The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have mounted a damage-control exercise by sharing with senior journalists details of technical intelligence (TECHINT) collected by them, which clearly indicated that the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Pakistani terrorist organisation, which is a member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) For Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, was planning to carry out sea-borne terrorist strikes against hotels on Mumbai's coast, one of the hotels being the Taj Mahal hotel, which was actually attacked and occupied by some terrorists on the night of November 26, 2008. This intelligence was disseminated by them to those responsible for physical security. It seems to be the contention of the IB and the R&AW that what happened in Mumbai was a serious instance of physical security failure and failure to act on available intelligence and not an instance of intelligence failure.

3. The two specific reports of the R&AW based on intercepts were disseminated in September. There was no follow-up report for nearly five weeks, either from the IB or the R&AW. As a result, the Mumbai Police and hotels downgraded the security alert. The Taj Mahal Hotel removed a security barrier, which they had erected, and the Mumbai Police removed the security barrier which they had set up to prevent clandestine landings. The terrorists from Pakistan seem to have landed at this very point, where the Mumbai Police had erected the security barrier on the receipt of the alert from the R&AW.

4. The R&AW and the IB have their offices in Mumbai headed by senior officers to interact closely with the local police and the Armed Forces units. All of them are members of special co-ordination committees. How come the IB and the R&AW officers did not come to know that the security alert had been downgraded following the non-receipt of any follow-up reports from the R&AW? Did the R&AW immediately advise the Mumbai Police, the Navy and the hotel authorities that the alert should be continued till they receive information that the LET has abandoned its plans?

5. While the intercepts of September speak well of the interception capability of the R&AW, it does not necessarily speak well of its capability for analysis, assessment and follow-up action. Many questions are relevant in this regard: In what form did it report the intelligence? Did it tone it down while reporting the intercepts in a paraphrased form? Did it tell the persons to whom it sent the two reports of September that the intelligence was based on intercepts of telephone conversations of an LET operative based in Pakistan? If it did not do so on grounds of operational security, how come it is now sharing them with journalists? This only strengthens the suspicion that the IB and the R&AW show a greater readiness to share sensitive intelligence with journalists to protect themselves than with each other to protect the nation and its people. To which Ministries and departments were the reports sent and at what level?

6. Unless one looks into all these questions, one cannot say where the failures occurred, which made the terrorist strikes possible. In 1987, the R&AW received a human intelligence report about a Khalistani plot to kill Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister, during his visit to Rajghat on Mahatma Gandhi's birthday. The R&AW officer----of the rank of Director, one rank below a Joint Secretary--- conveyed the information in a written note to a Joint Secretary in the Home Ministry and the Delhi Police. He did not alert other senior officers.

7. The report proved to be accurate. Rajiv Gandhi narrowly escaped the assassination attempt. T. N. Seshan, who was then co-ordinating the security arrangements for Rajiv Gandhi, was asked to enquire into this. He held both the Delhi Police and the R&AW responsible for omissions, which could have led to a national tragedy. He blamed the Delhi Police for inaction on the R&AW report and the R&AW for not realising the gravity of the information when it was received and for disseminating it at a lower level without alerting the senior officers responsible for Rajiv's security.

8. A report in the "Hindustan Times" of December 2, 2008, quotes an unnamed officer of the R&AW as saying that its job in the Mumbai case was over with sending the report to the concerned quarters in the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and that it had no other responsibility since it does not operate in Indian territory.

8. This is a highly irresponsible mindset, which needs to be checked. B. N. Mallick and R. N. Kao, the founding fathers of the Indian intelligence, used to stress on their officers that the responsibility of an intelligence officer does not stop with his sending a memo or a note about intelligence of a serious nature collected. It is equally their responsibility to ensure that the intelligence receives the attention it deserves in the ministries and departments concerned and that the necessary follow-up action is taken. In respect of terrorism, the role and responsibility of an intelligence officer starts from the moment he collects a piece of intelligence and continues till it is acted upon and the act of terrorism thwarted.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai)

The Sri Lankan government should immediately drop charges and free J.S. Tissainayagam, a prominent Tamil journalist on trial for his writings, Human Rights Watch said today. A Tamil publisher, N. Jasiharan, and his wife, V. Valamathy, who were also arbitrarily arrested, should be freed immediately.

Tissainayagam, a columnist with the Sunday Times newspaper and editor of the Outreach website, was arrested by the Terrorist Investigation Division (TID) of the police on March 7, 2008. The previous day, the terrorist investigation unit had arrested Jasiharan, the owner of E-Kwality press, and Valamathy. Tissainayagam and Jasiharan are co-directors of the company Outreach Multimedia. Valamathy has no official role with the company.

On August 25, more than five months after Tissainayagam's arrest, prosecutors charged him under the country's Emergency Regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act for printing and distributing the North Eastern Monthly magazine, of which he was previously an editor, and for aiding and abetting terrorist organizations through raising money for the magazine. He is currently on trial before the High Court in Colombo.

Tissainayagam's indictment cites two of his writings from the North Eastern Monthly. In a July 2006 editorial, under the headline, "Providing security to Tamils now will define northeastern politics of the future," Tissainayagam wrote: "It is fairly obvious that the government is not going to offer them any protection. In fact it is the state security forces that are the main perpetrator of the killings."

The charges against Tissainayagam also include part of a November 2006 article on the military offensive in Vaharai, in the east, which said:

"Such offensives against the civilians are accompanied by attempts to starve the population by refusing them food as well as medicines and fuel, with the hope of driving out the people of Vaharai and depopulating it. As this story is being written, Vaharai is being subject to intense shelling and aerial bombardment."

Human Rights Watch said that the written passages over which Tissainayagam has been charged reflect mere opinions about the conduct of the armed conflict between the government and the LTTE, which is seeking an independent Tamil homeland. The rights to freedom of opinion and expression are protected under article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Sri Lanka is a party. Although the covenant allows for certain restrictions on freedom of expression on grounds of national security, the terms of any such restriction must be specific and narrowly tailored to prevent against arbitrariness and to ensure that the internationally recognized human rights of all individuals are protected.

Human Rights Watch expressed concern for the safety of all three detainees. Since November 18, the authorities have held Tissainayagam in the Magazine prison in Colombo, which houses 140 convicted criminals. Upon his transfer there, Tissainayagam was threatened by other inmates.

Jasiharan and Valamathy have also come under threat. On November 25 and 26, Jasiharan's family in Batticaloa received calls demanding Rs.100,000 (approximately US$900) in return for his safety. The caller threatened that if payment was not made within three days, Jasiharan would be killed in prison. The family has filed a complaint with the police. Human Rights Watch has also learned that Valamathy is in the female ward in the Colombo prison with 110 other prisoners, the majority of whom are convicted criminals. The international covenant provides for the separation of accused persons from persons convicted of crimes.

None of the three detainees has had adequate access to counsel. Police officers have been present during Tissainayagam's discussions with his lawyers, violating his right to communicate and consult with a lawyer in full confidentiality. The three have filed a fundamental rights petition in the Supreme Court challenging the legality of their continued detention.

Article 14 of the Sri Lankan constitution enshrines the right to freedom of speech. However, since 2006 the government of President Mahinda Rajapakse has increasingly intimidated and tried to silence the media, nongovernmental organizations, and others with independent or dissenting views of the government's military policies and human rights practices. Senior government officials have attacked such critics as supporters of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and traitors of the state.

"The government's disregard for the basic rights and well-being of three well-known detainees raises even greater concerns for the hundreds of others detained under the security laws," Adams said.

India’s “secular” political establishment, barring the Left, has relied on a class of Muslim “leaders,” whose own political interest lies in keeping the community backward-looking.

— Photo: AP

Muslims in Ahmedabad holding a demonstration against terrorist attacks in Mumbai. There is now a growing, educated, and politically aware Muslim middle class.

But before the Hindu Right gets into the self-congratulatory we-told-you-so mode, here’s the sting in the tail. The same analysis that suggests that home-grown jihadi-ism has arrived in India also holds that Muslim extremism is a reaction to the way the community feels it has been treated over the years — exploited as a vote bank, suspected as fifth columnists, discriminated against, and intimidated by Hindu militants. The communalisation of Indian Muslims, it is stated, is a result of the failure of the Indian state to confront the “fault-lines in the system” (an euphemism for anti-Muslim bias, and Hindu communalism) that Al Qaeda-inspired groups are now exploiting.

There is almost a sense that Muslim extremism and other violent campaigns going on in India — a simmering “insurgency” in the north-east and Naxalite violence in central India — are a “comeuppance” for a state that has tended to neglect its minorities and the poor. There is also a view that thanks to its image as a “thriving democracy” India has, largely, escaped international scrutiny whereas other countries are routinely censured for lesser crimes.

Mohsin Hamid, an expatriate Pakistani writer, thinks that the West is often soft on India over its handling of ethnic tensions.

“Had recent protests in Indian Kashmir occurred in a former Soviet Republic, they would have been hailed by the world as a new Orange Revolution and had they occurred in Tibet they would have resulted in calls for international pressure on Beijing. Similarly, the tensions in India’s north-east, the armed Naxalite movement, and the slaughter of Muslims in Gujarat all run counter to the half truth of ‘India-shining’,” he wrote in The Guardian.

