attacks against innocent Tamil civilians occurred periodically since 1977 culminating in the July 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom.

[Merchants return to their burned out businesses in the Pettha area of downtown Colombo, Sri Lanka on Aug. 1, 1983, to see what can be salvaged following a week of rioting-pic: AP photo via Yahoo! News]

Dew Gunasekara, a Minister in the present UPFA coalition government and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka in his recent newspaper articles explaining why the Black July is unforgettable, said: “Mystery prevails how under such a Government with sympathy and goodwill of the minorities, communal disturbances erupted within a few months of it being installed in power. …1981 witnessed the burning of the Jaffna Library with 94,000 books and the dirtiest ever the District Development Council Election. On July 23 with the bodies of 13 soldiers having been brought to a single place for cremation in Borella, emotions were allowed to run high for the eruption of virulence and violence unprecedented in our recent history”. This was certainly a case of exploiting the tragic event for political advantage. Quoting Regi Siriwardena, Shanie has said: “In the entire course of the ethnic conflict, the vast majority of the Sinhalese and Tamil people were deceived regarding the realities of the political situation” and this seems to be the case even now.

Destined to fail ‘peace talks’

The ‘peace talks’ between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government that followed the February 2002 cease-fire agreement (CFA) collapsed early, while the ceasefire despite many violations by the LTTE held for nearly five years. The nearest stage to political settlement was in December 2002, when both the Government and the LTTE teams at the Oslo round agreed to explore a suitable federal structure. But this was rejected by the intransigent LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran, who did not agree with his team leader Anton Balasingham’s stance. Soon after the talks in Oslo, the latter explained convincingly the reasons for the compromise and the search for a federal alternative acceptable to both sides. The failure to advance the peace process based on the 2002 Oslo understanding also reveals the lack of interest in negotiated settlement.

True, the present constitution has been designed with narrow political and selfish motives, disregarding the diverse demographic and regional features and the long-term interest of the multi-ethnic island-nation but this should not have been an excuse for LTTE’s negative stance on the peace process, particularly when there was full backing of the international donor community to the 2002 Oslo understanding. There was indeed the need for a struggle to liberate the minority Tamil speaking people from Sinhala hegemony but the reckless way it was executed depending solely on warfare was unwise. The targeted killing of noncombatants including intellectuals and politicians considered as a hindrance to the struggle was a costly blunder. Its aim was also detested by the entire international community. These developments resulted in the erosion of the support extended by many countries to the Tamil cause in the aftermath of the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom. The disastrous effects are obvious from the present predicament with no external pressure on the Sri Lankan government to suspend its military onslaught. India’s hands-off policy with respect to the conflict in Sri Lanka is the result of the thoughtless blunder made in May 1991. Until recently, New Delhi was repeating like a mantra - ‘seek a negotiated settlement acceptable to all ethnic communities’.

The Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal submitted by the LTTE, a year after rejecting the Oslo declaration was based on the notion of confederation of two states, which was rejected unreservedly by the Sinhala polity. Although the LTTE announced they were willing to discuss their set of proposals with the government, the latter showed no interest because of the wrong timing and their extreme nature. There was increasing pressure to topple the then UF government led by the UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, who in good faith signed the cease-fire agreement (CFA) brokered by the Norwegian government. The controversial clauses in the ISGA proposal extended far beyond India’s non-unitary structure and lacked realism.

Contrasting situations

Unlike the present UPFA government that is firmly committed to the unitary system which for all intents and purposes is synonymous with Sinhala majority rule throughout the island, the then UF government with the President and Prime Minister from the two main rival parties was not bound rigidly to such a structure. Among the pre-conditions essential for a negotiation process to succeed is the kind of environment that prevailed soon after the February 2002 cease-fire agreement (CFA). The leader of the then coalition government, Ranil Wickremesinghe put his and his party’s political fortune on the success of the peace process. Now President Rajapaksa, who won the November 2005 Presidential poll with the crucial support of the LTTE via their enforced boycott in the North-East, relies on the success of the military campaign against the LTTE for consolidating his standing as a conqueror of terrorism and redeemer of the Sinhalese. He has now the backing of not only the very people and some foreign governments that supported the earlier peace process.

According to recent opinion polls, majority of Sinhalese want the Tigers to be defeated militarily. They are even ignoring the many undemocratic and corrupt practices and putting up with the unbearable high cost of living for the sake of the promised military victory. What an irony; the Tigers did not take advantage of the conducive environment in 2002 for negotiating a settlement, while the present government is exploiting the resumed war for its own political advantage As the Tigers did then, the government now is dodging the political settlement giving importance to the military campaign. The clamour for negotiated political settlement is fading fast. In fact, this now seems unlikely. .