Meanwhile, portents for the future don’t look good. There is concern that after the Mumbai attacks, the BJP could be tempted to revert to its “default” Hindutva programme in the run-up to next year’s general elections. Among Britain’s India-watchers, it has not gone unnoticed that the next putative BJP Prime Minister is the same man who led the inflammatory campaign on Ayodhya resulting in the demolition of Babri Masjid and the mayhem that followed. Nor do they find it comforting that the party’s next big star is Narendra Modi, who was the Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2002 when the riots took place.

The “biggest challenge” before the Indian government is to maintain communal peace, says Edna Fernandes, a British-Indian writer and author of Holy Warriors: A Journey into the Heart of Indian Fundamentalism. Journalist-broadcaster Ian Jack, an old India hand and among the more sobre interpreters of Indian events, believes it is time to “pray there are no riots.”

Maria Misra, an Oxford historian, has no doubt that Al Qaeda-style extremism has penetrated India’s Muslim community and asserts that “there is evidence of an entirely domestic element at play” behind the Mumbai atrocity. But, she suggests, that it is hardly surprising given the sense of Muslim grievance. Pakistani involvement notwithstanding “the chief recruiting officer” of Muslim terrorists is “often the Indian State.”

“This is especially true at regional and state levels where the police and judiciary are often ‘captured’ by Hindu political interests that have used anti-terrorist laws to pursue political vendettas,” she wrote in The Times.

This was also the burden of an Economist editorial which described India’s Muslim community as a “fertile ground for those sowing hatred” because it felt discriminated and had “occasionally been subject to hideous communal slaughter.” Besides, the perpetrators of the 2002 Gujarat “pogram” had never been brought to justice. The sense of injustice that this bred among Muslims made them a sitting duck for jihadi propaganda.

Nor was the Left-leaning Observer surprised that Indian Muslims had fallen prey to the “terrorists’ conspiratorial narrative.” The reason was simple: the “vast majority” of Muslims had been excluded from the economic boom and though this was a fate they shared with “millions of poor Hindus” there were additional factors that militated against Muslims such as the fact that “they have also been subject to terror at the hands of ultra-nationalist Hindus and have had little or no state protection.”

It is nobody’s case (and all commentators have been at pains to stress this) that the Muslims’ sense of grievance, genuine though it may be, is a justification for terrorism. But if wounds are left to fester for too long there’s a real risk of the infection spreading.

One point that the British commentators have not made but which an “insider” can see is that Muslim fundamentalism has also been helped by India’s “secular” political establishment which, barring the Left, has not only made no effort to develop a progressive Muslim leadership but actively prevented it from taking root. Instead, it has relied on a class of Muslim “leaders” whose own political interest lies in keeping the community backward-looking.

By mobilising Muslims around issues that have nothing to do with their daily lives they have landed the community in a situation where it finds itself a target of Hindu fundamentalists, on the one hand, and susceptible to faith-based militant Islamist elements on the other.

While the Congress is the chief culprit in this respect, it is not alone in propping up self-serving Muslim leaders. The fact is that it is hard to name any progressive Muslim leader in any of the secular parties. Over the years, the only change that has been noticed is that instead of “mullahs” with long beards we now have suave English-speaking Muslim leaders to match the “modern” face of Hindutva. Their language and worldview, however, remain unashamedly sectarian.

But what about the ordinary Muslims themselves? The idea of an amorphous — uneducated, poor Muslim mass as hapless victims of either their own leaders, or Hindu communal groups or jihadis has become part of the secular/liberal mythology. It is a view that is not only patronising but also misleading. There is now a growing educated and politically aware Muslim middle class which does not fit this description.

Only if they could divest themselves of their “victimhood” mindset they could be a huge force for good for the community. [courtesy: The Hindu]

Sri Lanka Government Should Lift Restrictions on UN and Other Groups Now

The Sri Lankan government should immediately lift its September order barring humanitarian agencies from the Vanni conflict area in northern Sri Lanka so they can assist thousands of persons displaced by flooding from Cyclone Nisha.

Government officials and humanitarian agencies estimate that between 230,000 and 300,000 displaced persons have been trapped in a small area of the eastern Vanni by fierce fighting between the Sri Lankan army and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE has refused to allow displaced persons in areas under its control to leave for government-held territory. It has increased forced recruitment of civilians, including children, as well as making civilians carry out regular forced labor in dangerous conflict areas. The LTTE has almost completely stopped giving out passes allowing civilians to leave the Vanni, with the exception of some urgent medical cases. Only about 1,000 persons have managed to flee the conflict zone since March 2008.

“The LTTE bears a heavy responsibility for the suffering of the civilian population in the Vanni,” said Adams. “By refusing to allow civilians their basic rights to freedom of movement, they have trapped hundreds of thousands of civilians in a dangerous war zone, in horrible conditions.”

The Sri Lankan authorities have not released any figures on the impact of Cyclone Nisha in the Vanni region. Local authorities have reportedly been instructed not to release any data to the public about the current humanitarian situation in the Vanni, but credible assessments indicate that between 60,000 and 70,000 persons in the Vanni have had to relocate because of the flooding. According to government figures, more than 20,000 persons have been displaced by flooding in neighboring Jaffna district, and the local authorities have called for emergency assistance, indicating the extent of the crisis in the region. The impact of the storm is likely to be far more severe in the Vanni because so many persons were displaced in the Vanni prior to the storm and were already living in flood-prone areas. Because of the flooding in the Vanni, a government aid convoy traveling on November 25 was forced to turn back, unable to deliver its supplies.

Human Rights Watch has previously reported that the Sri Lankan authorities have detained many displaced persons leaving the Vanni, holding them in closely guarded militarized camps near Mannar town. The government claims this is necessary for the safety of the detained civilians themselves, but the families detained in the camps have repeatedly stated their desire to leave; the government’s detention policy violates the rights of these displaced persons to freedom of movement.

On September 5, the Sri Lankan authorities ordered all UN agencies and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations to withdraw their staff and operations from the Vanni conflict zone, only allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Catholic church-affiliated Caritas, which employs local staff only, to continue their operations. Since the forced humanitarian withdrawal in September, only six UN convoys with limited amounts of mostly food aid have entered the Vanni, as well as a smaller amount of government-supplied aid. India has donated more than 1,000 tons of humanitarian assistance to be distributed through the ICRC, but the restrictions on humanitarian operations have prevented the distribution of India’s aid to date.

Human Rights Watch rejected the government’s position that the forced withdrawal of aid agencies was necessary for the security of the humanitarian staff. The ICRC and Caritas continue humanitarian operations in the Vanni without significant security problems, and many of the most urgent humanitarian needs are found in areas away from the active fighting. The most serious security incident against humanitarian groups in Sri Lanka in recent years concerned the execution-style slaying of 17 local aid workers with the Paris-based Action Contre la Faim in August 2006; credible investigations found that Sri Lankan security forces were responsible, but to date no one has been arrested, let alone convicted, for the killings.

“If the humanitarian community can operate in conflict zones like eastern Congo, Somalia, and Iraq, they can operate in the Vanni as well,” said Adams. “The government’s argument that the safety of humanitarian workers in the Vanni cannot be guaranteed comes across as more of an excuse to conduct military operations without scrutiny than a statement of concern.”

Prior to the cyclone striking Sri Lanka, the humanitarian community repeatedly warned that living conditions for the displaced population trapped in the Vanni were deteriorating and urgently needed to be addressed. They found that the food supplied by the humanitarian convoys has been insufficient to meet the nutritional requirements of the population. There is also a desperate need for shelters, water and sanitation services (particularly toilets and safe water to prevent the spread of disease), medical assistance, and other basic needs. An October humanitarian assessment by a United Nations team concluded that at least 20,000 shelters were immediately needed at that time.

“The Sri Lankan government has prevented aid agencies from assisting thousands of desperate people in the Vanni,” said Adams. “Now is the time for the authorities to rethink these restrictions on humanitarian activities or be held responsible for the resulting deaths and suffering.”

CNN Larry King Live Transcript:

CNN’s Larry King spoke with author Deepak Chopra about the situation.

Larry King: Let’s go to Dr. Deepak Chopra, the physician, philosopher. His new book is “Jesus: A Story of Enlightenment.”

Where were you born in India, Deepak?

Deepak Chopra: I was born in Delhi, but I have been in these hotels many, many times. I have stayed there, so I know the scene; I know the restaurants. I have been trying to get in touch with my friends and relatives, some of whom I have spoken to, some of whom I can’t speak to. The lines are jammed. We’re texting each other.

A friend of mine from Egypt was in the restaurant at the Taj hotel when the firing started, and somehow she managed to avoid the fray, hid in a basement and is now holed up in a room which is right next to the Taj hotel and is waiting to be told what to do.

The situation is complex, Larry, because it could inflame to proportions that we cannot even imagine. It has to be contained. We now recognize that this is a global problem, with only a global effort can solve this.

And you know, one of the things that I think is happening is that these militant terrorist groups are actually terrified that [President-elect Barack] Obama’s gestures to the rest of the Muslim world may actually overturn the tables on them by alienating them from the rest of the Muslim world, so they’re reacting to this.

You know, this is Obama’s opportunity to actually harness the help of the Muslims. (keep reading below video)

You know, there’s 1.8 billion Muslims in the world. That’s 25 percent of the population of the world. It’s the fastest-growing religion in the world. We cannot, if we do not appease and actually recruit the help of this Muslim world, we’re going to have a problem on our hands.

And we cannot go after the wrong people, as we did after 9/11, because then the whole collateral damage that occurs actually aggravates the situation.

In India, this is particularly inflammatory, because there’s a rise of Hindu fundamentalism. We saw what that did in Gujarat, where, you know, Muslims were scorched and they were killed, and there was almost a genocide of the Muslims.

India has 150 million Muslims. That’s more Muslims in India than in Pakistan. So this is an opportunity right now for India and Pakistan to recognize this is their common problem. It’s not a Muslim problem right now; it’s a global problem.

King: Do you think that this is just the beginning, that there’s a potential impact, or more?

Chopra: There is a potential impact of a lot more carnage. But it can be contained. And right now, one of the questions, you know, after I heard Barbara Starr talking about how coordinated this is, that there are militant groups that cross international boundaries, is who is financing this? Where is the money coming from? We have to ask very serious, honest questions. What role do we have in this? Are our petrodollars funding both sides of this war on terrorism? Why are we not asking the Saudis where that money is going that we give them? Is it going through this supply chain to Pakistan?

It’s not enough for Pakistan to condemn it. Pakistan should cooperate with India in uprooting this. They should be part of the surgery that is going to happen.

It’s not enough for Indians to blame Pakistanis. Indians should actually ask the Pakistanis to help them.

And it’s not enough for us to worry about Westerners being killed and Americans being killed. Every life is precious over there. We have got to get rid of this idea that this is an American problem or a Western problem. It’s a global problem, and we need a global solution, and we need the help of all the Muslims, 25 percent of the world’s population, to help us uproot this problem.

King: What does India immediately do?

Chopra: India at this moment has to contain any reactive violence from the fundamentalist Hindus, which is very likely and possible. So India has to condemn that by not blaming local Muslims. They have to identify the exact groups.

And the world has to be very careful that they don’t go after the wrong people. Because if you go after the wrong people, you convert moderates into extremists. It happens every time, and retribution against innocent people just because they have the same religion actually aggravates and perpetuates the problem.

King: Are you pessimistic?

Chopra: I think Mr. Obama has a real opportunity here, but a challenging opportunity, a creative opportunity.

Get rid of the phrase “war on terrorism.” Ask for a creative solution in which we all participate.

King: Is it because the war on terrorism really can never be won because the terrorists (inaudible)?

Chopra: Because it’s an oxymoron. It’s an oxymoron, Larry, a war on war, a war on terrorism.

You know, terrorists call mechanized death from 35,000 feet above sea level with a press of a button also terror. We don’t call it that, because our soldiers are wearing uniforms. They don’t see what is happening, and innocent people are being killed. So, you know, terror is a term that you apply to the other.

King: Thanks, Deepak Chopra, as always, extraordinarily enlightening.

[DEEPAK CHOPRA, M.D. Chairman and co-Founder of The Chopra Center for Wellbeing in Carlsbad, California]

(This incorporates some of the points coming to my mind, but is by no means a totally comprehensive list. I have deliberately not touched upon the Pakistan dimension. I would like to wait for some more details before commenting on the action that needs to be taken)

POINT 2: Induct proved experts in terrorism and counter-terrorism from the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the State Police and the Army into the R&AW at senior levels. Presently, the R&AW does not have any such expertise at senior levels. Of the four officers at the top of the pyramid, two are generalists, one is an expert in Pakistan (Political) and the other in China (Political).

POINT 3: A similar induction from the State Police and the Army would be necessary in the case of the IB too. Since I have no personal knowledge of the officers at the top of its pyramid, I am not in a position to be specific.

POINT 4: Make the IB the nodal point for all liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies in respect of terrorism, instead of the R&AW.Give the IB direct access to all foreign internal intelligence and security agencies, instead of having to go through the R&AW.

POINT 5: Have a common data base on terrorism shared by the IB and the R&AW directly accessible by authorized officers of the two organizations through a secure password.

POINT 6: Make the Multi-Disciplinary Centre of the IB function as it was meant to function when it was created----- as a centre for the continuous identification of gaps and deficiencies in the available intelligence and for removing them and for effective follow-up action.

POINT 7: Revive the covert action capability of the R&AW and strengthen it. Its charter should make it clear that it will operate only in foreign territory and not in Indian territory. Give it specific, time-bound tasks. All covert actions should be cleared and co-ordinated by the R&AW. Other agencies should not be allowed to indulge in covert actions.

POINT 8: The National Security Guards (NSG) was created as a special intervention force to deal with terrorist situations such as hijacking and hostage-taking. Stop using it for VIP security purposes. Station one battalion each of the NSG in Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bangalore. Ensure that its regional deployment does not affect its in-service training. Review the rapid response capability of the NSG in the light of the Mumbai experience and remove loopholes. In handling the Kandahar hijacking of 1999 and the Mumbai terrorist strikes, the delay in the response of the NSG would appear to have been due to a delay in getting an aircraft for moving the NSG personnel to Mumbai from Delhi.

POINT 9: Give the police in Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bangalore a special intervention capability to supplement that of the NSG.

POINT 10: After the series of hijackings by the Khalistani terrorists in the early 1980s, Indira Gandhi had approved a proposal for the training of Indian experts in dealing with hostage situations and hostage negotiation techniques by foreign intelligence agencies, which have acknowledged expertise in these fields. The training slots offered by the foreign agencies have been largely monopolized by the IB and the R&AW. The utilization of these training slots and the selection of officers for the training should be decided by the NSA---- with one-third of the slots going to Central agencies, one-third to the NSG and one-third to the State Police. It is important to build up a core of terrorism and counter-terrorism expertise in all metro towns.

POINT 11: The IB’s Multi-Disciplinary Centre should have a constantly updated database of all serving and retired officers at the Centre and in the States, who had undergone overseas training, and also of all serving and retired officers and non-governmental figures who have expertise in terrorism and counter-terrorism so that their expertise could be tapped, when needed.

POINT 12: Strengthen the role of the police stations in counter-terrorism in all major cities. Make it clear to all Station House Officers that their record in preventing acts of terrorism, in contributing to the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases and in consequence management after a terrorist strike will be an important factor in assessing their suitability for further promotion. Revive and strengthen the beat system, revive and intensify the local enquiries for suspicious activities in all railway stations, bus termini, airports, hotels, inns and other places and improve police-community relations. An important observation of the UK’s Security and Intelligence Committee of the Prime Minister, which enquired into the London blasts of July, 2005, was that no counter-terrorism strategy will succeed unless it is based on the co-operation of the community from which the terrorists have arisen. The UK now has what they call a community-based counter-terrorism strategy. The willingness of different communities to co-operate will largely depend on the relations of the police officers at different levels with the leaders and prominent members of the communities.

POINT 13: Adopt the British practice of having Counter-terrorism Security Advisers in Police Stations. Post them in all urban police stations. Their job will be to constantly train the PS staff in the performance of their counter-terrorism duties, to improve relations with the communities and to closely interact with owners of public places such as hotels, restaurants, shopping malls etc and voluntarily advise them on the security precautions to be taken to prevent terrorist strikes on soft targets and to mitigate the consequences if strikes do take place despite the best efforts of the police to prevent them.

POINT 14: Stop using the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) as a dumping ground for retired officers, who are favoured by the Government. The NSCS cannot be effective in its role of national security management if it is not looked upon with respect by the serving officers. The serving officers look upon the retired officers of the NSCS as living in the past and in a make-believe world of their own totally cut off from the ground realities of today in national security management. The NSCS should be manned only by serving officers of acknowledged capability for thinking and action.

POINT 15: Strengthen the role of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) as a Government-sponsored think tank of non-governmental experts in security matters to assist the NSCA and the NSA. Give it specific terms of reference instead of letting it free lance as it often does. It should be discouraged from undertaking esoteric studies.

POINT 16: Set up a separate Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to deal with internal security. Assessment of intelligence having a bearing on internal security requires different expertise and different analytical tools than assessment of intelligence having a bearing on external security. In 1983, Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister, bifurcated the JIC and created a separate JIC for internal security. Rajiv Gandhi reversed her decision. Her decision was wise and needs to be revived.

POINT 17: Set up a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) under the National Security Adviser (NSA) to ensure joint operational action in all terrorism-related matters. It can be patterned after a similar institution set up in the US under Director, National Intelligence after 9/11. The National Commission set up by the US Congress to enquire into the 9/11 terrorist strikes had expressed the view that better co-ordination among the various agencies will not be enough and that what was required was a joint action command similar to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Armed Forces. Its tasks should be to monitor intelligence collection by various agencies, avoid duplication of efforts and resources, integrate the intelligence flowing from different agencies and foreign agencies, analyse and assess the integrated intelligence and monitor follow-up action by the Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other concerned agencies. Every agency is equally and jointly involved and responsible for the entire counter-terrorism process starting from collection to action on the intelligence collected. If such a system had existed, post-Mumbai complaints such as those of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) that the advisories issued by them on the possibility of a sea-borne attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on Mumbai were not acted upon by the Mumbai Police would not have arisen because the IB and the R&AW would have been as responsible for follow-up action as the Mumbai Police.