Power of Sinhala nationalism

[Clashes erupted at an anti war rally in Colombo Aug 17, 2006]

Soon after President Rajapaksa assumed office as head of State and head of government, the international community called for a political settlement to the violent conflict that had inflicted huge damage not only by way of immense losses and suffering of many thousands of families but also as a major obstacle to development and general wellbeing of the people. The President responded promptly by setting up the APC and the APRC, despite the past fruitless experience with All Party Committees. Outsiders unaware of the country’s political culture believed in this apparent ‘logical’ approach to seek a ‘home grown’ solution. The APRC process has exposed clearly the inherent difficulties in resolving the conflict because of the prevailing contrasting concepts of nation and democracy. Preconceived suspicions and fears have also contributed to the discord.

The expert panel set up by President Rajapaksa to assist the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) included consciously several Sinhala nationalists. Not surprisingly, the panel prepared two contrasting reports. The multi-ethnic majority report (6 Sinhalese, 4 Tamils and 1 Muslim) focused on removing the underlying causes of the conflict, while the minority report (6 Sinhalese only) stressed the desired political setup of the nationalists, which is the present unitary structure and the safeguards needed to uphold the powers of the ethnic majority Sinhalese. Apparently, these have been considered necessary by them to prevent secession at any time in the future. Having set up the panel and urged it to submit soon their recommendations, the President rejected the majority report because the proposals were unpalatable to the Sinhala nationalists. After the rejection of not only the majority report but also the proposals submitted by the APRC Chairman fusing the two sets of proposals of the Expert Panel, the APRC process lost its earlier momentum and is now regarded by many a farce of no practical use in conflict resolution. However, in the short term it has given some hope to those seeking a political settlement to the conflict, while the military campaign proceeded in full force.

The scaremongering noises that prevented a settlement of the ethnic problem in the 1950s and 1960s when it could have been settled easily within the existing structure are heard once again with the JHU condemning the proponents of more devolved powers to the provinces as ‘supporters of federalism’. In their disturbed minds any devolved system is federal, which is the penultimate step to separation! The JHU’s decision to withdraw permanently from the APRC, because of the attempts being made to evolve a federal mode of solution (via devolution) to the ethnic conflict was communicated to President Mahinda Rajapaksa in writing August 12. Izeth Hussain in his article on ‘State terrorism’ (The Island 11 and 12 August 2008) has said, “the two parties known for their extremism on the ethnic problem, the JVP and the JHU, today have negligible support among the Sinhalese people”. Despite the few seats the political party led by Buddhist monks (JHU) have in the legislature, it seems to have considerable influence on the present government, because of President Rajapaksa’s allegiance to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. There is absolutely nothing wrong here but the question is should this overwhelmingly influence national politics in a multi-ethnic multi-religious country? The right balance must be struck to ensure ethnic harmony and national unity.

The perception of ultra Sinhala nationalists is at odds with the notion of multi-ethnic democratic country with equal rights and freedom for all citizens. They want to keep the centralized Sinhala majority rule intact throughout the island to assert the dominant status of the ethnic Sinhalese. To them the Sinhalese are more equal than others. The dilemma is in finding ‘a just and fair’ political solution acceptable to all the ethnic communities without undermining the supremacy of the Sinhalese. The present unitary structure guarantees this supremacy and hence the keenness of the Sinhala nationalists to retain it. Resistance to devolution (not decentralization) is because of the anxiety that it will weaken the present unitary structure.

India’s role in Sri Lanka

[Norwegian diplomats in Kilinochchi, May 2004]

Norway is (now on paper) the official negotiator (meaning envoy) of peace between the government and the LTTE. There is a fundamental difference between mediation and facilitation. The latter is useful when both parties to the conflict have finally decided to settle it through dialogue and compromise. Mediation entails greater involvement in the negotiation process, not necessarily participation in the direct talks between them. Norway’s role in the defunct peace process was very limited, not to the extent of influencing both parties to iron out the differences. On the other hand, India after realizing the problems of getting both sides to engage earnestly in ‘peace talks’ arranged in Thimpu, Bhutan in July 1985 took up a direct role in 1987 that went beyond mediation.

The late Ketheshwaran Loganathan has explained India’s role in 1985 and the lessons New Delhi learnt in his book “Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities”, published by the Centre for Policy Research and Analysis, University of Colombo in 1996. His book has relevant material useful to understand the problems hindering negotiated settlement to the conflict in Sri Lanka. Both sides have different political agendas which they do not wish to compromise. On the Thimpu talks he attended as a representative of the EPRLF in the joint Tamil delegation, he has said: “The Government of India assigned two senior officials to liaise with the two delegations (Sri Lankan government and Sri Lankan Tamils comprising TULF leaders and representatives of all Tamil groups active at that time including the LTTE) and to facilitate the talks. The Indian officials were not present during the actual negotiations. But, during the course of the talks , when it became clear that it was running into snags, Romesh Bhandari, the Indian Foreign Secretary spent a few days at Thimpu and functioned as a ‘facilitator’ – but, again, was not physically present during the actual talks”.