POINT 18: The practice of the privileged direct access to the Prime Minister by the chiefs of the IB and the R&AW, which came into force under Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, should be vigorously enforced. This privileged direct access is utilised by the intelligence chiefs to bring their concerns over national security and over inaction by the agencies responsible for follow-up on their reports to the personal notice of the Prime Minister and seek his intervention. If the intelligence chiefs had brought to the notice of the Prime Minister the alleged inaction of the Mumbai Police on their reports, he might have intervened and issued the required political directive to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra.

POINT 19: Either create a separate Ministry of Internal Security or strengthen the role of the existing Department of Internal Security in the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and make it responsible for dealing with internal security operationally under the over-all supervision of the Minister for Home Affairs.

POINT 20: Either create a separate federal terrorism investigation agency or empower the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate all cases involving terrorism of a pan-Indian dimension. It need not take up cases where terrorism is confined to a single state or a small region such as terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir or the Al Umma in Tamil Nadu. It should be able to take up the cases for investigation without the need for prior permission from the Governments of the States affected. It should not have any responsibility for investigating crimes other than terrorism. If its charter is expanded to cover other crimes too, there will be political opposition. There is a lot of confusion about this concept of a federal terrorism investigation agency. Many critics ask when the IB is there, what is the need for another central agency. The IB is an intelligence collection agency and not an investigation agency. The IB has no locus standi in the Indian criminal laws. It collects intelligence and not evidence usable in a court of law. It cannot arrest and interrogate a suspect or search premises or perform other tasks of a similar nature, which can be performed only by police officers of the rank of Station House Officers. The IB officers are not recognized as equivalent to SHOs.

POINT 21: Set up a task force consisting of three senior and distinguished Directors-General of Police (DGPs) and ask it to come up with a list of recommendations for strengthening the powers of the police in respect of prevention, investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related offences and the capabilities of the Police in counter-terrorism and implement its recommendations. This is the only way of getting round the present political deadlock over the revival of the Prevention of Terrorism ACT (POTA).

POINT 22: Expedite the erection of the border fence on the border with Bangladesh without worrying about opposition from Bangladesh.

POINT 23: Start a crash programme for the identification of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and for deporting them. Ban the employment of immigrants from Bangladesh anywhere in Indian territory.

POINT 24: Strict immigration control is an importat part of counter-terrorism The post—9/11 safety of the US is partly due to the tightening up of immigration procedures and their strict enforcement. Among the best practices adopted by the US and emulated by others are: Photographing and finger-printing of all foreigners on arrival, closer questioning of Pakistanis and persons of Pakistani origin etc. We have not yet adopted any of these practices. Hotels and other places of residence should be banned from giving rooms to persons without a departure card and without a valid immigration stamp in their passports. They should be required to take Xerox copies of the first page and the page containing the immigration stamp of the passports of all foreigners and also the departure card stapled to the passport and send them to their local Police Station every morning. All immigration relaxations introduced in the case of Pakistani and Bangladesdhi nationals and persons of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin should be cancelled with immediate effect. The requirement of police reporting by them should be rigorously enforced. It should be made obligatory for all persons hosting Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to report to the local police about their guests. A vigorous drive should be undertaken for tracing all Pakistanis and Bangladeshis overstaying in India after the expiry of their visas and for expelling them.

POINT 25: The MEA’s capability for terrorism-related diplomacy should be strengthened by creating a separate Division for this purpose. It should continuously brief all foreign governments about the role of Pakistan and Bangladesh in supporting terrorism in Indian territory and press for action against them.

POINT 26: The Mumbai strikes have revealed serious gaps in our maritime security on our Western coast. This is partly the result of our over-focus on the Look East policy and the neglect of the Look West dimension. This was corrected earlier this year. Despite this, there are apparently major gaps and an alleged failure by the Naval and Coast Guard authorities to act on the reports of the IB and the R&AW about likely sea –borne threats from the LET. The identification and removal of the gaps need immediate attention. The Mumbai off-shore oil installations and the nuclear and space establishments on the Western coast are also vulnerable to sea-borne terrorist strikes.

The risk of the rampant corruption and waste found at present at every conceivable level and resultant harassment and the harrowing delays the general public have to suffer to get even routine official matters attended to, being replicated and even exacerbated following devolution.

The dearth of competent persons, both at the political level as well as the level of public officials, it could be justly surmised, is bound to be a severe drawback on the quality and the standard of governance in any devolved unit. As far as the State machinery for the delivery of public services to the general public islandwide is concerned, it would therefore be in the national interest and, more importantly in the interest of the devolved unit, to continue having the existing State Combined Services viz. the SLAS, SLE (Education)S, SLE (Engineering)S, the Medical Services etc., centrally administered as there would otherwise be severe shortages of trained and experienced personnel to man the devolved units effectively. To starve these units of such experienced personnel would be to seriously hamper their development efforts. These are some of the critical aspects of devolution that deserve the closest attention.

The vital question of financial allocations to the proposed peripheral units, particularly where basic infrastructure is not developed and where a weak natural resource base offers little potential for development, would be a matter of critical importance. To tap the micro development potential of these units, the first priority would be to develop infrastructure in the vital areas of power and transport to enable the economic environment to improve rapidly and in a sustainable manner. This would basically mean the electrification of rural areas, interconnecting provincial roads with rural roads thereby linking hitherto neglected villages to secondary towns and cities enabling the facility of access to urban market centers, schools, State welfare services etc. Historically, this marked unequivalence has been created by cities and urban centers being the privileged beneficiaries over the years, of investment funds in developing the physical and social infrastructure of these selected areas, to the at times total neglect of the economically and socially deprived outlying regions. The underlying principle of devolution is to decentralise and shift the political power base thereby enabling these economic ‘backwaters’ to benefit by their direct involvement in the development process. To work towards this end, an immense amount of carefully planned groundwork needs to be done if the development scenario envisaged is to be realised.

The deteriorating Law and Order situation in the country, which again could be attributed to widespread corruption, indiscipline and the failure of the law enforcement authorities to curb escalating crime and violence, would pose a serious problem in the devolution of central authority to the devolved units. In such a scenario, one could well imagine what would follow if Police powers are suddenly devolved to the sub-national units haphazardly without due cognizance being taken of the need to have in place an integrally cohesive organisational structure, particularly in relation to the management and control of a disciplined service like the Police Service . This is where the Government will have to act with due caution and circumspection in devolving totally the powers laid down in the concurrent list. These are crucial matters that should be examined carefully and resolved consensually in the larger national interest as well as in the regional interest, if the devolutionary arrangement is to be worked out meaningfully and effectively.

The above problems, although fundamentally enervating by their very nature and seemingly intractable, could still be successfully surmounted if the political authorities have the necessary determination and the political resolve to do so.

The unit of devolution and the extent of devolution, are political decisions which will have to be taken with due sagacity and circumspection, taking into account both minority and majority concerns. The principle of devolution and the unit of devolution have been already conceded by the enactment of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. It is therefore now, a fait accompli. The extent of devolution is left now to be determined within a pragmatic and workable framework. To ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it would most certainly be imprudent to confer powers on the proposed unit of devolution, in excess of the powers conferred on State Governments in India, under that Constitution.

Corruption, lethargy and inefficiency may be replicated or even amplified in the devolved units unless effective preventive measures are introduced to check them.

Corruption is so pervasive islandwide today due primarily to the horrible example set by the elected representatives and the political decision makers. Political patronage nurtures and protects official corruption and often there is collusion between dishonest politicians and pliant public servants. Public servants are often rude, arrogant and unhelpful to members of the general public who are compelled to visit State Institutions for certain necessary official transactions. Fortunately, there are a few key Departments, like the Immigration Department and the Motor Traffic Department where work has been streamlined by computerisation of the work. One is indeed pleasantly surprised at the speed with which one is attended to in these two Departments. I think the secret lies in the depersonalisation of the work, which could be achieved through computerisation. It is indeed remarkable, the way efficiency levels have risen in these two State Institutions which had at one time earned quite notoriety, for lethargy, inefficiency and corruption.

A rapid turn-around of the work ethos in sluggish, inefficient and corrupt State Institutions could be achieved by streamlining and speeding up all transactions with the public, wherever possible, by the computerisation of such work. This should be implemented islandwide with the least delay; as it would prepare the ground for the devolved units to function with greater efficiency, resulting from cutting down delays and the minimisation of corruption. This should not necessarily lead to any redundancy of cadres. The workforce should be re­trained to work in the new transformed work environment. This can be easily achieved through short and intensive training courses in IT for these personnel. The initial investment in computer hardware will be covered in ample measure by the rapid speeding up of official tansactions and by the tremendous goodwill that would be forthcoming from the general public. What is required, is the political resolve of the Government and, more importantly, of the political authorities concerned coupled with the abiding commitment of public servants to do their duty conscientiously by the public, whom they are in any case, pledged to serve!

A Public Service Act to cover the Centre as well as the devolved units

A Public Administration based on the tenets of good governance, accountability and ethics, should be subject to the rule of law. The rules and regulations binding public administration should be legally enforceable. One of the important priorities in this regard, would be the enactment of a Public Service Act. A draft of such an Act has already been prepared by the Committee on Public Administration appointed by the OPA. The enactment of such legislation would go a long way in ensuring transparency and accountability in the Public Service which would hold the key to honesty and incorruptibility of Public Servants. The punitive measures laid down in the law against errant public officials, would serve as an effective deterrent, ensuring strict conformity to the rules and regulations laid down. In this respect, the Public Service Acts of India, Singapore, Australia and Malaysia are admirable models of public administration systems we could well follow.