“The ‘Thimpu Talks’ lasted two rounds. During the First Round, which lasted from 8th July to 13th July, the Sri Lankan Government delegation put forward the set of proposals and draft legislation that had been placed before the defunct APC. The salient features were that the Districts would comprise the unit of devolution, with provision for the District Development Councils to amalgamate. The Tamil organizations declined to negotiate any proposals that had already been rejected by the TULF at the APC. Further, the Tamil organizations took the position that the burden of presenting a broadly acceptable formula lay with Colombo. … the Tamil delegation placed before the Government delegation a set of ‘four cardinal principles’, based on which it expected the Sri Lankan Government to come out with a set of proposals”. It was also made clear that the Thimpu principles did not imply an ‘independent Tamil state’. The joint statement of the Tamil groups at the Thimpu Talks stated: “We are prepared to give consideration to any set of proposals, in keeping with the above mentioned principles, that the Sri Lankan Government may place before us”. This was not the basis of subsequent ‘peace talks’ between the Government and the LTTE.

The very sensible stand which is highly relevant even now is discernible from the joint statement issued in 1985 after the collapse of the Thimpu Talks by the left-social democratic front, comprising the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CP), Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the newly formed Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya (SLMP). The SLMP was headed by the true patriot and visionary Vijaya Kumaratunga, husband of former President Chandrika Kumaratunga. He was later assassinated for his liberal stand by Sinhala extremists. The following is the relevant excerpt quoted by K. Loganathan in his book: “Our three parties are also of the firm opinion that a negotiated settlement would be more easy to achieve if the government and its spokesmen as well as the Tamil and other organizations and the extremists conduct themselves in the perspective of the highest interests of all the people of Sri Lanka and not primarily or solely as the representatives of any particular community”. This is paramount if the settlement is sought on the premise of one people with equal rights in a united multi-ethnic country. What a contrasting situation now with the perspectives of nationalists overshadowing liberal views!

The terrorism which the present government wants to eliminate at very high cost could have been avoided had their advice been followed earlier. Their joint statement also urged the government to “come forward with new proposals which take account of the desire of the Tamil people to be ensured conditions which will protect them against violence to their persons and property, discrimination, injustice and affronts to their self-respect.” This is the sensible approach to seek a permanent settlement but it did not materialize for the reasons mentioned earlier. The case for separation would have been weakened and the LTTE marginalized in 1980s, if in the larger interest of all the people and the entire country the vital changes to the political system needed to unite the divided nation and ensure the ethnic minorities have the same rights as the ethnic Sinhalese and no one is disqualified or disadvantaged because of his or her race, caste, religion or place of birth been made then. This is the sure way to annul the case for separation completely and not coercion.

Having realized the nature of the problem, India leaving behind the Tamil organizations, negotiated peace directly with the Sri Lankan government in 1987. This resulted in the Indo Lanka Accord, the dispatch of the Indian Peace keeping Force and the resultant Thirteenth Amendment to the present Constitution. The role played by the LTTE in opposing India’s efforts to settle the seemingly difficult conflict is well known. It was not LTTE alone, the JVP and Sinhala nationalists in other parties too opposed India’s intervention. Now the present Sri Lankan Government is looking for ways to avoid major changes to the conflict-ridden system that distort the present structure, which is anathema to Sinhala nationalists. President Rajapaksa has turned the political clock back several decades. It is not only the future of the Tamils but also that of the entire country is uncertain. The two main parties must realize it is their confrontational power politics that led to the rise of radicalism.

The Island 13 August 2008 editorial has recalled the opposing stands the SLFP and the UNP took in turn since the early 1980s sabotaging the moves of their rival to settle the conflict. It has said: “Today, the UNP, which used to be a hawk, has transmogrified into a dove and the SLFP, the pacifist of yore, has turned out to be a hawk!” There is, however, a striking difference this time. The dove is in the opposition and the hawk is in the government reluctant to take dovish moves. The LTTE wanted a hawk in the government but this has turned out to be counterproductive.

India’s advice

[President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the SAARC summit-pic: Yamuni Rashmika]

Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, during the talks he had with President Mahinda Rajapaksa and other government leaders when he was in Colombo for the SAARC summit is reported to have reiterated India’s position that there is no military solution to the northeast conflict and a political solution is necessary. In this regard, he recommended the full implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution early and further moves later to settle the conflict permanently. Indian National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan who was also a member of the Indian delegation to the SAARC summit and is very knowledgeable about the ethnic conflict and the LTTE, in an interview with ‘The Strait Times’ August 12 warned Sri Lanka it may not be able to win the ongoing ‘war’ (even if the battle is won) against separatist LTTE, despite recent military gains, unless the Tamils are given “a feeling they have the right to their own destiny in many matters”. Stating that Iraq was a good example, Narayanan said: “What we are telling them is, get the Tamils on your side by greater devolution of power. What the Sri Lankans are not factoring in is the great deal of sullenness in the Tamil man. There are accusations of profiling even in Colombo”.