Corruption at the level of political authorities and the introduction of basic legal safeguards for its minimisation and to ensure good governance island- wide.

There is no gainsaying that certain elected representatives of the people have earned notoriety for corrupt practices including the embezzlement of public funds. They have been able to do so with impunity due to the protracted and byzantine procedures that have to be gone through, for them to be finally arraigned before the Bribery Commissioner or the Courts of Law. The Bribery Commissioner should be provided with additional cadres to apprehend corrupt officials, conduct investigations and launch prosecutions. As it is, he suffers from an acute lack of specialised staff even to carry out effectively the work related to the hundreds of cases requiring further action by the Commission. Furthermore, if there are shortcomings in the law which stymie effective action by the Commission and require the enactment of remedial legal measures, these should be attended to urgently by the concerned authorities by bringing in the necessary amendments to the Act.

Constitutional provision should be made for all elected representatives (including Presidents) as well as all State employees to make a declaration of assets at the beginning of each calendar year. Legal provision should also be made enabling any member of the public to obtain copies of such declarations on payment of the sum of Rs. 2000. (This is to discourage frivolous requests). Non-compliance with these legal requirements should carry with it a very heavy fine.

The Bribery Act should be amended enabling Ministers and MPs to be summarily arraigned before the Bribery Commissioner to answer any charges against them. They should be placed on par with public servants and the other citizens of the country. Under the proposed Audit Act all elected representatives of the people should be made accountable for breaches of financial discipline.

There should be provision incorporated in the Constitution in respect of the above three vital safeguards which are deemed crucial to any meaningful efforts directed towards the resuscitation of good governance in this country. This is bound to have a salutary effect on the proposed devolved units.

The necessary prerequisites for social and political stability could be spelt out quite unequivocally, as Law and Order! It is the inescapable duty of the Government to ensure their maintenance at the desired level, thereby living up to the legitimate expectations of the general public.

(The writer is a former Senior Advisor to the President and a retired Additional Secretary to the President)

While the picture of what happened in Mumbai between 9-21 PM on Wednesday and 8 AM on Saturday, when the terrorist situation was finally terminated, is still incomplete and confusing, certain facts available should give an attitude of the magnitude of the strikes, the like of which the world has not seen before:

* There were seven incidents involving explosive devices----outside the Taj Mahal Hotel, in the BPT Colony at Mazgaon, three near the Oberoi/Trident Hotels, the Colaba market and inside a taxi.

* There were many incidents of throwing hand-grenades---two of them at the Cama hospital and on Free Press Road. Hemant Karkare, the legendary head of Mumbai’s Anti-terrorism Squad (ATS), is reported to have been killed in the incident near the hospital.

* There were three incidents of fidayeen style (suicidal, not suicide) infiltration into buildings followed by a prolonged confrontation with the security forces before being killed or captured. These took place in the Taj Mahal and the Oberoi/Trident hotels and in the Narriman House in Colaba, where a Jewish religious-cum-cultural centre is located, headed by a Jewish Rabbi. Jewish people of different nationalities often congregate there. The centre also has cheap accommodation for Jewish visitors from abroad.

* According to the local authorities, most of the hotel guests who were subsequently rescued by the NSG had run into their rooms and locked themselves up when the terrorist forced their way into the lobbies and restaurants and started opening fire. They were not hostages. It is not yet clear whether the terrorists did manage to take hostages and, if so, of which nationalities.

* The terrorists took four Jewish people hostages in the Narriman House, three of them Israeli nationals. They were found dead when the NSG made their entry and killed the terrorists. It is not yet known how they died-----through bullet wounds or beheading as the jihadis normally do.

* There were over 160 fatalities. The number may go up as the security forces inspect the hotels. According to present indications, the number of foreigners killed was about 10 only--- including three Israelis, two Greeks, one Japanese and possibly two Americans (not yet confirmed ). The terrorists were reportedly looking for people with American, British and Israeli passports.

* Almost all the terrorist strikes took place against targets near the sea, indicating thereby that the terrorists, who had reportedly come by sea, were hoping to escape by sea if they managed to survive.

* Between 15 and 20 terrorists, who came from outside, are believed to have participated in the operation, The kind of local support they had is not yet clear.

* Two of the terrorists are reported to have been caught alive and are presently under interrogation. According to the police, one of them, who gave his name as Ajmal Amir Kamal, is a resident of Faridot, near Multan, in Pakistani Punjab. He identified himself as a member of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). His preliminary interrogation also indicates that the others, who came from outside, also belonged to the LET and had been trained at Muridke, in Pakistani Punjab, where the headquarters of the LET are located.

2. The Mumbai Police, the NSG, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Mumbai Fire Brigade have confronted the terrorists and handled the crisis in an exemplary manner, of which the entire nation can be proud. Their performance has been as exemplary as the crisis management of their counterparts in New York after 9/11. About 20 officers of various ranks, including the chief of the ATS, an additional Commissioner of Police of Mumbai, and two young and intrepid officers of the NSG have died fighting the terrorists.

3.The Government of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and his Congress (I) are back to their denial and cover-up mode. They play down the possibility of the involvement of Al Qaeda despite tell-tale signs of an Al Qaeda stamp on the strikes. They continue to maintain a silence on the role of sections of the Indian Muslims lest any open projection of this cost them Muslim votes. They continue to highlight the role of the LET, but without highlighting the fact that it is a member of Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) and that it has many associates in the Indian Muslim community.

4.I watched with shock and disbelief on the TV, visuals of Karkare trying different helmets and bullet-proof vests before choosing one which suited his build. Here was the most threatened officer of the Mumbai Police and the Government had not even given him a protective gear tailor-made for him. This is a telling instance of the casual way we handle counter-terrorism and we look after our brave officers fighting terrorism.

5.The Prime Minister has been unwise in reportedly suggesting a visit to India by Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for discussions on the Mumbai blasts. One fails to understand what useful results will come out of it. There are strong indications of the involvement of the LET in the Mumbai strikes----either on its own or at the direction of bin Laden and most likely with the logistic support of some Indian Muslims. By failing to act against the LET, its leaders and terrorist infrastructure even after ostensibly banning it on January 12,2002, the State of Pakistan has definitely facilitated its acts of terrorism in Indian territory. By sharing the information collected by us at this stage with the ISI chief we will help him in covering up the tracks of the LET and the ISI before we could complete the investigation. There has been opposition in Pakistan to his visit particularly from the Army.

6.One should not be surprised if the suggestion for the visit had come from the US and the Prime Minister had accepted it just as he accepted in September,2006, the US suggestion for setting up a joint counter-terrorism mechanism with Pakistan. The American ploy would have been to divert any Indian public anger against Pakistan and the Prime Minister should have firmly rejected it.

7.Three of the most gruesome acts of terrorism since India became independent have taken place in Mumbai---the March 1993 blasts, the July 2006 blasts in suburban trains and the strikes of November 26-29. It is a shame that we have not been able to protect effectively this city, which is the jewel of India. Mumbai is India’s New York and Shanghai. Look at the way the Americans have protected NY after 9/11. Look at the way the Chinese have protected Shanghai. The immediate priority of the Government should be to set up a joint task force of serving and retired officers from Maharashtra in the Police, intelligence agencies and the Armed Forces to work-out and implement a time-bound plan to ensure that 26/11 cannot be repeated again. Mumbai has till now been the gateway of India. The terrorists have exploited it. We should make it Fortress India. Foreign investors will lose confidence in India if Mumbai, where most of the corporate headquarters are located, can be attacked repeatedly with impunity by terrorists.

8.The second lesson is that confidence-building measures with Pakistan cannot be at the expense of national security. In the name of confidence-building, there have been too many relaxations of immigration regulations applicable to Pakistan. There has been pressure on the Government for more relaxations from the so-called Indians-Pakistanis Bhai Bhai (Indians-Pakistanis are brothers) lobby. The terrorists have been a major beneficiary of these relaxations. These relaxations have decreased the vigilance of our people. For example, hotels, which immediately used to alert the Police when a Pakistani national or a foreigner of Pakistani origin checked in, no longer do so. According to one as yet unconfirmed report, some of the perpetrators of the attacks on the hotels had checked in some days before the strike and the others came subsequently by boat. If this was so and if the hotels had immediately alerted the Police, the terrorist strikes might have been prevented.

9. In my view, the terrorist strikes in Mumbai had the stamp of Al Qaeda in the way they were conceived, planned and executed. There has also been a touch of the Hizbollah of the Lebanon, the Popular Front For The Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade and other Palestinian organizations.

10.The reported use of boats and dinghies for the clandestine transport of men and material for terrorist strikes on land is an old modus operandi (MO) used in the past against Israel. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had copied it from them. The anti-India jihadis have emulated their West Asian counterparts.

11.The use of boats for transport enables the terrorists to evade physical security checks by road, rail and air. The numerous creeks between India and Pakistan across the Bhuj area of Gujarat enable the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the pro-Al Qaeda Pakistani terrorist organizations to clandestinely transport men and material by sea. Reports that the ISI had planned to use this MO for helping the Khalistani terrorists in the 1990s had led to the Border Security Force acquiring some boats which could be used for surveillance in these creeks.

12.The success of the terrorists in evading detection by our Coast Guard and the police reveals a serious gap in our maritime counter-terrorism architecture. If this gap is not quickly identified and closed, the vulnerability of the Bombay High off-shore oil installations and the nuclear establishments to terrorist attacks from the sea would be increased. Many of our nuclear and space establishments----not only in Mumbai, but also in other areas---are located on the coast and are particularly vulnerable to sea-borne terrorist attacks.

13.The stamp of Al Qaeda is evident in the selection of targets. The Taj Hotel, old and new, the Oberoi-Trident Hotel and the Narriman House were the strategic focus of the terrorist operation. The terrorist strikes in other places such as railway stations, a hospital etc and instances of random firing were of a tactical nature intended to create scare and panic.

14. The strategic significance of the attacks on the two hotels from Al Qaeda’s point of view arose from the fact that these hotels are the approved hotels of the US and Israeli Governments for their visiting public servants and for the temporary stay of their consular officials posted in Mumbai till a regular house is found for them.

15. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, presently undergoing trial before a military tribunal in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre for his involvement in the 9/11 terrorist strikes, was reported to have told his American interrogators that before 9/11 Al Qaeda had planned to blow up the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi. After the visit of President George Bush to India in March,2006, Osama bin Laden had, in an audio message, described the global jihad as directed against the Crusaders, the Jewish people and the Hindus.

16.Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organizations have been critical of India’s close co-operation with Israel and the US. In the past, the ISI had also shown an interest in having Indo-Israeli relations disrupted through terrorist attacks on visiting Israeli nationals in India. In 1991, it had instigated an attack by the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front on some Israeli tourists in Srinagar by alleging that they were really Israeli counter-terrorism experts.

17.The fact that the number of foreigners killed was small would show that the attacks on the foreigners in the hotels was selective and not indiscriminate. Available reports indicate that the terrorists were looking for American, British and Israeli nationals----particularly visiting public servants among them with official or diplomatic passports.

18.The only reason for their targeting the British could have been the active British role in the anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan and in training the commandoes of Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG), jointly with an American team of instructors. The SSG was in the forefront of the raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007, and has been playing an active role in the operations against the Pakistani Taliban in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

19. The terrorist strike has also had an anti-Jewish angle as evident from the raid into the Narriman House and the taking of Jewish hostages there. The targeting of the Americans, British, Israelis and Indian Jews has to be seen in the overall context of not only the anger of some Muslims against the Indian co-operation with the US and Israel , but also the role of the US and the UK in the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. One should be prepared for more attacks in future not only on American, British and Israeli nationals, but also on their diplomatic and consular missions and their business interests in India.

20. The attacks on the foreigners have already disrupted the ongoing tour of India by the English cricket team. it is ironic that at a time when we were considering the advisability of our cricket team going to Pakistan due to the poor security conditions there, foreign cricket teams should start having fears about coming to India due to the poor internal security in India. Similar nervousness in the minds of businessmen in foreign countries over security conditions in India could be an outcome of the spectacular terrorist strikes.

21.In the US, Spain and the UK, the terrorist strikes attributed to Al Qaeda were followed by detailed enquiries to identify deficiencies which made the strikes possible and recommend remedial measures, which were implemented. In India, even though we have been facing a series of major terrorist strikes since November 2007, no enquiry has been held. Unless we have the courage to admit our deficiencies and correct them, our counter-terrorism machinery is unlikely to improve. The public has a right to be kept informed of the results of the enquiries and the action taken.

22.There is a misleading debate started by the Congress (I) on the importance of patriotism in the face of the terrorist strikes. It has been trying to silence criticism of its mishandling in the name of patriotism. It has been citing the example of the US after 9/11. In the US, patriotism did not mean support of the Government, right or wrong. It meant support for all the measures taken by the Government for strengthening the counter-terrorism machinery such as additional powers for the agencies and the police, increase in budgetary allocations for the agencies, tightening of immigration procedures etc. It did not mean silence on the sins of commission and omission of the Government. Electoral calculations seem to be the only motivating factor of the Government’s actions and not national interests and national security----even after the colossal Mumbai failure and the consequent tragedy.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

People continue to endure security problems and restrictions on their movements as a result of the conflict. [Pic: icrc]

The situation for displaced people has worsened in the recent past. Tens of thousands of families have been displaced from one area to another between April and the first week of November 2008.

Because of ongoing military operations a lot more people have fled from the south of the Vanni to the north than from to the north to the east. This implies that some of the families have been displaced more than once. This is a very heavy burden on people in terms of transportation costs, which are very high. People get really tired moving from one place to another, sometimes five or six times. Luckily family members have been able to move together so we have not seen many families separated by displacement.

There are still confrontations between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Sri Lankan armed forces in various areas. But because most of the people in those areas had already fled, there are no massive population movements at present.

What are the most urgent concerns for the displaced and what is the ICRC doing to help them?

Shelter is a major concern at present, particularly in view of the rainy season. Security is also an issue. People desperately need to feel protected. Water and sanitation too are a major concern.

The ICRC has been increasing its response to the needs of the population for some time, mainly because it is the only international humanitarian actor permanently present on the ground, following the departure of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations at the beginning of September.

ICRC teams have been distributing mosquito nets, hygiene items, plastic sheets and tarpaulins, and constructed emergency shelters. With the rainy season already in progress the ICRC is doing what it can to ensure that displaced people are protected from the elements.

What is the current security situation for ICRC staff in the Vanni?

ICRC staff continue to operate in a very volatile security situation because of frequent air strikes and dangers along the Vanni's roads linked to the evolving conflict.

The organization is applying a very strict and rigorous security system that involves notifying both parties to the conflict of every movement it makes. This is done for every working day of every week and when needed on the weekend. So, because the security situation is quite tense and volatile, there are strict rules in place and everyone has to abide by them.

The conflict in Sri Lanka dates back a couple of decades. Do you see any reason to be optimistic about a breakthrough in the near future?

The conflict has been going on for a long time now. The civilian population is very tired and is longing for peace and security that remain elusive. This is what I have been hearing in the last 12 months from the people.

From the civilians’ point of view, there is hope that this will end one day, and that their children will live in peace and be able to go to school and return home, without fear.

For the time being, no peace negotiations are under way. Both parties are now engaged in confrontations. But, We hope that the population will one day have peace.

What is your most striking memory of your mission in Sri Lanka?

It has to be the image of a number of trucks along the road at night, with people scattered about, asleep.

I was leaving work late one night when I came across trucks parked along the side of the road. There were people sleeping on the ground, on trucks, tractors, behind even the wheel, wherever. It turned out that they were displaced people. Obviously very tired, they had not had the time to pick a place where to set up camp, but simply slept where the night found them. It was a sight to behold. [icrc.org]

The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) holds grave fears for the safety of detained Tamil media worker N. Jesiharan and his family in Sri Lanka after the family received threats and demands for ransom in return for Jesiharan's safety while in detention.

Jesiharan is currently on trial on charges laid under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA).

According to the Free Media Movement (FMM), an IFJ affiliate, Jesiharan's family in a remote village in the volatile Batticoloa District, in Sri Lanka's east, reported receiving three threatening phone calls on November 25 and 26. The caller demanded a ransom of Rs100,000 (about $US920) to keep Jesiharan alive, the FMM reports.

The family lodged a complaint with the Kalavanchikudi police station. However, the duty police officer told the FMM the police could not take action because the caller's number could not be identified.

Jesiharan, the owner of E-Kwality Printers, and his partner Valarmathi were detained by the Terrorist Investigation Division (TID) of the Sri Lankan police in March, along with senior Tamil journalist J.S. Tissainayagam.

After being held for more than 150 days without charge, all three were indicted on August 25 under the PTA, and are now on trial. The charges refer to the content of Tissainayagam's journalistic work.

Jesiharan and Tissainayagam were unexpectedly moved from a remand prison to the notoriously violent Magazine Prison in Colombo following a visit from Samarasinghe on November 17. Samarasinghe had promised to improve their conditions of detention.

After local and international press freedom groups expressed extreme concern about the move, two representatives from the Human Rights and Disaster Management Ministry reportedly visited the two men in prison and confirmed that they were not being held with other prisoners.

"The threats made to Jesiharan's family make it even more imperative that Sri Lanka's Government and authorities fulfill their responsibility to ensure no harm comes to Jesiharan, Valarmathi and Tissainayagam, nor to their families" IFJ Asia-Pacific said.

The IFJ joins the FMM in calling on Minister Samarasinghe to increase security for all three, and to investigate fully the threats against Jesiharan's family and to ensure the perpetrator of the threats is brought to justice.

For further information contact IFJ Asia-Pacific on +612 9333 0919

The IFJ represents over 600,000 journalists in 120 countries worldwide

There was scarcely any surprise when the pro-LTTE Tamilnet website of Sri Lanka accorded the pride of place in its news items on November 12 to the unanimous resolution adopted by the Tamil Nadu Assembly earlier, calling for a ceasefire in the island nation.

The Tamil Nadu resolution was adopted solely in the context of the humanitarian crisis that has gripped the Northern districts of Sri Lanka ever since the military offensive was launched to finish off the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It is clear by now that if the offensive is not halted immediately, the LTTE rebellion-over twenty-five years old- would be finally crushed.

On the other hand, if Colombo eventually bows to the shrill Tamil Nadu protest, accompanied by restrained pressure from New Delhi and the international community, the LTTE would earn a life-saving reprieve. However, this appears to be a highly unlikely scenario.