The implementation of 13th Amendment is opposed by some pro-government parties. The JHU leader has already warned that his party would immediately withdraw support for the government, if it agreed to give police and land powers to the provinces. The JVP and its breakaway group the JNP led by Wimal Weerawansa are also opposed to this move. On the other hand, a majority in the government including the UNP democratic group want the full implementation of the 13th Amendment.

The debate on the 13th Amendment has been going on in the newspapers for some time now. It indicates the polarization of the Sinhala community between the diehard nationalists and moderates, who respect the multi-ethnic character of the nation and the rights and aspirations of the minorities. The moderates in the government have set up a national movement for ensuring wider powers to Provincial Councils (PCs) because of the felt need. Currently, the PC system is useless and a heavy burden on the government budget, as fiscal powers are not devolved. Minister Dilan Perera, a force in the newly formed national movement has said boldly that lasting political solution to the ethnic conflict could be found only through a federal concept. He wants police and land powers also to be devolved to the provinces. He is reported to have said: “We have formed the movement to urge the government authorities to devolve (full) powers to PCs. Our struggle for more powers to PCs would continue."

President Rajapaksa has assured the Indian Prime Minister that his government would comprehensively implement the 13th Amendment. The joint statement issued after the one to one meeting between the two heads of state confirmed this assurance. It is now for India to pursue this matter which is important from her standing as a regional power and obligation to end the conflict. Combating terrorism also requires the elimination of the causes. The previously active co-chairs of the donor conference/peace process still want positive developments on the political front. Having played a role in the peace process, they too cannot remain indifferent now. The coming weeks and months will be a crucial test of Sri Lanka’s sincerity to seek a political solution to the national problem. The earlier dubious argument that the military effort should not be undermined by any move on the political front is untenable now.

Conclusion

The LTTE leader has often cited the lack of ‘southern consensus on the ethnic question’ as a major obstacle to negotiated political settlement. Apparently, he was quite confident that this would not materialize in the foreseeable future. In this case, he seems to have been quite right. This shortcoming is now a formidable challenge to those seeking a just and fair political solution, let alone a negotiated political settlement.

Having recognized the fundamental weaknesses that resulted in going round and round the mulberry bush with the problem for decades, Somapala Gunadheera in his article - ‘In search of a Peace Package’ (Groundviews August 12, 2008) - has suggested a different approach to the final resolution of the ethnic conflict. He has attributed the inability to resolve the conflict to two factors. “We never had a clear policy on the modalities of resolution”. The second one is - “our leaders never had the wisdom, the sensitivity and the courage to handle the problem with statesmanship. In the alternative, they were exploiting the dispute for their own survival in power.” He has hit the nail on the head!

The reluctance to implement the 17th Amendment also shows the basic cause of the national malady. Shanie too in conclusion (‘The Travails of being a Tamil’ cited at the very beginning) has said: “Today, more than ever, we need leaders of foresight and courage, in politics, in civil society and in all walks of life. We need men and women who will take a public stand, as Governor Carr did, against violence in all forms – whether against an ethnic minority or against the weak and marginalised in society. We need leaders who will speak out against ethnic prejudice and war hysteria. We need men and women who will help our country towards that new dawn which will ensure justice and equality for peoples of all ethnicities, religions, and classes”.

The attraction this writer finds in Gunadheera’s suggestion is keeping the active politicians on the sidelines especially in the task of preparing the draft peace package. This is left mainly to the civil society leaders committed to national unity and peace, open-minded professionals including Constitutional Law Experts and an established neutral “NGO eminently qualified and resourceful enough” for coordinating the evolution of the Peace Package. Without naming he has said there are “non-partisan, intellectual institutions dedicated to the resolution of the ethnic conflict” to perform this task well.

It is high time the Sinhala patriots realize that it is the blunders of their power-hungry political leaders that led to the emergence of the national problem which intensified over the past several decades, because of the failure to resolve it for political reasons. The reluctance to reform the present constitution knowing well its flaws and the consequences is the kind of blunder referred to here. The full implementation of the 13th Amendment does not require any negotiation or any new approach because it is part of the constitution which all legislative members and the executive President had vowed to uphold.

[The writer is Former Additional Deputy Secretary to the Treasury, Sri Lanka and UN Advisor, Development Economics/Planning]