To the politicians in Tamil Nadu, however, the uppermost thought in their minds is that a ceasefire at the present juncture would save Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from terrible conditions. Northern and eastern Tamils have been periodically turning into IDPs over the last three decades and longer (the first IDPs in Sri Lanka used to be those who fled home in the wake of the several anti-Tamil riots that had rocked the island nation, years before the LTTE and other armed Tamil groups began to fight the government militarily).

In his latest rejection of the suggestion for a ceasefire of hostilities and initiation of political negotiations with the Tamil community (and certainly not with the LTTE as clearly stated on several occasions), President Mahinda Rajapaksa predictably maintained (during his bilateral talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi on November 13) his Government’s well-known position, that is, there would be no negotiation until the terrorists were “eliminated”. President Rajapaksa has been chillingly consistent with his Government’s policy for handling the continuing Tamil insurgency in his country.

While Sri Lanka has, since 1983, experienced five phases of war between the Government and the LTTE, this is the first time that the military offensive has continued in complete disregard of the international outcry on humanitarian grounds and frequent diplomatic pressure.

It is beyond doubt that President Rajapaksa has been able to carry out the all-out military campaign against the LTTE in contrast to his predecessors who were obliged to bow to international pressure to stop the war with a ceasefire and get back to negotiations.

It is equally well-established that each time a ceasefire was put in place (after the military had virtually cornered the LTTE), the latter had exploited the period of the reprieve by recruiting fighters and stockpiling arms and ammunition and other essential ingredients and, after ensuring that a resumption of hostilities with all possible consequences could be well-afforded, heightened their cleverly planned violations of the ceasefire agreement that led eventually to a military response by Colombo (each period of ceasefire was also marked by Government Forces violating its conditions with equal impunity).

And thereafter the cycle had kept revolving-outbreak of hostilities followed by a civilian exodus, large-scale civilian casualties and a humanitarian crisis, which was followed by an international outcry and followed in turn by a ceasefire and resumption of peace talks. President Rajapaksa has, however, chosen to break away from this vicious cycle, refusing to permit the LTTE an easy exit from certain decimation and instead has in plain language called for an “annihilation” of the LTTE before peace talks could be held.

Meanwhile, despite its numerically precarious position in Parliament, the Indian Government has steadfastly refused to follow the precedent of interference or intervention in Sri Lanka, sending the signal that even though it shares the widespread agony over the plight of Tamil civilians, it will keep off the island nation.

As far as Tamil Nadu is concerned, the Tamil politicians’ position suffers from a serious weakness. It does not indicate how the LTTE should be dealt with after a ceasefire comes into effect.

The Sri Lankan Government says that a ceasefire would be effective only if the Tigers lay down their arms and surrender.

The history of this war confirms the logic of Colombo’s position since every ceasefire (except the last one, which was ended unceremoniously by the launch of the military offensive in the Eastern province last year) was routinely followed by a resumption of hostilities.

It is only this time that if Colombo ultimately crushes the LTTE, its victory would not be followed after a certain period of interval by a resumption of the war as the Tigers would no longer be there to continue with fighting.

The Rajapaksa Government says that it is then that a political settlement will be arrived at ensuring peace in the country. In a recent interview to The Hindu (October 29,2008) the President said: “The current military operations are being carried out to build the environment required to free our own brothers and sisters from the cruel grip of terror and implement a just and enduring political solution based on the four Ds-Demilitarisation, Democratisation, Development and Devolution.”

It is obvious that a political settlement of the ethnic conflict under the prevailing circumstances can be one imposed by the majority Sinhala community upon the minority Tamil community though all the formalities of presenting an equitable settlement would be present.

With the LTTE eventually “eliminated”, who will represent the Tamils ? Only an answer from the Tamil community can tell us if an equitable political settlement under the prevailing situation is still possible.

So far Colombo and, more correctly, the majority community have not betrayed any intention to build a public dialogue and thereby create the necessary public space to make it possible for a truly inclusive political settlement of the ethnic conflict to emerge. The responsibility for this lies squarely with the majority community. (ENDS)

(Apratim Mukarji is the author of two books “ Sri Lanka : An Unending Conflict ? (2000) and” Sri Lanka : A Dangerous Interlude “(2005). This commentary is reproduced from Mainstream).

In recent years, America’s claim to be a democracy has been seriously damaged in the eyes of its own citizens. Even the most minimal definition of democracy – that it entails free and fair elections – was contradicted by two presidential elections (in 2000 and 2004), in which there was damning evidence that George W. Bush won only because the vote was rigged. The fact that the overwhelming majority of those who were disenfranchised in the elections were Black Americans linked up this outrage to the persistence of discrimination and violence against minority communities in the US. A lack of equal rights, exclusion from the franchise, and, after the attacks of 9/11, a rapid erosion of civil liberties: these were the marks of a state heading towards totalitarianism.

In this context, there was every possibility that Obama would fall between two stools, and at times that appeared to be happening. The son of a Black African father and White American mother, who had spent part of his childhood in Indonesia, the diversity embodied in his physical being could have been a reason for everyone to reject him. For many White supremacists, the very idea of a Black president was anathema. Added to this was his foreign-sounding name, which made them denounce him as not being ‘American’ enough (such an irony, given that White Americans are no more indigenous to the US than Black ones!). Others repeated his middle name, ‘Hussein’, and circulated pictures of him at school in Muslim Indonesia, insisting he was a Muslim: a powerful attack in the current climate of Islamophobia. On the other side, for many Black Americans he was not Black enough, given his White mother, and had not shared enough of their struggle, since he was not the descendent of slaves. It is to Obama’s credit that he was sufficiently comfortable with his own identity to ride out these attacks with equanimity, reiterating his belief in a non-racial nation.

Finally, those who organised his election campaign also deserve credit for a magnificent job well done. Obama was nowhere when he first stepped into the race; even Black Americans backed Hillary Clinton because, among other things, they simply could not see Obama winning the presidency. Thus, the whole success of the campaign hinged on grassroots mobilising of people, many of them young, who otherwise might not have voted at all, and on combating the cynicism and despair resulting from a feeling that nothing that ordinary people did could change anything. It was only after the enthusiasm of these marginalised people had been aroused that more mainstream figures came forward to back Obama. Critics from the Left who suggest that Obama won only because he was backed by the establishment need to be reminded that even if this was true after the financial and economic crisis broke out in the US, it was certainly not true at the beginning of his campaign for nomination. And while it is likely that he will not live up to the expectations of many who voted for him, this does not detract from the significance of the fact that he was elected.

Elections in Sri Lanka

The situation in Sri Lanka in many ways resembles the situation in the US prior to the elections there. Minorities in Sri Lanka, like minorities in the US, have been disenfranchised in various ways since Independence, starting with the legislation that deprived hill-country Tamils of their citizenship and franchise. They have also been subjected to all-pervasive discrimination, persecution and violence, like African-Americans in the US. This has been orchestrated by virulent Sinhala supremacists, including our home-grown equivalents of the Ku Klux Klan and lynch mobs which have periodically been turned loose to visit horrific bouts of torture, rape and murder on minority communities. These people are still very much part of the ruling elite; when we hear Army Commander Sarath Fonseka and Minister Champika Ranawaka voicing the belief that ‘this country belongs to the Sinhalese’, and ‘other communities are all visitors to the country’, we know that our country is governed by the Sri Lankan version of the jingoists who were defeated in the US election. And, as in the US, the irony is that Sinhalese are no more (or less) indigenous to Sri Lanka than Tamils.

That Fonseka and Ranawaka make such statements in public makes it clear that the government is waging a war not against the LTTE but against the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. Special Report 31 of University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) (UTHR-J) reports that many of the LTTE’s conscripts are either very young children or so unwilling to kill that they prefer to kill themselves. In such circumstances, an offer of a just political solution and humane treatment for those who escape from the LTTE’s clutches would end the war very soon and save innumerable lives, including those of the Sinhalese poor who are being used by the government as cannon fodder. Yet the president has repeatedly sabotaged attempts to put forward proposals for a just political solution, and, according to UTHR-J, those who escape the LTTE are treated with sickening brutality: ‘The government in turn confines those escaping LTTE-controlled areas in mass detention centres from which they are not allowed to leave. Those in Vavuniya find themselves in a place of crime and lawlessness, where torture, murder, extortion, abduction and rape are routine and women are powerless.’

One of the main obstacles to minorities voting in free and fair elections has been constituted by the violence of the LTTE, which has thus acted as an accomplice of the Sinhala supremacists in depriving minorities of their democratic rights. Here there is a marked difference from the US. There has been a Black nationalist separatist movement in the US, embodied mainly in Nation of Islam (NoI); and when Malcolm X, who was a member for several years, left the organisation and moved closer to the civil rights movement, advocating the use of international human rights to bolster the struggle for the rights of Black Americans, the NoI leadership responded with public death threats. Shortly afterwards, he was assassinated by members of the group, but there were strong suspicions that agencies of the state, which had infiltrated NoI, were also involved. However, this was an exception, not the rule. Despite sharp differences between, say, the civil rights movement and the Black Panthers, Black activists did not collude with the racist state to kill each other.

In Sri Lanka, by contrast, the LTTE has acted as the agent – in Premadasa’s time as the paid agent – of Sinhala supremacists in their drive to eliminate every Tamil leader of any importance. Those who remain have been driven underground or into exile, or forced to accept the protection of the state, thus restricting their freedom of action severely. Nor has the supposedly non-violent TULF been innocent of such activities. The first murder of a Tamil political leader who expressed his desire to work for a Sri Lanka which was not divided along ethnic and religious lines was that of Alfred Duraiappah, who was issued with public death threats by TULF leaders (exactly as in the case of Malcolm X) before he was assassinated by their gun-wielding disciple Prabakaran in 1975. They were thus instrumental in creating the Frankenstein’s monster which later turned against them.

The combination of LTTE terror, state terror and the violence of armed groups allied to the state has ensured that there have been no free and fair elections in the North and East for decades, up to and including the recent Provincial Council elections in the East. The situation is, indeed, much worse than it has been in the US. If Mahinda Rajapaksa calls for snap elections, as it has been rumoured, it is likely that he, like George W. Bush, will win a second term, given that a large number of Tamils will not be able to vote freely. But, like George Bush, he will then have to face the consequences of massive military expenditure combined with profligate luxury consumption by the political elite, even while the mass of the people suffer a steep reduction in their standard of living. If Sri Lanka loses its GSP+ trade preferences from the EU on account of the failure of the government to achieve the relevant human rights standards, the consequences would be even far worse. The inevitable economic collapse will ensure that he leaves office as hated as his US counterpart.

Prospects for Democracy in Sri Lanka

Despite all these drawbacks, prospects for democracy in Sri Lanka are in some ways brighter than in the US. Supporters of Sinhala supremacism are a smaller minority in Sri Lanka than supporters of White supremacism in the US, and unlike Martin Luther King, we do not have to dream of a day when little Sinhalese and Tamil girls and boys play together, since most of us have witnessed such a sight or even experienced it in our own childhood.

What is lacking, however, is an organising drive which can bring together and energise opponents of ethnic supremacism in the way that Obama’s campaign did in the US. The fact that witnesses in the cases of the murdered five students and ACF workers could be terrorised by the police throughout, without effective opposition from civil society, demonstrates the weakness of the supporters of democracy and the rule of law in Sri Lanka. NGOs, whose personnel depend on being paid to do their work, cannot be a substitute for a vibrant civil society movement whose participants freely contribute their time to a struggle for justice and equality in our country. Until that can be built, our democracy will continue to go down the drain.

Many migrant and domestic workers still face abuse and exploitation in Middle Eastern and Asian countries because governments have failed to adopt measures needed to protect them, Human Rights Watch said today ahead of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women on November 25.

“There are countless cases of employers threatening, humiliating, beating, raping, and sometimes killing domestic workers,” said Nisha Varia, deputy director of the women’s rights division of Human Rights Watch. “Governments need to punish abusive employers through the justice system, and prevent violence by reforming labor and immigration policies that leave these workers at their employers’ mercy.”

Millions of women from countries including Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Nepal are domestic workers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Singapore, Malaysia, and other countries throughout the Middle East and Asia. Most countries exclude domestic workers from protection under their labor laws, leaving domestic workers little remedy against exploitative work conditions.

Domestic workers are also at heightened risk of abuse because of restrictive immigration-sponsorship policies that link their visas to their employers. Employers control a worker’s immigration status and ability to change jobs, and sometimes whether the worker can return home. Many employers exploit this power to confine domestic workers to the house, withhold pay, and commit other abuses.

Authorities receive thousands of complaints of labor exploitation or abuse each year. While most involve unpaid wages, food deprivation, and long working hours with no rest, a significant number allege verbal, physical, and sexual abuse. But many cases are never officially reported, due to domestic workers’ confinement in private homes, lack of information about their rights, and employers’ ability to deport them before they can seek help.

Some law enforcement authorities have begun to prosecute and punish abusive employers, although to varying degrees. In 2008 in Singapore, several employers have been convicted of beating domestic workers, receiving sentences ranging from three weeks to 16 years in prison. In mid-November, a man was sentenced in Malaysia to 32 years in prison for raping a domestic worker, and his wife received six years for abetting the crime.

But criminal justice systems often continue to expose abused domestic workers to further victimization and give them no – or only severely delayed – redress:

• In May 2008, a Riyadh court dropped charges against a Saudi employer who abused Nour Miyati, an Indonesian domestic worker, ignoring both the employer’s confession and compelling physical evidence. Nour Miyati suffered daily beatings and was abused so badly that her toes and fingers were amputated after developing gangrene. During the three years of legal proceedings, she remained stuck in an overcrowded embassy shelter unable to work or return to her family in Indonesia. At one point, she also was sentenced 79 lashes for changing her testimony, though the sentence was later reversed.
• On November 27, 2008, a Malaysian judge is to announce the verdict in the four-year case against Yim Pek Ha, the employer of an Indonesian domestic worker, Nirmala Bonat. In 2004, images of Bonat’s badly burned and injured body shocked Malaysians. Bonat also had to stay in an overcrowded embassy shelter for years without being allowed to work and had to defend herself from charges of inflicting the abuse herself.

“2008 marked a year of missed opportunities,’’ Varia said. “While most governments have started to think about some level of reform, many of these discussions have stalled. Providing comprehensive support services to victims of violence, prosecuting abusers, and providing civil remedies are reforms that just can’t wait.”

Human Rights Watch recommends that, in order to curtail all forms of violence against migrant domestic workers, governments should:

• Abolish or reform immigration-sponsorship policies so that domestic workers’ visas are no longer tied to their employers;
• Develop protocols and train law enforcement officials on how to respond to domestic workers’ complaints appropriately, and how to investigate and collect evidence in such cases;
• Prosecute perpetrators of psychological, physical, and sexual violence;
• Expedite criminal cases involving migrant domestic workers, who must often wait for a resolution for several months or years while confined in a shelter, and ensure they have legal permission to work during the interim period;
• Create and widely disseminate contacts for confidential, fully staffed and toll-free hotlines to receive reports of abuses against domestic workers;
• Create comprehensive referral and support services, including health care, counseling, shelter, consular services, and legal aid.

To read the July 2008 Human Rights Watch report, “As If I Am Not Human: Abuses against Asian Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia,” please visit:

http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/07/if-i-am-not-human-0

For more Human Rights Watch reporting on abuses faced by migrant domestic workers, please visit:
http://www.hrw.org/en/category/topic/women%E2%80%99s-rights/women-workers

The Sri Lankan government should take immediate steps to address the deteriorating human rights situation in the country’s Eastern Province, where there has been an increase in killings and abductions in recent weeks, Human Rights Watch said today.

“The Sri Lankan government says that the ‘liberated’ East is an example of democracy in action and a model for areas recaptured from the LTTE,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “But killings and abductions are rife, and there is total impunity for horrific abuses.”

Human Rights Watch investigations have found that there have been at least 30 extrajudicial killings in the Eastern Province since September. In one recent case, the bodies of two young Tamil men who had been detained by the police on October 3, 2008, during a security roundup in the town of Batticaloa were found on a beach six days later with their hands and legs tied to a concrete pole, and showing signs of severe torture.

The police claimed that the men, Kandasamy Kugathas, 18, and A. Gunaseelan, 26, were released on the morning of October 4. But a family member of one of the men saw them at the police station that evening. A Human Rights Watch investigation found that the two were taken from their cells at about midnight by men in civilian clothing who had demanded the two by name. Since the killings, the police have intimidated witnesses into changing their account of the killings and falsified important evidence.

On November 2, unidentified gunmen shot and killed five Tamil youth at Kalmunai beach in Ampara district. On October 20, three Sinhalese contractors working in Kokakaddichchoalai in Batticaloa district were shot dead. On October 16, four farmers, two of them Tamils and two Muslims, were shot dead near their land. The killings were in a restricted area near a Tamil Makkal base, accessible only with a police pass. In Trincomalee on September 21, Sivakururaja Kurukkal, chief priest of the Koneswaram Temple, was shot dead in broad daylight while riding his motorcycle in a high-security area near several government checkpoints.

In addition to the recent killings, Human Rights Watch has learned from credible sources of at least 30 abductions in Akkairappatu and Adalachennai divisions in Ampara district in September and October. Witnesses said the abductions were carried out by armed men in civilian clothes who spoke Tamil, suggesting they belonged to the TMVP or other paramilitary groups.

In a case investigated by Human Rights Watch in Ampara in October, a young man previously detained, beaten, and released by the group was reported missing soon after his release. As in a number of other cases, family members did not report the case to the authorities out of fear that harm would come to the victim.

Members of civil society organizations and journalists in the East have also been threatened and attacked. On October 29, Sankarapillai Shantha Kumar, a member of the NGO Consortium in Akkaraipattu, was abducted around midnight from his home. Although a complaint was filed, there has been no credible investigation and he is still missing.

On September 8, Radhika Thevakumar, a journalist with Thinakaran, who at the time was working for the Pillayan faction of the TMVP, was shot and severely wounded in Batticaloa. On September 10, K. Kunarasa, provincial correspondent for the Thinakaran Tamil-language daily in Ampara, received death threats that caused him to limit his reporting. These and other threats and attacks against journalists have caused the media to curtail reporting on the security situation in the East.

“Many in the East believe that the government has given its blessing for these abuses,” said Adams. “It is important for the government to take action against perpetrators to demonstrate that this is not the case.”